Destructive Engagement

"[The Americans] have not only created new excuses for South Africa to continue to delay, but they have also begun to lay an East-West dimension on the Namibian issue." —SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, January 14, 1983

Entering its 68th year of South African military occupation and its 17th year since the United Nations declared that occupation illegal, Namibia is still not free. SWAPO’s struggle for Namibia’s liberation is forced to continue with little hope for a negotiated settlement.

The white minority regime in Pretoria remains intransigent, directly assisted and supported by the Reagan Administration’s policy of “constructive engagement.” Never intending voluntarily to give up control over mineral-rich Namibia, South Africa has been forced to negotiate only through the combined efforts of SWAPO’s guerilla struggle and international pressure. Reagan’s election to the White House has signalled a new, closer alliance between the US and South Africa and has successfully deflected the efforts of the international community to achieve Namibian independence.

Authored by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, “constructive engagement” views Southern Africa through the prism of the Cold War. It has meant a new partnership with the staunch “anti-communist” South African regime in joint efforts to stop perceived Soviet expansionism, undermine the achievements of the Angolan, Mozambican, and Zimbabwean revolutions, and hold the line against the liberation movements of Namibia and South Africa, SWAPO and the African National Congress (ANC), respectively.

A secondary objective for the US is to see an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia, although doing everything it can to undermine a SWAPO electoral victory and keeping an independent Namibia within the sphere of South African economic dominance. Crocker’s policy has been based on the premise that if South Africa’s “trust” was restored in the US (having been presumably compromised by the Carter Administration), Pretoria would not only agree to a settlement in Namibia, but would also reform apartheid. To establish this trust, the Reagan Administration has bestowed on South Africa a series of diplomatic “carrots”: the loosening of controls on exports to the South African military and police; increased nuclear exports; high level military and police visits; political support in the UN; approval of a $1.1 billion IMF loan; increased corporate investment; the export of 2500 electric shock batons; and a new consular treaty establishing formal diplomatic ties.

With a new friend in the White House, Pretoria has felt a new resurgence. The white minority regime has felt free to crack down on domestic dissent. Human rights violations have increased drastically with torture and deaths in detention on the rise. Trade unions and church organizations have been targeted. Activists have been jailed and banned. Yet, the Reagan Administration has neither said nor done virtually anything to protest.

Destabilization attacks against the Frontline states have dramatically escalated. Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Lesotho all have been targets of military harassment or attack. Hundreds of people have been murdered and extensive property damage has been inflicted. Again, the Reagan Administration has said virtually nothing to protest becoming a silent partner in Pretoria’s policy.

Another fatality of the policy is that Namibian independence is now further away than it was two years ago. Despite a dazzling display of shuttle diplomacy, the Reagan Administration has held Namibian sovereignty hostage to its own Cold War ideology. By insisting on an agreement of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola as a pre-condition to a settlement for Namibian independence, the Reagan Administration has punished the Namibian people with continued occupation, war, and exploitation by the South African military forces.

Ironically, the Reagan Administration has sacrificed its own policy in Africa. Pretoria has successfully led the Reagan Administration by the nose in the negotiations, taking as many “carrots” as it can get without giving up one thing. “Constructive engagement” is a case of the client state leading the superpower. This has resulted in the State Department looking more and more foolish in its pronouncements of progress as South Africa erects obstacle after obstacle. “Constructive engagement’s” internal contradictions of placing Cold War goals ahead of all else has meant its attempts both to reach a Namibia settlement and remove the Cubans are doomed to fail.
This policy has severely tested relations with Black Africa which has been united in its criticism of the US-South Africa alliance. Chester Crocker has based his entire Africa policy on the success of his Namibia diplomacy. This is one gamble he has surely lost.

The Cuban Linkage

The US and South Africa have publicly placed the removal of the Cuban troops from Angola as their central concern in Southern Africa. Since mid-1981, the Reagan Administration has publicly expressed its desire to see the Cubans go home within the context of a Namibia settlement. However, the administration’s language has changed in recent months: what was once described as informal “parallel movement” on the issues of Namibian independence and Cuban withdrawal has now changed to formal linkage. Together, the US and South Africa have made agreement on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola a precondition to Namibian independence.

