Information is ammunition for your struggle. A fighter without ammunition is not a fighter. And for you, a fighter without information cannot speak.

Samora M. Machel, President of FRELIMO to CFM delegation, Dar es Salaam, 8/71.

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE 1972 ELECTIONS

In the past decade, parallel to American expansion in other parts of the world, there has been a growing involvement of American interests in Africa, especially in the white-ruled countries of Southern Africa. The U.S. global strategy that has taken shape in the last few years has two complementary aspects: on the one hand, it seeks to contain by military means the revolutionary impetus of "people's wars" which threaten Western economic domination over the Third World. On the other, it aims at creating the preconditions for a neo-colonialist solution which would secure political control by a Western-oriented elite without changing the basic economic relationships. This strategy has recently culminated in Nixon's diplomatic maneuvers in China and the Soviet Union aimed at establishing a new world system based on balance of power and mutual acceptance of spheres of influence, while the most ruthless bombing and killing goes on in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.

As far as Africa is concerned, the world system that has begun to emerge during the Nixon era has its centers of gravity in the
relatively more developed and/or strategically more important countries of the continent. What is at stake is the creation and strengthening of "sub-imperialist" areas which would be closely tied into the economic and military system of the West and which would in turn dominate the poorer countries. While the U.S. on the average has maintained a "low profile" in Africa, and Africa would appear to be one of the minor concerns of American business and defense strategy, concentrations of American investment and military aid are present in selected areas of the continent, most importantly in the Portuguese "colonies" of Angola and Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia (South West Africa).

The growing involvement in this region has taken a sharp upward turn in the Nixon years. However, American interests have been pointing in the same direction during the past decade under different Administrations. Kennedy's attempt to oppose Portugal in the U.N. during the Angolan crisis of the early 1960's was quickly reversed. Military equipment has continued to flow to Portugal under the cover of NATO, and Portuguese officers are being trained by American advisers in the most recent techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. Millions of dollars in investment by large American banks and corporations have poured into the economies of Portugal, South Africa and Zimbabwe, aided by tax credits, government loans and most recently in the case of Rhodesia by Executive sanctioned Congressional amendments which circumvented U.N. sanctions against that country. The growing American support for the white regimes of Southern Africa has become obvious in the past two years, with the first U.S. veto cast in the U.N. in favor of the racist government of Rhodesia; with the resumption of mineral imports from the Smith regime in open violation of U.N. resolutions which the U.S. Government had supported; and, most blatantly, with the new Azores agreement concluded by Nixon with Portugal which provides some $400 million worth of credit to the Lisbon regime and a $48 million Ex-Im Bank loan to South Africa.

Several important Western aims can be attained by strengthening the present political and economic systems of Southern Africa. The area has substantial natural resources such as oil, copper and gold. The development of its industrial potential within a Western framework would assure important markets to the multinational corporations that are investing there. Its dominant economic position in the subcontinent would increasingly draw into its sphere the independent (and often anti-West) countries to the north and make them increasingly dependent on the white minority regimes. From a military point of view, the area occupies a vital strategic position. Western nations fear an increase of Russian and Chinese influence in the area through their aid to the liberation movements
as well as links to independent Africa. Western nations hope to minimize this influence by the success of counterinsurgency operations, thereby definitely incorporating Southern Africa into the Western economic, political and military system.

Recent history, however, shows that this grand design cannot be pursued without substantial violence and bloodshed. In Namibia there have been large-scale strikes by miners and farmworkers; in South Africa, many universities were forced to close down because of student protests; while in Zimbabwe, black protests soundly defeated British proposals for a settlement with the white minority regime. The revolutions in Angola and Mozambique have advanced by leaps and bounds to the point where, as in Vietnam, a neo-colonialist solution may no longer be possible. But still U.S.-made napalm and herbicides are dropped over the liberated areas of these countries by U.S.-made planes, while the African people are herded into strategic hamlets. South Africa has stepped up its policy of total segregation and is well on the way to extending it to Namibia. Yet while the white regime continues to repress all political opposition, it succeeds in its public relations campaign and outward policy to appear to be liberalizing. In Zimbabwe the Smith regime patterns its actions on those of its South African allies, and thousands of Africans have been forcibly removed from the "white" areas.

In the attempt to stabilize the region and guarantee their continued influence, the Western powers are thus forced to support increasingly open repression. This fact clarifies the issues for the liberation movements which have become aware of the necessity to wage a total revolution that will prevent their absorption into a neo-colonialist framework even after so-called political independence comes. At the same time contradictions are developing within the imperialist camp as people in the U.S. achieve a better understanding of the real meaning of the Vietnam war in the overall scheme of American foreign policy and become aware of the need to adopt a global anti-imperialist perspective. One of the results of this increased consciousness is the growing activism around Southern African issues in the Black community and among church and campus groups, some of whose demands were in fact picked up by the Democratic Party in their 1972 Platform.

