



#125

Boipatong

8 July 1992

At the funeral for 36 of the 42 Boipatong men, women and children massacred 17 June, the African National Congress's secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa stated in his oration that South African President F. W. De Klerk admitted in May to ANC President Nelson Mandela that he had 'no power over the policemen'. This admission was furiously denied by Roelf Meyer, Pretoria's constitutional affairs minister. This exchange raises again the issue - responsibility for the violent actions of the security forces at the very top in Pretoria. If De Klerk's confession is so what good is he at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa negotiations? Meyer's angry refutation says his boss is in charge and that a two-track policy - utilized for so many years in Namibia - has been and is in full swing.

The ANC has suspended its participation in the CODESA talks until a number of conditions are met, chief among them the defanging of the South African Police and the South African Defence Force and their spawn of assassination squads and terror gangs, and the public trials of members. Pretoria responds with protestations of sincerity, of an urgent wish to commence CODESA again. Pretoria and its friends promote the notion that the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party are equally to blame for the countrywide violence, the 'black-on-black' syndrome. Security forces personnel all the way up to generals, more than one of whom have been shown to be directly involved in state terrorism, continue at their posts undeterred. Another wrinkle in the deception is the offer that local policemen go their own way in terror without notifying their superiors, who appear unable to read the newspapers.

The call now is for teams of international observers to go in and report on the terror. The ANC and others want monitors to keep watch on the security forces. Pretoria has acceded to some sort of the former (they will be stingily selected), but not the latter. The United Nations is being drawn into the situation and a Security Council meeting is set for next week to consider dispatching observers. In the meanwhile the terrorized people of South Africa will see no let-up in their suffering. South Africa and the world will have to rely for the grisly facts, as heretofore, on courageous human rights groups and some newspapers.

 THE INDEPENDENT

Monday 22 June 1992



Black South Africans vent rage at De Klerk

FORTY THOUSAND black South Africans packed into the shabby little soccer stadium at Boipatong yesterday to bury 36 of the 42 innocents massacred two weeks ago by supporters of Inkatha.

Enraged by reports that police delivered the Inkatha killers to the township, that bound the crowd and the speakers, politicians and churchmen of all persuasions, was the desire to bury the government of President F W de Klerk.

The spectacle of the rows of coffins, and of the bereaved families, solemnly apart, somehow, from the political proceedings, inspired pity and grief. Speaker after speaker offered condolences to the mourners, but more as an

John Carlin finds the thousands who packed into a shabby football stadium to mourn the victims of Boipatong in unforgiving mood

afterthought, it seemed.

It was the denunciations of the "murderous De Klerk regime", the metaphorical call to arms for "the final battle" against apartheid, the chant "Down with De Klerk! Down!", the clamour for the international community to use its clout to help bring down the government, that rang through with real conviction, that ignited the passions of the crowd. "Enough", the banners read, "is enough!"

The day's most militant speaker, Jay Naidoo, general secretary of the Congress of South

African Trade Unions, received the loudest cheers. The Inkatha "vigilantes", he declared, had been armed by Mr de Klerk, trained by the army and let loose on the black communities.

Mr Naidoo warned of a national strike unless the government altered course. He said: "Cosatu is not making an idle threat. We are mobilising for the type of mass action that will bring this country to a standstill. The issue is simple: We want majority rule now!"

To chants of "De Klerk must go! De Klerk must go!" he stepped back from the micro-

phone for Chris Hanu, general secretary of the South African Communist Party. Mr Hanu called the government vampires and merchants of death, and said their hands were "dripping with blood".

Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC's secretary-general, who is normally statesmanlike, led the crowd in the chant "Down with De Klerk! Down!". Announcing that South Africa had reached "disaster point", he said talks with the government had brought nothing so far, "just misery".

Mr de Klerk was useless and incompetent, he said, a fact re-

vealed, he claimed, by his admission to Nelson Mandela in a private meeting last month that he had "no power over the policemen". Mr de Klerk and his Minister of Police, Hensley Kriel, had to go, for the ANC would "no longer tolerate the politics of murder".

Leaders of the Pan-Africanist Congress and Azapo, radical organisations that have scorned the ANC for negotiating with the government, shared the podium yesterday with the likes of Mr Ramaphosa. They echoed the cries of rage against "De Klerk and his killers" and called for

Boipatong to unify all liberation movements behind the call for democracy.

It was left to Archbishop Desmond Tutu, speaking last, to attempt to defuse a palpable anti-white sentiment among parts of the audience, which runs counter to the ANC bedrock concept of "non-racialism".

But the archbishop, like other church leaders who spoke before him, demanded that Mr de Klerk arrest the Boipatong murderers, admit international monitors to supervise the security forces and hold elections for a democratically

elected constituent assembly.

He, too, however, could not resist a dig at his white compatriots. "For most white people the killings of Boipatong were just statistics until I said: What about Barcelona?" It was the threat of pulling out of the Olympic Games, he said, that stirred white consciences, not the killing of black children.

■ **DAKAR** — Foreign ministers at an African summit have agreed on a plan that could create their own peacekeeping force to monitor conflicts on the continent, AP reports.

The proposal was expected to be approved by heads of state at a three-day annual meeting of the Organisation of African Unity.

THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 4 July 1992

De Klerk's hidden concessions 'too little, too late'

From John Carlin in Johannesburg

precipitated the hostile new mood that has seized South African politics.

The straw that broke Codesa's back was the government's insistence on 75 per cent as the majority required in an elected assembly to approve a new constitution. The ANC, whose opening position had been 66.66 per cent, shifted at the eleventh hour to 70 per cent. The government did not budge and the talks collapsed, leading the ANC to conclude that the government was "not serious about democracy" and that the only option was to take politics to the streets.

"Mass action" was born — or, rather, re-born — and the ANC's enemies replied with the Boipatong massacre, which led the ANC to call off all involvement in Codesa and issue the government with a list of 14 demands to end the violence. The consequence of the Codesa breakdown in May has been that today, it is widely agreed, South Africa faces the serious possibility of anarchy and economic collapse. Mr de Klerk indicated as much in a televised speech on Thursday.

"Annexure F" said that the government was now prepared to accept 70 per cent as the constitution-making majority but there is no question of the ANC accepting this now as it has since moved its

position back to 66.66 per cent and, what is more, added its list of demands — including the suspension and arrest of police and army officers involved in township violence — for a return to the negotiating table.

None of these demands received a response on Thursday from the government, which instead counter-attacked with the charge that the ANC, not the government, was stoking up the township violence.

"Annexure F", again seeking to turn the clock back to the May Codesa meeting, answered the ANC's charge that the government wished to hold on to power indefinitely with the proposal that if a new constitution had not been agreed by

a transitional government within three years a general election should be held.

The annexure also dropped a particularly contentious government clause demanding disproportionately high representation for minorities in that transitional government.

Effectively the government has thus admitted to a serious blunder at the Codesa talks in May. Had it accepted the ANC's compromise then, the chances are that the three-stage sequence of mass action, massacre and breakdown of negotiations would have been avoided.

As it is, political temperatures are higher than they have been at any point since Mr de Klerk came to power in September 1989 and the likelihood of the

ANC accepting the government's invitation to talks is nil. Indeed, the government seems to have accepted as much otherwise it would have made a point of highlighting its three concessions on Thursday instead of deliberately hiding them from public view. As it was, Mr de Klerk's speech made no mention of the government's shift in tactics, concentrating instead on a vituperative offensive against the ANC and its alleged plans to seize power by force.

"Annexure F", as a senior South African political reporter observed yesterday, might unlock doors when and if negotiations restart, but offered no short term solution to the crisis. It was a case of too little, too late.

HIDDEN deep in a memorandum sent on Thursday by the South African Government to the African National Congress — after dozens of pages full of an anti-Communist sound and fury — were three interesting political concessions which, had they been made earlier, might have averted the present crisis.

A six-page memo from President F W de Klerk to Nelson Mandela was followed by six dense and detailed annexures. The last one, "Annexure F", revealed a government decision to back down on the hardline positions that they had adopted in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) negotiations on 16 May, positions that wrecked any chance of a deal and pre-



March after massacre puts blame on De Klerk

FOLLOWING the massacre of 39 people on Wednesday night in Boipatong township, F.W. de Klerk, South Africa's first reformist President, is being viewed by the African National Congress with barely less disgust than his predecessor, P.W. Botha.

ANC leaders marched through Johannesburg yesterday afternoon in protest at the killing of men, women and children by rampaging Inkatha warriors delivered to the township, according to eyewitnesses, by police in armoured vehicles.

A new ANC poster was unveiled at the march with a photograph of Mr De Klerk under a "wanted" sign. The small print read: "Wanted for crimes against the people of South Africa."

An ANC statement issued earlier contained the harshest condemnation of the government to date. Placing the blame for Wednesday's massacre on Mr De Klerk, the statement said: "His administration is less than three years in office and yet the death toll of black people during its brief period of office exceeds that of 40 years of National Party rule."

In an Amnesty International report last week echoing — in more restrained language — the ANC's perception that the government bears responsibility for the political violence, the figure given for the number of dead since January 1990 was 7,000.

Nelson Mandela, who was out of the country this week but will visit Boipatong on Sunday, has frequently denounced Mr De Klerk's failure to express sympathy for the victims of the routine township massacres. The outcry over the Boipatong slaughter prompted him to break with precedent, however.

In a statement on Thursday night Mr De Klerk expressed his "deepest condolences" to the families of the victims. He promised not to rest until the perpetrators had been brought to justice.

Had he, or his police, heeded calls over the last two years for action to be taken against the Inkatha-controlled single men's hostel across the road from Boipatong, there would have been no massacre, no need to bring anyone to justice. The very name KwaMadala inspires terror not only in Boipatong but all over the neighbouring and densely populated area of Sharpeville and Sebokeng, 40 miles south of Johannesburg.

A report this month by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression (IBIR) on the Inkatha hostels, entitled "For-

The hostel at the source of the latest killings has long inspired terror, writes John Carlin in Johannesburg

resses of Fear", contains a long section on KwaMadala. It turns out that eight Inkatha supporters accused of carrying out a massacre at a funeral vigil in Sebokeng in January last year all gave their addresses to the police as KwaMadala. The most notorious figure in the region, Khetisi Kheswa, known in the townships as "the Vaal Monster", also lives in KwaMadala, as does a man arrested, then released on bail, after gunning down five people at a Sebokeng tavern in July last year.