With the issues of constitutional principles, electoral system, and size, composition, and role of the UN monitoring troops (phases one and two in the State Department’s three phase plan) temporarily put on hold last June, South Africa proceeded to introduce another major snag into the negotiations. On June 21, South African Prime Minister PW Botha stated bluntly: “[W]e cannot enter into the third phase (actual implementation) of the agreement with the Western Five unless the Cubans are withdrawn from Angola.” Pretoria’s desire for parallel movement quickly became a hard line precondition.

Despite Botha’s strong words, it was the Reagan Administration who came up with the idea of conditioning Namibian independence on a Cuban withdrawal in the first place. As one South African official told the New York Times in July: “This was something the Americans initiated, wanted and pursued.”

Up until recent months, Crocker had contended that it was because of South African insistence that the Cuban troop linkage had been brought into the Namibia negotiations. However, under heated questioning from the House Africa Subcommittee in a February 15, 1983 hearing, Crocker finally admitted that this was not the case, saying the linkage issue “was our effort. I am not denying that.”

The administration increased its pressure for linkage in September when President Reagan sent a letter to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, chairman of the Frontline countries, pushing the Frontline leaders to accept the withdrawal of the Cubans as part of the Namibia settlement. Reagan’s letter stated: “[I] will underscore that we cannot and will not put aside the Cuban issue.” The Frontline leaders were outraged at this letter, especially since it directly followed a new South African invasion of Angola which the US did not condemn. They issued a strong statement at their meeting in Lusaka in early September explicitly rejecting linkage. The communiqué “noted with indignation” US attempts to link the negotiations for the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The summit “unequivocally emphasized the importance of separating the decolonization process in Namibia from the existence of Cuban forces in Angola” in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435.

The Reagan Administration’s public posturing on the Cubans continued when Vice President George Bush went on a seven-country African tour in November. In a major speech in Nairobi on November 19, Bush stated: “The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa’s departure from Namibia is the key to the settlement we all desire.”

Bush’s pressuring on the Cuban issue was rejected throughout Africa. A Nigerian diplomat stated that “the Reagan Administration opened a Pandora’s box with the issue of linkage.” Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, chairman of the OAU, declared linkage a “delaying tactic.” Additionally, at the November 27 OAU meeting in Tripoli, the 31 African countries present issued a strong statement rejecting linkage. When the Africans took the issue to the UN in December the General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning linkage. UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar added his voice on February 15 following an eight-country African tour: “I cannot accept a link between solution of this problem [the Cubans] and solution of the Namibian problem.”

What have the US’s allies in the Contact Group, the Western Five who have acted as negotiators in the Namibia talks, been saying? Every one of them—France, Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany—have rejected the linkage approach. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson said in October: “It is no secret that we, and not only we, but the Germans, the Canadians and others have told the Americans that linkage is not acceptable.” However, after these initial protests it appears the Contact Group is not doing much to remove this obstacle.
from the negotiations. Namibia does not seem an important enough issue for these countries to pressure the Reagan Administration to abandon the linkage approach. They seem content to let Reagan run with the ball so, when he falls, they will not risk their relations with Black Africa.

Surely, if linkage is to succeed the Angolans will have to give their approval for Cuban withdrawal and put their trust in the negotiations. Despite promises of diplomatic recognition and development assistance if the Cubans leave, the Reagan Administration has given the Angolan government little reason to trust it. Luanda is aware that Reagan's first Africa policy action was the attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment prohibiting military and para-military operations in Angola. In addition, US diplomats have not successfully convinced the Angolan officials they are sincere in stopping the South African military threat. When Vernon Walters, Reagan's roving ambassador and former CIA deputy director, went to Luanda in June, he reportedly promised the Angolan government that the South African attacks would cease. He returned to Luanda in July repeating his assurances in the hopes that Angola would agree to the linkage plan. Only one hour after Walters' plane took off from Luanda, South Africa began another massive invasion of Angola.

