1977 has ushered in new complexities in the struggle for Zimbabwean national liberation. The collapse of the Geneva negotiations has stepped up the struggles of all forces involved. The conference adjourned on Dec. 15, and was scheduled to reconvene on Jan. 17. Ivor Richard, Britain’s man-in-charge at Geneva, subsequently undertook his own shuttle diplomacy in Southern Africa to put forward Britain’s plan to replace the Kissinger proposals which had been rejected by the nationalist forces. The Richard Plan proposed a transitional government composed of an Interim Commission appointed by Britain, and a Council of Ministers composed of five members from each of the forces at Geneva (ZANU* ZAPU* ANC* Sithole, the Rhodesia Front and other white forces). This plan was considered acceptable by the U.S., South Africa, and the liberation forces as a basis to return to Geneva. But on Jan. 24, Ian Smith rejected the plan and scuttled the effort for a negotiated settlement.

WHAT THE SMITH REGIME IS UP TO

Ian Smith denies that he was responsible for the failure of the peace talks, and claims that once the Kissinger proposals were abandoned by Britain and the liberation forces, he was justified in ending negotiations. He has been under increasing pressure from white reactionary forces at home, which were responding to the intensified armed struggle in Zimbabwe. For instance, there were rumors of a right-wing military coup. Some white settlers announced a “scorched earth” policy, meaning they would destroy everything rather than turn over property to blacks.

Smith is now unilaterally trying to negotiate the Kissinger proposals with moderate blacks—this is the so-called “internal solution.” Smith is now looking for and engineering the black forces with which he will negotiate. A primary figure in this is Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the ANC, of whom Smith said, “The Muzorewa delegation is the most responsible and probably the best behaved.” Smith has also set up an organization named Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization (ZUPO), headed by Chief Chirau and other tribal chiefs loyal to the government.

WHAT SOUTH AFRICA IS UP TO

South African Prime Minister Vorster continues to favor a negotiated settlement, knowing full well the threat that armed struggle for true national liberation in Zimbabwe poses to his own regime. He also hopes that his role in dealing with Smith will gain South Africa more credibility on the international scene and with African neo-colonial countries. There is trouble on the home front, however, with rising unemployment, decreasing foreign investment and increasing black resistance, which has mobilized the more intransient white forces against abandoning Smith. Therefore, he has given public assurances that he will not force Smith beyond the bounds of the Kissinger Plan. Also, Vorster told Ivor Richard that South Africa would not tolerate any guerrilla action in Zimbabwe that would in turn jeopardize South African security. This raises the specter of the use of South African troops if the guerrilla war widens.

NEW U.S. POLICY?

The Carter administration seems to be adopting a new posture in Southern Africa, aimed at blunting the image of U.S. involvement in Angola. It consists of outright support for Portuguese colonialism and Southern Africa white settlerism, until this became a losing strategy with the defeat of Portugal in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, outlined current U.S. policy as supporting a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Richard Plan. But he also made it clear that the U.S. does not accept the endorsement of the Patriotic Front as the coming government of Zimbabwe.

Cyrus Vance has recently asked the Senate to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which authorizes U.S. corporations to break UN sanctions against trade with Rhodesia. But despite these public displays of a new African policy, the real relationship remains unchanged. Vance said outright the chrome can be imported through South Africa, a known outlet for Rhodesian chrome. The U.S. has shown no indications of really pressuring Smith through forcing South Africa to close its borders. When young was asked i the U.S. would impose sanctions on South Africa, he said, "I don’t see sanctions."

What does the U.S. have up its sleeve? One tactic is intervening economically. On Jan. 20, 200, a new AID study was to have been completed, putting forth “a new kind of intervention that is more likely to succeed than our intervention in Angola.” The details are unpublished, but it was attacked by ZANU as a vehicle to block the development of black revolutionary governments.
SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

The Patriotic Front has said that the armed struggle must be heightened because the main priority is the military defeat of the Smith regime. The Patriotic Front won a victory in early January at the Conference of Frontline Presidents when the Patriotic Front was recognized as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people. This, in fact, recognized the validity of armed struggle by supporting the leader of the freedom fighters, ZIPA. Nyerere of Tanzania said, "We have reiterated our conviction that armed struggle is due to the existence of colonialism, oppression, and racism in Zimbabwe. Once these are eliminated, the armed struggle will end." Then at the OAU-Liberation Committee meeting from Jan. 28-Feb. 3, the Pan-African Army was authorized to defend the freedom fighters against pursuits of the Rhodesian Army into neighboring countries.

