U.S. intervention in Angola must be stopped. We must urge Congress to oppose the Administration's intervention policy and to expose what is being done in our name to hamper the struggle for liberation in southern Africa.

The Administration has admitted that the CIA is arming FNLA and UNITA to fight the MPLA and that its $42 million request for security assistance to Zaire in the military aid bill is related to the "instability" in Angola. Congress should legislate an end to CIA covert operations in Angola now, while they are still going on. Surely the secret war in Laos gave fair warning of the horror, danger and futility of such secret U.S. missions. Another effective way Congress can prevent U.S. intervention in Angola is to cut the requested $19 million in military credit sales and $22.75 million in security supporting assistance to Zaire so long as it is supporting any movement in Angola.

Consideration of the International Security Assistance bill has begun at a reckless pace in the House. International Relations Committee mark-up has already begun, but possible Angola amendments will probably be considered after the November 21 - December 1 Thanksgiving recess. The full House will probably act on the bill in early December. Senate action will probably follow by the end of the year.

AMENDMENTS ON ANGOLA

Congressmen Michael Harrington (Mass.) and Don Bonker (Wash.) will offer the following amendments in the House International Relations Committee:

1) No assistance authorized by this act and no covert assistance of any kind may be furnished directly or through any foreign country to any political group in Angola.

2) No defense article or service included in the Foreign Military Sales Act and no Security Supporting Assistance shall be sold or given to Zaire until the President reports that it has halted all military assistance to political groups in Angola and Congress has approved this report by concurrent resolution.

A more moderate amendment may also be introduced providing that no aid authorized by this bill shall go directly or indirectly to any political group in Angola.

Representatives' response to ending indirect and covert assistance to movements in Angola will depend largely on their judgement of the extent of the alleged "Soviet threat" in southern Africa and whether real U.S. security interests are at stake. It will also depend on how extensive they believe the Angolan operations to be and on their view of CIA covert operations in general.

Several members of the International Relations Committee are clearly disturbed by the Administration's proposed aid for Zaire. They question whether U.S. national security will be served by this aid. They question funding Zaire's intervention in
Angola on its own behalf and in collaboration with the United States, and cite human rights violations in Zaire itself. A cut in aid to Zaire could also have the support of fiscal conservatives who oppose expenditures for foreign aid generally. Some members have also opposed the security supporting assistance loan to Zaire on the ground that the U.S. is bailing Zaire out of its financial crisis while simultaneously telling New York to go "cold turkey".

The third amendment prohibiting aid to Angola directly or indirectly will probably get support from some Representatives who consider themselves "friends of Africa" who are concerned about both opposing U.S. intervention in Angola and not alienating Zaire's President Mobutu. But restrictive amendments of this sort which do not actually cut the aid authorization are difficult to enforce.

There may also be several broader amendments to the military aid bill which might have an indirect impact on the Zaire component:

A) An overall cut in the entire military aid bill, or the military credit sales or security supporting assistance program, which could lead the Administration to reduce Zaire's portion by some amount;
B) No military assistance may be provided to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, as determined by Congress; and
C) An extended phase-out of the military credit sales program.

The critical military confrontation in Angola and the U.S. intervention in that struggle demand that we work on a specific legislative approach aimed at Angola. All three amendments on Angola and Zaire should therefore be supported. But the struggle in Angola promises to be a long one, so the more general amendments A, B and C also deserve support. We should also oppose the Administration's request to lift the ceiling on military aid to African countries. Under present law, aggregate military aid to Africa cannot exceed $40 million unless the President waives the limitation after finding and reporting that it is important to U.S. security. This ceiling puts an important constraint on the President to justify military aid not only to Angola and Zaire but elsewhere in the continent as well, and puts a restraint on general buildup of U.S. military involvement there. The proposed aid to Zaire alone exceeds the present ceiling. The total Africa request is three times the ceiling level: $22 million for Ethiopia, $31 million for Morocco, $15 million for Tunisia, $3 million for Kenya, $600,000 for Liberia and $43 million for Zaire.

The main targets at the moment are members of the foreign affairs committees and Foreign Operations subcommittees of the Appropriations committees of both houses. They will both consider the military aid authorization and appropriations bills. There is a special need to contact liberal Senators who are still developing their strategy, especially Senators Clark, Humphrey, Cranston, Kennedy, Javits, Brooke and McGovern, to urge them to take the initiative to effectively stop U.S. intervention in Angola. Conservatives in either house should not be written off, because many may oppose the military aid bill altogether on fiscal grounds.