Mudge is Out

Cuban withdrawal or not, other developments make a Namibia settlement highly unlikely. The South Africans continue to make pronouncements that they never intend to leave Namibia. In an interview with the Heritage Foundation's Ian Butterfield in September, Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha said that Pretoria would not tolerate a SWAPO victory in Namibia. "South Africa cannot condone the Red Flag in Windhoek, it simply cannot," he said.

On December 26, General Constand Viljoen, chief of the South African Defense Force, stated he did not expect his troops in Namibia to be withdrawn in 1983. "I would hate ourselves to rush into a solution within the next year, only to find ourselves going back in after two years when Southwest Africa is again burning."

Reagan has painted himself into a corner with the Cuban linkage issue. It was little surprise that Pretoria was more than happy to supply the paint and brush.

South Africa's continued construction of military facilities in northern Namibia is another indication that the troops are not going home anytime soon. Colonel Johan Louw, Commanding Officer of Sector 30 of the Southwest Africa Territory Force, confirmed this in a statement last August: "many people are losing confidence in Namibia's future, he said, but "here we are busy expanding. A great deal of money has been spent here. Do these people really think that we would develop this sector if we, the Defense Force, did not believe in the future of this country?"

Another indication that a settlement is not near is the collapse of the "internal government" created by South Africa in Namibia. Relations between the South Africans and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), which dominated the Namibian National Assembly and Council of Ministers, had been shaky for many months. DTA leader Dirk Mudge complained that the South African military and South African Administrator General, Danie Hough, were increasingly encroaching on his "autonomy." (The "internal government" was created by South Africa in 1978 in an attempt to pose an electoral alternative to SWAPO.) Mudge resigned in early January and the Council of Ministers dissolved on January 18.

The South Africans then had the choice of installing its own "ethnic" leaders in another internal government or direct military rule. The latter was chosen, at least for the time being, with Willie van Niekerk, a confidant of PW Botha's, taking up the reins of power as the new Administrator General. Some observers believe that the Reagan Administration strongly discouraged the South Africans from installing a new internal government because it would signal that Pretoria was not serious about reaching an internationally acceptable settlement. Yet, without a party to counter SWAPO in a supervised election, it is highly doubtful that the South Africans will give the go-ahead.

The Cease-fire

Hopes for a settlement were raised again when it was revealed that high level South African and Angolan officials met in Sal, Cape Verde on December 7 to discuss a possible cease-fire. The reported plan called for a cease-fire in southern Angola, a withdrawal of Cuban troops to 185 miles north of the Namibian border, the withdrawal of SWAPO troops to 250 miles north of the border, and a South African troop withdrawal from Angola back into Namibia. Western press reports indicated that Luanda was prepared to concede to the plan and that a possible "reconciliation" was imminent between the Angolan government and Jonas Savimbi's South African-backed UNITA guerilla movement.

The Reagan Administration pushed strongly for the talks behind the scenes as a confidence-building measure for eventual removal of the Cuban troops and elections in Namibia. However, a cease-fire of this kind would probably hinder an internationally-acceptable settlement. Because the cease-fire did not include any steps towards a Namibia settlement, the pressure would be off South Africa to settle.

Considerable pressure was placed on Angola to agree to the plan. US Ambassador to Zambia Nicholas Pratt flew to Luanda on January 26 to press for an answer. UNITA escalated its
military operations, launching for the first time an attack from Zaire in Uige Province. This was particularly troubling because Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko had in early January signed a deal with Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to place Israeli troops in Shaba Province neighboring Angola. Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos declared that the Israeli military presence is part of Reagan's destabilization policy. "Leaks" from the Reagan Administration in the Western press that Angola was about to settle (denied repeatedly by Luanda) were further public pressure on the Angolan government.

Angolan Foreign Minister Paulino Jorge held a press conference in London on February 11 to clarify his government's position. He stated that there was no cease-fire agreement. When asked about the Angolan President's left-wing position. He stated that there was no cease-fire agreement. He reiterated the Angolan government's stance so they are taking what they can get. Angolans will not rest. They are taking what they can get. The government's on-going pressure on the Angolan government.