In Mozambique, Frelimo announced the founding of a Marxist-Leninist party, with a firm line on international solidarity with the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.

UPSURGE IN GUERRILLA RECRUITMENT

On the military front, the publicity of atrocities attributed to ZIPA has occupied front page headlines, an attempt to discredit the liberation forces as enemies of the people. More significant is that the Zimbabwean people are responding to the call for armed struggle in new proportions. For example, 400 students crossed into Botswana en masse and said they wanted to train as guerrillas and join the freedom fighters. The New York Times reported on Feb. 15 that thousands of recruits are crossing into Botswana where they are being airlifted by Zambian transports to Zambian bases. Sources close to the ZIPA high command say there are at least 2,500 guerrillas operating in the country, about 12,000 men and women training in the various camps in the frontline countries, and a vast reservoir of recruits in the refugee camps outside Zimbabwe.

At this time, the unity in the Patriotic Front is intact and supported by the Frontline states. However, the forces of imperialism will try to shake that unity wherever possible. For instance, Jason Moyo, a ZAPU leader, was assassinated for his instrumental role in forging the Patriotic Front and military unity. A dangerous possibility is that the new U.S. liberal administration will try to develop and back a rival army to ZIPA. It should be remembered that Senator Dick Clark of Iowa said that the U.S. should support African guerrillas if the Geneva talks fail. With this in mind, the massive recruitment in Zimbabwe of combatants entering the ZAPU bases in Zambia should be viewed with some apprehension, considering Zambian President Kaunda's recent statement and Nkomo's historical line. Kaunda told Andrew Young during his African tour that "U.S. intervention of a peaceful kind should be aimed at avoiding unnecessary bloodshed... We have a lot of confidence in the Carter administration." At this time Zambia's economy is highly stressed by falling world copper prices, opening Kaunda to pressures from the West.

JOSUA NKOMO KAUNDA AND YOUNG OPEN TO WESTERN PRESSURE?

And ZAPU's political history is a curious one. The Soviet Union has always supported ZAPU. In recent years, the Western powers have chosen ZAPU's leader Nkomo as the most acceptable black leader. However this has not diminished Soviet support for him. Is this recruitment for ZIPA under the leadership of a principled alliance in the patriotic Front, or is Nkomo subject to pressures to develop a rival "liberation army", which would catapult Zimbabwe into an Angola-type civil war aimed at destroying ZANU? This is not to belittle in any way the tremendous courage of the new recruits who are clearly sincere in their commitment to the struggle for national liberation, but rather to raise some troubling questions about the leadership.

WHITTLING AWAY AT RHODESIA'S ECONOMY

The war is hitting Rhodesia's economy hard. An indication of how tourism, formerly a money-spinner, has dropped off comes with the announcement that Rhodesia's largest hotel group, Meikles-Southern Sun, has declared 300 employees redundant, including 40 whites. This amounts to 15% of total staff and follows a previous reduction of 300 employees.

But perhaps one of the most significant indicators of the economic problems of Rhodesia is the fact that the Rhodesian Banking Corporation's Quarterly Review for January did not come out, "due to military commitments."
'Massacre' of Catholics in Rhodesia—a racist falsehood

By SARA RODRIGUES
Special to the Guardian

Luanda, Angola

The big headlines you read all week about black guerrillas in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) murdering seven white missionaries were lies.

And the lies were manufactured by the same people who ordered the massacre to begin with—the white racist regime of Premier Ian Smith.

According to the story ventilated by the white minority government, a unit of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) attacked the Roman Catholic St. Paul's Mission, 37 miles northeast of Salisbury, and systematically shot and killed the missionaries—two priests, four nuns and a lay brother. One priest survived.