We are enclosing for your use background information on U.S. intervention in Angola, a summary of arguments against intervention, and three press clippings on CIA covert operations there. Please let us know what additional information you need from us for communicating with your representatives in Congress and for educational work in your community. Also, please send us a report on your Congressional representatives' positions on Angola as soon as possible. Covering all 535 members of Congress on this issue in two months will be an impossible task without your help. Try to see your representatives in the upcoming Thanksgiving recess.

We will send out at least one other legislative update on U.S. intervention in Angola before the end of the year. In the meantime, feel free to write to us or call us at (202) 546-7961.
UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA CONTINUES

The civil war in Angola is daily growing fiercer, and the intervention of foreign powers - including the United States - is escalating. The turmoil goes on despite the events of November 11, which marked Angolan Independence Day and the end of a Portuguese colonial presence of over 500 years - longest in the history of Africa. On Independence Day the movement which controls the capital, MPLA, proclaimed a people's republic with its leader as president. This was countered by a rival declaration on the part of the other two movements, FNLA and UNITA, which have formed an alliance against MPLA.

The evidence of U.S. involvement in Angola has increased substantially over the past few weeks. At a closed-door Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on November 6, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby and Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco "justified the Administration's covert supply of rifles, machineguns, vehicles and ammunition" to FNLA and UNITA (New York Times). Colby, according to the Washington Post, "defended covert supplying of U.S. military assistance as the only way to prevent the Soviet-armed Popular Front /MPLA - Ed./ from forcefully gaining control of the country." These revelations confirmed the September 25 New York Times article by Leslie Gelb, which recounted the history of CIA support for FNLA and UNITA (see reprint).

In an open House hearing November 5, Edward Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, provided an example of the Administration's duplicitous public stance on Angola. Asked if it were a proper summation of his position to say "it is our policy not to intervene but you have no comment on whether we are intervening," Mulcahy replied that this would be "substantially correct", but added that he might have more to say in closed session.

According to Gelb, the funds for FNLA and UNITA have "been disbursed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire." Mulcahy has said that the U.S. has a kind of "client-state" relationship with Zaire, and Mobutu has long been involved in his own right in the Angolan struggle, on the same side that the U.S. is now supporting. Holden Roberto, leader of FNLA, is Mobutu's brother-in-law, and FNLA has been based in Kinshasa since its formation. The Bakongo people, who comprise the bulk of FNLA's supporters, straddle the border between Zaire and Angola.

Zaire's involvement in the recent fighting, both in support of FNLA and of UNITA as the former's ally, has been indicated by sketchy but consistent evidence. The Post article (reprinted here) notes that "Mobutu has been supplying arms and more recently his own troops to fight for a non-communist independence group, the National Front..." Other articles have reported the presence and sometimes the capture in northern Angola of troops, trucks, and armored cars of the Zairean army. For UNITA, Zaire's assistance has been critical in the area of supply transport. Until recently UNITA controlled no ports and was thus heavily dependent on air transport. Three different reports by internationally respected journalists have described air shipments of arms from Zaire to Silva Porto, UNITA's headquarters. Two of them indicated the use of aircraft - Hercules (C-130's) and DC-3 - which probably came from U.S. aid programs to Zaire.

Foreign efforts to weaken or eliminate the MPLA have apparently had some effect. The military situation has changed considerably over the past month. MPLA, dependent on the Soviet Union for arms and reportedly reinforced by 2500 Cuban troops, still controls the capital and broad middle belt of the country. However, the movement has lost significant ground on both southern and northern fronts. In the south, motorized columns led by hundreds of white mercenaries have advanced over 625 miles in two weeks, taking several towns and ports, including Lobito and Benguela at the
head of the vital Benguela railway. The mercenaries are reportedly South Africans and right-wing Portuguese, some observers maintain that regular South African troops are also involved. These forces are fighting in conjunction with UNITA and, to a lesser extent, FNLA in the South. How the mercenaries were recruited and financed remains unclear.

The Administration not only is financing a covert military operation - reminiscent of Laos - in Angola, but is at the same time putting together a massive economic and military aid package for Mobutu's Zaire. The package totals $82 million: $20 million in Export-Import Bank credits, $20 million in food and agricultural commodity assistance, $23 million in "security supporting assistance", and - the latest addition - $19 million in military credit sales (up from $3.5 million last year). The items slated to be sold on credit include 12 armored cars and 400 jeeps and trucks - precisely the kind of Zairian army equipment now being used in Angola. The magnitude of this aid package is many times the level of previous years and is by far the highest aid figure for any other country on the continent.

