Mr. Chairman,

I am the Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa, an American organization which was founded in 1953 when the struggle for self-determination was sweeping across Africa. Our basic purpose has been to give expression to American support for African aspirations towards freedom and equality. We have continually worked for a governmental policy that would reflect this purpose. We are thus especially grateful to you and your Committee, Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to address you. At the outset I would like to express our full support for the resolution put by Senator Case that any agreement with Portugal for military bases or foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. It is an essential part of the American system of democracy that issues of fundamental importance be decided by the representatives of the American people, and not by decree. It is our contention that the question of the current so-called Azores agreement with Portugal involves critical foreign policy decisions in regard to Africa and must therefore receive the most serious consideration.
The relationship between Portugal and the United States has been almost totally ignored, even by foreign policy watchers here at home, but this is not true in Africa, where it has become a critical yardstick by which U.S. sincerity in its opposition to racism and colonialism is judged - and unfortunately all too often found wanting.

Portugal is the last colonial ruler in Africa - a country of some 10 million maintaining enforced rule over 15-18 million Africans, thousands of miles from the so-called Mother Country, at a time when the principle of self-determination and independence for all people is surely beyond question. The Portuguese government maintains that the African territories are part of, in fact provinces of, metropolitan Portugal. According to Portugal all rights these territories and their people enjoy will be within the Portuguese body polity. The peoples of the African colonies, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, never gave their consent to this union, and have in fact challenged it in an increasingly determined manner in the last decade. After various abortive attempts to convince the Portuguese government of their opposition by peaceful means the people in these territories were ultimately forced to resort to violence. All three colonies are now the site of widespread guerrilla actions conducted by popularly supported liberation movements. The movements have won important victories in the last few years and continue to win increasing popular support as they liberate new areas and establish democratic self-government in these zones.

It is not necessary to prove here that the African population in these colonies has been denied adequate opportunities for advancement. To do this would shift the crux of the opposition to Portuguese African policy from its very nature to a mere debate over the details of its administration. The basic principle being fought for is the right of a people to choose freely, for themselves. The United States has consistently championed this right in its rhetoric, at the same time as it has provided moral, material and military aid to Portugal now fighting a last ditch stand to prevent the exercise of that right by the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.
The Importance of Aid to Portugal

Poverty-stricken Portugal has the second lowest annual per capita income of all the NATO members - $539 as against $346 for Turkey and $4,279 for the United States. It has little industry and is certainly not capable of producing complex air, naval and military equipment. Yet it spends more on so-called defense (which might better be termed aggression) as a percentage of Gross National Product (7.8%) than all the other members except the United States (9.6%). In fact, almost 50% of annual government expenditure now goes to fight the wars in Africa...and it is clear that as the areas of conflict escalate Portugal finds it more and more difficult to find the resources to fight on and has been forced to rely heavily on friends and allies. As the activities of the liberation movements become more and more menacing, military cooperation between Portugal and South Africa has increased considerably. This was to be expected. But the bulk of Portuguese material and military support comes not from South Africa but from its fellow NATO countries, including the United States. Since the early '60s United States military and economic assistance to Portugal has been discreet, often indirect and disclaimed. The United States continued to give some military aid to Portugal, both via NATO, and directly through the Military Assistance Program, under which the United States still maintains a 21-man Military Advisory Group in Lisbon whose function according to General Goodpaster (Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command) "is designed to permit the training of key Portuguese military personnel." The United States also still provides for training of Portuguese officers here in America. State Department figures indicate Portuguese armed forces trained in the U.S. as follows:

**Fiscal Year 1968**

107 (5 army, 95 navy, 7 airforce) Expenditure $120,000

**Fiscal Year 1970**

33 (4 army, 26 navy, 3 airforce) Expenditure $88,000

Portuguese deserters have frequently stated that U.S. army personnel and particularly U.S. guerrilla warfare experts operating in countries such as West Germany have been involved in training programs for Portuguese soldiers.
Reported military aid in the years 1946 to 1967 amounted to $326 million; the figures reported under the Military Assistance Program (M.A.P.) for recent years are small, $1 million in 1969 and 1970.

There is, however, a great deal of mystification about the nature of some of the aid that the United States acknowledges that it gives to the Portuguese. Stated United States government policy is that since 1961 "military equipment provided to the Portuguese under either the Military Assistance Program (M.A.P.) or through U.S. government or commercial sales shall be used only in the NATO area - which does not include any part of Africa."