The government of South Africa announced that a major offensive had been launched by SWAPO inside Namibia involving 800 guerrillas and that 129 had been killed by the South African army. To spite Angola, South Africa sent a low-level delegation to the second-round of Cape Verde talks in February 22. The negotiations were cut short after three hours due to "weak South African representation," according to the Angolans. The prospects for a Namibia settlement are very dim. Inside South Africa, PW Botha's regime seems nowhere near settling. The government's on-going battle with the Conservative Party, the Nasional Herstigte Party (HNP), and the National Party's own right wing is already over-heated over the proposed constitutional changes to bring the Coloured Labour Party into a second assembly. It is doubtful that Botha could withstand a major national debate over Namibia. Particularly when African National Congress (ANC) sabotage attacks inside South Africa are greatly increasing—the stunning December explosions at the Koeberg nuclear reactor being just one example—Botha cannot afford to appear "soft on terrorism" to the right wing. Nor does it appear that Botha intends to. There has been no attempt to educate the white public to the possibility of a SWAPO government in Windhoek—in fact, just the opposite. Namibia continues to provide the white minority regime a buffer zone from the ravages of war and a testing ground for the latest weapons. Developments in Washington reinforce this dismal forecast. The Reagan Administration, supposedly the neutral negotiators, has shown, at least up to this point, that it is not ready to make the necessary concessions.

Time is Running Out

"When the Washington Office on Africa opened in 1972, Richard Nixon was President and US policy towards Southern Africa was based on Henry Kissinger's analysis that whites were in Southern Africa 'to stay.' Not only have we survived Nixon, we have continued to carry out our mandate through three subsequent administrations—struggling for an end to US support for racist minority rule in Southern Africa."

Jean Sindab, Executive Director of the Washington Office on Africa spoke these words to an enthusiastic audience gathered at the organization's 10th anniversary celebration held November 6, 1982 at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The event was truly a gala affair, attended by over 500 people including diplomats, congressional aides, Africa scholars, church groups and grassroots organizers. Among the honorary sponsors were Senators Paul Tsongas and Edward Kennedy and Congressmen George Crockett and Stephen Solarz. A reception was followed by a program featuring the 'a capella singing group Sweet Honey in the Rock, the Cosan African Dance Ensemble and South African poet Fatima Dike. The evening's speakers included H.E. Dr. Moteane Melamu, Ambassador of Botswana; Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO Observer to the U.N.; and Ted Lockwood, former director of the Washington Office on Africa.

Love and appreciation to all who helped make our event a success, and we stand firmly committed to more "years of struggle and hope."
Pretoria Benefits from US Nuclear Assistance

On December 19, 1982, four bombs exploded at South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power reactor. The African National Congress took credit for the explosions which were set off in retaliation for Pretoria's brutal attack on Lesotho in which 42 people were killed ten days earlier. The sabotage, which delayed Koeberg's start up for several months, highlighted the vulnerability of South Africa's top secret nuclear installations.

That nuclear program has been a direct beneficiary of the Reagan Administration's "constructive engagement" policy. In November 1981 the Reagan Administration allowed two firms, Edlow International and SWUCO, to broker enriched uranium from Europe to South Africa to start up the Koeberg reactor. Pretoria was in a pinch because it stood to lose $1.3 million for every day the reactor was delayed. In a December 1982 hearing before the House Subcommittees on Africa and International Economic Policy and Trade, State Department spokesman Harry Marshall admitted that he had met with Edlow officials before the brokering transaction and "did not discourage" it. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), the US is prohibited from directly supplying enriched uranium to South Africa, which has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor agreed to full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on its nuclear facilities preventing their use for military purposes. To circumvent the NNPA, the Reagan Administration has found proxies in Europe to supply the enriched uranium to South Africa.

Despite the uproar over the November 1981 deal, Edlow and SWUCO have obtained another cargo of enriched uranium for South Africa's Koeberg, this time from Belgium. That shipment is currently awaiting the issuance of an export license from the European Economic Community Commission. Although the State Department is aware of the sale, it has raised no objection. The Commission is expected to grant the license in the near future.