A massacre of 20 people in the same township later in the year was attributed to KwaMadala-based Inkatha supporters. The IBIR said hostel inmates had been responsible for more than 50 deaths. That was before Wednesday's slaughter.

In addition, they have been accused of kidnapping teenage girls from Boipatong and elsewhere and turning them into "sex slaves", according to IBIR. One girl has been identified as an HIV carrier and another is pregnant. In an affidavit one girl recalled: "The experience was awful and I passed out after the 10th man."

On Thursday evening, 18 hours after the massacre, the police responded to the hue and cry with a search of the hostel which yielded a number of spears and other "traditional Zulu weapons".

Yesterday police surrounded the hostel and promised to put 200 detectives on the case. Boipatong residents will hope they will be more successful than the police who investigated the massacre of 38 at the Sebokeng funeral vigil. Yesterday a magistrate dismissed the case against the seven accused — one was killed in the interim — on the grounds that the police had failed to make a case against them.

■ A former police agent identified a security police colonel as the killer of the black activist Steve Biko. Reuter reports.

The Afrikaans weekly *Vry Weekblad* yesterday quoted police agent John Horak as saying the policeman was promoted after the death in custody of Biko, one of the country's most prominent anti-apartheid leaders, in 1977.

Hidden agenda behind the township wars

IT IS impossible to see the massacre in Boipatong last week, the event that precipitated the crisis in South African politics, as anything other than an orchestrated attack with a deliberate political motivation. In the same way, it is impossible to see the township wars of the past two years, in which 7,000 people have died, in any other light.

In Boipatong, as in the vast majority of other massacres, the people who actually do the killing are blacks linked to the Inkatha Freedom Party, the right-wing Zulu organisation headed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Those who direct them are whites operating within the intelligence structures of the police and army.

The only issue in doubt is how high up does the authority come from? Does it stop at "the securocrats", the generals and colonels who effectively ran the country during the Eighties? Or does it go right up to F.W. de Klerk, as Nelson Mandela claims? These questions have not been conclusively answered.

What is certain, however, is that President de Klerk has displayed no inclination either to rein in these sinister elements within the security forces or to express anything other than public approval of Inkatha, an organisation whose chief instrument of political persuasion is terror.

"Either De Klerk is totally indifferent to the killings," said a European diplomat last week, "or they suit his political purposes."

There can be no question that the killings have suited Mr de Klerk's political agenda, an agenda brutal in its simplicity: to prevent majority rule in South Africa, a course that would undoubtedly lead to an African National Congress (ANC) government, and to hit upon a new political system that entrenches the political power of his National Party and the economic privilege of the white population.

Who benefits from the killings that have plunged South Africa into crisis? John Carlin reports from Johannesburg

The politics of survival, Nationalists call it. And when survival is the issue, humans are not the only animals who will stop at nothing.

How has the township terror suited Mr de Klerk? In four identifiable ways. Launched in the Transvaal heartland in July 1990, five months after the ANC had been unbanned, it wreaked havoc on the movement's capacity to carry out its principal task, to organise; it undermined the mythical image of the ANC in the majority of black people's minds as an all-powerful, unstoppable, redeeming force; it generated a political perception at home and abroad essential to the "Nat" game plan, namely that blacks are savages who cannot be expected to run a country without the controlling hand of the whites; and it boosted Inkatha's bargaining power in negotiations in a manner disproportionate to the support the organisation enjoys.

One of South Africa's most abiding myths is that the majority of Zulus support Inkatha. It is highly questionable that 30 per cent do. Nevertheless, Mr de Klerk perceives Inkatha to be vital to his political objectives. Already allied openly in constitutional negotiations, it is Mr de Klerk's intention to forge an electoral alliance when the time comes. Inkatha — which shares the Nationalists' fears of democracy, the ANC and loss of privilege — offers him his only door to the black constituency.

How is it that Inkatha and the South African government have

discovered this confluence of political interests? In fact, the security police and military intelligence discovered it in the mid-Eighties, when they started funding Inkatha, seeing in them an extremely useful instrument to do their counter-insurgency dirty work against the ANC's legal surrogates at the time, the United Democratic Front (UDF).

Not only that; the spectacle of black-on-black violence could only be beneficial, both in terms of projecting political messages and dividing and ruling.

The war against the UDF in Natal province, Zulu country, began in earnest in 1987, the year Jac Buchner, South Africa's top police expert on the ANC and counter-insurgency, was sent from Pretoria to head the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal. Thousands have died in Natal since.


In July 1990, the war against the ANC was exported to Johannesburg and Transvaal province. Inkatha supporters were bussed up in their thousands to take over the single men's hostels in the townships and establish them as barracks from which to launch attacks on the resident population.

The Boipatong massacre last Wednesday was carried out by Inkatha supporters from KwaMadala hostel. It was from here that Inkatha began its Transvaal offensive on 22 July 1990, hostel inmates killing 32 ANC supporters on that one day.



■ LONDON — John Major yesterday resisted a call in the Commons for the reimposition of sanctions against South Africa in the wake of the Boipatong massacre, writes Stephen Goodwin.

The Prime Minister told MPs that European Community sanctions and support for an interim government was not the right way to proceed. He said the South African government had made "enormous strides towards representative democracy".