Salisbury Minister of Information Elias Broomberg described the killings the next day as an infamous act carried out with all the animal brutality and cowardice which terrorists practice. He asked: 'When will the free world wake up and realize that this sort of thing, which is the stock in trade of these thugs—whom it is popular to call freedom fighters—must be wiped out?'

PATRIOTIC FRONT RESPONDS TO LIES

Responding immediately, the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front—the political organization associated with ZIPA—refuted the allegations. In a statement broadcast from Maputo, Mozambique, the liberation organization attributed the slayings to the infamous Selous Scouts—a special elite force of black puppet soldiers under control of the Smith government. The Scouts are similar to the Flechas in Angola and Grupos Especiais in Mozambique, organized by the fascist Portuguese during colonial days.

The Patriotic Front, composed of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), charged the Smith regime ordered the Selous Scouts to disguise themselves as guerrillas and to carry out the massacre in order to generate antiguerrilla propaganda.

According to the front broadcast, 'The murders are the latest in a series carried out by the Rhodesian racist forces against the clergy in Zimbabwe. The Smith regime has every reason to eliminate church leaders. They stay among the people. They see daily the atrocities that the fascists inflict on the struggling masses of Zimbabwe.'

Further discredit was cast upon the Salisbury story when the government announced Feb. 8 that the killers were not found because "heavy rains are hampering the search." Premier Smith's security forces rarely apologize for their inability to produce the culprits. The general practice is for the government forces to gun down Zimbabwe peasants after any genuine guerrilla action and claim they were dead guerrillas. Now that some skepticism is beginning to surface, the racist regime might just do this to complete its brutal fiction.

THE RACISTS' STRATEGY

By depicting the liberation soldiers as enemies of the people, the white regimes seek not only to gain international support for their racist cause but to turn the masses against the Patriotic Front, which is committed to armed struggle to free Zimbabwe from the minority government.

And by portraying the freedom fighters as 'savages' gunning slaying innocent white nuns and priests, the regimes are attempting to stem the growing—if belated and opportunistically—the churches of Southern Africa are beginning to extend to the liberation struggle.

Such a strategy is too sophisticated to have sprung from Smith's Rhodesia regime. As usual, its mentors can be found across the Beit Bridge in neighboring South Africa.

At a press conference in Chicago on November 17, 1976, Andrew Young stated what he saw as the only realistic US foreign policy option:

QUESTION: Some foreign policy observers have said that the US has two foreign policy options in southern Africa, one being neo-colonialism, the other being outright support of the minority government of South Africa. Could you just comment on that idea and what kind of options we have in southern Africa?

YOUNG: I don't even see that many. I don't think the United States has but one option and that's neo-colonialism.

As bad as that has been made to sound, neo-colonialism means that the multinational corporations will continue to have major influence in the development and productive capacities of the third world. And they are, whether we like it or not. I don't think any American administration—and I don't think any African administration—has yet been able to escape from that.

Now there will be greater or lesser controls. I think a Tanzania or an Angola will probably set a pretty strict line between the relationship between the sector that is government-controlled and the sector that is controlled by multinational corporations. But the problems of Africa directly relate to the fact that their wealth is mineral wealth and nobody has the technology to extract that wealth other than the multinational corporations. And even a so-called leftist government like Angola has from the very beginning, including in its revolutionary days, been closer to Gulf Oil Company than they have been able to get to the State Department.

And I just think that the capital and technology happens to be in the hands of the people who are called neo-colonialists. And while ideologically we've looked on that as bad, largely out of the writings of Kwame Nkrumah, because it took him a little too long to sense...you know, learn how to control that participation in his economy, and that was his undoing.

The multinational corporation is more pervasive in the world today than any military operation, or any government operation. Exxon is larger than all but four or five nations in the world and so when you say can they survive without neo-colonialism it is almost like saying can they survive being part of the tension between the United States and Russia or the United States and Japan in terms of trade matters. It's just there. And more and more nations have learned to relate to it and to live with it and to control it. That's what we've got to learn to do...I think gradually the nations of the third world are going to do the same thing. They are going to learn how to control these corporations.