South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, the site of the world's largest open-pit uranium mine at Rossing, results in high profits from the export of uranium. In 1981, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, over 1 million kg of raw South African and Namibian uranium were imported into the US for use in domestic reactors or for re-export to other countries. Ten utilities have been identified as using South African or Namibian uranium: Baltimore Gas and Electric, Carolina Power and Light, Consumer Power, Duke Power Co., Duquesne Light, Northern States Power, South Carolina Electric and Gas, Southern Company Services, Systems Fuel, and Yankee Atomic.

In addition to lighting American homes, apartheid uranium is endangering American communities. In late February, a South African flagship arrived in Baltimore harbor with some of its cargo of South African yellowcake uranium spilled. Two crews of the International Longshoremen's Association refused to unload the cargo because of the health hazards. It is believed that this uranium was headed for Metropolis, Illinois to be converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for eventual use in a Japanese reactor. The "Coalition to Stop South African Uranium in Baltimore" has been formed to halt these imports into that port.

US power companies have found another way to buy South African uranium. Recently, the Reagan Administration allowed five companies to purchase 80 tons of South African-owned uranium stored at the Department of Energy (DOE) warehouses in Piketon, Ohio. This enriched uranium is being stored by the DOE because the NNPA has prohibited the US from fulfilling its end of a 1974 US-South African contract to enrich South African uranium for Pretoria's Koeberg reactor. According to the contract, however, South Africa must still supply the uranium to the US. The identity of the utility companies involved is being protected by the Reagan Administration. In a negative response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the DOE stated, "Because of the fact that ESCOM [Electricity and Supply Commission] is a South African company, it is likely that some or all of the utilities purchasing Escom material from SWUCO would be faced with protests from consumer groups, public interest organizations and various other groups." However, two of the utilities involved have been identified as Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and Northern States Power Company of Minnesota.

Subsequent to this transaction, the Reagan Administration took one step further in allowing American utilities to supply the raw uranium to DOE for South Africa thus saving Pretoria extensive shipping costs. The likely next step for the administration is to cancel the 1974 contract altogether thus totally removing US leverage to get Pretoria to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Due to the Reagan Administration's increase in nuclear assistance to South Africa, the Washington Office on Africa has initiated a major campaign to halt US-South Africa nuclear collaboration. In March 1983, the Washington Office on Africa, in coalition with anti-apartheid, church, anti-nuclear, disarmament, Black, and labor groups and the Congressional Black Caucus, the Congressional Non-Proliferation Task Force, and the Congressional Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on Southern Africa, sponsored a Congressional briefing and strategy session on this issue. Over 150 people attended the briefing which focused on legislation introduced by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY). This legislation, HR 1020 (formerly HR 7220), would ban all nuclear exports to South Africa and end the training of South Africans at US government nuclear facilities. The briefing also featured a presentation by Randy Kehler, Director of the National Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, which passed a resolution at its February national convention supporting the Rangel bill.
Southern Africa and the 98th Congress

The 1982 election results might be a harbinger of better things to come for Southern Africa. The Democratic gain of 26 seats has generated a more assertive mood among Democrats and liberals which could lead to increased Congressional criticism of the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement.

The 98th Congress brings ten new members to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The committee's Africa Subcommittee experienced a dramatic shift with only two holdovers from the 97th Congress: Howard Wolpe (D-MI), the chairman, and George Crockett (D-MI). There are four new Democratic and three Republican members: Howard Berman (D-CA), Harry Reid (D-NV), Edward Feighan (D-OH), Ted Weiss (D-NY), Gerald Solomon (R-NY), Toby Roth (R-WI), and Ed Zschau (R-CA).

The bipartisan spirit of the subcommittee during the 97th Congress has markedly changed with the advent of Rep. Solomon as ranking minority member. Conservative Washington Times columnist Michael Saz noted in a March 3rd column about the Foreign Affairs Committee the importance of "the reliable anti-communist Solomon" and Republican Toby Roth, who "also has good conservative credentials." Saz predicts the presence of a "loyal and vocal opposition to the chairman's and the subcommittee staff's overemphasis on southern Africa instead of concern with Soviet, East German and Cuban adventurism on the Horn of Africa, Angola and Mozambique." This was substantiated at a February 15 Africa Subcommittee hearing when Rep. Solomon ranted, "I really think that our biggest problem in the whole world is international communism and the spread of it."

