Namibia 28 January 1986

Pretoria's War Against the Namibian People

At 3 am on 23 January, the offices of the Council of Churches in Namibia - a large rambling building in Namibia's chief city, Windhoek - were heavily damaged by arson. Neighbors heard the 'whoomp' of a gasoline explosion, saw flames leap into the night sky and observed a vehicle racing from the scene.

The Namibia Communications Centre in London reported the attack immediately. The US press appears not to have noted this assault on the churches in the South African-occupied Territory. The incident is a serious escalation of Pretoria's war against any entity that stands in opposition to its rule - in Namibia, in the independent countries in southern Africa, in South Africa.

The fire severely damaged the development, finance, non-formal education and reception offices. According to Council staff the smell of petrol was evident in filing cabinets in the reception area in the front of the building. The fire department arrived shortly after the explosion and was able to contain the fire before it consumed the entire structure. The Rev Dr Abisai Shejavali, general-secretary of the CCN, stated that police and fire officials said the fire had been started by the use of gasoline and kerosene. Dr Shejavali added: 'The Council of Churches in Namibia and its staff will continue to strive for the true freedom and independence for this country.'

The London-based Namibia Communications Centre also reports that at night on 18 January a bomb blast extensively damaged the generating system at the Lutheran Oshigambo high school in northern Namibia. Bishop Kleopas Dumeni said he suspects members of the South African Defence Force for the bombing. The bishop, in a detailed statement to the South African Police, said he 'totally rejected' an army assertion that 'SWAPO terrorists' had perpetrated the act. Bishop Dumeni declared: 'I suspect members of the South African Defence Force at the Oshigambo army base to be responsible for this bomb explosion.'

On Sunday, 26 January, South African Police in occupied Namibia repeatedly assaulted people at a festive gathering in Windhoek's Katutura township. They used batons, tear gas and attack dogs against men, women and children celebrating the United Nations International Year of Peace at an occasion organized by the SWAPO Youth League. Police charged again and again into the crowd which kept regrouping. At least 56 people were arrested including Ms Ida Jimmy, SWAPO Women's Council leader who was only released last October after serving a five-year sentence for giving a militant speech. (While in prison, Ms Jimmy gave birth to a son; the infant died and Ms Jimmy was not allowed to attend the funeral.)

The detained SWAPO prisoners smuggled out a message from their jail cell, where 46 were confined in a 6 x 4 metre room: 'We of SWAPO make clear that we will resist and challenge the draconian laws imposed upon us in our country. We will not be broken!'

AFGHANISTAN: The New Battlefields

The Washington Post

The Arms Pipeline

It is here, among the parched hills of Pakistan's tribal territories, that the pipeline ends. Dust-covered trucks roll into guerrilla bases along the Afghan border and unload arms to be cleaned and repacked on donkeys and horses for the trip into Afghanistan.

Accounts pieced together from Afghans, Pakistanis and westerners said that the CIA secretly buys weapons—in China, Egypt and elsewhere—and ships them to the Pakistani port of Karachi and isolated points along the coast of Baluchistan, to the west. One source said shipments in recent months included 40 tons of Soviet equipment captured by South Africa.
The Reagan Administration has not prepared to enter a coalition with noncommunist opposition forces led by Jonas Savimbi, an Angolan envoy said yesterday, warning the Reagan administration that it would be backing "a loser" if it decided to work with him militarily or other assistance.

A national coalition government is "out," Angolan Foreign Trade Minister Isabel Gaspar-Martins said, because Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is regarded by the government as an "offshoot of South Africa" and not a "national" movement.

"It's like telling you, 'All right, let's form a government with Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan together and let them create a national government.' It cannot be done," Gaspar-Martins said.

The Reagan administration has been seeking a reconciliation between the Angolan government and UNITA as part of an overall settlement of various conflicts in southern Africa.

In addition, several senators have indicated that their decision on whether to back an administration proposal for military and other aid to UNITA would depend partly on the government's willingness to negotiate with Savimbi.

Gaspar-Martins, a foreign-policy adviser to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, said his visit only a few days before Savimbi's arrival here to lobby for U.S. military assistance was purely a "coincidence."