Although Nixon has sharply stepped up the American commitment to racism and minority rule in Southern Africa, there has been a steady growth of U.S. involvement over several different Administrations. The economic, strategic and political interests
mentioned above are an integral part of the present American system and are likely to influence to a large extent the policies of any President. Nevertheless, the McGovern platform position on Southern Africa, written under the pressure of many groups and individuals that have been seriously involved in these issues, notably Rep. Charles Diggs, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, offers some real contrasts to the Nixon position.

Although McGovern is not an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist candidate, and although a proposed platform plank by Diggs urging the U.S. to "acknowledge the sacred right" of the liberation movements to use "whatever means are necessary . . . to win their freedom" was not put in, the Africa section of the Democratic Party Platform offers possibilities for real change. The Preamble recognizes the "struggle against racism and colonialism" as central to African politics today; declares that "we stand for full political, civic and economic rights for blacks and other non-white peoples in Southern Africa"; and seeks an end to "U.S. complicity with [white minority] governments." Although we can't know what such ritual expression of support for the African majority really means, the Democratic call for an end to U.S. complicity with white regimes stands in clear contrast to Nixon's statement of February, 1971 that:

we intend to do what we can to encourage the white regimes to adopt more generous and more realistic policies towards the needs and aspirations of their black citizens.

The specific alternatives which the Democratic Party Platform offers to past and present policy include: (1) the end of military aid to Portugal and the cancellation of the Nixon $436 million deal; (2) vigorous support of the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia, especially on chrome; (3) full support to U.N. assertion of control over Namibia; (4) clear U.S. opposition to racial totalitarianism in South Africa including pressing U.S. corporations for equal pay and opportunity at all levels within South Africa; and (5) (regardless of action on the last point) denial of tax credits in the U.S. for those taxes paid to the white minority ruled countries in Africa.

Despite the potential positive import of the platform it does not go far enough in recognizing the real nature of the forces of oppression in Africa. It also ignores the forces in this country which work against implementation of the planks. The very "racism and colonialism" which the Democratic Platform so facilely finds at the center of African politics could not exist without the direct (through government) and indirect (through business) support by the great Western powers, particularly Britain and the U.S. That is, Western corporate interests are best served by access to cheap labor, low-cost raw materials, and available markets provided by investing in colonialist and white-minority states.
In this context the ambiguities of the phrase "all military aid to Portugal should be stopped" assumes greater importance. Very little U.S. military aid goes bilaterally to Portugal — large quantities of weapons used in Africa reach Portugal through NATO. This means that a real cessation of military aid to Portugal is contingent on Portugal's expulsion from NATO. Moreover, much of the equipment that can be used in counterinsurgency warfare does not wear the technical label of "military aid." Recent examples are two Boeing 707's sold without condition to Portugal and admittedly used for troop transport to Africa, and the U.S.-made Piper and Cessna planes used by South African mercenaries to spray herbicides on liberated areas of Mozambique. Where does McGovern stand on these more complex questions of U.S.-Portuguese relations?

Equally ambiguous are the platform planks supporting the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia and U.N. control over Namibia. Such support is a small step, but we need to go beyond it. U.N. actions are only as strong as member nations choose to make them. In fact, in the absence of any enforcement procedures, U.N. resolutions on Southern Africa are blatantly ignored — for example, something like $200 million worth of Rhodesian exports per year are reported as goods coming from Portuguese controlled areas of Mozambique and South Africa. The critical question with regard to these two points is whether McGovern stops at technical support of U.N. resolutions, which Nixon has not done, or whether he foresees the U.S. taking an aggressive leadership role in their enforcement.

The last two platform planks are rather contradictory. The first, calling for "U.S. businesses in South Africa to take measures for the fullest possible justice for black employees" is unacceptable since the very presence of these concerns in white-minority ruled countries assists in strengthening their economies, insuring the continuance of the status quo. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the last recommendation which, in calling for an end to tax credits for these businesses, borders "quite close to a U.S. government ordered withdrawal of U.S. investment from white ruled Africa." (Africa Report, July-Aug., 1972) Which do the Democrats really mean?

The ambiguities of each point of the plank would be clarified in practice, and an evaluation of them must consider the probabili-
ity of their implementation in light of the various national constituencies which have strong positions on Southern African issues. The fact that the growing Black/church/campus constituency for majority rule in Southern Africa had sufficient clout to affect the Democratic Platform is not insignificant -- this is the first substantive plank on Southern Africa in U.S. history. But two other constituencies -- the business elite and the foreign policy establishment -- can be expected to offer vigorous opposition to the implementation of the strongest points in the plank.

Ever since its creation, NATO has been sacred to the foreign policy establishment, and any threats to its status quo is regarded as blasphemy of the worst sort. Recent European tours by McGovern campaign aides, designed to quiet European NATO leaders' fear of a McGovern presidency (and thus the fears of their supporters in this country), and the post-convention silence on the $30 billion defense fund cuts, suggest the strength of this constituency. Its opposition to the expulsion of Portugal from NATO, no matter how blatantly its NATO weapons are used to suppress liberation movements in Southern Africa, is a certainty.

