POLICY GUIDELINES FOR THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA
ADOPTED AT A MEETING OF ITS STEERING COMMITTEE ON JUNE
17, 1976.

1. Recognition of the People's Republic of Angola and support
for its Admission into the United Nations.

The Washington Office on Africa supports U.S. recogni-
tion of the People's Republic of Angola and advocates
that the United States vote for Angolan membership in the
United Nations.

2. Policy toward South Africa.

A. The United States government, according to the policy
which Secretary of State Kissinger has been implementing
since his April 28th Lusaka speech, sees South Africa as the
key to an acceptable solution in southern Africa. The United
States is therefore prepared to end some of the restrictions
which it has implemented in regard to South Africa.

The Washington Office on Africa does not accept this
view of the developing situation in southern Africa, and sees
rather that this strategy by the United States amounts to
an acceptance of South Africa's "detente" strategy which it
is implementing in its own interests. We therefore oppose
any concessions which would have the effect of strengthening
Apartheid.

B. Recognition of the Transkei

The Washington Office on Africa opposes U.S. recogni-
tion of the independence of the Transkei, on the ground
that such recognition would legitimize South Africa's
separate development policy and endorse a "solution" which
ignores the reality that Xhosa people are rightfully South
African citizens.

C. Sale of nuclear fuel and highly enriched uranium
to South Africa

The Washington Office on Africa opposes all nuclear
co-operation with South Africa on the grounds that such
co-operation could enhance South Africa's military capability
and that it constitutes one example of expanding economic
co-operation between the two countries which further commits

THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA IS SPONSORED BY THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA, THE AFRICA OFFICE OF THE BOARD
FOR GLOBAL MINISTRIES OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, THE BOARD OF WORLD MINISTRIES
COUNCIL OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (DISCIPLES OF CHRIST).
2.

the United States to the defense of Apartheid.

D. Export-Import Bank policy toward South Africa

The Washington Office on Africa opposes any weakening of the loan or guarantee policy of the Export-Import Bank with regard to South Africa. We also oppose the granting of major new guarantees which significantly increase Ex-Im's exposure in South Africa. Ex-Im financing encourages U.S. trade with South Africa, undergirds the South African economy, especially in such critical areas as energy, and thus further commits the United States to the defense of Apartheid.

3. Policy toward Rhodesia

The Washington Office on Africa continues to support full U.S. compliance with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia. We would oppose military or paramilitary training of any Zimbabwean faction or any U.S. involvement in a peace-keeping force during a transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe unless such a peacekeeping force is authorized and approved by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. The only negotiations which the United States should accept as a way to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe are those involving all the forces which are active in the struggle. WOA opposes the recruitment of mercenaries in this country.

4. Policy toward Namibia.

The Washington Office on Africa opposes U.S. acceptance of any results of the constitutional talks being carried out by the present group of participants at the Turnhalle conference which strengthen the bantustan structure of Namibia or which are in contradiction to United Nations resolutions in regard to Namibia. Any constitutional conference should include all political parties in Namibia. It opposes any U.S. effort to soften the U.N. resolution of January, 1976, calling for U.N. supervision and control of Namibian electoral processes. WOA opposes the continued granting of tax credits to U.S. corporations operating in Namibia.

5. Economic, technical and military aid to countries or movements in Southern Africa

The Washington Office on Africa will judge proposals of U.S. governmental aid to countries and movements in southern Africa in accordance with the following criteria. Aid proposals, of course, must be evaluated individually on their own merits. ("Southern Africa" for these purposes includes South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; it also includes Zambia, Zaire and Tanzania to the extent that any proposed aid to those countries could affect the struggle for majority rule and/or self-determination and independence in the said eight countries of Southern Africa.)

We could support aid in accordance with the following
3.

criteria:

A. Aid should serve the genuine development needs of the countries of the region by increasing their ability to meet the basic needs of the population.

B. Aid should be given through multilateral channels wherever that is possible unless the donee nation requests otherwise.

C. Refugee and humanitarian assistance is acceptable.

D. Compensatory aid to black-ruled countries to enable them to recoup losses suffered because of implementation of U.N. sanctions is acceptable.

E. Aid which is requested by black-ruled countries which have most effectively supported majority rule and self-determination in southern Africa is acceptable.

We oppose the following kinds of aid:

A. Aid which has the effect of strengthening the domination of white-ruled states over black states or over their own population.

B. Military aid or significant military sales (whether for cash or on credit) to any of the countries in Southern Africa either by the United States or by any other country. The alleged need to match Soviet escalation which may be alleged to have taken place in neighboring states should be viewed skeptically when put forward as a rationale for U.S. military assistance.

C. Aid which is not intended to serve any of the above specific purposes which we do support, which could give the U.S. flexibility to carry out overt or covert programs to meet its own purposes rather than to meet the legitimate needs of southern Africa is not acceptable.

D. Aid should not be given to buy votes at the United Nations or for any other political purpose promoting domination by Western interests.