But he went out of his way to make known his government's willingness to support the Reagan administration's proposals to begin providing covert aid to UNITA.

Gaspar-Martins warned that such a U.S. commitment to Savimbi is bound to have a negative impact on U.S.-brokered negotiations between his government and South Africa for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for South Africa-administered Namibia. But he did not say Angola would break off the talks.

He said Angola, in the latest discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, has renewed an offer to withdraw Cuban troops from the southern part of the country and send most of them home but is not ready to make more concessions.

Angola is awaiting word from Crocker, who has just returned from South Africa, as to whether South Africa has new proposals regarding its withdrawal from Namibia and the schedule for independence elections.

Gaspar-Martins also sought to dissuade Congress and the administration from making a commitment militarily or politically to Savimbi. He said UNITA forces have repeatedly engaged in the kind of terrorist activities against civilians and targets in a guerrilla war against the central government that the Reagan administration has been condemning elsewhere.

He noted that, at its summit last summer, the Organization of African Unity criticized Savimbi's movement and U.S. proposals to begin aiding it. U.S. aid would be condemned as "a very unfriendly act not only against Angola but the rest of Africa," he said.

"I think the United States is backing the loser. Savimbi is a loser. He cannot win," Gaspar-Martins said.

"To us, you know, he is called 'Judas' Savimbi because of his treason, linking himself to South Africa," he said.
Weinberger Urges Aid to Anticomunist Guerrillas

By Fred Hiatt

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said yesterday that the United States should find ways to help guerilla movements fight communist governments, but he again advocated caution before committing U.S. forces.

In a speech prepared for delivery at Fort McNair here last night, Weinberger ticked off a high-level "conference on low-intensity warfare," which Secretary of State George P. Shultz is scheduled to address today. Defense Department officials said the conference is intended to outline the Reagan administration's commitment to those it considers "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere.

"There are four nations and others who look to us," Weinberger said that Americans "cannot ignore their aspirations without betraying our own."

"If it is proper and just that we should help those who wish to remain free," he said, "then we can hardly turn our backs on those who have lost their freedom and want it back."

But Weinberger, resuming a debate that he and Shultz have waged on the use of force, said that the military must be only one component of a strategy to defeat communism. That strategy must include "diplomacy, and economic leverage, and the proper management of our technological riches, and the proper...

The administration has pushed initially for a more active role, both open and covert, in Third World conflicts, from which the United States pulled back after the Vietnam war. U.S. dollars are flowing to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and Washington may soon resume aiding Angolan rebels as well.

The United States supports governments threatened by leftist insurgencies, as in El Salvador, Weinberger said last night that such aid should not go to a government that will use it only to "sustain itself in power, but he added, "We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives."

Weinberger's prescriptions appeared to fall short of those advocated by some conservative strategists. Later this month, for example, the Heritage Foundation will conduct a seminar entitled, "How to Roll Back the Soviet Empire Through Low-Intensity Warfare."

Weinberger acknowledged that even the term, "low-intensity conflicts," which has become increasingly fashionable among defense analysts, is fuzzy. Such Third World conflicts are sometimes labeled insurgencies; guerilla wars or, in Soviet literature, wars of national liberation.

The defense secretary said "there is a place for power" in responding to low-intensity wars, particularly for special operations forces such as the Army's Green Berets. Even then, however, he stressed the value of special forces in training local fighters and performing "civic action," such as digging wells, building roads and offering medical help.

The Reagan administration has pushed initially for a more active role, both open and covert, in Third World conflicts, from which the United States pulled back after the Vietnam war. U.S. dollars are flowing to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and Washington may soon resume aiding Angolan rebels as well.

The administration also has increased support for governments threatened by leftist insurgencies, as in El Salvador, Weinberger said last night that such aid should not go to a government that will use it only to "sustain itself in power, but he added, "We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives."

Weinberger's prescriptions appeared to fall short of those advocated by some conservative strategists. Later this month, for example, the Heritage Foundation will conduct a seminar entitled, "How to Roll Back the Soviet Empire Through Low-Intensity Warfare."

