INSIDE MOZAMBIQUE: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

With the armed struggle in Mozambique ended and independence slated for June 25th of this year, the transitional Mozambican government, headed by FRELIMO, is tackling the enormous social and economic problems left by years of Portuguese mismanagement and colonial rule.

Its most immediate challenge came on the night of Sept. 7 after the signing of the Lusaka agreement formally ending colonial rule and providing for the transition to independence. On that night a small band of white rightists seized Lourenço Marques' radio station and airport in an attempted government takeover. The rebellion was crushed by Portuguese and FRELIMO troops, but on its heels came a week of violence which left at least 82 dead and 479 wounded. In late October, violence again erupted in Lourenço Marques, leaving at least 49 dead. About 2000 men from special police units, traffic police, Portuguese forces, and FRELIMO took part in rounding up more than 1200 suspected agitators for security checks in a concerted effort to restore confidence among the people. Meanwhile, FRELIMO members held meetings throughout the city to explain its policies, emphasizing its antiracist ideology. The transitional government began to implement a rural resettlement program, giving land, farm tools, and seeds to jobless Mozambicans in an attempt to reduce the chances of further friction in the capital.
Although bloody, these outbreaks were shortlived, and there has been remarkable calm in Mozambique since October. The credit for the relative ease of the transition goes to the transitional government's success in isolating and controlling subversive elements and to FRELIMO's intensive campaign of political education and mobilization of the people. A demilitarization program instituted by Rear Admiral Victor Crespo, the Portuguese High Commissioner, banned guns of 7.65 caliber or more to all Mozambican civilians and imposed one to six month jail terms for disobedience. Elements of the Portuguese military responsible for the October clashes and suspected of being linked to the former Portuguese security police, as well as other Portuguese considered to be "hinder- ing the process of decolonization" have been exiled to Portugal. Following the distribution of inflammatory leaflets and three grenade explosions in Lourenço Marques in late December, combined police and FRELIMO troops arrested about 70 people, most of whom were freed after proving their innocence. To prevent further outbreaks of violence, the transitional government issued three decrees: (1) seeking to end "the spreading of false rumors" which have been inciting people to violence and preventing the decolonization process (2) establishing penalties of two to eight years for the above crimes, and (3) giving the right to suspend habeas corpus during a national emergency.

Political Education

Meanwhile, mass education, with particular emphasis on the antiracist nature of the revolution, has been carried out on an ever-widening scale. To accord the local newspapers wider readership, FRELIMO has decided to spread out newspapers on notice boards at all public places. Political education and Mozambican history are replacing the teaching of morals, religion, and Portuguese history in the schools. In keeping with FRELIMO's emphasis on ending the exploitation of women, prostitutes from Lourenço Marques' red light district have been taken to special camps for short periods of reeducation. Even the treatment of political prisoners is geared toward education of the masses, following FRELIMO President Samora Machel's policy of "not killing them but learning from them." This was illustrated in a special ceremony held in March in which over 200 self-confessed traitors to the revolution described their crimes to 3,000 young Mozambicans, some of them revealing links to the former Portuguese secret police, the United States, Israel, Swaziland, Malawi, South Africa, and Rhodesia.

The Economy

The threat of violent subversion of the revolution having receded, the overriding problem facing the transitional government is the severely damaged economy. Interested primarily in
extracting short-term profits rather than reinvesting in Mozambique's economy, the colonial Portuguese government had failed to develop the country's potential agricultural and mineral wealth. To the limited extent that industry had been developed, the colonial government had fostered parasitic industries requiring expensive equipment from Portugal and geared toward final assembly of or repackaging of products made in Portugal. In addition, few Africans had been trained in needed skills.

The transitional government inherited an economy with few foreign reserves, a large trade deficit, mounting inflation, and large amounts owed to foreign suppliers and creditors. Making things worse, fears about decolonization have caused a crippling outflow of capital, widespread currency speculation, and the exodus of about 30,000 out of Mozambique's 200,000 whites, many with skills essential to the economy. FRELIMO Vice-President Marcellino dos Santos, in a confidential report before the U.N., stated that damage to factories in the final stages of the fighting, together with inflation and new wage demands, had bankrupted many colonial firms, exacerbating an already high unemployment rate.