The first two portions of the package - EXIM and food assistance - need no specific approval from Congress. The State Department had hoped to slip the security supporting assistance by quietly also, but opposition from several Senators has forced the Administration to submit this portion, along with the military credit sales, as part of the military aid bill now before Congress.

The Administration has justified the bulk of the aid on the grounds that falling prices for Zaire's copper exports coupled with rising prices for critical imports like oil had produced a crisis - but only a short-term one - in the country's balance of payments and external debt repayment position. Senator Dick Clark of Iowa has attacked this justification by pointing out the evidence of mismanagement by the Mobutu government, and the fact that no aid was being proposed for a country like Zambia, which is far more dependent on copper exports than Zaire.

The Administration has conceded, however, that the Angolan strife is among the reasons for the quantum leap in aid to Zaire. Secretary Kissinger said in hearings on the military aid bill November 6 that the railways through Angola are important outlets for Zaire and Zambia, and in this situation "we do believe it is important to make it clear to Zaire that we are prepared to be of assistance." On November 11, General H. M. Fish of the Defense Department said one purpose of the package was to strengthen Zaire in light of the Communist build-up in the area and instability in neighboring Angola; it was important to "maintain a balance" in the region. The next day an exchange between Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary W.P. Clements and Representative Lee Hamilton of New York ended in this way:

Hamilton: Well, then, the purpose of our aid to Zaire is to assist her in regard to Angola, is that it?
Clements: Not directly.
Hamilton: Indirectly?
Clements: Well, conceivably. The government in Angola could be important to Zaire. It might have more than a passing interest. There would be consequences if we fail to respond which could be very serious.

In short, the Administration is putting forward its case in classic cold war terms. The Angolan square of the world chessboard must be held by "us" or it will fall to "them". Since Zaire's Mobutu is our main ally in the area, he must be backed to the hilt in his own country or in Angola, thereby, as the official Congressional Presentation Document on military aid puts it, "strengthening Zaire's regional influence in Central Africa." U.S. intervention in Angola on such spurious grounds should not be allowed to continue - and to escalate into another Vietnam.
WHY U.S. INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA MUST BE STOPPED

1. U.S. intervention in Angola may prove as tragic and costly as in Indochina. It will add thousands more to the killed and wounded, and entangle the U.S. in an escalating conflict in southern Africa for years to come. By heightening ethnic and cultural divisions as we did in Laos and Vietnam, the U.S. will make Angola's transition to independence a bitter agony.

The same shopworn rationale which proved so disastrous in Vietnam is being trotted out again. CIA Director William Colby and State's Joseph Sisco recently testified that the U.S. must prevent a new country from falling under Communist domination and maintain the balance of power in Africa.

2. The Congress should not sanctions a new CIA covert military operation. The Angolan intervention is just one more chapter in the sordid history of secret CIA-engineered assassinations, chaos and military adventures. By being asked to be silent, Congress is being invited to shirk its Constitutional responsibility to declare war. Further, a 1974 law limits CIA activities to responding to threats to U.S. national security: yet even Colby has testified no such threat exists in Angola.

3. An MPLA-led government in Angola would be a socialist government similar to those of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, with which the U.S. is now trying to establish good relations. MPLA stands for national control and technological transfers of skills to Angolans in strategic industries such as oil. Such demands are reasonable for a country which has suffered from 500 years of colonial exploitation. They do not threaten the security of the U.S. Nor will an MPLA-led government be a Soviet puppet. MPLA insists it will resist any Soviet domination attempt just as it fought Portuguese domination.

4. By intervening the U.S. will have damaged prospects for mutually beneficial relations if an MPLA-led government comes to undisputed power. By fanning the flames of war, the U.S. will drive MPLA to rely more and more heavily on the Soviet bloc, thus increasing the chance of the very influence we say we fear.

5. If the U.S. and its allies succeed in installing a "friendly" government, recent history suggests that such a government will be unpopular, foreign-oriented and extremely repressive. Chile, the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Iran and a host of others are cases in point.

6. By making common cause with South African and mercenary forces, the U.S. is alienating the developing world and deepening its complicity with South Africa's racists. Any Angolan government which comes to power beholden to South Africa for support will discourage the fight for freedom in Namibia and South Africa.

7. In years to come, U.S. citizens may be asked to shoulder a never-ending burden of costs for Angolan intervention. In a parallel case, U.S. intervention in the Belgian Congo has already cost over $400 million in aid to our "client" without any perceptible gain for the average citizen of Zaire or the United States.