Despite Solomon's presence, however, the progressive work of the subcommittee will continue under the strong leadership of Howard Wolpe. The subcommittee will likely consider legislation such as Rep. Rangel's (D-NY) H.R. 1020 to cut off nuclear exports to South Africa, and Rep. William Gray's (D-PA) and Rep. Stephen Solarz's (D-NY) bills to stop further US corporate investment in South Africa.

The Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations also experienced important shifts. Rep. Don Bonker (D-WA) replaced retiring Rep. Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) as head of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee, leaving open the human rights subcommittee chairmanship. Gus Yatron (D-PA), who was ousted from the head of the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee in 1979, became the new chair. Yatron faced a challenge for the position from the more liberal Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) and Rep. Crockett. The challenge was supported by human rights groups who questioned Yatron's commitment to criticizing human rights violations under right-wing regimes. In the past, he has been a strong advocate of human rights in Cuba and the Soviet Union but has been silent on Central America and South Africa. However, he recently promised a delegation of human rights activists that he would maintain an "open door policy." The subcommittee members are: Yatron, Bonker, Mel Levine (D-CA), Ted Weiss, Tom Lantos (D-CA), Peter Kostmayer (D-PA), Jim Leach (R-IA), Zschau, and Solomon.

The International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee will also consider Rep. Rangel's HR 1020 as well as other non-proliferation legislation such as Wolpe's HR 1417, a bill that attempts to close up some loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Members of this subcommittee are Bonker, Dan Mica (D-FL), Berman, Feighan, Michael Barnes (D-MD), Wolpe, Gejdenson, Roth, Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and Doug Bereuter (R-NE). Bonker's subcommittee shares jurisdiction over non-proliferation issues with the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs (ISSA) chaired by Rep. Clement Zablocki (D-WI) who also chairs the full committee. Joining Zablocki on ISSA is Dante Fascell (D-FL), Lee Hamilton (D-IN), Gerry Studds (D-MA), Mica, William Broomfield (D-FL), Lee Hamilton (R-MI), and Henry Hyde (R-IL).

Little has changed on the Senate side. Conservative Frank Murkowski (R-AK) replaced retiring Senator Sl Hayakawa (R-CA) on the full Foreign Relations Committee. The composition of the Africa Subcommittee remains unchanged with Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) as its chair. Kassebaum, who has been a staunch supporter of "constructive engagement," wrote an op-ed article in the February Washington Post calling for a re-examination of the policy. There is no evidence, however, that the subcommittee will become more active in the 98th Congress. The next Southern African issue the Senate is expected to take up is the ratification of a new consular agreement between the US and South Africa. The members of the Senate Africa Subcommittee are: Kassebaum, Jesse Helms (R-NC), Murkowski, Charles Mathias (R-MD), Paul Tsongas (D-MA), John Glenn (D-OH), and Chris Dodd (D-CT).

Both the House and Senate will be considering Reagan's FY 84 foreign aid request. Aid to Zimbabwe is continuing for $75 million as part of the $225 million pledge to that country. There is no aid request for Mozambique, the UN Trust Fund for South Africa or the UN Institute of Namibia. UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, with the support of congressional conservatives, has been holding up the authorized funds for the Namibian Institute insisting that no US funds be used by SWAPO. She recently released the FY 82 funds, reducing the authorized amount of $500,000 to $2,000. The Human Rights and International Organizations subcommittee held a hearing on US voluntary contributions to UN organizations at which WOA testified for continuing US support for these institutions.
The Deportation Saga of Dennis Brutus

The attempt to deport Dennis Brutus, an internationally renowned academician, poet, and staunch critic of apartheid, has entered a new stage. Born in Zimbabwe of South African parents, Brutus was imprisoned on the notorious Robben Island in South Africa in the early 1960's because of his opposition to the participation of South African teams in the Olympics. Released on the condition that he never return to South Africa, Brutus subsequently went to London and acquired a temporary British passport which was renewed as long as Britain retained colonial authority in Zimbabwe. With that passport, he was granted a US visa which had to be renewed annually. Teaching at Northwestern University in Illinois, Brutus continued to speak out vociferously against apartheid. His efforts have been largely responsible for South Africa being expelled from virtually every international sporting body. He has also campaigned for divestment, and his success in bringing these issues to the public eye has made him a political target.

