U.S. intervention in Angola mushroomed into a major political issue in Washington for a few days at the end of Congress' 1975 session, as the Senate overwhelmingly voted to cut off funds for U.S. covert activities in Angola. The 54-22 vote was a clear expression of the Senate's opposition to mounting U.S. covert action in Angola, but it marked only the beginning of a head-on confrontation between Congress and the increasingly arrogant Administration over the wisdom and control of U.S. assistance to FNLA and UNITA forces which are fighting the MPLA.

Of all the political issues involved, the possibility that Angola could become another Vietnam was by far the most significant. Although some Senators probably did not understand the Angolan situation fully, they could not vote against a measure which could later be used as a Gulf of Tonkin-type license for further U.S. entanglement. In addition, Senators were angry that the Angolan aid was being given covertly, and without the consent or even prior knowledge of all but a few members of Congress. In fact, consideration of the Tunney amendment has already created an atmosphere in which Congressional oversight of CIA activities will probably no longer be left to only a few hand-picked senior members. Passage of the Tunney amendment may create a precedent for early and open Congressional deliberation and decision on future "covert" foreign military operations.
announced that the Administration was prepared to spend another $9 million in Angola. A week later, an Administration official quoted in the New York Times said that "we're going to keep up" covert arms supplies to Angola "despite the Senate vote"; "I'm not going to say how much or where it is coming from."

HOUSE STILL TO ACT ON TUNNEY AMENDMENT

In this highly-charged atmosphere, the House will vote on the Tunney amendment within a few days of its return on January 19. At the end of December, the momentum in the House was strong in favor of ending CIA Angolan operations; Congressman Bonker and several other freshmen collected over 130 co-sponsors for a House resolution urging non-intervention in Angola in the few hours which the Senate debate was in progress (see attached list). We must demonstrate to Congress that concern over Angola is not coming solely from the press or being orchestrated in Washington.

PLEASE TRY TO VISIT YOUR CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BEFORE HE OR SHE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON, AND TO MAXIMIZE COMMUNITY SENTIMENT AGAINST U.S. INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA.

WHAT THE TUNNEY AMENDMENT DOES AND DOESN'T COVER

The Tunney amendment cuts funds in the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for Angola, except for CIA intelligence gathering (which could be a substantial loophole). The Administration requested $9 million specifically for Angola and $28 million in "reprogrammable funds" for Angola (originally requested for other purposes) in the next five months. Expenditure of this $37 million will be illegal if the House accepts the Tunney amendment. The amendment does not affect the $27-32 million which has already been spent in the last seven months, or $6-9 million which is "in the pipeline" - committed but not yet expended.

If the House concurs with the Senate vote - and there is a good chance that it will - it will be a clear statement of Congressional sentiment that the U.S. should stay out of Angola. It is therefore a critical vote. However, it will not be the last vote on Angola. When Congress closed one channel for aid to Vietnam, the White House found another one. The Ford Administration has lost no time to assure us and Congress that it is prepared to do just that in Angola.

There are several possible loophole in the Tunney amendment which will need to be addressed. First, it cuts off only those CIA funds authorized by the Defense Department appropriations bill. More funds could be hidden in other bills.

Second, the Tunney amendment affects only covert assistance; the Administration could still make a public request for aid for Angola. The House International Relations Committee and the Senate foreign aid subcommittee have approved watered-down amendments on Angola to the military aid bill. As the amendments now read, they allow U.S. military aid to Angola if it is openly reported, unless either house disapproves the aid within thirty days (in the Senate version), or unless and until both houses disapprove the aid by concurrent resolution (in the House version).

Third, neither the Tunney language nor the military aid bill amendments deal effectively with U.S. funneling Angola aid through other foreign countries. The New York Times reported on December 19 that the Security Council 40 Committee decided in July to channel U.S. aid through Zaire and Zambia to minimize the evidence of direct involvement. Unauthorized transfers of aid to third parties are prohibited by law, but these violations are very difficult to prove and punish.

Many other loopholes may become apparent, and we will try to watch for them. Now, however, our task is to assure that Congress clearly supports non-intervention in Angola. Then we can work to see that this policy is implemented.
DID US TRIGGER ANGOLA ARMS RACE?

The following article by Oswald Johnston is a reprint from the Los Angeles Times, datelined Washington, December 7, 1975

Last month's massive Soviet military airlift to the dominant faction in the Angolan civil war was in part a response to covert arms supplies from the United States that began last summer, intelligence sources here believe.