Weinberger acknowledged that even the term, "low-intensity conflicts," which has become increasingly fashionable among defense analysts, is fuzzy. Such Third World conflicts are sometimes labeled insurgencies; guerilla wars or, in Soviet literature, wars of national liberation.

The defense secretary said "there is a place for power" in responding to low-intensity wars, particularly for special operations forces such as the Army's Green Berets. Even then, however, he stressed the value of special forces in training local fighters and performing "civic action," such as digging wells, building roads and offering medical help.

The Reagan administration has pushed initially for a more active role, both open and covert, in Third World conflicts, from which the United States pulled back after the Vietnam war. U.S. dollars are flowing to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and Washington may soon resume aiding Angolan rebels as well.

The administration also has increased support for governments threatened by leftist insurgencies, as in El Salvador, Weinberger said last night that such aid should not go to a government that will use it only to "sustain itself in power, but he added, "We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives."

Weinberger's prescriptions appeared to fall short of those advocated by some conservative strategists. Later this month, for example, the Heritage Foundation will conduct a seminar entitled, "How to Roll Back the Soviet Empire Through Low-Intensity Warfare."

Weinberger acknowledged that even the term, "low-intensity conflicts," which has become increasingly fashionable among defense analysts, is fuzzy. Such Third World conflicts are sometimes labeled insurgencies; guerilla wars or, in Soviet literature, wars of national liberation.

The defense secretary said "there is a place for power" in responding to low-intensity wars, particularly for special operations forces such as the Army's Green Berets. Even then, however, he stressed the value of special forces in training local fighters and performing "civic action," such as digging wells, building roads and offering medical help.

The Reagan administration has pushed initially for a more active role, both open and covert, in Third World conflicts, from which the United States pulled back after the Vietnam war. U.S. dollars are flowing to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and Washington may soon resume aiding Angolan rebels as well.

The administration also has increased support for governments threatened by leftist insurgencies, as in El Salvador, Weinberger said last night that such aid should not go to a government that will use it only to "sustain itself in power, but he added, "We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives."

Weinberger's prescriptions appeared to fall short of those advocated by some conservative strategists. Later this month, for example, the Heritage Foundation will conduct a seminar entitled, "How to Roll Back the Soviet Empire Through Low-Intensity Warfare."

Weinberger acknowledged that even the term, "low-intensity conflicts," which has become increasingly fashionable among defense analysts, is fuzzy. Such Third World conflicts are sometimes labeled insurgencies; guerilla wars or, in Soviet literature, wars of national liberation.

The defense secretary said "there is a place for power" in responding to low-intensity wars, particularly for special operations forces such as the Army's Green Berets. Even then, however, he stressed the value of special forces in training local fighters and performing "civic action," such as digging wells, building roads and offering medical help.

The Reagan administration has pushed initially for a more active role, both open and covert, in Third World conflicts, from which the United States pulled back after the Vietnam war. U.S. dollars are flowing to antigovernment forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and Washington may soon resume aiding Angolan rebels as well.

The administration also has increased support for governments threatened by leftist insurgencies, as in El Salvador, Weinberger said last night that such aid should not go to a government that will use it only to "sustain itself in power, but he added, "We cannot permit our disdain for some imperfect regimes to bring forth far worse alternatives.

American Ends Visit To S. Africa

Crocker Criticizes "Economic War"

By Allister Sparrin

JOHANNESBURG, Jan. 14.—Chester A. Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa, left here tonight saying he had a better appreciation of the gap between the country's race groups but still did not believe in economic sanctions as a way to end apartheid.

"I wish I had more time to talk about the prospects,' Crocker said.

"By Fred Hiatt

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said yesterday that the United States should find ways to help guerilla movements fight communist governments, but he again advocated caution before committing U.S. forces.

In a speech prepared for delivery at Fort McNair here last night, Weinberger ticked off a high-level "conference on low-intensity warfare," which Secretary of State George P. Shultz is scheduled to address today. Defense Department officials said the conference is intended to outline the Reagan administration's commitment to those it considers "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere.

"There are four nations and others who look to us," Weinberger said that Americans "cannot ignore their aspirations without betraying our own."

