South Africa Attacks Again

The recent South African air attack on the Mozambican capital of Maputo, followed by Pretoria's continued saber-rattling, suggest that this region is becoming a terrain of increasing international conflict. South Africa's attempt to redefine the conflict in Cold War terms, describing its borders with Angola and Mozambique as "its first and second fronts against Communism," carries ominous implications of a broader global conflict.

The May 23 air attack against Mozambique which resulted in the death of six and wounding of 39 is part of South Africa's long-term strategy to intimidate the struggling socialist nation. The strategy dates back to 1974, before Mozambican independence, when senior South African officials contemplated a preemptive attack against Mozambique to prevent FRELIMO, the Mozambican liberation movement, from coming to power. But a sharply divided South African government eventually concluded that the strategy was not feasible, though it did give at least tacit support to an abortive white-settler coup of September 1974.

Instead, South African policymakers chose to put increasing economic and military pressure on Mozambique to ensure that the government of Samora Machel could not threaten their apartheid regime. Since FRELIMO inherited an economy totally dependent on South Africa, Pretoria has been able to exert pressure easily. Shortly after independence, for example, it cut the number of Mozambican laborers working in the gold mines from more than 100,000 to 30,000, depriving the new government of its most important source of hard currency. Pretoria also redirected South Africa's valuable export trade away from the port of Maputo and has threatened to build a new Indian Ocean facility to replace Maputo.

South African military pressure has been even more devastating. As early as 1976 South African intelligence, together with its Rhodesian counterpart, organized an anti-FRELIMO fifth column comprised of former Portuguese secret police and ex-colonial troops, disaffected settlers and mercenaries that became the basis of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). By 1978, from its bases in Rhodesia, MNR was plundering agricultural cooperatives, burning schools and medical centers, interdicting railroad lines, disrupting commerce, attacking major economic projects and effectively paralyzing the planned transformation of FRELIMO's efforts to improve the quality of life in the countryside.

With the aid of these South African officers, MNR caused great hardships in 1981 and 1982, regularly cutting the railroad lines between Maputo and Zimbabwe, harassing trains from Beira, Mozambique's second leading port, to Zimbabwe, and periodically blocking rail traffic between Beira and Malawi. Pretoria's strategy was clear. Mozambique's ports serve as the international gateway for many of the land-locked SADCC countries—most notably Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. Without a viable transportation and communication network all other forms of regional cooperation would be impractical and SADCC would be aborted from the outset, thereby insuring South Africa's regional domination. In December 1982 South African raiders destroyed 34 oil storage tanks in Beir valued at more than $40 million. This led to a severe shortage in Zimbabwe.

At the same time that South Africa was intensifying its economic pressure, it was redefining its long-term military objectives. Fearing the increasing popularity of the African National Congress (ANC) and its ability to attack strategic points within South Africa, Pretoria embarked upon a campaign to compel its neighbors not to provide sanctuaries or support for the ANC. In 1981 it began attacks on the homes of (Continued on page 9)
THE FOURTH FRELIMO PARTY CONGRESS (Continued from page 1)

internal conflicts. The Third Party Congress held in 1977 in independent Mozambique transformed FRELIMO, the front into FRELIMO, the Marxist-Leninist party and took steps to consolidate the gains made by the people in their ten years of armed struggle against colonialism.

In preparation for the Fourth Congress, discussions were held across Mozambique on the principal problems facing the country. In January, Party members began electing delegates to attend. 667 delegates were elected from throughout the country. Of these 72 percent were peasants workers and soldiers. One hundred and five women were elected. Twice the number who attended in 1977.

The tone of the Congress was one of open frankness and honest self-criticism. The report of the Central Committee included statistics and appraisals of every aspect of Mozambican life. The cases of successes, were pointed out as were the examples of the failure of some government policies. For example, the report stated that the policy of the state to favor state farms over family farmers has resulted in decreased productivity for family farms. The report recognized the need to break the dependence on imports and where local materials could be made to serve.

The Central Committee report also outlined the need for more peasant participation in agricultural planning involving their district. Following the presentation of the Central committee report and an economic and social directives report which outlined growth targets for each sector, there was an opportunity for delegates to give their views of the problems facing the country as well as to respond to the Central Committee report. Common complaints were the lack of essential consumer goods, building materials, parts for repairing farm machinery and the inability of the state farm machine companies to deliver promised equipment on time. Delegates told of the effect of the drought and black marketers on their area.