Added to these difficulties has been the problem of feeding thousands of Mozambicans returning from refuge in Zimbabwe or Malawi or from imprisonment by Portuguese authorities. Large numbers of people who were living in aldeamentos (strategic hamlets built by the Portuguese) where they were dependent on the Portuguese military, or who were working on white-owned plantations whose owners have left have also required assistance. Dos Santos reported to the U.N. in February that parts of the country faced widespread starvation unless international help was organized at once. He stated that the new nation needed at least $40 million from the U.N. and $100 million from other sources.

Aid from Abroad

Mozambique has received aid from the United Nations Development Program ($20 million), the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization ($3.5 million), and the U.N. World Food Program ($2.2 million promised in food relief). A U.N. team has been sent to conduct a thorough investigation of the country's needs. To alleviate bread shortages, Rumania has agreed to supply all of Mozambique's wheat requirements for the rest of the year. Contributions from other nations have included medical supplies and equipment from Italy and East Germany, a large grant for purchase and transport of seed to flood-hit areas from the U.S., and technical and financial aid from Austria, Bulgaria, Rumania, and East Germany, on invitation from FRELIMO, have sent teams of experts in agriculture, health, industry, and education, along with promises of material aid. A 14-man economic delegation from the U.S.S.R. arrived in Lourenco Marques in April. Finally, in an attempt to show their good will to the new government, South Africa and Rhodesia have sent gifts of flour, milk, beans, maize, and medical supplies.
National Reconstruction

Meanwhile, the transitional government has taken strong steps against further deterioration of the economy. Export of materials, equipment, and other merchandise judged necessary for the development of the country has been banned, and citizens have been warned that activity "contributing to the creation of an insecure social and economic atmosphere to the detriment of national priorities" will result in confiscation of goods or even imprisonment. Several appeals have been made to whites to remain in Mozambique or to return from abroad. The appointment of a white FRELIMO member to the position of Rector of the University of Lourenco Marques has provided concrete evidence of FRELIMO's antiracist policies and its wish to have whites join in national reconstruction. These policies have already had remarkable success as shown in the large numbers of white volunteers staffing FRELIMO's literacy programs and participating in party meetings and committees. Many whites who had fled the country after the violence in September and October (some of whom were rejected by South Africa's stringent immigration standards) are now returning.

Mozambique's economy is still heavily dependent on links to Rhodesia and South Africa with about 40% of its budget coming from rail and port dues on South African and Rhodesian goods, another sizeable portion coming from tourism from those countries, and thousands of Mozambicans continuing to work each year in South Africa's mines. The hydroelectric power from the Cabora Bassa Dam will be sold to South Africa, as originally planned. Under an agreement reached in March, Portugal will retain a 90% interest and Mozambique will have a 10% interest in the dam project until 1990 when complete nationalization will begin.

But while ties to South Africa and Rhodesia remain, FRELIMO has also already begun working towards its goal of a truly self-sufficient economy. Plans for the development of Mozambique's oil industry and mining potential are underway. FRELIMO is considering a road link-up with Zambia, which would lessen Mozambique's dependence on Rhodesian and South African transport fees. Most important will be agricultural development, which, with improved prices resulting from the abandonment of the colonial exchange system, should provide a far greater source of income than it has in the past. FRELIMO has decided to transform 250 aldeamentos built by the Portuguese into rural communes, and plans to build 150 additional communal farms.

Thus, in the few months since it has taken office, the
transitional government has successfully restored calm, mobilized and educated large sectors of the population, and begun to re-build a shattered economy. When PRELIMO formally takes the reigns of power on June 25th, it will be leading a nation already well into a process of revolutionary transformation.

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunity for the Communists.

So begins "Option 2" of the now famous National Security Study Memorandum 39, issued by Secretary of State Kissinger in 1969, the document which has become a blueprint for U.S. support for the racist regimes of Southern Africa. NSSM 39 contains a series of guidelines for U.S. Government policy in Southern Africa: the relaxation of the arms embargo and of political and economic isolation of the Rhodesian and South African regimes and continued support of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

Militarily, the change in U.S. policy from lukewarm condemnation to more open support of the white minority regimes can be seen in the sale of such hardware as the Bell helicopters now used to patrol South Africa's northern borders, and the Boeing 707 and 747 aircraft used by the Portuguese for troop transport to and from the colonial wars. The easing of economic restrictions through changes in Export-Import Bank loan policies has enabled U.S. corporations to take greater advantage of the lucrative investment opportunities in Southern Africa. Moreover, NSSM 39 signaled the United States' attempt to legitimize the minority regimes, particularly in the eyes of independent African states. Backed by U.S. influence, South Africa would assume the role of benevolent partner in the development of black Africa (at least of those African states willing to play the game), which would help deflect public attention away from South Africa's internal politics. "Detente", the overworked Kissinger term for the coercive normalization of international relations, has now become part of Pretoria's foreign policy vocabulary as well.
The victories of the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola exposed the faulty reasoning inherent in U.S. strategy but they by no means signaled a switch to U.S. support of progressive governments. The U.S. has no intention of curtailing its attempts to shape Southern Africa in its own interests. In fact, recent events show that the U.S. is more concerned than ever.