"If it is proper and just that we should help those who wish to remain free," he said, "then we can hardly turn our backs on those who have lost their freedom and want it back."

But Weinberger, resuming a debate that he and Shultz have waged on the use of force, said that the military must be only one component of a strategy to defeat communism. That strategy must include "diplomacy, and economic leverage, and the proper management of our technological riches, and the proper..."
US begins new round of negotiations on Namibian independence

By Louis Wyman
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Paris

Diplomatic efforts to gain independence for Namibia seem to be back on track. But some analysts see a glimmer of hope in the apparent political strengthening of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, whose agreement is essential to any independence settlement.

Mr. dos Santos seems more inclined toward a compromise agreement on Namibia (South West Africa) than other members of his government. His position was apparently strengthened at the recent congress of his ruling Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MLPA).

The United States is resuming its push for a Namibia agreement. Chester Crocker, the US assistant secretary of state, arrived in Angola Wednesday for talks on Namibia. For four years, Mr. Crocker has been trying to get Angola to send 30,000 Cuban troops home in exchange, South Africa would withdraw from Namibia and permit UN-supervised elections to take place. South Africa administers Namibia in defiance of the UN.

But thus far, Crocker's initiative has, in the words of a West European diplomat, "failed miserably." The Reagan administration says there has been progress.

In his earlier talks, Crocker had persuaded the Angolans to accept a linkage between Namibian independence and the departure of Cuban troops from Angola.

Slowly the gap between the South African and Angolan positions narrowed. Angola offered to send its estimated 25,000 Cubans home over a period of three years, keeping 5,000 Cubans around the capital. Pretoria demanded that all Cubans leave within six months.

There was room for further compromise. But last May, when a secret meeting between South African President P. W. Botha and Angolan President dos Santos went into its third or fourth day, South African commanders were captured trying to sabotage American-owned oil installations in the northern Angolan province of Cabinda. Pretoria said the commanders were gathering intelligence.

Despite South Africa's action, dos Santos agreed to continue talks both with the US and with South Africa. But in a meeting last week, Crocker added a new condition, linking Namibian independence to the establishment of a new government in Angola that would include Jones Savimbi, whose insurgents the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA, are waging civil war against the Angolan government. According to a senior official, dos Santos and South African foreign minister P. W. Botha have agreed to this provision.

But in a speech last Friday President dos Santos for the first time included Savimbi's insurgent group among the "freedom fighters" which "the United States felt morally obligated to support." Savimbi is expected in Washington later this month where he will meet with high administration officials and key senators.

US Secretary of State George Shultz has delayed providing covert aid to UNITA in the hope that dos Santos would agree to the new terms which, one Angolans source here, calls "political hari-kari."

Angola has been able to deal severe blows to UNITA in recent months. Savimbi had been pinned on the defensive in South Africa and felt a need to intervene late last year. Pretoria wanted to create a situation that would freeze diplomatic efforts and allow South Africa to move its forces into Angola to bail out Savimbi, according to a West European diplomat recently stationed in Luanda. Pretoria, however, said it went into Angola in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas.

At the recent party congress, dos Santos filled the Central Committee with personal supporters (by enlisting it from 57 to 99 seats). Though he pro- poses to be Marxist, he has spoken out against dogmatism and in favor of pragmatism.

All domestic obstacles to a negotiated settlement have now been removed and dos Santos has a free hand to work out a compromise solution with South Africa, says one African pro-Western source.

Chester Crocker in Angola: "The future of Africa."

Reagan's Angola strategy

Instead of blundering into the 10-year-old Angolan civil war with little more than lukewarm support to José Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas, President Reagan has chosen a sophisticated strategy of carefully-planned sequential steps.

This approach is designed to maximize the chances of a negotiated departure of Cuban troops from Angola, while at the same time ensuring broad bipartisan support for Congress if American armed assistance to Mr. Savimbi eventually proves necessary.

The first tactical move in the implementation of this strategy was the meeting that Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost had with President Eduardo dos Santos at the United Nations last month. The leader of the uncredited Marxist MPLA that had with Pres- ident Eduardo dos Santos at the UN in New York.

