Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to speak before you today about current developments in Angola. I will begin with some comments on the disaster assistance required in the area and what the United States response has been. I will then go on to look more broadly at the "disaster" in Angola, what is causing it, and what recommendations we make for U.S. policy at this time.

The situation now unfolding in Angola is a tragic one, and one in which large portions of the territory's population may justly be seen as victims of disaster.

On November 11 - six days from now - the last Portuguese troops and administrators will probably leave Angola, ending a Portuguese colonial presence of more than 500 years, the longest in the history of the African continent. Unfortunately, however, the transition in Angola from Portuguese colony to independent state has in no sense proceeded so smoothly as in the former sister colonies of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In some respects the Angolan case bears a greater resemblance to the turmoil which engulfed the Congo (now Zaire) when Belgium abruptly made its exit from its colony in 1960.

Whereas in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau sovereignty was transferred to single, relatively unified liberation movements, there are in Angola three movements competing to inherit the powers of government. The three are divided by differences in ideology, ethnic and class identity, geographical area and personal leadership and styles of organization. A transitional government comprised of all three groups has long since fallen apart, and the movements have, for some months, been fighting one another. Portuguese troops
have not interfered or participated except to protect Portuguese lives and property. Angola's vast resources and strategic importance in relationship to the future of southern and central Africa have led to intervention by external powers in this fighting - a subject to which I shall return shortly. Meanwhile, the consequences of the turmoil in human displacement and suffering have mounted.

Figures have been cited indicating that over 5000 people - combatants and civilians - have been killed. Though this is a likely minimum it is impossible to judge the number accurately. Many more, of course, have been injured. Thousands of people have been displaced and rendered homeless - permanently or temporarily - as the battle proceeds. A city like Caxito, for instance, has changed hands several times, each time with destruction of homes and workplaces, each time with residents forced to take flight. In other parts of the country, fighting in rural areas has driven people to converge on cities like Nova Lisboa, seeking refuge but further crowding an already poverty-ridden urban area.

Other sizable migrations, while not strictly caused by immediate fighting, have been related to the end of Portuguese colonialism and the general climate of turmoil. The most publicized example has been the flight of Portuguese nationals - most of them white - out of Angola. It is estimated that only 50-60,000 of the original 300-350,000 will still be in Angola on November 11. The bulk of these emigrants have been airlifted to Portugal, though some have crossed by convoy into Namibia. The presence of so many destitute refugees in Portugal who feel bitter against what they see as a betrayal is bound to create political problems for a Portuguese regime already foundering under the weight of economic and political turmoil. Portugal's ability to meet their human needs is therefore limited. In the case of South Africa, it seems unlikely that it will be able or willing to provide more than
Many refugees have come into Angola as well. Thousands of Angolans - many of them of Bakongo origin - have returned to northern Angola from Zaire since the Portuguese coup of April 1974. Others have returned to the north from central Angola, presumably to escape the fighting there. According to Osèculo of May 19, 1975, the FNLA military send some 60,000 Ovimbundus working on coffee farms of the Bakongo north trekking back south to Ovim­ bundu country in mid-1974. Still other Africans have returned from Zambia into southeastern Angola. In the words of a French correspondence in Luanda: "Compared with that of the whites, this black migration is infinitely more important, more threatening." (Le Monde, September 25, 1975)

In short, many people suddenly find themselves in new surroundings this year, in many cases under unsettled conditions, without homes, fields, animals, seeds, tools, or sufficient food, clothing or medical care. Overcrowding is severe in some areas, such as the north, and in some cities. Relief is needed now, and will probably be needed for some time to come.

What is being done? The answer is "very little". The only international relief organization currently active is the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has 30 - 40 medical personnel providing emergency services. The Red Cross says it is working in co-operation with all three liberation movements. The United States has donated some $200,000 to this effort thus far.

Otherwise, several church mission programs, such as Church World Service, the Mennonite Central Committee and the Baptists have had limited success in getting emergency supplies in, primarily through Kinshasa or Lusaka. However, there is hesitation in becoming too active because of possible political repercussions of aid dispensed in any one area of the country.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has a representative in Luanda, but under the present conditions has been unable to render effective assistance.