But such opposition might seem mild compared to business resistance to the termination of tax credits for U.S. concerns paying taxes to white minority governments. The level of U.S. business presence in these countries is high, and involves the most prestigious and powerful American firms. The selective elimination of tax credits would almost certainly require a legislated change in U.S. tax law, and against a coordinated lobby of businesses with investments in Southern Africa (witness the power of the pro-Rhodesian lobby), such legislation would have little hope of success.

In the heat of the campaign with its promises, compromises, and appeasements, Southern Africa has not been an issue. How important would the Southern Africa plank, sure to raise such fierce opposition, be to President McGovern?

Neither the substantive criticisms above, nor an awareness of the strength of the opposition to the platform, however, should blind us to its historical significance. The strong protests at Harvard and elsewhere over Gulf Oil and other corporate giants; the demonstrations by the Norfolk, Va. Black community against Portugal and NATO; the refusals by longshoremen to unload Rhodesian chrome; and the spreading anti-corporate campaigns have set in motion a process and created a growing anti-imperialist awareness that may grow to threaten politicians of both parties. The Democratic Party Platform represents the first major party recognition of that new consciousness. It is crucial that we do not see this recognition as a victory for our struggle, and do not sit back waiting for the Democratic Party to change American policy on Africa. The reforms represented in the platform may not be implemented if we do not keep constant pressure on the system, both before and after the election. We must make a continuous effort to relate Southern Africa issues to our institutions here, and the election can be seen as another way of applying pressure for American support for the struggle against racism and colonial-
ism in Southern Africa. But it must not blind us to the context in which American policy has developed, nor substitute for our continued direct support of the struggle of our brothers and sisters in Southern Africa and the rest of the Third World.

What Can We Do?

1. **Work in the Election Campaign?** There is disagreement among the members of CFM on the importance and value of this activity, rooted largely in the arguments expressed above. Certainly there is a difference between the candidates, and Nixon's record on Southern Africa is abhorrent. Equally, any participation in campaign work should also be used to educate people about U.S. involvement in Southern Africa. In this context, some CFM members think that hard work for McGovern is an important tool in the struggle for justice, while others doubt that the election should be allowed to divert any of our time or energy from direct anti-imperialist work.

2. **Direct Support to the Liberation Movements.** The movements receive various forms of assistance from a number of countries and organizations, but their needs are unlimited as they work to build new countries simultaneous with waging wars of liberation. CFM has information on the needs of FRELIMO and how to ship goods (clothes, medicines, books) to Africa. Monies can be sent directly to the movements (through CFM for FRELIMO). Other organizations such as the Africa Fund (164 Madison Ave., NYC 10016) work to aid projects related to the movements such as the Mozambique Institute. Write us for details.

3. **Anti-Corporate Campaigns.** Check the involvement of your institution (church, school) in corporations involved in Southern Africa; look at its investment portfolio, question the involvement, demand action. Campaigns are already underway against Gulf, several banks. Again contact us for more information.

4. **Informational Work.** It is necessary to find ways to break through the wall of silence which the media has built around Africa and especially the revolutionary struggles there. There is a lot of literature, a number of films, speakers on Southern African issues. Set up a literature table, call a meeting. Let us know your needs.

5. **Congress.** You can always write to your Congressmen, but it is not an effective action on the whole. It may be more significant to research their records on Southern Africa (for information on this contact Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002), and their corporate connections as well as other institutional links. Important legislative bills on Africa are available from the above Committee.

6. **Demonstrations, Celebrations, Etc.** Sometimes these actions serve as good tools to involve people and to do general informational work or create specific pressures. Thus it is always wise to choose a particular target (South African Airways office, Portuguese Consulate, Gulf station) or a day, such as September 25 for FRELIMO, as an occasion for solidarity demonstrations.
Dear Friend of Mozambique,

This month's newsletter is longer than usual and is the result of a lot of discussion in which we attempted to synthesize our different points of view on the significance of the elections for southern Africa. We invite your comments.

At long last we have finished the FRELIMO button which has on it a picture of the late Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, first President of FRELIMO, with the words "FRELIMO Venceremos." Five thousand buttons are being sent to FRELIMO for use by troops. Let us know if you are interested in ordering any.

Robert Van Lierop and Robert Fletcher (interviewed in News and Notes #12) have completed their new film, "A Luta Continua." The film is excellent, giving good background information on Portuguese colonialism and on southern Africa as a whole as well as on FRELIMO's work. We recommend it highly. Contact us for rental details if you would like to order the film.

We would like to let you know about the formation of a new Black American and African group, African Information Service, which is engaged in anti-imperialist work concerning southern Africa. We suggest you write to the AIS for information at 112 W. 120th St., N.Y., N.Y. 10027.

On September 25 Congressman Louis Stokes from Ohio, head of the Congressional Black Caucus, read a statement into the Congressional record supporting FRELIMO's struggle for independence and condemning U.S. complicity with Portugal. The statement was read in honor of the eighth anniversary of FRELIMO's struggle.

To conclude, we want to thank you for your contributions in response to our last mailing which will be of great help in our continuing work of support for the Mozambican struggle.

Venceremos,
Committee for a Free Mozambique