The meeting was the last of the five-day talks to get the Cubans to leave. Mr. dos Santos was given a specific deadline, he was clearly warned that within a limited time his regime would have to come up with a more acceptable schedule for the final departure of Cuban troops as a way of getting the South Africans to withdraw their forces from Namibia.

It was also made clear to the Angolan leader that the US government could not passively stand by and permit an attempt to destroy UNITA with Soviet weaponry and Cuban forces. A negotiated national reconciliation with UNITA, leading to free elections, was urged as the only way to end the civil war and prevent the superpower rivalry from spreading.

The second stage in the administration's strategy started last week in the Zambian capital of Lusaka, where Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker met with Angolan Minister of the Interior Rodrigues Quito. With both sides claiming the talks were "useful," another session is scheduled for Lusaka after the Dec. 11 meeting of the MPLA party congress. With demands for armed assistance to UNITA increasing in Congress, American negotiators have for the first time been able to use a credible threat of US intervention as a bargaining lever.

As these talks continue, State Department officials also claim that recent discussions with the South Africans on their departure from Namibia show some promising signs that the worst possible outcome: defeat of the moderates, who seek a negotiated settlement with UNITA.

This coherent Reagan strategy has a good chance of winning enough bipartisan support to avoid the worst possible outcome: defeat of the Americans request for aid to UNITA.

As Mr. Savimbi's representatives in Washington point out, there is some danger in delaying the provision of aid to UNITA for two months. In spite of the efforts of the MPLA and South Africans to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops, Savimbi still prevails in the MPLA. The threat of a rainy-season offensive cannot be discounted.

If this MPLA hard-liners, with Soviet and Cuban support, succeed in sabotaging the current negotiations, and force an extension of the American armed assistance, the administration would then be in a strong position to request congressional approval of American assistance for UNITA as the only way to offset massive Soviet and Cuban intervention and prevent the extension of Communist control throughout the region. By providing this aid directly to Mr. Savimbi, the US would make UNITA less dependent on South Africa and strengthen the hands of the MPLA moderates, who seek a negotiated settlement with UNITA.

This coherent Reagan strategy has a good chance of winning enough bipartisan support to avoid the worst possible outcome: defeat of the Americans request for aid to UNITA.

As Mr. Savimbi's representatives in Washington point out, there is some danger in delaying the provision of aid to UNITA for two months. In spite of the efforts of the MPLA and South Africans to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops, Savimbi still prevails in the MPLA. The threat of a rainy-season offensive cannot be discounted.

If this MPLA hard-liners, with Soviet and Cuban support, succeed in sabotaging the current negotiations, and force an extension of the American armed assistance, the administration would then be in a strong position to request congressional approval of American assistance for UNITA as the only way to offset massive Soviet and Cuban intervention and prevent the extension of Communist control throughout the region. By providing this aid directly to Mr. Savimbi, the US would make UNITA less dependent on South Africa and strengthen the hands of the MPLA moderates, who seek a negotiated settlement with UNITA.

This coherent Reagan strategy has a good chance of winning enough bipartisan support to avoid the worst possible outcome: defeat of the Americans request for aid to UNITA.
The changing faces of Jonas Savimbi

CENTRAL TO THE Unita image, is its leader Savimbi, all the other figures in it remain somewhat shadowy. A number of the once better-known names have disappeared without a trace as the rigours of recruiting and outrun lead to internal disputes and the summary settling of scores.

So the public image depends entirely on the PR job done by Savimbi.

The PR image serves to conceal a relative short political history marked by what might appear to be a remarkable agility when switching allegiances, but is in fact a consistent allegiance to his personal ambition to rule Angola.

In 1961 - the year the MPLA launched the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism - Savimbi was a student in Switzerland. He had given up medical studies in Portugal to enroll in the faculty of Political Science in Lausanne. Having apparently decided to involve himself in nationalist politics, he joined the MPLA.

But he was not to remain in it for long. Shortly after a trip to Africa, where he met Tom Mboya, the Kenyan politician with strong American ties, he abandoned his studies and went to join the FNLA in Kinshasa.

