Dear Friends:

Secret State Department documents written in May declared the Reagan Administration's intention to "work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional action." President Reagan has moved swiftly and decisively to do just that by establishing and consolidating an alliance with South Africa regardless of the consequences it will hold for United States domestic racial relations and US relations with its Western Allies and Black Africa. Not only has President Reagan called South Africa a "friendly country", he has matched those words with friendly deeds.

There is no better illustration of this growing partnership than the US response to the South African invasion of Angola. Urging that the invasion be understood "in its full context", the State Department response seemed intent on justifying the invasion—rather than condemning it. As further evidence of its new commitment to South Africa the US stood alone in its veto of a UN Security Council Resolution which denounced the South African invasion. The significance of this vote was not lost on South Africa or the rest of the world. Explaining the US response Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated in a major policy address that the US would not choose sides between Black and White in South Africa. The weak response by the Reagan Administration to South Africa's wanton aggression was wholeheartedly welcomed in Pretoria.

In its haste to offer carrots to South Africa, the Administration has undertaken initiatives that can only serve to increase South Africa's aggression both internally and externally. On the crucial issue of Namibia, the US has encouraged South African intransigence by further complicating the negotiating process. Crocker admitted in a State Department briefing that "As concerns the issue of constitutional matters, it has been our initiative—not a South African concern or desire—that we address constitutional matters before an election."

Moving on all fronts, the US defied a 1977 UN Sports Boycott and issued visas to the South African Springboks rugby team, demonstrating its willingness to help South Africa break out of its isolation. It steadfastly refused to withdraw the visas despite mounting protest from US groups and a threatened boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics by Black African and Warsaw Pact states.

The US/South Africa military collaboration is also growing.
The Senate has now voted 66-29 for repeal of the Clark Amendment. If the House also votes for repeal the US most certainly will find itself allied with South Africa in any military intervention in Angola. The US has initiated an agreement with the South Africans to train its Coast Guard. This program has already begun. Moves are also underway to "normalize the level of (defense) attaches" in the embassies. A South African naval attache has already arrived at his post in Washington. The US has also consented to the posting of new honorary consuls in American cities. These consuls advocate pro-South African positions and dispense its propaganda.

We are enclosing an action alert which focuses on these and other issues and describes specific ways in which you can counter this growing alliance with South Africa. We are also enclosing an arguments sheet on how the South African invasion of Angola has intensified the need for the Clark Amendment.

Pretoria also seems determined to forge ahead in its systematic and destructive oppression of Blacks in South Africa knowing full well the Reagan Administration will not hold it accountable. The bulldozing of the squatter camps and "deportation" of the inhabitants back to the "homelands" together with the mass arrests taking place of union, political and student leaders are just two of the latest examples.

South Africa is intent on preserving its apartheid system in both Namibia and South Africa. The US by its actions has chosen to help it achieve its objectives. But South Africa should take note: neither its actions nor those of the US will end its international "polecat status". South Africa will simply have company, as the US government, too, becomes a pariah in the world community.

South Africa and its new ally must not be allowed to stop the liberation struggle being waged by the peoples of Southern Africa. The Washington Office on Africa is determined not to let that happen, but we need your help. Your past contributions have been tremendously helpful and we strongly urge you to continue your support. We hope that each of you can give at least $5.00. If you can afford more, please be as generous as possible. The rising costs of postage and printing are creating difficulties for us in continuing our work at a time when the work of our office has never been more crucial. The Reagan Administration is daily taking steps towards cementing its alliance with South Africa. We must be able to continue to inform you of these actions and how you can help counter them. Your support at this time will enable us to do just that.

Please send your contribution today. And we thank you for your continuing political and financial support.

Yours in the struggle,

Jean Sindab
Executive Director
The Reagan Administration's rush to form a close alliance with South Africa has been slowed down by citizens concerned with promoting a progressive U.S. foreign policy towards the Southern African region. Thus far, we have defeated an administration move to appoint Dr. Ernest Lefever, a pro-apartheid advocate, as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. We have won crucial House Committee votes to retain the Clark Amendment which prohibits U.S. military aid to any faction in Angola (7 to 0 in the House African Subcommittee and 19 to 5 in the full House Foreign Affairs Committee). We have also prevented the South African rugby team, the Springboks, from playing in all but one municipal facility during their recent U.S. tour.