8. We question the merits of sending U.S. aid to Zaire. While Zaire may be suffering a genuine economic crisis, its support of the Angolan fighting represents a waste of resources in the face of enormous development needs. The Zaire government has grossly mismanaged its economy, squandered foreign exchange surpluses and heedlessly gone into debt. Mobutu has made himself one of the richest men in the world and created a small wealthy class of Zairois while the average urban worker of Zaire now has only 68% of the real income he had in 1961. The Zaire government has to repress popular discontent to stay in power. At a time when New York is being lectured to and denied aid, it is ridiculous to be openhanded to Zaire, with its economic chaos and foreign adventure.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6—Two Administration officials told a Senate committee today that the Administration was covertly supplying arms to liberation groups in Angola, according to officials with direct knowledge of the testimony, which was given in a closed session.

Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence, said that the Administration was covertly supplying arms to liberation groups in Angola, the Portuguese territory in southwestern Africa that is becoming independent Tuesday.

The New York Times previously reported that such covert aid was being funnelled into Angola with the help of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Asked to defend the current Administration request for aid to Zaire, Mr. Kissinger responded that ports in Zaire and Zambia depend on rail traffic through Angola.

Large Increase Asked

The Administration is asking Congress for a large increase in foreign military aid to Zaire—$30.4 million, as compared with $3.8 million last year. In addition, the Administration is asking $40 million in food aid credits and Export-Import Bank loans.

Military aid to Kenya and Ethiopia is down somewhat compared with last year, with two new elements in this year’s requests. The $3 million aid to Kenya includes $1 million to begin a military training program. This year Ethiopia has already made cash purchases of military equipment, mainly aircraft, totaling more than $25 million as compared with total cash purchases last year of $14 million.

Mr. Kissinger told the House committee that the only American interest in Africa was in the independence of its nations. Mr. Sisco also sounded that theme before the Senate committee as he justified the Administration’s covert supply of rifles, machineguns, vehicles and ammunition to the two anti-Soviet liberation movements in Angola. He maintained that the United States did not want to defeat the Soviet-backed liberation group but sought to make the other groups strong enough to negotiate a coalition government, the sources said.

Not Optimistic

Under questioning, the sources continued, Mr. Sisco and Mr. Colby acknowledged that they were not optimistic about a negotiated settlement in Angola, nor were they clear on what steps the administration might take next. The sources said, however, that the two former officials argued that the groups being backed by the United States and China were in a better position today than before the covert aid began.

THE WASHINGTON POST

CIA Aid In Angola Defended

Nov. 6, 1975

By Walter Pincus

Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby has defended covert supplying of U.S. military assistance to Angolan independence forces as the only way to prevent the Soviet arms in Popisk Front from forcefully gaining control of the country.

During a closed-door appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Colby, according to one senator who was present, said U.S. national interest in Angola was not strategic but rather the general need to prevent a new country from falling under Soviet domination.

Colby’s justification for covert operations in Angola drew criticism from several senators.

The Ford administration was seeking a $57 million package of grants, loans and credits for Zaire on the ground that it was going bankrupt.

The deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Edward Malley, supported that position, citing Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger’s statement in September to the Organization of African Unity that “War is most alarming with the preference of extra continental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence.”
The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is reported close to controlling Angola, which is scheduled to become Independent next year. The anti-Communist situation stabilized somewhat last week with the installation of a Government including members of the defunct National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as ministers.

The Washington sources said that C.I.A. operations in both countries had been approved for a year. With few exceptions, the members of these subcommittees are regarded as conservative.

The sources did not know or would not state when the covert operations began. But two of the sources indicated that the decision was going to Portugal with an interview given by Mr. Ford to U.S. News & World Report early last month when he talked of the virtual impossibility of C.I.A. involvement in Lisbon.

FORD VOICES SKEPTICISM

Speaking of aid going "quietly" from Moscow to Western Europe to war-torn factions in Portugal, he said:

"I think it's very tragic that, because of the C.I.A. investigation and all the limitations placed on us in that covert operation, we aren't able to participate with other Western European countries.

The American people shouldn't handicap themselves from meeting the challenge, as we were hand-capped in South Vietnam and are handicapped in trying to be a participant in Portugal."

One of the sources said that Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger made the decision some time after they went to Brussells for a NATO meeting in late May. It was after consultations with heads of state there, the source continued, that they saw how strongly the West European leaders felt about maintaining a non-Communist Portugal. The source continued, "Then we knew that we would stand with them on this one, and also more money was needed."