The CIA, which was already backing FNLA, doubtless regarded him as quite a catch. As man from Central Angola, he might give a more national, a more Angolan image to the FNLA, a tribally-based group centered on connections with the old Congo Royal Family who did their recruiting among exiles from Angola in what is now Zaire.

Savimbi became 'foreign minister' in the so-called 'government in exile' set up by the FNLA.

But that allegiance did not last long either. In 1964 at the All African Meeting of Heads of State held in Cairo, Savimbi publicly resigned from the FNLA, accusing it of tribalism.

He could have joined the MPLA had he really wanted to fight for his country's independence, but his terms were that he should be made its vice president with responsibility for foreign affairs and without any democratic decision by MPLA.

He then returned to Europe and nothing more was heard of him for the next two years, apart from the fleeting creation of something called 'Amanqola' (Manifesto of the Friends of Angola) in Switzerland.

Following Zambia's independence, the MPLA prepared to open a new front on the east, the Third Political Military Region. When the First Region was opened in northern Angola, the CIA-backed FNLA had already emerged to direct the bulk of its activity against the MPLA.

When the Second Region was opened in Cabinda, FLEC - a series of groups supported by conflicting oil interests and recruited mainly from the Portuguese army's armed forces - had appeared to oppose the MPLA in Cabinda.

In 1966, when the Third Region was about to be opened, Savimbi re-emerged and announced the creation of Unita in the east.

The alliance Unita formed with members of the Portuguese High Command has been well documented.

His correspondence with General Luiz Cunha, commander in chief of the colonial army in Angola, and other officials of the Portuguese colonial regime, came to light after April 25, 1974, when young officers of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement gained access to the secret files of PIDE (Portuguese Political Police).

In this correspondence, the 'enemy' referred to by both Savimbi and the Portuguese officials, was the MPLA. In a letter to General Luiz Cunha dated September 29, 1972, Savimbi outlined what he regarded as the way to achieve peace in eastern Angola: "The weakening of the MPLA forces in Angola, leading to their liquidation. This task can be accomplished through the combined efforts of the (Portuguese) military forces and Unita's forces'.

This damning evidence of collaboration with the colonial enemy was rebuffed as a forgery by Unita and its mentors.

What else could they say? In 1982 the files of the PIDE (renamed DGS) were opened to the international press. This event was reported in the British paper, The Times (23.8.82) under the headline 'Secret Files in Lisbon Compromise Savimbi'.

To quote The Times: 'In one dusty file, a telegram from the DGS branch in Lusso, Angola, marked Top Secret and dated September 19, 1972, gave an account of a report from Dr Jonas Savimbi, who at that time was supposed to be fighting the Portuguese. According to the DGS, Dr Savimbi said his Unita had successfully ambushed a 30-man force of rival MPLA. He now wanted arms, ammunition, syringes, medicines, and a safe passage for his men through Portuguese army lines'.

Contacts with the PIDE were maintained through settler merchants in the small area of eastern Angola where Unita was sheltered from the war, and through a Catholic priest.

These contacts were again used when Unita hastened to sign a ceasefire with Portugal in June 1974, 'in order to seek political advantage from being able to establish itself legally in Angola and start to recruit new members'.

It badly needed to. On June 18, 1974, while hailing the 'ceasefire with Unita', the Portuguese daily, Diario de Lisboa, wrote: 'Unita is the smallest of the three guerrilla organisations operating in Angola' and estimated that it had 'approximately 300 men under arms'.

In an article published in The Guardian in May 1974, Portuguese commander, Jose Martins e Silva, at the Portuguese army headquarters in Luanda, commented on the three Angolan organisations which, with Portugal, were later to form the transitional government under the terms of the Alvor Agreement: 'We are not worried about the guerrillas belonging to Unita because they are not strong'.

'The (Portuguese) Army wants peace. We want the people to decide the future - the six million people who live inside Angola. Organisations like Unita and FNLA are unwilling to accept peace because they know they don't represent more than a small number of people in a small sector of the country.'

SOUTH AFRICA'S latest intervention in Angola on behalf of the rebel movement, Unita, has once again raised the question of Pretoria's intentions in Southern Africa, particularly in Angola and Namibia.