The Senate is currently considering the foreign economic assistance act with an amendment providing $30 million for "economic and relief and rehabilitation assistance" to the former Portuguese territories. Some of these funds could be expended for Angolan relief, but the same constraints which hamper other efforts apply. The delicacy of relief operations in the present situation was recognized by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which stipulated in its report that none of the $30 million should be spent "for refugee or economic assistance that would constitute political support for any one of the liberation movements in Angola." We support this careful language and urge that the expenditure of this money be closely scrutinized by Congress. We would further urge that any U.S. funds for Angolan relief be expended through international agencies, such as the Red Cross/ the United Nations.

We firmly believe, however, that relief policy cannot be considered in isolation from other aspects of U.S. policy, all of which is due for close examination.

On September 23, Secretary of State Kissinger enunciated the official U.S. policy toward Angola in a meeting with representatives of the Organization of African Unity. On that occasion, Secretary Kissinger said that one of the three major U.S. concerns in Africa was "that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict." He added a "cautionary word" specifically about Angola: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the
promise of true independence." We would support this stated policy, but we believe that it does not at all reflect the actual U.S. involvement in Angola.

Mounting pieces of evidence suggest that the United States is carrying out an aggressive policy of interference in the internal affairs of Angola, with the apparent goal of weakening the MPLA by any available means.

In a front page *New York Times* article of September 25 (attached), Leslie Gelb revealed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been buying arms for the two liberation movements which are fighting the MPLA - the FNLA and UNITA. A *Washington Post* story of the following day reported that the Administration had not denied the reports, issuing only a "no comment" reply.

CIA support to one of these movements, the FNLA, is not a new story. According to Gelb, the CIA and President Kennedy selected FNLA leader Holden Roberto as a man to back in the future, since Portugal could not be expected to retain Angola indefinitely. Support waned in 1969 but the CIA reactivated its Roberto connections last spring, in light of the upsurge in liberation activities following the Portuguese coup.

The CIA interest in UNITA is much more recent. Gelb's report on this connection followed a few days after an announcement by UNITA President Jonas Savimbi that UNITA is receiving armaments from anti-Communist western nations and their allies. Savimbi is avowedly anti-Communist and anti-MPLA - two reasons for the CIA's interest in him. He and the popular Ovimbundu leader Daniel Chipenda who is co-operating with UNITA against the MPLA may also be emerging as more realistic possibilities as future contenders for leadership in Angola than Roberto, who has spent only four years of his life in Angola and who therefore can be more readily considered as representing Zairean rather than Angolan interests.
U.S. support for these movements has been largely indirect, disbursed mostly through the Zaire government of President Mobutu. Zaire's role as a conduit for U.S. intervention in Angola is given credence by the vast increase in economic and military aid being requested now by the Administration, just at the time when the war in Angola is becoming fiercer. I will address myself specifically to this aid package later. This conduit relationship with Zaire has existed for some time. According to a well-informed source, the U.S. assisted the FNLA in the 1960's by treating it as another division of the Zairean army.

Zaire's recent involvement in Angola is well-documented, especially in the several critical battles between the MPLA and FNLA for Caxito, fifteen miles from Luanda. In an MPLA press conference on August 23, prisoners captured in the battle said that the tanks used by the FNLA forces were "no more than units of armoured cars of the Zairean army, commanded and crewed by Mobutu's officers and men of Mobutu's army." According to the Portuguese Diario de Notícias of September 6, the MPLA captured a Zairean Army corporal who was driving one of the armoured cars. According to Tom Callaghey, an American graduate student who has recently returned from Zaire, brand-new Mercedes Benz trucks with FAZ insignia (of the armed forces of Zaire) were barreling down the road from Kinshasa to Matadi this spring. Local officials told him they were for the FNLA and were purchased with American money.