When Zimbabwe became independent in the spring of 1980, Britain summarily cancelled Brutus' passport, telling him to obtain one from the new government. Although Brutus urgently attempted to obtain the Zimbabwe passport before his temporary worker's visa expired, unavoidable delays resulting from the transition to a new government prevented its issuance in time for the extension of the US visa. Notifying the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of his situation, Brutus was informed that there "would be no problem."

In 1980, however, a US immigration judge declared Brutus deportable. Consequently, an application for political asylum on behalf of Brutus was filed February 3, 1982. At that time, it was ambiguous whether Brutus would be sent to Zimbabwe or South Africa if deported. If sent to South Africa, his imprisonment would be automatic, one of the provisions of his 1966 exile. Deportation to Zimbabwe, however, would also be dangerous, given South Africa's systematic pattern of killing opponents in neighboring countries over the years.

Congressional pressure in support of Brutus' application for political asylum has been quite significant. Over 52 representatives and 17 senators have written on his behalf. Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill (D-MA) urged Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliot Abrams to do all that is necessary to suspend the deportation proceedings against Brutus. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), in his appeal to Secretary Abrams, deplored: "To deport Professor Brutus would, I believe, send to the world a message of sympathy on the part of our government for the South African regime that imprisoned him for the 'crime' of opposing that nation's racist system." Additionally, eight members of the House Africa Subcommittee strongly urged Abrams to act favorably upon Brutus' request for political asylum.

In September 1982 however, ignoring congressional and international appeals, the State Department released an opinion to the INS advising that Brutus not be granted asylum in the US. However, because of the intense pressure this case has generated, the State Department sought to circumvent the sensitive issue of whether to deport Brutus to Zimbabwe or South Africa, and recommended deportation to Great Britain. In light of conciliatory gestures over the last several months made by the Reagan Administration to senior South African political and military officials visiting the US, it is disappointing that the State Department could not recommend asylum for Dennis Brutus.

All supporters are urged to write letters supporting Brutus' case for political asylum in the US to Judge Irving Schwartz, INS, 219 S. Dearborn, Chicago, IL 60604.

Top Pretoria Police and Military Officials Visit Washington

In violation of the spirit of the international arms embargo against South Africa, the Reagan Administration has totally lifted the prohibition of meeting with high level South African police and military officials.

The first such meeting occurred in March 1981 when US Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick met secretly with Lt. Gen. PW van der Westhuizen, chief of South African military intelligence in New York.

Westhuizen returned to the US twice subsequently to meet with State Department officials on Namibia. In the latest of these visits in August 1982, van der Westhuizen was accompanied by Maj. Gen. Charles Lloyd, commander of South Africa's forces in Namibia, and Lt. Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, chief of the army. The administration argued that it was not up to it to determine who Pretoria sends to Washington.

However, the exchanges continued when CIA Director William Casey visited South Africa in late September 1982. While there he met with Prime Minister Botha, Foreign Minister Botha, Defense Minister Malan, and Military Intelligence chief van der Westhuizen.

In early November, South Africans Maj. Gen. Lothar Paul Neethling, chief of the national forensics laboratory, and Maj. Gen. HV Verster, head of counter-terrorism, visited Atlanta, for the International Association of Chiefs of Police convention, and Washington. This is the second time since Reagan came into office that these police officials have come to the US. The Carter Administration had previously denied them visas.

On March 17, Lt. Gen. Johann Coetzee, chief of the South African security police, met with Chester Crocker at the State Department to discuss, according to administration sources, the Namibia negotiations. It is unclear what, if anything, Pretoria's security police chief has to do with the Namibia negotiations. Coetzee is the South African official responsible for the on-going harassment of the South African Council of Churches.