However, while South Africa's support for Unita has been an open secret for many years, very little is generally known about the background of the rebel group which South Africa is seeking to promote as a legitimate factor in the Angolan/Namibian equation.

This crude opportunism had its contradictions as when speeches made in Umbundu in Huambo or Bie Provinces - in which the killing of all whites was advocated - were understood by local settlers who spoke the language.

Abroad, Unita's image was promoted through black American groups heavily infiltrated by the CIA.

Even after independence in Angola, we saw such US military organisations as Roy Innis' Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) recruiting black mercenaries to fight with Unita.
South Africa's apartheid system pulls the strings

UNITA is an instrument of the South African apartheid government. More than that, it is an instrument of imperialist strategy in southern Africa.

A succinct account of the role reserved for the group was given in documents leaked to the New York Times after South African Foreign Minister Botha's visit to Washington in May 1981.

To quote the International Herald Tribune reporting on the documents revealing Botha's talks with US officials, the join US-South African army personnel are alleged to train UNITA members.

South Africa is also alleged to carry out illegal flights to Angola from Namibia to land supplies for UNITA. It is clear that Namibian independence under Security Council Resolution 435 and the consequent withdrawal of the South African Armed Forces from Namibia would totally change the situation.

Even without this, the offensive of the Angolan armed forces to wipe out the armed bands is clearly evident in all areas of country as well as in domestic activities. The MPLA also uses Namibia as a transit for sending its arms and equipment to UNITA in order to supply the Angolese army and UNITA.

It is in the illegally occupied territory of Namibia that South African army personnel are alleged to train UNITA members.

The events after the signing of the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 are well known.

UNITA was too small a force to matter. The FNLA, finding that it had no political support in Angola, tried to seize control of the capital of Luanda by force.

The population of Luanda was massacred, MPLA supporters were hunted down, tortured and killed, and the most horrible atrocities were committed during which virtually all the military occupation of Luanda by FNLA and UNITA forces was involved.

With support from the population of Luanda, the MPLA launched a counter-offensive and by July 1975 the capital had been cleared of the forces, most of whom did not even speak any Angolan language or Portuguese.

UNITA officials, who had consistently supported FNLA positions in the transitional government opposing the MPLA, also left the capital.

The FNLA and UNITA then sought to establish their own spheres of influence in areas where their leaders had tribal affiliations - in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire, and UNITA in the Central Highlands.

On August 13, the MPLA issued a statement denouncing these attempts to carve out spheres of influence. The statement spoke of forces which 'under cover of nationalist facades, are entering our territory from permanent rear bases abroad, and which have found it necessary to carry out all kinds of violence, culminating in monumental massacres of the people in almost all the regions of the country where they can establish themselves. By August 1975, the MPLA had established its control in almost all provinces of Angola. UNITA left the capital.

But it was in August too, that the first contingent of South African troops entered Angola, allegedly to protect the Calange hydro-electric scheme on the Namibian border.

This was merely a prelude to the South African invasion by an estimated 6000 troops which resulted in the occupation of the whole of the centre and south of Angola.

There was a simultaneous invasion from the north, the aim being for the invading forces to converge on Luanda and take the capital before independence from the MPLA in November 11.

In the wake of the South African armoured column, UNITA was established in Angolan towns, enjoying the South African military protection which it has continued to enjoy to this day.

The attempt to take the capital and to prevent the proclamation of independence by the MPLA, failed.

The MPLA appealed to a number of countries for assistance. Some African countries sent small contingents of troops to help Angola's threatened independence. On November 5, 1975 the Cuban Central Committee decided to send Cuban contingents to help the MPLA forces, and so leave the experienced former guerrilla fighters more free to deal with the combat tasks.

It was after independence on November 11, that the Cuban contingents arrived and helped in the counter-offensive which resulted in the expulsion of the South African Army in March 1976.

After independence, the FNLA and UNITA tried to seek recognition for the nationalist movement and to set up in Huambo under the umbrella of the South African Armed Forces.