Andrew Young Speaks Frankly:

THE RACISTS' STRATEGY

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For the past few years, the church—whether Roman Catholic or Protestant (with the exception of South Africa's Dutch Reformed)—has increasingly supported majority rule. While some individual missions, such as Mozambique's White Fathers order, and individual churchmen bravely poured personal rain (though rarely bodily harm) during the modern era of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, the various churches generally stood silent or actively supported the status quo. With the fall of the Portuguese empire, however, the churches became aware which way the winds were blowing and began to minister to their parishioners accordingly.
POLITICAL PRISONERS

Recently, at Geneva, Zimbabwean representatives of the Patriotic Front laid great stress on the question of political prisoners held by the racist Smith regime. While this problem, like many others, will be resolved by the final victory of the liberation forces in Zimbabwe, it is a matter which requires the most urgent attention of all those in solidarity with the struggle in Southern Africa. Not only has this question been ignored, of course, by the U.S. and Britain in their neo-colonialist designs, it unfortunately has not received the needed attention amongst progressive forces.

As in Chile and South Africa, the repressive Rhodesian settler regime can only be maintained with extreme repression, especially against the organized black political forces.

HISTORY OF POLITICAL REPRESSION

At present, at least 1750 Zimbabwean are held in Rhodesian jails for political reasons (according to some sources, the total approaches 3000), including 58 who face the death sentence. The majority face indefinite terms. Many have never been charged; others are held after having supposedly completed their sentences; still more are held though they won acquittal in court. At least 960 are held under the Emergency Powers established at the time of illegal Rhodesian "independence" in 1965.

There is a second group (at least 750) who are serving time under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1966, the most important weapon of legal repression utilized by the Smith government. This act allows for preventive detention and specifies sentences for political "crimes".

Hundreds of African nationalist leaders and supporters have been jailed since the late 1950's under such laws. In April 1964, two prison camps were set up specifically for long term detainees, at Wha Wha (near Gwelo in the midlands) and at Gonakudzingwa (in the southeast near Mozambique). Many still there were arrested in the early 1960's. While the 1966 law adds to the arsenal of legal and administrative weapons to attack African political activity, the differences between conviction in court and detention without trial have become a mere technicality.

In December, 1974, Smith, so as to aid the upcoming constitutional conference, agreed "to release the African leaders from detention and restriction and their followers as well." These numbered about 460 at the time. In reality, he proceeded to lock up more Africans. In October, 1975, the number had risen to 644. One year later the estimated figure was at least 800. There are many Zimbabweans who are detained at army bases, police stations, and local posts, while numerous persons are restricted in movement (and required to periodically report to police stations for up to five years), under Sections 55 and 56 of the Law and Order Act. Restrictees are often made to live on Tribal Trust Lands.

The people convicted for political offences include guerilla fighters, officials of the African National Council, and ordinary citizens. The majority are held in Maximum Security Prisons, the largest being Khami (near Bulawayo), Gwelo, and Salisbury. They have virtually no contact with the outside world.

Many of these prisoners had no direct connection with armed liberation forces. Their convictions were covered by the African Affairs Act (which outlaws political gatherings), the Unlawful Organizations Act (used to ban the main African parties), and the common law charge of public violence (used against political demonstrators). Immediately following a demonstration at Highfields (a Salisbury suburb) in June, 1975, where 11 Africans were shot dead, the government charged 68 Africans with public violence and inciting others to riot. Many received sentences of up to five years.

PRISON CONDITIONS

In the early days at Gonakudzingwa, detainees’ conditions, while unpleasant, were not unbearable, but now the situation is much worse. More prisoners are punished for disciplinary "offences" (such as trying to communicate with relatives). The main long term detention center is presently Wha Wha, a fortification containing iron barracks and at least 600 detainees. In July 1976, Minister of Law and Order, Hilary Squires acknowledged a need to expand the facility to allow for more prisoners. There was also a debate in parliament over the lack of space and medical facilities at the camp. It was noted in the debate that 26 persons occupied one room at Wha Wha, which may well be the biggest concentration camp in Africa.