Despite public denunciation of the Soviet intervention by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and other US officials, the initial superpower decision to intervene in Angola with money and weapons may have been made in Washington not Moscow, according to these sources.

The precise motivation for the Soviet decision probably taken late in the summer, cannot be measured exactly. But sources close to policy-making levels in the administration believe that a decision by President Ford and Kissinger last June set the stage for the growing superpower rivalry in the former Portuguese colony. "It is a standard action-reaction cycle," one source said. "Now the Soviets have reacted, and the Administration will have to make a basic decision whether to up the ante and call them, or fold."

The Chinese, who supplied arms and advisors to anti-Soviet factions in Angola through the summer, virtually closed down their Angola operation last month, apparently fearing a "superpower image in black Africa."

It is widely believed in the intelligence community that the level of Soviet support since late October has so decisively tilted the balance in favor of the Popular Movement (MPLA), the Soviet supported faction, that only a major overt intervention of a like magnitude by the United States would be able to turn the tide.

The United States up to now has sent weapons to the two anti-Soviet factions in Angola by means of a clandestine airlift to Kinshasa, Zaire. The airlift has drawn on arms depots in the continental United States and NATO arsenals in West Germany. But analysts now feel that the maximum that could be supplied through covert channels would have little effect other than to convert the war into a prolonged bloody stalemate. Thanks to the recent Soviet efforts, the MPLA would always be in the ascendancy and in control of Angola's mineral wealth, but in no serious danger of ever being dislodged.

"The only thing intervention on that scale could accomplish would be to muck up the Angolans" is a prevailing intelligence estimate of a continued US covert arms supply.

But an Administration decision to go public with its military support of the rival factions, the National Front (FNLA) and the National Union (UNITA) raises serious political problems, domestic and international. A post-Vietnam congress is not likely to stand still for an American involvement in a distant civil war, however much the Soviet side seems to be winning.

Only last week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Dick Clark (D-Iowa), Chairman of the Africa subcommittee, proposed legislation to prohibit any US involvement in Angola without specific Congressional authorization. In short, Clark was putting the Administration on notice either to stop its covert efforts or else go public.

In doing so, Clark made it plain that he, for one, would oppose an escalation of the US involvement. Only last October, the committee and other congressional forces looked dubiously on a Kissinger attempt to pump some $60 million in emergency aid into Zaire, which remains the main outside supporters of the FNLA faction.

Primarily, Clark and other Africa specialists in Washington fear that
Any sign move by the Administration to move into the Angolan war would irrevocably ally the United States with South Africa - a development sure to undermine all remaining US influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

During the past week, the government in Nigeria, normally suspicious of Soviet motives on the continent, declared its recognition of the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola. Its announced reason for doing so was the intervention by South African groups on the side of UNITA forces in Southern Angola.

The Soviets, rhetorical and ideological supporters of the MPLA for years, were under no similar political constraints when they acted in mid-November to move their aid efforts, by then sizeable out in the open with direct supply flights to Luanda.

On November II the independence of Angola was declared, and the Soviets merely announced their recognition of MPLA, then in control of the new nation's capital, as the Angolan government. "It was a perfect cover for them", one source said. "There was no need for further covert action, and for once they had an opportunity to intervene in black Africa without fearing a political backlash." The South African intervention on the other side had taken care of that.

Analysts feel the basic Soviet objectives in Angola are political more than military, although they do not underestimate the ports of Luanda and Lobito as potential South Atlantic Soviet naval bases. In part, the Soviets may have wanted to counter Chinese influence, which is still a powerful force in Zambla and, more recently, Mozambique. In part, analysts also believe, they may have wanted a foothold in Southwest Africa to be established in the region as black African pressures mount on the white minority regime in South Africa.

But analysts place great emphasis on the theory that the Soviets were reacting to reverses suffered last summer by leftist forces in metropolitan Portugal even while the MPLA appeared in danger of being defeated in Angola.

Both arenas are stated areas of US interest. And both, since last June, have been arenas of covert US intervention.

CIA aid to Portugal has mostly been measured in money funneled to the dominant democratic Socialist Party groups. But in Angola, almost from the start, it took the form of arms supplies to FNLA and UNITA via Zaire.