Yet over the last few years the United States government has allowed T.A.P., the Portuguese state-owned commercial airline to purchase seven 707s, three 727s and two 727 Cs (converted to passenger use) from Boeing, many of the purchases having been financed by the U.S. government-backed Export-Import Bank. The Portuguese admit that the Military charters T.A.P. planes for transporting men and material in and to Africa. Recently, extending U.S. complicity with the Portuguese colonialists yet further, it was revealed that the United States government has approved the sale of two Boeing 707s direct to the Lisbon government, placing no restrictions at all on their use. The use of these aircraft as troop transporters was announced by a Portuguese Air Force Commander, Colonel Costa Maia, in Angola in June, 1971. Lisbon observers commented that air transport would greatly improve the morale of the 150,000 soldiers stationed in Africa. That announcement could have come as no shock to the U.S. authorities who had already responded to a question from Senator Case about the use of U.S. aircraft previously sold to the Portuguese commercial airline as follows: "We presume that U.S. aircraft sold to the airline have been used in normal transport operations to carry all types of passengers and cargo, both civilian and military." (our emphasis) It is a strange kind of semantics that excludes huge airplanes sold for the purpose of carrying men, guns and other equipment to a battlefront from a definition of military equipment!

Maintaining its consistency in inconsistency, the United States government last fall allowed a further sale of two Boeing 747s to T.A.P. with the assistance of a $15,100,000 loan from the Export-Import Bank.
Similarly the United States has also allowed the sale of three Boeing 737s to the Department of Ports, Railways and Transport of the Portuguese Administration in Mozambique, for its airline department D.E.T.A. D.E.T.A. and a smaller commercial airline, F.M.A.C., have an open agreement with the Military to provide transport. This agreement was formalized by a contract signed early in 1970 and reported as follows by the official Portuguese press:

"We cannot but stress the unusual event. The celebration of the Contract by the D.E.T.A Mozambique Airlines and Empresa Mocambicana de Aviacao Comercial (EMAC), who will give the Military Region of Mozambique regular air transport on a charter basis.

"At the ceremony which took place in the Library of the Regional Military General, there were present the Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces of Mozambique, Provincial Secretaries of Communications and Public Works, Directors of Railways, D.E.T.A and EMAC, many heads of services, Officers-General and other high ranking armed forces officials.

"The Provincial Secretary of Communications and General Kaulza de Arriaga spoke of the act, emphasizing the great importance of this co-ordination, expressed in the contract which they had signed."

In a sense then the Azores pact, which gives Portugal economic aid in return for the U.S. base, simply formalizes and strengthens the continuing objective U.S. support of Portuguese colonial rule, all pretences to the contrary having been dropped. But the size of the sums involved makes this more than just a continued extension of token assistance.

Under the agreement signed on 9 December 1971 Portugal will receive: a) $15 million aid per year for two years under PL480 to finance economic and social development; b) a subsidy of $1 million for educational development; c) a minimum of $5 million in aid for non-military equipment; and d) an oceanographic ship valued at $8 million. In addition the Export-Import Bank of the United States undertakes to grant total loans of up to $430 million for development projects in Portugal including the construction of airports, modernization of railways, construction of bridges, electricity supplies, mechanization of agriculture, construction of ports, urban planning and supply of equipment to schools and hospitals. All this adds up to close to $1 billion dollars spread over 2-3 years. Total Portuguese government revenue and expenditure only amounted to $333 million in 1969, the last year for which figures are avail-
able. Conservative financial commentators such as the London Economist have noted that "Since 1961, insurrection in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique has cut the amount of finance available for public investment under the development plan. As a result of the heavy military burden and, since 1963, the stepping up of expenditure on development, both internal public debt and foreign debt greatly increased during the past decade." The regime is facing serious problems in regard to financing the war. In addition the dictatorial regime is also facing increasingly militant opposition internally from the Portuguese people. Against this background, and accepting the generally held view that the Azores base is no longer a jewel beyond all price in military terms, it seems that in signing the Azores agreement the United States has consciously embarked on a rescue operation for the Portuguese. The implications of this are extraordinarily serious - for they may well affect U.S. relationships with many of the countries of independent Africa for years to come. Such an action will inevitably be seen as part of an increasing administration tendency to "make allowances" for racism and colonialism as unpleasant accompaniments of what are otherwise seen as useful, stable and reliable allies in an apparently volatile continent.