From the province of Inhambane a delegate told of the effect of the MNR on the lives of inhabitants. In one area the first supplies received after some time were later robbed by the terrorists. Other delegates told of how the coal mine operations and the sugar crop production has been affected by the MNR.

Peasants also told of how they successfully fought the MNR. The delegate from a communal village in Gaza recalled how the villagers who had armed to defend themselves, pursued and captured a MNR band which attacked the village. The request from his village was for better weapons.

Delegates during a vote on a resolution presented at the Fourth FRELIMO Party Congress.

Other success stories came from a collective farm in Sofala where through self-reliance and practical planning the members increased their food production and were able to organize a food cooperative and a communal lunch room.

Overwhelmingly the delegates who made presentations used the opportunity to put before the nation's highest officials the problems and realities of life in their region and to point out what they saw as the state's shortcomings in areas that affected their lives most.

Foreign invitees including Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister and Oliver Tambo of the ANC, presented messages following the delegates' presentations. Support group representatives from North America, Scandinavia and western Europe were also present as observers.

The election of the new Central Committee was the one session closed to all but voting delegates. It lasted hours longer than scheduled, an indication to many that there was a great deal of discussion about its composition. The result was a Central Committee with 130 members — twice as large as the previous one. The new Central Committee includes many former freedom fighters, many more people from the country side and even some who had been the most vocal critics of government policies at the Congress.

The government reorganization promised by Samora Machel during the Congress was announced at a public gathering on May 21st. The most important change involved the reshuffling of those ministries responsible for the drive to wipe out the MNR and restore peace — the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Security and Justice. It was also announced that new tasks and assignments would be given to members of the government and that many employees of the central government would be transferred to the district level in order to reinforce each district's capacity to plan and administer.

Both private and family farming sectors are to be provided with the support they need from the state so that they can do more in the fight against hunger.

President Machel's talk stressed that small scale development projects which use local materials and resources which people can provide for themselves will get extensive attention, such as those involving increasing the production of fish, small game, and small factories specializing in items needed by the population on a day-to-day basis. The banks are to be reorganized to lend support, to these small projects. The Ministry of Agriculture is to be reorganized to produce more cereals, cooking oils and meat.

Machel announced the state's intention to stem the tide of people without jobs to the city and to integrate those unemployed already there into agricultural units in rural areas.

The Ministry of Foreign Commerce will be reorganized to make sure that those products produced actually get collected and exported. Radical changes were announced for the housing authority.

In his address before the people, Machel spoke of many of the problems which had been brought up by their representatives at the Congress, and presented the leadership's programs to solve them. Defending the country and providing Mozambicans of every region with the minimum necessary for a decent standard of life were the dual objectives stressed.

The real success of the Fourth Congress was not just that the four day session allowed FRELIMO leadership and party members from across the country to exchange views on the state of the nation, or that it lead to new discussions about solving the country's problems. The real success was that it produced new approaches and new determination for continuing the struggle for a better life for all Mozambicans. Although the Congress itself lasted only four days, the spirit will be felt for years to come as the new path charted takes shape.
The MNR and the People's Counteroffensive

by Allen and Barbara Isaacman

Maputo—"We are in a decisive battle in which the real enemy is South Africa." This is how Mozambique Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano explained the current situation in a recent interview. Evidence of the extent of this undeclared war is growing daily, and the Mozambicans believe worse is yet to come, pointing to the recent warning by South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique.

At the moment, Pretoria's main weapon in this war is the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Over the past year, the MNR has intensified its military activity in the southern half of Mozambique, attacking bridges, railroad lines, communal villages and development projects. Paralyzing key sectors of the rural economy and destabilizing Mozambique are not its only objectives. It also seeks to sabotage the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference, forged in 1980 to break South Africa's economic dominance in the region.

South Africa's ties to the MNR date back to its formation in 1976, although the most active agents in its initial creation were ex-Portuguese secret police agents and Rhodesian intelligence officers. Initial MNR recruiting grounds were primarily among the secret police agents and African members of the elite Portuguese special forces who had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambique independence.

From 1976 the Rhodesian government provided the MNR with logistic support, arms and bases along the Mozambican border. MNR bands were sent marauding into Mozambique in retaliation for Mozambique's imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia and its support to ZANU forces.