Prisons are organized according to a racist system of segregation. Class I is for Europeans. Class II for "Coloreds" and Asians, and Class III for Africans. Class III prisoners get no beds nor clothing adequate for winter. Their diet is poor—milk, fruit, eggs, bread, and butter are nonexistent while meat is rare). Health conditions are wretched, with T.B., bronchitis, ulcers, and anemia prevalent.
POLITICAL PRISONERS IN ZIMBABWE (CONTINUED)

There is another aspect of both pre-trial detention and post-conviction imprisonment which is most detestable. This is the extensive use of torture. Evidence exists to show that electric shocks, beatings on genitals, burning with cigarettes, water torture, exposure, and gross beatings are all employed by the Rhodesians. During trials there are numerous reports of assaults and physical intimidation by police and security forces, while judges play dumb.

NEW LAWS

An especially vicious institution is the system of Special Courts, established under the new Emergency Powers (Criminal Trials) Regulations at the end of April, 1976. These courts focus on penalties for belonging to or co-operating with armed liberation forces. They allow for virtually no legal defense and over 100 people have already been sentenced by these tools of political oppression.

This new reign of terror relates to one final phenomenon —final in the most literal sense. By this I refer to the imposition of the death penalty. Of the aforementioned group convicted by the Special Courts, nearly a quarter, 24, have been sentenced to death. This outcome is always a likelihood in any case dealing with anyone fighting for or aiding guerrillas (the Rhodesian courts use the term “terrorist”, after outlawing the words “guerrilla” and “freedome fighter”). A new Law and Order (Maintenance) Amendment Bill was introduced into the Rhodesian House of Assembly in September, 1976. If passed, it would make death mandatory for possessing weapons, concealing guerrillas, failing to report guerrillas (a charge on which a Swiss priest was just arrested), and giving false information about guerrillas, as well as for recruiting, already a capital offense.

From March, 1968, when 5 men were put to death (despite a British royal reprieve) through April, 1975, at least 35 Zimbabweans were known to have been executed. As of October, 1976, 58 people were under sentence of death. However, due to a ruling on April 21, 1976 by the Ministry of Justice, no public announcements on executions would be made.

SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS

While this is a somber note to close on, it is worth remembering that political prisoners carry on the struggle. In the words of a political prisoner brought before the Salisbury High Court in 1966, “We are not prepared to plead or to be tried by this court. . . We consider ourselves not criminals, but prisoners of war.” We must help free these political prisoners and focus on the racist apparatus which has imprisoned them. We must organize rallies and do educational work to demand the freeing of all political prisoners in Zimbabwe, the end to all emergency laws and decrees, the end to detentions, the end to all torture and executions, and the lifting of the ban on all African political organizations. This is all part of extending solidarity with the Zimbabwe national liberation struggle.

For further information contact:
International Defense and Aid Fund
for Southern Africa
P.O. Box 17
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

MORE OF

ANDY YOUNG'S NEO-COLONIALISM

Q Vorster claims the Communists, the Marxists, are trying to take over his government. Does this pose a dilemma for the United States? What I mean is, if you support majority rule you have to support the Blacks, but if you do not support the Blacks because the Communists are your enemies — whose side is the U.S. really on? What is the priority? The stopping of Communism or support of majority rule?

A I think we crossed that hurdle to some extent in Angola, when we came to realise — and the Black Caucus did a very good job of pointing this out to the American people — that any government in Southern Africa will not remain Communist for long . . . The economic interests of Southern Africa, of Black Africa, require markets for their resources . . . I mean, Zaire has to sell its copper and so does Zambia to survive. Angola needs to sell its oil.

Now the Russians and Chinese are not importing any natural resources, because they’ve got all the resources they can utilise and they don’t have enough capital and technology to develop their own resources in the Soviet Union, so if the resources of Africa are going to be developed even in the conditions of a Socialist state, Africa has got to sell its resources to the West. Its got to turn to the West for capital to develop those resources, which means that governments that emerge in Southern Africa are going to be, essentially, mixed economies with strong ties to the West regardless of what their ties to the Communist bloc are.

And I’m confident that the system which has developed here with all of its imperfections has still produced more in the way of revolutionary changes for people than any Socialist country I know about. Because I define revolution as the extension of resources, goods and services to people who did not have it previously. And American technology, frankly, does that better than anybody in the world.
The Star Bureau

WASHINGTON — Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith has accepted the principle of holding a referendum under international supervision to establish black leadership in his country it was learned this week.