The clear message emerging from these actions is that an informed and mobilized citizenry can make a difference. We urge you, therefore, to take action on the following issues, so that we may continue to challenge the Reagan Administration's efforts to align itself with the racist apartheid regime of South Africa.

**RETAIN THE CLARK AMENDMENT**

By a lopsided vote of 66 to 29, the full Senate voted on September 30th to repeal the Clark Amendment. But the Congressional fight is not yet over. We still have ahead of us a vote in the House of Representatives where we are in a stronger position to prevent repeal. In order to do that, we must build on the House Foreign Affairs Committee action which, in May, refused the Administration's request for repeal. House members will no doubt take note of the Senate vote so it is imperative that they hear from their constituents and from national organizations opposing the Senate vote. Regardless of this Senate defeat, the growing U.S./South Africa alliance makes retention of the Clark Amendment all the more important. If the entire Congress agrees to repeal the Clark Amendment, it will be a clear sign that the U.S. condones and will collaborate with South Africa's regional aggression and its racist policies.

We cannot tell you exactly when the House vote will occur or even if it will come up this year. There are a number of reports that the House may not pass a 1982 foreign aid bill at all, forcing the administration to operate on a "continuing resolution." In this event, the Clark Amendment would of course remain on the books. But the next foreign aid bill for fiscal year 1983 will begin its way through the House in early 1982, so we must take action now.
Please write to your Congressional representative immediately urging him or her to vote with the majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to retain the Clark Amendment.

MAINTAIN EXPORT CONTROLS

Following the 1976 Soweto uprising, President Carter imposed a ban on exports to the South African military and police. In June 1981, the Reagan Administration published new regulations which allowed for the sale of medical equipment and supplies to the military. The new rules also permit the sale of hijacking equipment. However, exports of any other goods of U.S. origin to the South African military or police are still prohibited. By December 1981, the Department of Commerce will decide on whether to extend or revise the export controls currently in effect. The department has invited comments from the public on this issue.

Please write to: Richard J. Isadore, Director, Operations Division, Office of Export Administration, Room 1617M, Commerce Department, Washington, DC 20230, urging that export controls on South Africa remain in effect.

STOP COAST GUARD TRAINING

To deflect any possible public criticism, the Reagan Administration has quietly entered into an agreement to train officers for the South African Coast Guard. In August 1981, two South African military officers, one from the Navy and one from the Air Force, attended a three-week training course at a U.S. Coast Guard Academy. The State Department claims the training program is to help South Africa establish a "civilian" Coast Guard. At the same time, however, officials concede that this new program is to provide training in air-sea rescue techniques to protect the vital sea-lane routes around South Africa. Clearly, this is not the responsibility of a civilian Coast Guard, but it is an indication of the military nature of this training program. At present, no specific training schedule, program, or location has been disclosed by the State Department. Therefore, public protest against this program could end it.

We urge you to take the following action:

1. Alert your Congressional representatives to this new agreement between the U.S. and South Africa by writing a strong letter of protest against the program and urge them to pressure the Reagan Administration to terminate this agreement at once!

2. Alert your community and action networks about this new military cooperation. The Administration is definitely trying to keep this new agreement as quiet as possible. Don't let them succeed! Spread the word as much as possible about it, and urge people to take action.

3. Alert the media, community, and local political leaders. Urge editors to write stories or editorials on the new agreement. Urge officials to issue public statements protesting it.
Invasion Intensifies Need for Clark Amendment

September, 1981

South Africa launched another invasion of Angola on August 24, 1981, inflicting heavy loss of life and destruction of property. Aerial bombardments and attacking armoured columns of the South African military laid ruin to several towns in southern Angola and occupied others, penetrating as far as 250 miles north of the Namibian border. Although the South Africans have made no secret of the fact that they have made regular ground and air raids into Angola this past year, this latest attack is the largest since the June, 1980 South African invasion of Angola. Its purpose, according to the South Africans, was to rout out guerillas of the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, from their Angolan bases. However, South Africa's continued presence in southern Angola and the intensity of the invasion points to a much larger picture.

This invasion comes at a time when the Reagan Administration has asked for repeal of the Clark Amendment, passed in 1976, which prohibits U.S. military or paramilitary aid to any faction in Angola without Congressional authorization. Repeal of the Clark Amendment would mean certain re-entry of the U.S. in the Angolan conflict on the side of the South Africans in what is becoming an ever-widening war in Southern Africa. For this and other reasons the South African invasion intensifies the need for retention of the Clark Amendment.