EXPORTING DESTABILIZATION: TRENDS IN U.S. SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY

The most recent development in U.S. policy toward Southern Africa has been the selection of Nathaniel Davis as the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Davis served as the U.S. Ambassador to Chile during the period spanning the U.S. orchestrated coup which led to the downfall of the elected socialist government of Allende and the subsequent fascist military takeover. Representative Michael Harrington, an outspoken critic of the Davis appointment, gave Congressional testimony that Davis was fully informed of CIA operations in Chile, and that Davis had actually recommended some of the CIA’s activities.

African reaction to the Davis appointment was swift and hostile. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, in an unprecedented statement, expressed strong concern over the Davis nomination, and warned that they would most "vehemently condemn and resist any move by any country to import into Africa the odious practice of 'political destabilization' which brought untold harm to our brothers in Latin America."

Again, the Kissinger strategy backfired. By nominating Davis, the U.S. brought the threat of intervention out into the open, leading to an unusual show of solidarity on the part of the OAU, and a well-justified air of suspicion among African leaders concerning U.S. intentions.

As Edgar Lockwood reports in the April Southern Africa Magazine, Kissinger's selection of Davis is part of a general pattern of transferring U.S. counter-insurgency operatives from more or less successful stints in Latin America to key positions in Africa. Deane Hinton, the new U.S. Ambassador to Zaire, a country which despite its nationalist rhetoric has remained consistently friendly to U.S. interests, served as AID chief in Guatemala and Chile. Hinton is widely believed to be a C.I.A. agent. A member of the Davis-Hinton team in Guatemala and Chile, Jefferey Davidow, is now U.S. Political
Officer in South Africa. William G. Bowdler, American Ambassador to South Africa (pending confirmation), was Political Officer in Havana during pre-revolution days and remained as a Cuba advisor at State and in the National Security Council. He later served in Guatemala after Davis left for Chile.

The current Ambassador to Malawi, Robert A. Stevenson, had earlier succeeded Bowdler as Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department. A related Kissinger move was the selection of Frank Carlucci, veteran anti-Communist and skilled U.S. operative in such countries as Zaire and Brazil, as the new Ambassador to Portugal. Carlucci, in his brief tenure, has already been linked to the abortive March right-wing coup in Portugal, an event which catalyzed Portugal's leftward shift.

What is the basis of this unprecedented U.S. diplomatic concern for Southern Africa?

There have been numerous recent developments in Southern Africa which are of great concern to United States interests. As of June 25, a progressive FRELIMO government will lead an independent Mozambique, a government which under no circumstances can be expected to sacrifice its autonomy to U.S. political or corporate interests. Political conflict coupled with the tremendous potential wealth of the country make Angola a prime target for U.S. interference. U.S. attempts to "destabilize" the situation in both Mozambique and Angola are very real (see last section).

Another important development is the growing linkage between South Africa and NATO. The Ottawa Declaration, signed by NATO powers last July, formally extended NATO's sphere of concern beyond the North Atlantic-Mediterranean region to other "troubled areas of the world" where the interests of NATO members are threatened. The increased cooperation between South Africa and the North Atlantic alliance has reached the stage of joint military exercises and serious contingency planning for the integration of South Africa into the NATO partnership. A carefully orchestrated campaign being carried out by principals which include the U.S. defense establishment, British South African interests, NATO military men, and the South African Government has begun to direct public opinion toward the acceptance of South Africa as a partner in NATO.

The official raison d'etre for cooperation with the Vorster government is the strategic importance of the sealanes around the South African cape, an area where Western defense is supposedly "particularly vulnerable." In time of war, as Defense Department logic goes, the Soviet Navy would threaten the sea lanes and endanger the supply of strategic raw materials, including oil, to the Western powers. This is coupled with the long standing lobbying effort by the U.S. Navy for more American presence in the Indian Ocean area. The aims behind
these propaganda moves include the takeover of South Africa's excellent Simonstown Naval Base as a NATO base and the full integration of the South African defense forces within NATO. On September 1, it was revealed that the NATO Military Committee had made the decision to begin negotiations with South Africa over the Simonstown Base. Concurrently, the South Africa propaganda machine has begun to take out prominent advertisements in influential news media promoting South Africa–NATO military participation.