And from London it is reported that Britain, the United States and South Africa have agreed on the outlines of a trilateral package deal on Rhodesia involving "guarantees by the Government in Pretoria that Salisbury will accept a two-year transition to African majority rule.

The diplomatic correspondent of The Guardian writes that the guarantees are to be conveyed by the British and American Governments to the President of the five frontline governments of black Africa, the informal alliance chaired by Dr Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

Key

This is the first suggestion that Mr Smith is prepared for such an initiative under international supervision although it has previously emerged he is in favour of a referendum.

And this could well be the key to new proposals aimed at a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem if the frontline Presidents can be persuaded to go along with it.

The international supervision envisaged would be observer presence by directly interested parties and would not exclude the United Nations in such a role although a totally UN supervised referendum is unlikely to be accepted by Mr Smith.

Muzorewa

The Rhodesian acceptance of such supervision is based on the assessment that Bishop Abel Muzorewa would most likely emerge as the most supported black leader in Rhodesia.

At the same time, Britain and America now realise that a new pattern of negotiation needs to be established without various factions vying for ascendency.

It is understood that South Africa has pointed out strongly that a single black voice has to be found for future negotiations and that this subject formed the major bone of contention at the Rhodesian issue.

Foreign Minister-designate "Pik" Botha said this week that South Africa feels the sincerity of Mr Smith should be tested and that South Africa could be held responsible for the correctness of its assessment.

Ambassador Botha said in Washington that Rhodesia's acceptance of the principle of black majority rule within a reasonable period was no longer an issue. But the problem was deciding who would speak for the blacks there.

The white government of Mr Smith "cannot hand power over to the bushes," said Mr Botha.

The Star's African News Service reports from Salisbury there is little doubt that Mr Smith favours some sort of test — possibly a referendum — to determine which black leader has majority support in Rhodesia.

But whether he has agreed to a plan for an internationally supervised referendum could not be confirmed.

Nevertheless, a definitive test of black opinion inside Rhodesia would play an important part in Mr Smith's quest for an internal settlement.

In the past, he has confirmed that he has ordered that studies be made of the feasibility and practicalities of such a test. At a recent press briefing, he acknowledged that the test could take the form of a referendum.

Mr Smith and some of his senior Ministers have indicated that they believe that Bishop Muzorewa has majority support and in the event of a referendum they would hope the bishop wins.

At the Geneva conference, Bishop Muzorewa was the man who tabled the plan for a referendum to choose an interim leader. The plan was rejected by the Patriotic Front.

The Star Saturday March 19 1977

Bishop Muzorewa: campaign to "sell" him to the international business community.

Muzorewa

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The Star Saturday March 19 1977

Bishop Muzorewa has stated Mr Smith's problem in essence. "If whites see us (black nationalists) as devils, then what they must do now is pick the lesser of the devils," he has declared.

Two of the bishop's top men, secretary general Gordon Chavunda and publicity secretary Max Chigweda, have appeared on discussion programmes on Rhodesian TV in recent weeks. Up to now, having a black nationalist air his views on Rhodesian TV has been about as likely as snow on Christmas Day in Johannesburg.

Today it almost appears as if the hard-line, pro-Government TV service is trying to accustomed white Rhodesians to the faces of the bishops men, to the exclusion of any other black nationalists.

In the event of a referendum Mr Smith would fiercely hope that the bishop would win. He could then say: "Demonstrably the bishop has the approval of the people. He is the man with whom to negotiate a settlement."

For the outside world it would be a hard argument to refute.

But Mr Smith's hopes would be that settlement with the bishop would at least make it easier to fight the war. The rationale would be that a war against a Muzorewa-rulled Zimbabwe would be shown up as blacks struggling for legitimate rights but as communist aggression against a democratic leader. Hopefully, it would be easier for the West to help with arms and supplies than it is now.