Maps from Amnesty International's STATE OF FEAR



MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA



White plotters aim to divide and rule

THE ACTION by the ANC in breaking off South Africa's constitutional negotiations, while still committing itself to a negotiated settlement, epitomises the agonising position it has been forced into, squeezed between the rising militancy of its followers and the obduracy of the De Klerk Government.

Disillusionment at the slow pace of negotiations and the continuing violence in the townships has been building up for months. It boiled over with the Boipatong massacre and the mini-Sharpeville which I witnessed afterwards. When Nelson Mandela went to nearby Evaton to address a rally last Sunday, angry people in the 20,000 crowd yelled at him: 'You are like lambs while the Government is killing us.'

Suspending the talks was the least the ANC could do to appease that anger. Otherwise it would have forfeited wholesale support to the extreme Pan-Africanist Congress, which has been denouncing the ANC as sellouts for sitting down to talk with the Government, instead of fighting it to the finish.

The ANC knows the white establishment cannot be overthrown by force. It knows there is no viable alternative to negotiations, and so it must hang in there even though President de Klerk and his Ministers have been making it increasingly difficult. Hence the egg-dance of breaking off negotiations while setting what Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa called 'these perfectly reasonable and do-able demands' for getting back. Now we must see whether De Klerk will respond — or keep up the squeeze.

De Klerk has been toughening his stance ever since his big white referendum victory in March. Instead of seeing

Allister Sparks, in Johannesburg, exposes President de Klerk's manoeuvring to frustrate a deal with the ANC and cling to power.

that as clearing his path to move faster, as most observers expected, the President took it as a sign of booming support for his National Party. This stirred hopes that maybe he would not have to relinquish power after all; that if he could forge alliances with conservative non-white movements he might yet emerge at the head of the biggest political bloc in the country, or at least force the ANC into a coalition that would neutralise its ability to undertake any significant post-apartheid restructuring.

De Klerk needs to play for time, which he believes is on his side. Time to lock South Africa's major trading partners in as allies of his government, to see sanctions collapse, take credit for an economic recovery — and to let the ANC twist in the wind as disillusionment sets in among its followers at the lack of progress in the negotiations.

So the Government deliberately stalled Codesa II. It did so by playing hardball on the issue of the majority needed to agree on a new constitution, making demands it knew the ANC could not accept. Then came the alliance-building phase. On 16 June, Soweto Day, the most important anniversary in black South Africa's calendar, President de Klerk made a high-profile appearance as Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's guest in the KwaZulu capital of Ulundi. Next day the National Party announced a campaign programme naming the ANC 'enemy number one'.

Some analysts believe — and this is the critical question — that part of this strategy is a

covert operation to destabilise the ANC. Those who believe this claim that Military Intelligence and the Security Police are now manipulating cleavages in the black community to promote 'black-on-black' violence by 'vigilante' groups in the townships, mainly rural Zulus living in the migrant workers' hostels of the Witwatersrand.

The purpose is, first, to convince Western powers that black South Africans are unfit to govern the country alone, and, second, to destabilise the ANC by disrupting its ability to organise, making people fearful to be associated with it. Those who hold this theory say they are uncertain whether De Klerk himself is directing the operation; whether it is being pursued freelance by anti-reformists in the security forces — old securocrats still loyal to ex-President P. W. Botha — whom De Klerk cannot control; or whether it is a bit of both, that De Klerk cannot fully control them and has rationalised this by taking the view that a whiff of destabilisation will help his cause.

There is no conclusive evidence of these allegations, but the circumstantial evidence pointing to security force involvement in the violence has become overwhelming. Even more important, the perception in the townships that the police are involved is now universal.

The Human Rights Commission, a private research group in Johannesburg, reports that between July 1990 and April 1992 armed gangs from the migrant hostels carried out 261 attacks on

black township residents, killing 1,207 and injuring 3,697.

In March 1990 police opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators in Sebokeng township, near Boipatong, killing 11 and wounding 28. A commission of inquiry into the shooting found the force used by the police was 'quite immoderate and disproportionate to any lawful object to be attained'. Twenty-seven months after the shooting there is still no trial.

All this has whipped up a huge sense of outrage in the townships, and the ANC is having to respond to that mood in its constituency. It must respond or it will be dead. Yet it must also keep the hope of a negotiated settlement alive. If the squeeze becomes too great and it fails in that, there will be no hope for South Africa.

De Klerk is a clever and subtle man, very different from the crude P. W. Botha who preceded him, yet perhaps he has been too clever by half. It never did make sense to try to destabilise the ANC.

What De Klerk and his colleagues have never understood, is that the ANC is essentially a moderate organisation, yet one that is widely acceptable in the black community because of its record as the primary resistance movement and its long list of heroes and martyrs. That placed the ANC in the unique position of being able to carry a black community radicalised by years of apartheid into a negotiated settlement.

The sensible thing would have been for De Klerk to harness that capability and work with it. Instead, the desire to keep his own party in power has caused him to try to destabilise it. In the process he has destabilised South Africa and the future security of his own people.