At first, sources say, this aid was almost exclusively in the form of money to the Zaire regime of Joseph Mobutu for the express purpose of financing weapons transfers.

But in August, sources say, there was a sharp escalation in weapons going across the border from Zaire. NATO weapons and American weapons beyond those stockpiled in Zaire's Western supplied armory turn up in the field and at the time appeared to have turned the battle decisively against the MPLA. Many of these weapons, it is claimed, were flown into Kinshasha on US C-141 transports on covert missions.

It was at this point that the Soviets reacted on a scale that was evidently unexpected by Kissinger and other architects of the US policy.

Early in September, the first Cubans began to land in the port of Luanda, and the influx continued steadily for the next two months. By the end November, at least 4,000 Cubans were committed to the war, officials here estimate some 200 armored cars are now in MPLA hands, under Cuban control, and at least a dozen mobile multi-tube launchers for 122-m.m. rockets. The rockets, a favorite weapon of guerrillas in the Middle East and South East Asia are a deadly and sophisticated weapon in the context of Angola and the presence of the rockets, with Cubans to fire them, seems to have given MPLA a decisive edge. More important, however is the fact that the latest Soviet move in the action-reaction cycle of the Angolan civil war has faced Ford and Kissinger with admission with wideranging consequence for US policy in sub-saharan Africa.
The Need To Control

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Dec. 21—When the Vietnam war came to its inevitable end last spring, Henry Kissinger said that Congress's refusal to try to drag it on proved America's unreliability as an ally. Now President Ford is doing the same on Angola. The Senate vote to stop covert intervention there, he said, "is a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends on the United States."

Why do these men want to exaggerate the impact of distant events on their country's reputation? Why do they invite the world to judge American strength by our position in Angola, a land that has no historical tie to the United States and has never depended on us for its security? Exploring those questions may afford some insight into the real, as opposed to the advertised, premises of United States policy.

One reason given by Mr. Ford for taking the Senate vote so seriously was that it "deprived us of our ability to help the people of Angola." He said the United States should be able to help any people "decide their own fate. We have over a period of time helped to maintain free governments."

Talk of helping countries to "decide their own fate" has rather a mocking sound these days. Does Mr. Ford think people have forgotten the massive and conspiratorial United States efforts to upset the Democratic process in Chile? Can he use the word "free," without gagging, for such objects of United States support as the Governments of Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines?

In fact, hardly any official pretends that our Angolan policy has anything to do with the people of Angola. It is justified, instead, as necessary to maintain our influence in Africa against that of the Soviet Union. If we let the Soviet-supported faction prevail in Angola, Mr. Kissinger told Senate leaders privately, Africans would think of the U.S.S.R. as the superpower that matters.

Recent history goes against the notion that Soviet military aid in Africa leads to permanent influence. In Egypt it was counterproductive. Experts think the U.S.S.R. would reap more trouble than joy from neocolonial activity in black Africa. The specter of a Soviet naval base in Angola, raised by Mr. Kissinger, does not alarm the Pentagon.

Nor is there good reason to believe that the United States will win respect for itself in Africa by intervening in Angola. The effective way to gain influence would have been to condemn the South African army's intervention. Instead, the United States is on the same side as South Africa—a coincidence, we say, but one that could hardly be more fatal to our reputation in most of the continent.

The ultimate political argument is that failure to act in Angola will hurt our image with the Russians, making them think us weak everywhere. To the contrary, after Vietnam a shrewd Soviet leader might want to see America involved in remote quarrels outside her experience. He might also care less about Angola than about continued American willingness to be forthcoming on such matters as grain supplies for the U.S.S.R.

Altogether, the political arguments seem to me dubious. At best they cannot explain President Ford's overdone reaction to the Senate vote. Twice in a brief statement he called it a threat to America's greatness. "A great nation," he said, "cannot escape its responsibilities." The hyperbole suggests that the premises of the policy are as much psychological as political.

After Vietnam it was widely said that the United States had learned one basic lesson: it cannot be a global policeman. But the Angolan affair shows that Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger have not learned that lesson. For them, "greatness" depends on the will to be involved anywhere and everywhere in the world—and to see that events follow the script we write.

In the magazine Foreign Affairs last January Prof. Richard R. Fagen of Stanford examined what was then known about Chile and said United States covert activities were "the symptoms and consequences of a foreign policy which attempts to manage conflict and change on a global scale." The activities would continue, he said, as long as American leaders thought our interests were "threatened by almost any Third World experiment in socioeconomic transformation not directly under our control."