The arms and ground equipment being used by FNLA are not of U.S. manufacture as far as we know. They are, however, probably being supplied largely from the ground forces of the Zairean army, and the United States has been replenishing these forces over the last year with sales of jeeps and trucks under

1 from radio report monitored in Portugal; printed in Volume 5, number 19/20 of Facts and Reports, published in the Netherlands
the military credit sales program. According to Washington Post reporter David Ottoway, the United States is apparently prepared to provide Zaire with M-16 rifles which are ideally suited to the needs of FNLA and UNITA in their fight against the MPLA. Given the continued existence of opposition forces within Zaire, Zaire could not afford to put much of its equipment into Angola without this additional support for its own military needs.

More recently, Zaire has begun assisting in the arming of UNITA. Fred Bridgland reported in the October 25 Johannesburg Star, after an interview with UNITA's President Savimbi, that UNITA's biggest problem is in obtaining supplies. Since it controls no major ports, most of its military equipment must be flown in. This is exactly where Zaire, and U.S.-supplied equipment, have appeared. David Martin of the London Observer saw a camouflaged Hercules transport plane which apparently came from Zaire off-loading arms at Silva Porto, UNITA's headquarters, in August. Nicholas Ashford of the London Times reported on August 25 that a DC-3 had flown arms to Silva Porto from Zaire (see attached clipping). Fred Bridgland reported in the Johannesburg Star of October 25 that he had seen ammunition boxes coming onto Silva Porto from the Zairean town of Thysville.

Both these Hercules and DC-3 transport planes probably came from U.S. aid programs to Zaire. George Vest, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State, testified as follows on June 5, 1974:

"The U.S. military assistance program has been one element in a multinational effort to give the Zairean military the capability of maintaining internal security as well as providing defense against external threats... The U.S. contribution - the development of a logistics capability - has been vital. Two air transport projects, the DC-3/DC-6 program of the 1960's and the C-130 program currently in progress, have
been the key elements in the nationwide security effort. /deleted/"

Today the Hercules and DC-3 aircraft are apparently being used outside Zaire. If they have been transferred to Angolan liberation movements, this would appear to violate Congressional restrictions prohibiting such transfer of American military equipment to third countries or parties. If they are still being operated by the Zairean government, their presence in Angola goes well beyond the purpose of "maintaining internal security as well as providing defense against external threat." In either case, these incidents raise serious questions about the wisdom of extending further military aid to Zaire at this time.

There have been other reports of U.S.-made aircraft in Angola, some being used against the MPLA, which deserve investigation. Airplanes for arms transport, reconnaissance and other military maneuvers will play a large part in the Angolan war. The Johannesburg Star of September 27 reported that an employee of Alaska International Air, a company close to the Nixon and Ford White House, was in a charter plane flying from Luanda to Dundo (both in MPLA-controlled territory) which mistakenly landed at a Zaire Air Force base across the border. Approximately three weeks later, a Zairean pilot was shot down at Dundo flying a U.S.-made Cessna, according to the MPLA representative at the United Nations. The October 18 Johannesburg Star reported that a Cessna bombed a radio station near Luanda which was presumably used by the MPLA. The October 18 Washington Post reported that John Scott Robinson, a representative of Ranger Air, a Florida-based air charter company, was believed to have been seized by "liberation fighters" in Angola. The August 23 Washington Post reported charges that U.S. Skymasters were flying military equipment from West Germany to Carmona for the FNLA. (see attached series of clippings) The Administration should explain what these planes, and these several American pilots, are doing in Angola.
Such evidence of U.S. intervention in Angola has grown in the last several months, but these developments have received inadequate attention. Too often critics of U.S. foreign policy cite U.S. intervention in Indochina and Latin America, but criticize U.S. policy toward southern Africa as merely an absence of interest or absence of positive concern. Such an interpretation is incorrect. U.S. intervention in Angola has already become as costly and as dangerous as its involvement in Chile only a few years ago. Surely the tragic lessons of Chile should teach us to oppose immediately and vehemently every sign of covert or overt intervention in the troubled political affairs of another country.