Amnesty mooted to rein in the SA military

THE INDEPENDENT

Friday 26 June 1992

THE full scale of the South African special forces that can be drawn on to create mayhem in the townships has only recently been realised in the West. There are, according to Western sources, more than 5,000 of them - taking in, among many others, four military intelligence reconnaissance regiments, the black, Portuguese-speaking 32 Battalion, and remnants of the supposedly disbanded Koevoet unit (see panel below). The men include those who used to lie at the end of an airstrip deep inside Angola for six months at a time and radio back to base on every MiG take-off. Their officers are now holding the Pretoria government to ransom - and this poses the biggest problem in getting the negotiations with the ANC under way again.

How this problem is resolved is the key to any peaceful transition in South Africa. The solution does not lie in blue helmets or EC troika missions or economic sanctions. The possible solution, which is being pondered by minds in Whitehall but is far from HMG policy yet, sounds, at first, unthinkable. But then again, their reason, so is a bloodbath. The pos-

sible solution, which would have to come from within South Africa itself, is a general amnesty.

The argument behind the amnesty line goes like this: over the past 10 years, South Africa's security forces have already undergone the painful transition from being lauded as war heroes to being loathed as villainous murderers. There is no external war left for them to fight, and they have ended up killing in their own country. They are a self-financing

pool of malcontents - they own a large share of companies in the Johannesburg area - and they are not reliant on the government. No arms sanctions would touch them - on the contrary, their cover companies came into existence as a result of sanctions and as a means of sanctions-busting.

The special forces are now terrified of what would happen to them under black-majority rule: in other words, they fear a Nuremberg trial. This is why they are

causing havoc in the townships to delay reform towards such majority rule, and why they are blackmailing the Pretoria government. Most of the government have something to hide too: somewhere there are papers with ministers' signatures on them authorising the villainous murders of the past. One of the few who is seen as having clean hands is President F W de Klerk himself.

But Mr de Klerk cannot do anything to rein in the hit squads on

his own and he lacks the support of the military structure, the very structure that provides the hit squads. For the same reason the calls for "investigations" of the Boipatong massacre can never be satisfied, because the culprits cannot be brought to book. Mr de Klerk has denied any calibrated knowledge of the nasty business going on behind his back; a general amnesty would allow him to keep denying it.

It may be inconceivable that the

worse white South Africans behave, the more they should go free. The advocates of the amnesty line, however, harbour some hopes that the concept is saleable to the ANC too - because many of its members with a violent background would rather the slate was wiped clean. The question is how Nelson Mandela would sell it to the angry masses in the townships, without a tangible bonus to go with it.

One thing is certain: the British government will not endorse any action that Mr de Klerk does not want. "We're not supporting any kind of action that does not have the blessing of the main parties in South Africa," said a British diplomat yesterday. "And de Klerk has said that any intervention, whether by foreign government or international institution, is unacceptable. But he also said that he would welcome, on the other hand, advice."

That advice is now being pondered in Whitehall; but if Britain were to push the amnesty line, it is unlikely that it would do so overtly: it is already accused of having stayed in bed for too long with the whites of South Africa.

Annika Savill, Diplomatic Editor, looks at a startling solution to the hit squads

PRETORIA - As President F W de Klerk met with senior advisers yesterday in an attempt to find ways out of South Africa's political crisis, new facts emerged to reinforce the African National Congress belief that the government's security forces are directly involved in township killings, writes John Carlin. A suspicious link has been found between a brutally effective elite unit used by the South African police in the Namibian war, "Koevoet" (Crowbar), and "the faceless men" who have been waging war on township inhabitants, 7,000 of whom have died in the last two and a half years. Several hundred members of Koevoet, who fought

with the South African army, were absorbed into the South African police after Namibian independence early in 1990.

This week it was revealed that a detachment of at least 20 former Koevoet members are based at a coalmine near Ogies, a small town 80 miles east of Johannesburg, ostensibly working as mine security guards. Earlier this week one of the Koevoet men, it was reliably learnt yesterday, spoke to a miner at the colliery and told him he was fed up with killing women and children in places like Boipatong. The miner contacted the ANC, which contacted lawyers in the Goldstone Commission, a ju-

dicial commission appointed by Mr de Klerk last year to investigate political violence. On Wednesday afternoon two Goldstone lawyers and an ANC official raided the colliery with 30 policemen headed by Colonel Henk Esslinger. They confronted the 20 "mine security guards", who at first denied their Koevoet connection. Pressed by the colonel, they admitted it. At which point the colonel said he had to withdraw from the case because of a conflict of interest. He too had served in Koevoet, as an officer. The lawyers and the ANC man conducted a search as best they could. The Goldstone Commission is to hear details today.

ANC links police team to killings

David Beresford in Johannesburg

A SECRET South African police team made up of ex-Koevoet personnel - the notorious unit responsible for a string of atrocities in pre-independence Namibia - has been discovered in a hostel owned by the British-controlled mining house, Goldfields. They were found during a raid ordered by a supreme court judge after ANC intelligence received a tip-off that they were responsible for the Boipatong massacre, in which more than 40 people were murdered last Wednesday.

At a special sitting of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry yesterday police lawyers confirmed the men had been members of Koevoet, but said they were now being used to counter rustling. ANC officials said, however, that they had two witnesses who could give evidence linking the men to Boipatong. One of the witnesses failed to turn up for the hearing and it was postponed until today.