And while Western governments were calling for a government of 'national unity' in Angola, - meaning that FNLA and UNITA should be brought into the central government - the two groups proved they were not able to maintain unity, even among themselves.

Fighting broke out in Huambo between the FNLA and UNITA. On December 22, Huambo Radio broadcast impassioned pleas for peace, and by December 23, the fighting had spread to Benguela, also still occupied by South African armed forces.

The fighting, which caused widespread destruction, especially in Huambo, showed the inability of the two tribally-based organisations to achieve even a modicum of unity.

During their short reign in Huambo, they made no attempt to establish any kind of administration. And when Huambo was liberated in early February, there were charnel houses of dead bodies and mass graves.

Everywhere banks, vaults and safes had been broken into, and, in all of the east, the FNLA and UNITA leaders had taken with them millions of dollars.

But by mid-January, Jonas Savimbi had already made his headquarters in Kinshasa, capital of neighbouring Zaire.

From there he made the following typical statement: 'We do not need any American advisors or soldiers here. We don't need any military aid from the United States and our friends in the West. It would be a pity if the US were not to help our cause.'

'For the moment, the MPLA is being dealt a crushing defeat in Huambo and its defeat in Huambo. We are fighting for the interests of our own people in Angola.'

On March 1, 1976, the late President Agostinho Neto, said that FNLA and UNITA members who had fled to neighbouring countries should have no fear of returning to Angola.

He said: 'Even here in the capital of Angola, there are people who were FNLA and other organisations that held in Namibia and Botswana, about returning to their country.'

'So long as they accept the laws of the country, we accept them. Let us work together. We are not exclusive people. We do not want Angola to be solely for MPLA members.'

In the light of propaganda today, presenting Savimbi as a man seeking 'national reconciliation' it is important to recall that this movement offered to all Angolans who had fought against the Government, and who as in future they respected the law.

This call for national reconciliation was ignored by Savimbi, who declared his intention to continue 'guerrilla warfare', showing that he had no desire to see national reconstruction in his country.

Assurances of continued support from the US and other Western nations sustained Savimbi's overriding ambition to be president of Angola one day.
Everything in the way of positive opposition to racial discrimination is of value, as you will know, and I am sure that in the world of chess this is especially so because of its international character.

- Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, CR president, British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

CHESS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID

The South African Chess Association - the only non-racial national umbrella organization for the promotion of chess in South Africa - will celebrate its second anniversary at a chess congress to be held in a 'township' near Cape Town at the end of March 1986.

This congress will be held in a 'township' because SACA does not hold its congresses in 'international' venues in 'white' areas, nor does it request 'permits' from the apartheid authorities for 'multi-racial' activities, as does the apartheid South African Chess Federation.

SACA celebrates two years of non-racial chess in the land of apartheid even though its playing halls have been closed to it by the apartheid allies of the South African Chess Federation - even though members and officials have lost their jobs and been consigned to the concentration camps called 'homelands' - even though many of its members have suffered detention under the emergency declaration of Pretoria. SACA members choose the non-racial chess of their organization over the government sanctioned 'multi-racial' activities of the apartheid SACF.

It is important that the people of South Africa know that the 'outside world' recognizes those who struggle for a democratic, unitary, non-racial society. For those in the world of chess this occasion presents the opportunity to greet our sisters and brothers in the spirit of FIDE's glorious slogan, GENS UNA SUMUS. (FIDE stands for Federation Internationale des Echecs, called in English, World Chess Federation).

Send your messages of solidarity and celebration to:

South African Chess Association
P.O. Box 217
Athlone 7760
SOUTH AFRICA

The United States Chess Federation has pressed FIDE to revoke its stand against apartheid in chess. You can protest this action by the USCF:

E. Steven Doyle, president
Gerard Dullea, executive director
U.S. Chess Federation
186 Route 9W
New Windsor, NY 12550

Please send copies of your messages both to SACA and USCF to SACA's international representative:

Jerome Bibuld
377 Westchester Avenue
Port Chester, NY 10573
Protesters march in front of the building housing the Pacific Maritime Association.

(©Photo: Richard J. Brown)

ECSA
339 Lafayette Street
New York, N.Y. 10012