We call on the United States government to end its intervention in Angola. We urge Congress to take every action in its power toward this end. The recommendations which follow relate to overt U.S. policy in the region. While we cannot make specific recommendations about covert policies which have not yet been revealed in specifics, we do urge Congress to investigate the extent of CIA operations in Angola and to judge whether they really serve United States interests.

Secretary of State Kissinger says he disapproves of "extracontinental" interference in Angola. Therefore we do not expect to see massive amounts of U.S. arms appear on the Angolan battlefield. But his statement gives credence to the evidence that the U.S. is operating through African countries. We believe that the only way to stop U.S. interference in Angola is to stop U.S. aid to Zaire so long as that country is deeply involved in the support of any liberation movement or political party in Angola.

Last week President Ford submitted to Congress a military aid bill with $41.75 million earmarked for Zaire - $22.75 million in Security Supporting Assistance and $19 million in military credit sales. This represents a tremendous jump in
military aid to Zaire from past years. The Administration told the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a few weeks ago that it wanted to give this aid to Zaire under the existing continuing resolution. It was only the persistent pressure of a few Congressmen and Senators which has compelled the Administration to come into public hearings with any detailed justification of the Zaire aid package. If in fact the Administration studiously sought to slip aid to Zaire through quietly, questions should be asked as to whether the Congressional authorization process is being purposely avoided to prevent revelation of the facts of intervention.

The Administration has now been forced into the open to the extent of seeking $22.75 million of security supporting assistance as a part of its general submission on the military aid bill. We believe that this request should be scrutinized with the utmost care and searching questions asked.

Ostensibly this aid is required by an emergency created by a falling of copper prices, since about 60% of Zaire's foreign exchange earning come from the export of copper. Yet Zambia, which is 90% dependent on its copper earnings, is not scheduled for any assistance. A number of other African countries are suffering from a fall in export earnings and a rise in oil prices but no such extraordinary aid is proposed for them.

At a time when New York City is being told to go "cold turkey" in the interests of acquiring a sense of fiscal responsibility, the Congress is being asked to be openhanded to a foreign country which has no coherent plan for its development, has failed to acquire any usable and relevant data on its alleged top-priority project of agricultural development, a country riddled with governmental corruption and graft - and one involved in a foreign military adventure. We believe that until the economic problems of U.S. cities are
dealt with and until the Zaire government ceases its intervention in Angola and puts its own financial house in order, it is spendthrift and foolish to deal with Kinshasa's problems. We therefore believe that no Security Supporting Assistance should be granted at this time.

The $19 million in military credit sales is also a large increase from previous years. In fiscal year 1974, $3.5 million was expended in military credit sales for Zaire, and in fiscal year 1975 the same amount was allocated, although only about half of this amount has been expended to date. Now Congress has received a request for over five times this amount, which coincides suspiciously with Zaire's intensified military involvement in Angola. The Administration's informal justification for this sharp increase is that Zaire is trying to modernize its military and to "get rid of some old stuff." This rationale begs the question: Where is Zaire getting rid of its "old stuff" to? Could it be Angola?

We feel that all of this aid to Zaire should be stricken from the military aid bill as the most effective way to minimize the extent to which Zaire is used as a conduit for U.S. military intervention in Angola.

Quite apart from Zaire's role as a channel for the implementation of U.S. policy, however, Zaire appears to be ineligible to receive military credit sales under the provisions of the bill because of its own interventionist policy in Angola. According to Section 35 of the Foreign Military Sales Act:

"When the President finds that any economically less developed country ... is diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures, to a degree which materially interferes with its development, such country shall be immediately ineligible for further sales and guarantees under sections 21, 22, 23, and 24, until the President is assured that such diversion will no longer take place."
The language of this section perfectly describes Zaire's involvement in Angola, and the results of that involvement on Zaire's internal development. In fact, even apart from the Angola venture, questions have been raised before in Congress about the level of Zaire's military expenditure. In the appropriations hearings on military aid in 1974, Congressman Passman said, "According to the economic data sheet in front of the justification, it is indicated that 4.4 percent of Zaire’s GNP is spent for defense. Could you please tell the Committee why this country spends such a large amount of its GNP for defense and aren't some of these funds spent for defense diverted to development assistance programs within this country?" AID administration Adams agreed that the figure was high, but necessary "to ensure internal security" in such a vast territory, some of which "has a history of internal rebellion."