The police raiding party, using a helicopter, swooped on a Goldfields colliery near the town of Ogies, in the Eastern Transvaal. They found more than 40 police, including two white officers, in a section of a hostel used by mine security. More than 30 were ex-members of Koevoet. R-1 automatic rifles were also discovered.

A trade union official who first investigated the men at the

hostel said they spoke to each other in a "strange language" and took their specially prepared meals by themselves. Goldfields management in Johannesburg have confirmed that they leased facilities to a "tenant", describing it as a normal commercial transaction.

Koevoet, which means "Crowbar", was founded in Namibia by a former regional security branch commander in the Inkhatha heartland of Natal, Brigadier "Long" Hans Dreyer. He formed the unit with a core of Zulus from Natal, whom he later supplemented with Ovambo tribesmen recruited in Namibia. Although operating in Namibia, the unit fell directly under the authority of security branch headquarters in Pretoria.

The unit was disbanded shortly before Namibian independence, and its members supposedly absorbed into the rest of that country's police force. But a renegade South African security branch officer, Captain Dirk Coetzee, a former commander of a police hit squad, told the Guardian last year that they were in fact brought across the border.

The captain claimed that these men with military units made up of ex-Renamo combatants from the Mozambique conflict, formed the so-called "Third Force" being used to destabilise black townships.

Anti-apartheid activists believe Boipatong was chosen because a local white police commander had been shot dead in the area the previous day.

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PO Box 32723
Braamfontein 2017
Johannesburg
South Africa
Phone: (011) 403-4450/1
Fax: 339-1422

HRC SPECIAL BRIEFING

ON MASSACRES

1 July 1992

INTRODUCTION

The Boipatong massacre of 17 June has prompted the Human Rights Commission (HRC) to look into its records of major massacres that have occurred with sickening frequency since July 1990. That month was the month during which Inkatha announced its formation of a nationally based political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a decision with far-reaching consequences in extending the five-year-old war in Natal beyond its borders, particularly to the PWV area.

THE RECORD OF MASSACRES

The picture that has emerged from our files of over 5000 politically-related incidents monitored from media reports, police unrest reports, community structures and others, is shown in the attached lists. They are compiled on the arbitrary premise that any incident in which ten or more people died should be classified as a massacre. It should be noted that while most incidents occurred over a period of a few hours, some of them took days or even weeks to unfold. The attached lists contain the barest of essential details in the interests of conciseness, but further details are to be found in the HRC Area Repression Reports for each month since July 1990 and in the source references contained therein.

Commissioners: Mr. Geoff Budlender, Dr. Max Coleman, Mr. Chris Dlamini,
Mr. Pius Langa, Mrs. Joyce Mabudafhasi, Dr. Diliza Mji, Fr. Smangaliso Mkhathshwa,
Mrs. Albertina Sisulu.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE MASSACRE RECORD

In the 2 years there have been 49 massacres costing the lives of 1250 people or, on the average, 25 deaths per massacre.

In 15 cases the death toll was higher than 25.

However, it is important to note that our premise of 10 or more deaths qualifying an incident as a massacre, does not take into account numerous other incidents encompassing over 6000 deaths and 13 000 injuries during the period, which could also properly be described as massacres.

THE CHARACTER OF THE MASSACRES

A number of points emerge very strongly about the nature and objectives of the massacres :

- * The drive by Inkatha to establish political influence, membership and even territory, is the predominant theme.
- * The tactics of extreme terror, used indiscriminately against township communities, to paralyse, immobilise and disorganise, is a complementary theme.
- * The use of hostels as bases from which to plan and launch these activities.
- * The persistent reports of security force complicity in these massacres, as well as involvement of unidentified whites.
- * Retaliation which sometimes produces its own massacres.

WHERE THE MASSACRES TOOK PLACE

Natal

During the last two years, 11 massacres costing the lives of 167 people were recorded in Natal. It must be added that these have not been the only massacres experienced by the region; one must go back a further five years or so to grasp the full picture.

The sub-regional breakdown is as follows :-

Midlands	- 5 massacres (79 lives)
North Coast	- 3 massacres (33 lives)
South Coast	- 2 massacres (37 lives)
Durban	- 1 massacre (18 lives)

PWV

Since July 1990, there have been 38 massacres costing the lives of 1083 people in the PWV area as follows :-

East Rand	- 14 massacres (476 lives)
Soweto	- 9 massacres (245 lives)
Vaal	- 8 massacres (195 lives)
Alexandra	- 4 massacres (89 lives)
West Rand	- 2 massacres (57 lives)
Johannesburg	- 1 massacre (21 lives)

WHO WERE THE PERPETRATORS ?

In most cases, media and other reports on massacres refer to allegations or deductions about the identity or source of the attackers, sometimes corroborated by legal evidence. On this basis it has been possible to make assessments as to the identity of the alleged attackers. An analysis of the lists yields the following :-

- * IFP (members, supporters, elements) were responsible for 34 massacres (69%).
- * "Vigilantes" of unspecified affiliation, but certainly aligned with IFP, were responsible for 3 massacres (6%).
- * Security Forces (SAP, SADF, KZP) were directly responsible for 4 massacres (8%).
- * Township residents and ANC supporters had a responsibility in 6 massacres (12%).
- * No clue as to the identity of the attackers was available in 10 massacres.
- * There was shared responsibility in 8 massacres, either in the case of two parties openly attacking together, or in the case of opposing parties being equally responsible.