Control: That is the end so deeply, even irrationally, desired. The feeling stems in part from the personality of our dominant policymaker, Mr. Kissinger. He is authoritarian by nature and finds it more congenial to deal with the predictability of authoritarian regimes than with the disorder of democracy. But there is more to it than that. For years now, the highest levels of American Government have been fixed on the status quo, mortally fearing change in a world irresistibly changing.

It is the mark of the insecure to become hysterical at change. Great countries, like mature individuals, understand that life is complicated—and that they cannot make everyone else conform to their vision.
Kissinger Parley Excerpts

Following are excerpts from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's news conference in Washington yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC News:

The basic problem in our relation with the Soviet Union is the emergence of the Soviet Union into true superpower status. That fact has become evident only in the 70's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the disparity in strategic power between the United States and the Soviet Union was overwhelming in our favor.

In the 70's and 80's the Soviet Union will have achieved and is on the road to achieving effective strategic equality, which means that whoever may be ahead in the damage they can inflict on the other, the damage the other in a general nuclear war will be of a catastrophic nature.

This being the case, in the past the emergence of a country into superpower status, such, for example, as Imperial Germany vis-à-vis Great Britain, has generally led to war.

Under the conditions of the nuclear age it must not lead to war. That is a fact of the period that any administration and any opponent of the administration would have to face if they had to assume responsibility - how to manage the emergence of Soviet power without sacrificing vital interests is the pre-eminent problem of our period.

That part of the Soviet-American relationship cannot be abolished. That is inherent in the relationship.

Move for Moderation

The second problem we have is whether we can accelerate the process of moderating this potential conflict by conscious act of policy. This has been called détente. In this respect, it requires conscious restraint by both sides. If one side doesn't practice restraint then the situation becomes inherently tense.

We do not confuse the relaxation of tension with permitting the Soviet Union to expand its sphere by military means and that is the issue, for example, in Angola. The danger to détente that we face now is that our domestic disputes are depriving us of both the ability to provide incentives for moderation such as in the restrictions on the trade act, as well as of the ability to resist military moves by the Soviet Union as in Angola.

If the Soviet Union continues action such as Angola we will without any question resist. Failure to resist can only lead other countries to conclude that their situation is becoming precarious, because in Angola we are not talking about giving military and financial assistance to people who are doing the fighting - to local people who are doing the fighting.

Unless the Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreign-policy actions, the situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense, and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.

We warned and warned [Congress] about the implications of the amendments with respect to Soviet trade. The end result was that the trade act could not be implemented or the trade agreement would not be implemented and the people who were supposed to be helped were hurt in the sense that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union fell from 38,000 to 10,000.

Warning to Congress

We warned and warned about the implications of the Turkish aid cutoff and it is perfectly evident that our relations with Turkey have been damaged beyond any immediate hope of recovery, though we have made some progress and we are warning now that what is happening in Angola has nothing to do with the local situation in Angola.

We were prepared to accept any outcome in Angola before massive arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the introduction of Cuban forces.

We are not opposed to the M.P.L.A. [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola and we would never have given assistance to any of the other factions if other great powers had stayed out of this.

The issue is not whether a pro-Soviet faction is becoming dominant in Angola. The United States policy until well into the summer was to stay out of Angola, to let the various factions work out their own arrangements between themselves. We accepted any difficulty a pro-Marxist faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some minimum outside support in the Frelimo [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique].

Start of Soviet Aid

What happened between March and the middle of the summer was a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment which was then followed by Soviet advisers and large numbers of Cuban troops - large, at least, in relation to what it takes in Angola to affect the situation.

Therefore, the issue is not whether the country of Angola represents a vital interest to the United States; the issue is whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the population its own brand of government. And the issue is not whether the United States should resist it with its own military forces.

Nobody ever suggested the introduction of American military forces. The President has made it clear that under no circumstances will we introduce American military forces.

The issue is whether the United States will disqualify from giving a minimal amount of economic and military assistance to the two-thirds of the population that is resisting an expeditionary force from outside the hemisphere and a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment.

If the United States adopts as a national policy that we cannot give even military and economic assistance to people who are trying to defend themselves without American military assistance, then we are practically inviting outside forces to participate in every situation in which there is a possibility for foreign intervention and we are therefore undermining any hope of political and international order.