1 Repeal of the Clark Amendment at this time would be the final evidence to Black Africa and our allies that the U.S. is committed to an alliance with South Africa. Creating even the possibility of U.S. military involvement on the side of Pretoria is to have this country join South Africa as a pariah in the international community. By casting the sole veto in the United Nations Security Council vote condemning South Africa's invasion, the U.S. has already isolated itself from the rest of the world. This action was justified by the administration on the grounds of placing the attack "in its full context." This "context" essentially blamed the Cuban presence in Angola and SWAPO guerillas, who are fighting for Namibian independence from illegal South African rule, for the South African invasion. In the face of South Africa's brutal attack, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated in a major policy speech: "We cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side or another in these disputes." This "non-alignment", expressed very clearly in the U.S. veto in the United Nations, has Pretoria smiling. As a South African official explained after the U.S. veto: "We are obviously pleased that the United States adopts a more realistic stance than the others..." The U.S. response to the invasion has identified this administration closely with South Africa and has, in the process, alienated Black Africa and our Western allies.
Repeal of the Clark Amendment coming on the heels of the South African invasion would only increase the presence and influence of the Soviets and Cubans in Angola. The proper "context" in which to view the widening war in Southern Africa is South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia. Pretoria's mandate over control of the territory was terminated in 1966 by the United Nations. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1971 that South Africa has no legal authority over Namibia. Yet, South Africa has refused to yield control of the territory, forcing the Namibian people to resort to armed struggle to free their country from oppressive colonial rule. South Africa's attacks into Angola are attempts to maintain its illegal presence by attacking SWAPO bases and weakening the Angolan government. To repulse these invasions of its sovereign territory, the Angolan government has been forced to call on Cuban troops. This forced dependence on the Cubans comes at a time when the Angolans are attempting to normalize relations with the U.S. Evidence of this is found in the Angolan government's good working relations with U.S.-based oil companies. Furthermore, Angolan leaders have stated repeatedly that the Cubans will leave Angola when a settlement is reached in Namibia and the South African threat disappears. However, the Angolans have been forced to increase their dependence on the Cuban troops in the face of devastating South African attacks on their country. Faced with the additional threat of U.S. intervention to destabilize the Angolan government, the Cuban presence will be strengthened to help counter the possibility of a twin assault.

Repeal of the Clark Amendment would greatly encourage South African intransigence on Namibia. By refusing to criticize any of South Africa's policies, the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" was a signal to Pretoria that it could invade Angola with impunity. In their search for a military solution in Namibia, the South Africans destroyed Angolan air-defense systems in the south and killed hundreds of Angolans, Namibian refugees, and SWAPO guerillas in an attempt to militarily weaken SWAPO and drive it further north. By pushing SWAPO northward, South Africa hopes to extend the areas controlled by UNITA (the South African-supported guerilla movement which would receive U.S. arms if the Clark Amendment is repealed). If the South African military creates a UNITA buffer state along the Namibian border, it would enable Pretoria to bolster its client party in Namibia, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), should elections ever be held there. Opening the possibility of U.S. intervention on the side of South Africa would prolong Pretoria's stalling tactics on granting independence to Namibia.

Repeal of the Clark Amendment would be very damaging to the Namibia negotiations. The U.S. is now in the process of presenting a new plan for Namibian independence. The Angolan government has played a major constructive role in trying to bring about a Namibian settlement. Despite continuing South African bombing raids into Angola, its leaders have persuaded SWAPO to accept the compromises worked out by the Western Five Contact Group (U.S., Canada, West Germany, France, and Great Britain). If any new plan is to be accepted internationally, it must have the approval of the Front Line States and SWAPO. The intensification of the war, together with the repeal of the Clark Amendment, which holds the threat of renewed U.S. intervention in collaboration with South Africa, would clearly not produce a conducive atmosphere in which to gain the acceptance of any new plan.

Repeal of the Clark Amendment at this time would play directly into the hands of the South African government. Pretoria has very shrewdly attempted to situate the regional conflict in East-West terms hoping to draw the U.S. into a military role in Southern Africa. Should this happen, the U.S. could find itself involved in a deepening military quagmire on the side of South Africa. Retention of the Clark Amendment, however, would set back South Africa's aggressive drive in the region and give the United Nations plan for Namibia a chance to be implemented. It would display to the world that the American people are interested in peaceful initiatives to reach a settlement in Namibia and are opposed to any further alliance with apartheid South Africa.