No such justification can be attempted for Zaire's expenditures on its Angolan operations. While Zaire's President Mobutu has historically been closely tied to the FNLA, which is headed by his brother-in-law, Holden Roberto, no Angolan liberation movement has made any threat against Zaire that would make Zairean involvement in the Angolan civil war a "necessary military expenditure" for its own security.

The evidence that Zaire's involvement in Angola has damaged its own development is indisputable. Zaire is in arrears in payments of her international debt; unpaid loans to American public and private creditors alone currently exceed $8 million. The shortage of foreign exchange has hurt Zaire's economy, which is heavily import-dependent.

While a significant portion of her balance of payments problem comes from the drop in the world price of copper and the simultaneous rise in the price of oil, another factor is Zaire's large foreign armaments purchases. U.S. commercial military sales to Zaire in 1974 were valued at over $21 million. Sales in
just the first seven months of 1975 have already reached $18 million. Even if some of these purchased arms are not going directly to Angola, they are replacing older Zairean equipment which is. We must presume that Zaire is making arms purchases either for cash or credit from European suppliers as well. According to a well-informed source, President Mobutu is reputed to be heavily pre-occupied with Angolan affairs rather than his own country's economic chaos.

Congress should therefore press the President to withdraw the military credit sales request to Zaire under the provision of Section 35. If this does not succeed, military credit sales to Zaire should be prohibited by amendment. An amendment stating that no aid in the military assistance bill may go directly or indirectly to Angola would probably also be helpful, although it would require careful monitoring after passage. Consistent with these recommendations, we further suggest that Section 33 of the Foreign Military Sales act imposing a $40 million ceiling on military assistance to all African countries not be repealed, as the Administration is requesting.

We also recommend that Congress urge the Administration to influence South Africa to halt its invasion of Angola. Press reports of the last month document an alarming penetration into Angola by South African troops, extending over 100 miles inside the country. Secretary of State Kissinger told representatives of the Organization of African Unity in New York in September that he "noted" the "statesmanlike efforts" of President Vorster and other African leaders "to avert violence and bloodshed." Surely South Africa's aggression into Angola is a reversal of whatever "detente" policy ever existed. The Administration has consistently defended its "communication without acceptance" policy toward South Africa. If the Administration supports peaceful relations between South Africa and its neighbors, it should vehemently condemn South Africa's current invasion of Angola.
The United States should cease and desist from all forms of direct or indirect intervention in the Angolan civil war and should seek the co-operation of all non-Angolan powers in ensuring a de-escalation. The United States can live with whatever party comes to power in Angola. We see no real reason for the present hardlining posture of Secretary Kissinger.

We cannot conclude better than to quote from the Presidential address of Professor John Marcum to the 1975 annual conference of the African Studies Association which has just been concluded in San Francisco:

"Secretary of State Kissinger has expressed more anxiety about what he terms the spread of 'Marxist ideologies and perceptions of the world which are contrary to our values' than about the danger of overreaction to harsh rhetoric and socialist advocacy. Having maintained supportive relations with Lisbon during all the years of insurgency, Washington could hardly expect any Angolan nationalist to be pro-American. And if one movement, the MPLA, was particularly hostile and distrustful of American economic and political intentions, this was no reason to identify it as the "enemy" and to fall into the trap of involvement in an internal conflict in which the United States has no vital interest. There was no need for the United States to choose sides.

Angola provides the United States with an opportunity to set a more worthy example in foreign policy. To this end Washington could declare its readiness to establish relations based on the principle of mutuality of interest with whomever ends up governing Angola. It could seek from the Soviet Union a mutual agreement not to engage in an Angolan war by proxy. It could prove to itself and the world that it did learn something in Vietnam."