Clearly, the "Soviet threat" is being used as a means of consolidating political, military, and economic cooperation with South Africa—moves which would be politically much more difficult under normal conditions. Making South Africa a military ally would give the racist regime a degree of legitimacy which it presently lacks. Dangerously, a NATO–South African alliance would put the U.S. and the other Western powers in a sadly familiar position: as military pressure on the Vorster Government increases, coupled with increased internal resistance (the FRELIMO victory in neighboring Mozambique has already led to numerous anti-government and pro-FRELIMO demonstrations in South Africa), South Africa's friends will be increasingly put in the position of providing direct military support to its beleaguered ally. The spectre of U.S. troops defending Johannesburg is not on the immediate horizon, but the rapidity of U.S.–NATO entanglement with the South African Government makes the threat of some form of intervention very possible.

U.S. INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

One of Angola's most serious problems is the threat of secession of the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), which is supported by U.S., French, and Zaire interests, issued a press release in Kinshasa in late February which demanded that Cabinda should be treated on an equal footing with other Portuguese colonies. Dr. Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA, has taken the lead in seeking a resolution to the "Cabinda Problem." Speaking in Brazzaville in February, Neto affirmed the MPLA's belief in the territorial integrity of Angola and his readiness to negotiate a political solution to the crisis. In a rally held in the District Stadium in Cabinda, Neto stated, "We know that there are certain individuals both within and outside Angola who are inciting the population of specific areas to separate from the rest of Angola.... Cabinda is fairly rich in oil, timber, coffee, etc....we can clearly see the interests these individuals or countries have in trying to separate Cabinda from the rest of Angola."

N'Gola Kabangu, the Angolan Minister of the Interior was somewhat more explicit, stating that it is American and French
interests which are giving aid to the Cabinda separatists. The Minister also stated that the Gulf Oil Company, the largest investor in Cabinda and the long-time benefactor of the Portuguese colonial war effort, should use a portion of its profits to support the socio-economic development of Angola.

Evidence of U.S. interference in Mozambique came to light during a FRELIMO public meeting for Mozambicans led by President Samora Machel at FRELIMO's main military training camp in southern Tanzania. Paulo Jose Gumane, former president of COREMO, once a small opposition movement to FRELIMO, admitted that since 1962, his organization had received funds from P.I.D.E., the dreaded Portuguese secret police, the U.S. and Israel. Moreover, the U.S. was deeply involved with South Africa, Swaziland, Malawi, Rhodesia, General Spinola, and Portuguese business interests to prevent FRELIMO's accession to power after the April 25 coup in Portugal. According to Gumane, the U.S. Consular Officer in Lusaka, Clagett J. Taylor, had advised COREMO to open an office in Mozambique before FRELIMO. Taylor was reported to have said: "If you do this, we are prepared to help with money, once you are established inside the country."

There is little in the record of U.S. activities which would indicate that such behind the scenes subversion attempts will end on the day of Mozambican independence. What is clear is that FRELIMO will not allow foreign interference, in all its forms, to impede the progress of the revolution in Mozambique.

Help Build the Revolution!

Name _______________________
Address _______________________
Amount _______________________
committee for a FREE MOZAMBIQUE

May 22, 1975

Dear Friend of Mozambique,

If it seems we've been a bit quiet for some time, be assured we haven't been very still. We are currently winding up a research project on U.S. corporate influence and investment in Mozambique which we hope will be of some use to FRELIMO. Also some members of the committee have been busy making plans to attend the Independence Day Celebration in Lourenco Marques. Although we all can't be there in person, we certainly can make our presence and support felt, by giving to CFM's first Independence Day gift, which will be presented in person by our CFM representatives. Remember the words of Sharfudine Khan, "You should consider the date of independence to be the beginning of the real revolution." Your money is needed more than ever to help build the revolution.

This edition of News and Notes is really a double issue covering two important areas: the developments in Mozambique since the formation of the transitional government last September, and the United States' current involvement in southern Africa.

Just a reminder—copies of the twenty-minute film-strip/tape show, "Our Dream is the Size of Freedom", are still available. The cost is $20.00 per copy. Discount will be considered.

A LUTA CONTINUA--THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!

Committee for a Free Mozambique

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