CIA war in Angola

A report from the Campaign for a Democratic Foreign Policy

Now, and for the last year, the CIA has been conducting a secret war in Angola. Begun even before the end of the Vietnam war last spring, the CIA covert war has led many Americans to question whether Angola has become "Ford's Vietnam".

Last January, Secretary of State Kissinger's powerful "40 Committee" ordered the CIA to intervene in the Angola war through the covert supply of rifles, machine guns, artillery, and ammunition, and, more recently U.S. mercenary soldiers (Newsday, December 12, 1975). In this war, which has already cost well over $50 million, the Administration has allied itself with the armies of white-ruled South Africa against the Angolan Popular Movement (MPLA). The Popular Movement is already recognized as the legitimate government of Angola by 15 black African nations.

Why are we at war in Angola?

Many Americans, wary of being stampeded into a new Vietnam war, are looking carefully at the Administration's justification for intervention in Angola.

Some arguments are easily answered, such as U.N. Ambassador Daniel Moynihan's warning that if the Soviet Union "takes over" Angola, they will be "next to Brazil" (New York Times, December 21, 1975). Moynihan neglects to mention that Angola and Brazil are separated by over 3,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean.

Other Administration statements require closer examination, particularly President Ford's belief that the war is a classic test of will for the United States in responding to a Soviet and Cuban takeover in Angola. This view flies in the face of evidence showing that:

1. The United States has no national security interests and no commitments in Angola.

No Administration official has disputed this. In fact, according to a definitive '1969 National Security Council report on U.S. policy in Africa, "Although the United States has many interests in southern Africa, it has none which could be classified as vital security interests" (NSSM 39, 1969).

2. Rather than as a response to the Soviets, U.S. intervention in Angola began 4 months before the start of significant Soviet arms shipments.

A recent New York Times investigation showed that as early as January, 1975, Secretary Kissinger's "40 Committee" ordered secret CIA intervention in Angola—despite the near-unanimous opposition of Africa experts in the State Department. Only in April did the Soviet Union respond with its first substantial shipment of war materiel to the Angolan Popular Movement (New York Times, December 15, 19, 1975).

3. Whatever the Soviet motives, Angola will not become a Soviet satellite state under the Popular Movement government.

In October, a Popular Movement spokesman declared, "We can assure you that we have fought for 14 years for the complete independence of the Angolan people, not to be under the umbrella of another power or another country" (Paulo Jorge, MPLA delegation to the United Nations). Repeatedly and categorically, the Popular Movement has announced that no foreign bases—including Soviet bases—would be allowed in Angola.

Knowledgeable observers are convinced that Angola under the Popular Movement government will follow a course similar to that of the former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Both governments came to power with significant Soviet military support, yet both have successfully refused to allow Soviet bases in their countries.

A new Vietnam?

On May 6, 1975, President Ford said, "I think the lessons of the past in Vietnam have already been learned, learned by Presidents, learned by Congress, learned by the American people, and we should have our focus on the future" (New York Times, May 7, 1975).

Now, Americans must decide whether to follow President Ford into an alliance with white-ruled South Africa to defend imaginary U.S. security interests, or to teach the lessons of Vietnam to the President by rejecting his policy in Angola.
We can stop this war now.

Congress voted for a war in Vietnam in 1964 without knowing it; don't let them make the same mistake.

Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964, setting “U.S. public support for virtually any action” in Vietnam by the President (Pentagon Papers, New York Times, p. 269). With virtually no domestic criticism, the resolution unanimously passed in the House, with only two “no” votes in the Senate.

It took ten years of citizen pressure to help end the war in Vietnam.

Public opposition culminated in a systematic effort between June, 1973, and April, 1975, which forced Congress to cut over $2.6 billion from the Administration's aid requests for Saigon and Phnom Penh.

We must carry this momentum of public antiwar pressure further. Americans must let Kissinger and Congress know, in no uncertain terms, that this is not 1964, and that public opinion against the war in Vietnam was not just against that single war. It was against a policy of U.S. interference in another country's affairs, whether in Vietnam, Chile, or Angola.

The Senate recently voted to cut off all funds for covert actions in Angola. The Tunney Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations bill, which Tom Wicker of the New York Times called “historic”, was passed by a wide margin of 52-22 on December 19.

A similar motion will be offered in the House by Representative Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) when Congress reconvenes on January 19, 1976. The Administration is using the Christmas recess to lobby the Representatives hard. Even should the Defense appropriations be defeated, Kissinger admits that funds from the 600% increase in Military Assistance to Zaire will be funneled into Angola.

Without organized public opposition, Kissinger's lobbying efforts in Congress will go unchallenged. Letter, telegrams and personal visits will be crucial to the outcome of this vote.

This first test of the lessons of Vietnam is a test for us all.

What you can do:

Write your Congressperson, or visit them in your town while they are on recess, demanding that she or he:

1. support the Giaimo motion, which prohibits covert aid to Angola, and immediate Congressional hearings on all U.S. activities in Angola;
2. support the Harrington amendment to defeat the Administration's Military Assistance Program request for indirect Angola aid through Zaire; and
3. oppose all CIA "covert operations" and urge that a special prosecutor be appointed to begin criminal proceedings against CIA officials for past and present illegal CIA activities.

For more information and copies of this leaflet, please contact:

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The Center for National Security Studies has prepared a 12-page Intelligence Report on Angola, available from their office.

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