These talks are indicative of the closer alliance between the US and South Africa on military and intelligence issues.


Comment

Editor's Note: Our article on scholarships (WNA, Autumn 1982) in no way intended to impugn the integrity of the students in the AAEF program. Therefore, in response to the article, we are reprinting the following letter.

The Washington Office on Africa's article "Scholarships: Education or Indoctrination," attacked the educational program for black South African students proposed by the American African Educational Foundation. That program will bring black South African students to America to give them an education in an arrangement with the US Government, corporations and universities. These students will have management positions and upward mobility upon their return to South Africa. The AAEF joins most Americans in a concern about the effects of apartheid upon that society and its future generations. Ideological confrontation is emotionally satisfying, however we believe that every effort should be made to obtain a peaceful solution within the short time available.

We object to the extreme conclusions that the WOA has drawn from our efforts. We also object, very strongly, to the suggestions in the article that AAEF might be serving the South African government in an effort to maintain apartheid. It is, of course, factually correct that the government does issue passports to students coming to the US. Beyond that, the South African government is not involved directly or indirectly in the program. We also object to your selective use of facts in order to justify a predetermined conclusion.

AAEF hopes that its educational efforts will help the people of South Africa to solve their problems.

Kevin Callwood
Executive Director, AAEF

Destructive Engagement, continued from page 4

ator, has painted itself into a corner by publicly declaring its insistence that Cuban withdrawal from Angola be formally linked to Namibian independence. It was little surprise that Pretoria was more than happy to supply the paint and brush. There seems to be little the US, South Africa, or Angola can do now without losing face. Despite Crocker's flurry of diplomatic shouting and promises of a settlement just around the corner, the very Cold War basis of "constructive engagement" has meant that Namibian independence has taken a back seat to removal of the Cuban troops.

Domestic pressure from the Republican right wing has reinforced that priority. The State Department recently has been the object of vocal criticism from the very conservative publication Human Events, Howard Phillips, National Director of the Conservative Caucus, and the right-wing Republican Steering Committee chaired by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), for not taking a hard enough anti-communist line in its Africa policy. Although these criticisms do not necessarily portend Crocker's removal from his post, they do show a very clear right wing constituency Reagan must please in carrying out his Africa policy. For both Ronald Reagan and PW Botha, a conservative foreign policy victory is badly needed and removal of the Cuban troops from Angola has the highest priority.

Meanwhile, Namibian independence is put off and the prospects look bleaker as the 1984 presidential elections draw nearer. It is highly likely that the South Africans will stall once more to see who will occupy the White House in 1985. As the South African Financial Mail noted on December 3: "South Africa looks set to remain in Namibia for a long time yet."

Resources

Stop the Apartheid Bomb! A resource on US-South Africa nuclear collaboration, 6 pp., 15¢ each for 1-10, 12¢ for 11-50, 10¢ each for over 50 copies. (Add 35% for postage.)

Free Namibia! Special resource on Namibia and US policy, newly updated, 6 pp. Same price as above.


South Africa Information Packet. Ten background resources from the Africa Fund. Available for $3.00.

Washington Office on Africa

110 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-7961

Subscription Rate: We request a $10 annual contribution to receive this newsletter plus legislative alerts on Southern African issues. Additional copies of this issue are available for 25¢ each for 1-10; 20¢ each for 11-50; 15¢ each for over 50 copies (add 35% for postage).

Sponsors of the Washington Office on Africa: The American Committee on Africa; The American Lutheran Church, Division for World Mission and Cooperation; Christian Church (Disciples of Christ); Church of the Brethren; Episcopal Church, Coalition for Human Needs and Public Affairs Office, Executive Council; Lutheran Church in America, Division for Mission in North America; Society for African Missions (S.M.A. Fathers); United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW; United Church of Christ, Board for World Ministries, and Office for Church in Society; United Methodist Church, Africa Office and Women's Division of Board of Global Ministries; United Presbyterian Church, Program Agency.

Produced by: Jean Sindab, Kenneth Zinn, Nkechi Talia, and Iris Lanham.