WHO WERE THE VICTIMS ?

Assessment of the identity or affiliation of the victims is obviously an easier matter than in the case of the perpetrators. Furthermore being exactly complementary to the attackers, statistics on victims provide additional confirmation of statistics on perpetrators.

The following emerges from the lists:-

- * Township residents were the victims in 36 massacres (73%).
- * Residents specifically identified as ANC supporters were additionally victims in 10 massacres (20%).
- * IFP members and supporters were victims in 9 massacres (18%).
- * In 6 massacres both opposing parties were assessed to be victims of one another, and having a joint responsibility.

Mention should also be made of the following features of a number of massacres:-

- * Funerals and vigils were attacked on 3 occasions.
- * Places of public recreation (beerhall, tavern) were attacked on 2 occasions
- * Commuters (train, bus) were attacked on 3 occasions.

THE ISSUE OF COLLUSION

Repeated and persistent reports have emerged, both in Natal since the mid-eighties and in the PWV since July 1990, of collusion between the Security Forces (SAP, SADF, KZP, etc) and vigilante groupings, primarily elements within Inkatha. Allegations of Security Force complicity in massacres appear frequently in reports from eyewitnesses.

In the attached lists, such allegations have been made in the cases of 19 massacres (39%), which is a frequency difficult to ignore.

Furthermore, allegations of the presence of unspecified or unidentified whites in support of vigilante massacres appears in 8 cases. Again such reports are so persistent that they cannot be discounted.

Finally it must be said that the abysmal record of the authorities in arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators, provides further reason to believe that they are part of the problem.

CONCLUSION

Major massacres over the last two years have been happening at the rate of two a month. There can be little doubt that there is a design and purpose behind most of them that places them alongside the gas chambers of Nazi Germany in sheer cold-blooded cynicism and brutality. The horrifying trail of massacre after massacre fully confirms the correctness of the declaration by the international community that the Apartheid system is a crime against humanity.

THE GUARDIAN
Thursday June 25 1992

South Africa's ruling elite fails to grasp black despair

Whites miss point about Boipatong

David Beresford
in Johannesburg

ONE of the more threatening aspects of the political crisis arising out of last week's Boipatong massacre is the apparent failure of the white population to comprehend the feelings of blacks about the political slaughter.

On South Africa's breakfast television yesterday morning a white interviewer was plaintively asking political scientists why there was any distinction — other than that of numbers — between the killings in Boipatong township and those of whites on farms murdered by "men carrying AK-47 rifles".

A current affairs programme on Tuesday night ran a lengthy documentary on Palestinian killings of informers in the occupied territories, clearly intended to show that South Africa was not the only country with political troubles.

"More than 600 people have died there in the last five years," said the anchorman sol-

emly, seemingly oblivious to the contrast with South Africa where 6,000 people have been killed in less than two and a half years.

On radio chat-shows, white callers betray an unintentional but appalling indifference to the impact the violence has on the lives of blacks. Yesterday a saleswoman was to be heard complaining about the dangers she ran when driving in the vicinity of a black township. "I feel quite safe at home," she said brightly of her white suburb which has gone untouched.

It is this sort of attitude among whites that is creating pressure in the ANC, particularly among militant youths, for random attacks in the white areas to try to bring home to the ruling elite the crisis of violence. Nelson Mandela said in a recent speech that such a strategy would be a "disaster of the first magnitude", adding: "One cannot stop the violence by killing innocent people."

But there was some understanding of the desperation in the townships from an unexpected quarter yesterday: the

white business community. The Johannesburg newspaper, Business Day, ran an editorial sympathetic to the ANC's withdrawal from the Codesa constitutional talks in protest over official inaction on the Boipatong killings.

Describing the ANC position as "conciliatory", it said: "It could have been all too easy for the ANC's leadership to respond to supporters' frustration by taking the battle back to the streets. . . ."

"What is now needed from government's side, from the side of white business, church and political groups, and from the side of other participants in Codesa, is a display of awareness of the plight of black South Africans.

"The ANC has called for June 29 to be a day of mourning for the people slaughtered in Boipatong. That call is not an attempt to win cheap political points. Rather, it provides an opportunity for all South Africans to display their commonality; their common need for peace. We must all mourn on that day."

CATALOGUES OF TERROR

'...from January 1990 to the end of March 1992 - more than 7,000 people have been killed, victims of large-scale attacks on whole communities, of targeted assassinations, of attacks by mysterious killers on commuter trains, of unprovoked shootings by the security forces, or of torture in police custody. Many others have been injured, made homeless, or forced to go into hiding out of fear of assassination. More than 400 people died in March 1992 alone, during a surge in political violence particularly marked in the run-up to the 17 March referendum. During these two years of intense violence, the victims have come from across the political spectrum. The overwhelming majority of them, however, have been members or perceived sympathizers of the ANC and other formerly banned organizations, members of trade unions and human rights and peace groups, as well as people of unknown affiliation who died during attacks on commuter trains.'