The snags in Smith's poll plan

By Martin Meredith

SALISBURY

AS THE Russians prowl round the borders of Rhodesia offering support to the nationalist guerrilla movements, the Rhodesian premier, Ian Smith, is moving rapidly towards a preliminary agreement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his African National Council. Both leaders hope this will undercut the guerrilla strategy.

Smith and Muzorewa are set on the idea of carrying out a national referendum to determine which black leader has the most black support. Of four possible contenders, Muzorewa is expected to come out on top. If the way is then open for him to lead an African delegation to an internal constitutional conference, which would then accept the ANC as the next step in an internal settlement.

However, several hurdles remain before a referendum can be held — the most important being how it would be held.

There are three possibilities:

1. All the black leaders, including Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe and Ndabaniyane Sithole, at present in exile, could be allowed into Rhodesia to take part. However, as Nkomo, Mugabe and Sithole are closely involved with the guerrilla war, the prospects of their moving about the country would provoke an outcry among the ruling Rhodesia Front and most of the white electorate.

2. If the government agreed in principle to allow them to return, the three men would be welcomed. This would not be regarded as a major settlement with the ANC and the ANC leaders are regarded as minority leaders and might be reluctant to have the measure of their support confirmed.

3. Muzorewa could campaign in Rhodesia while the others stayed in exile. But Muzorewa is insisting that he will not agree to a referendum unless the leaders of all the major black parties are allowed into Rhodesia to campaign.

Muzorewa could leave Rhodesia and stay outside while the referendum is taking place — putting himself on an equal footing with the exiles. But this dubious method might not be acceptable to an international team of observers. Muzorewa would be driven from Britain, America and elsewhere — the ANC would supervise the referendum. Only in this way, he believes, would the internal settlement eventually gain international recognition. Smith accepts the observers idea and is expected to discuss the matter with Dr David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, at talks in Cape Town next month.
FOR THIS STUFF SEE OUR ADDRESS ON PAGE 2

RESOURCES:

MEDICAL AID TO ZIMBABWE—4 page informational folder on medical needs in Zimbabwe. Free.

MEMORANDUM TO DONORS—6 page memorandum from Edgar J. Tekere, ZANU leader in Mozambique, describing the formation of the ZIPA force and the rejection of the leaders who betrayed the armed struggle. Free.

POSTER—17" x 22" red, green and black on yellow paper. Proceeds direct to ZANU. Price—$1.50

ZIMBABWE NEWS—Quarterly political organ of ZANU, giving in depth analyses of the liberation struggle, as well as discussions and debates in the nationalist movement. Libraries, institutions or governments: $25 per year; Students: $10; individuals: $12.50

WHAT'S AT STAKE IN ZIMBABWE?—A reprint from an earlier Bulletin, analysing the global and African strategy of US and British imperialism, the role of South Africa, neo-colonial regimes in the region, the differences in the nationalist movements, and ZANU-ZIPA'S perspective on the protracted struggle. Single copy: 10¢; 40% off for orders over 10 copies.

ZIMBABWEAN WOMEN—A valuable pamphlet describing the special oppression of women in Zimbabwe, and their role in the liberation struggle, written by ZANU women. Single copy: 35¢; 40% off on orders over 10 copies.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

1. The ZSC is trying to raise clothing, medical supplies and money for the freedom fighters and refugees from Zimbabwe. We need places in every boro in NY (and in other cities) where we can store clothing. Do you know of such a place, a friend who might help, etc? Then we need clothing, and lots of it. Do you have access to medical supplies (hospitals, school labs, etc.)? Can you, or do you you know who can, give money?

2. Co-operate with ZSC in many ways on these campaigns. Set up speaking engagements and film showings.

3. Join the ZSC, individually or as representatives of organizations (we will send our principles of unity upon request).

4. Contact ZANU directly at:
   Tapson Mawere
   89-09 162 St.
   Jamaica Queens, NYC 11432
   (212) 291-8039

Mail to Chicago ZANU Support Committee
1220 West Grace Street
Chicago, Ill. 60613

CASSETTE TAPE—Chimurenga songs and dances from the camps of the ZANU militants. Both sides, 60 minutes total. Translation on paper. Cost $5.00.
Zimbabwe African National Union
Support Committee-New York
P. O. Box 181
Bronx, New York 10453