Another source said that the West Europeans were already "giving plenty" and would have given more, but "it's just that we can't keep our hands out of anything."

Two of the sources indicated that the West European trade unions that they would not identify were smuggling small arms and ammunition to Portugal. The Portuguese Communists, they said, had been previously armed by Moscow.

The American sources said covertly financing these anti-Communist forces marked a latest step in a long process of reversing the Communist trend. For all but a year following the death of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, the administration's policy was to maintain privately but not publicly about the leftward trend among the Portuguese military leaders. The theory was that more harm than good would come of any American involvement.

In KEEPING WITH PAST POLICY

But the recent decision to take a strong anti-Communist stand in Portugal, including covert financing, was very much in keeping with the history of American policy toward the countries on the northern rim of the Mediterranean.

Beginning with the Communist-inspired insurrection in Greece and Turkey after World War II, and running through the threat of Communist role in the Italian government in the early nineteen-fifties, the C.I.A. has been active in this region.

Mr. Ford's hold on the Arab scene for Africa, particularly beginning with Moscow's attempt to gain a foothold in Zaire, which was previously the Belgian Congo. From the time President Mobutu dissolved the number of the short-term debts and to increase American aid to Zaire to about $150 million this year, from about $30 million.

The sources also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers were operating from bases in Zaire to help at least one of the liberation fronts being supported by Washington.

Until the spring, most of the Western aid to anti-Communist movements in Portugal was being given secretly by the West German Social Democratic party and the Belgian Socialist party without any American involvement.

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Until the spring, most of the Western aid to anti-Communist movements in Portugal was being given secretly by the West German Social Democratic party and the Belgian Socialist party without any American involvement.
At about the same time, in the early sixties, it was learned that President Kennedy determined that Portugal, an American ally in NATO, could not control her African colonies indefinitely and that some contact must be made with future revolutionary leaders. In 1962, on the advice of the C.I.A., among others, Mr. Roberto, the brother-in-law of General Mobuto, was selected as a future leader for Angola.

**ROBERTO 'REACTIVATED'**

The sources said that from 1962 to about 1966, the C.I.A. supplied Mr. Roberto with money and arms, but to little avail. At that point, they said he was deactivated and put on "retainer."

Mr. Roberto was reactivated this spring, according to the sources, at about the time it became clear that the then Communist-leaning government in Portugal ordered its armed forces in Angola to give active support to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola headed by Agostinho Neto.

But the sources said that C.I.A. operatives and American diplomats judged that United States support should also be thrown behind Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

It could not be learned whether Chinese and American officials had ever discussed or sought to coordinate their efforts against Mr. Neto. What was learned was that American funds were being used to buy arms for both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi, and that the Chinese were providing military advisors for Mr. Roberto and perhaps for Mr. Savimbi as well.

It could not be learned whether any C.I.A. operatives were also acting as military advisors.

**CABINDA A KEY FACTOR**

At stakes in Angola, besides the enlargement of Soviet influence, is a region deemed rich in copper, industrial diamonds and oil. Of particular interest to the United States and to President Mobutu, the sources said, is Cabinda, an oil-rich area bordering on Zaire and separated from Angola by the Congo River. There, the sources related, the Gulf Oil Corporation continues to pump over 100,000 barrels a day. The sources said that the Administration believed that Mr. Mobutu would like to annex Cabinda in the likely event of a Communist take-over in Angola.

All the sources said, that it was Zaire that was of primary concern to the Administration. It is believed that Mr. Kissinger is about to select Sheldon B. Vance, a former Ambassador to Zaire and a close friend of Mr. Mobutu, to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He would replace Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary. Mr. Davis was in charge of Deane B. Hinton, the ambassador who was ordered out of Zaire some months ago amid charges by President Mobutu that the C.I.A. had designs on the President's life.

It was Mr. Vance, two of the sources said, who this summer began to contact Zaire's many creditors in the United States and elsewhere to see if the millions in debts that were soon to come due could be refinanced. It could not be learned whether Mr. Vance had completed this task or had succeeded.

In the meantime, the State Department has approached several Congressmen with a view toward increasing American aid to about $15-million. This year, Zaire was to receive about $60-million, but the State Department is now aiming for $90-million. This would consist of $20-million in development aid, $20-million in Export-Import Bank loans, and $20-million in Food for Peace credit. Several officials said that so far, Congressional responses had been decidedly negative.