SOUTH AFRICA - State of Fear, Amnesty International, London, June 1992

'Natal and large parts of the Transvaal are being torn apart by a terrible strife. Fear stalks the townships and the countryside. Law and order has broken down, the police do not protect the people and people do not trust the police. Policemen are partisan and misconduct is rife. The situation has become significantly worse since the International Commission of Jurists' last mission to South Africa in August and September 1990. We suspect this is mainly because the Government has failed to take effective action to curb the violence. The result is that it would not be possible at present to hold free and fair elections, on the basis of one person one vote, in the parts of South Africa we have visited. Elections must be held soon. Bringing the violence under control is, therefore, the most serious challenge which faces South Africa.'

AGENDA FOR PEACE - An Independent Survey of the Violence in South Africa, the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, June 1992

'Residents of Boipatong in the Vaal area claim the dilapidated KwaMadala hostel on the edge of Iscor's Vanderbijlpark steelworks is being used as a springboard for Inkatha attacks on residents in the Vaal. A comprehensive report compiled by the Congress of South African Trade Union's Western Transvaal Region shows a significant increase in the number of incidents of violence and intimidation in the area since November 1990. Residents in the area have claimed that the KwaMadala hostel is used to house people who are not employees of Iscor. The hostel was re-opened after clashes between Inkatha supporters and ANC supporters at the Iscor's KwaMaziza hostel. Despite denials by Iscor that people who are not employed at the company reside at the hostel - eight of the accused in the Nangalembe Night Vigil attack gave their addresses as KwaMadala despite the fact that they do not work for the company. Khetisi Kheswa implicated in various assaults and murders in the Vaal has on more than one occasion sought refuge at the KwaMadala Hostel. He too was never employed by Iscor.'

FORTRESSES OF FEAR, Independent Board of Inquiry, Johannesburg, June 1992

'Cynics might suggest that the violence can be used as a reason to postpone the elections for a Constituent Assembly, but this is not an option. If the violence is not stopped now, it will run out of control and become endemic and there will be no winners. It is also having a very adverse effect on the economy. Violence is the most pressing problem which South Africa faces.'

AGENDA FOR PEACE - An Independent Survey of the Violence in South Africa, the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, June 1992

'On the basis of the many interviews with South Africans conducted for this report, Africa Watch concludes that there is abundant evidence that the state is implicated in the past six years of so-called "black on black" violence. The bias of the state security forces, who have either intervened or failed to intervene on a selective basis, has fueled the conflict. Despite the pressure for reform from some elements in the state, the government has failed to deal effectively with the violence and the behavior of the security forces. While the reasons for the actions of the security forces and government officials are complex, one of the most obvious factors is frequently overlooked by the press and by political commentators. That is, the Inkatha movement led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi holds government power in the KwaZulu "homeland" and has at its direct disposal an arm of the South African state - namely, the KwaZulu Police. The other major party to the conflict, the ANC and a constellation of organizations affiliated with it, was only legalized in February 1990, following three decades of underground operation and severe state repression. Inkatha members hold government office, while government agents have imprisoned, tortured and executed ANC members. On those ground alone, it is scarcely surprising that the organs of the state display some partiality between the two in the current conflict.'

THE KILLINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA - The Role of the Security Forces and the Response of the State, Africa Watch, New York, January 1991

'The overwhelming message received by Amnesty International's representatives in the townships and squatter camps was one of enormous frustration, anger and fear. The residents felt unprotected from murderous attacks against them in their homes and while commuting to and from work. As one resident of the East Rand township of Thokoza expressed it, "the situation is very tense. You feel that you can die at any time." The residents saw the police as indifferent and unresponsive when they went to them for assistance. They felt helpless - that they had nowhere to go when they heard shooting during the night or when armed thugs turned up outside their homes. They saw the police, as of old, as hostile and biased. They viewed with bitterness and cynicism the failure of the police to catch killers or act against mobs of heavily armed men moving about the streets with impunity. They compared the rarity with which the police searched and seized weapons from the black migrant workers' hostels, which in many areas had been taken over by Inkatha Freedom Party supporters, with the vigour, indeed brutality, with which the same police raided the homes of ANC supporters, especially where they were suspected of being members of self-defence units or the armed wing of the ANC. The anger at this lack of even-handedness by the police was compounded by the occasions when residents saw the police as actively colluding with their attackers.

'Amnesty International's representatives were moved by the patience and courage of many community leaders who, despite highly provocative circumstances, were resisting the temptation to retaliate with violence. Instead, they were working through "dispute resolution committees", which were gradually being set up under the terms of the September 1991 National Peace Accord agreed between representatives of the government, ANC, IFP and other political parties. Despite government pronouncements on the need for neutral policing, township residents evidently feared and distrusted the police. They saw police conduct as a major force perpetuating the violence.

'Confronting this dangerous and apparently intractable situation are human rights groups, lawyers, religious leaders, researchers and other monitoring and support groups. Amnesty International's representatives met a number of them and were struck by their dedication and courage. In quite different regional situations, all of them referred to instances over the past two years where the police had consistently failed to respond or intervene quickly to calls for help, even when human rights monitors had alerted them to an impending attack. In the wake of violent incidents, monitors described going to great lengths to encourage victims and witnesses to make sworn statements. These statements were handed to the police for investigation. Almost invariably, in the monitors' experience, nothing further had happened.'

SOUTH AFRICA - State of Fear, Amnesty International, London, June 1992