The achievement of Zimbabwean independence did not end MNR activities; it simply shifted the operation's major backer to South Africa.

Today, with the wisdom of hindsight, it seems true that although the Mozambican government continued to combat the MNR, it seriously underestimated the vigor with which South Africa would promote the continuation of MNR subversion. Thus Mozambique began to turn its energy toward national reconstruction. SADCC programs were crystallized, and several important economic agreements were signed. The popular militias were disbanded in many frontier regions.

The South Africans, on their side, had no intention of winding down the MNR. They saw the roving bands as instruments of havoc. We were shown captured documents of an October 1980 meeting between MNR leader Dhikakama and a South African colonel, Van Nierok, at a Transvaal military base. Van Nierok ordered the MNR to extend its operations from central to southern Mozambique—to "interdict rail traffic from Malverne-Gwelo, to establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, and open a new military front in Maputo province."

South Africa wanted to discourage Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting their commodities through Maputo, which was drawing substantial traffic away from South African ports. To achieve this, the documents reveal, South African officials promised rockets, mortars, small arms and advisors "who will not only teach, but also participate in attacks."

Mozambican field commanders told us that "Boers" (white Afrikanders) regularly accompanied MNR bands in the central part of the country. A young officer who had fought in Manica province described several dead white soldiers his battalion had discovered when it overran an MNR base at Chidogo. South African passports and other documents have been captured at other MNR bases. Sara Muchalima, a twenty-six-year-old woman who had been kidnapped by the MNR, said she saw ten European advisors who, along with Dhikakama, were evacuated. By helicopter shortly before the base at Garagua fell.

While South African soldiers do participate in attacks, South Africa directs most of its energy to training MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal and providing supplies and logistical assistance to the insurgents inside Mozambique. Mozambican field commanders in Tete and Manica provinces told us that MNR forces are regularly resupplied via airdrops at night. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings, which are becoming more frequent. Key to South Africa's war is the sophisticated communications equipment given the MNR. Thus MNR bands can maintain contact with South Africa, whose reconnaissance planes flying inside Mozambique provide valuable information on Mozambican troop movement.

Western diplomats we talked to in Maputo estimate the MNR numbers at about 5,000—appreciably lower than Dhikakama's claim of 17,000 armed soldiers. Many MNR recruits appear to have been coerced into joining. John Burleson, a British ecologist held prisoner by the MNR for several months, reported seeing hundreds of forced recruits who were kept under armed guard. Once in, especially after they have been involved in an attack of some kind, many recruits are afraid to leave because MNR commanders tell them they will be killed by FRELIMO if they are caught.

Mozambique's serious economic problems make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, inadequate material support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane provided fertile ground for MNR overtures. Further, the MNR has resorted to the manipulation of tribal divisions and superstition to gain support.

Whatever the initial attraction of these appeals, widespread plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate support for the MNR and alienate the rural population. Stories of MNR atrocities are now legend, with many reports of rape, beatings and worse. Peasants from Gaza described one such encounter: "At Madura, they came and demanded money and food. They accused some people of being informers for government forces and cut off the nose, lips and ears of a number of people. Then they told them to go and report to FRELIMO."

Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members, but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding and terrorism with the ultimate aim of discrediting the government. A high-ranking Western diplomat in Maputo told us that although he was initially skeptical, he now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible." In one of its bloodiest actions, terrorists stopped a packed train fifty miles north of Beira and raked it with machine gun fire, killing fourteen and wounding fifty others.

These tactics, together with the MNR's reliance on narrow tribal appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the FRELIMO Party's Marxist strategy. Apart from its anti-communist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has

(Continued on page 4)
Ministerial Changes Announced

A major reorganization of the Mozambican government was announced at the end of May. A government communique stressed the fundamental importance of defense "in the present phase of our history when our country is the victim of imperialist attacks and of an undeclared war." In an effort to centralize the country's security efforts at the highest level President Machel assumed overall control of the Ministry of Defense (Lt. General Alberto Chipande remains Minister of Defense). Armando Guebuza was appointed Minister of the Interior and Mariano Matsinhe moves from being Minister of the Interior to become Minister of Security.

The government communique also emphasized the "decisive" role of political mobilization in the provinces—a theme which received a great deal of attention at the recent Fourth Party Congress. Several senior members of FRELIMO will take on the leadership of key provinces in addition to their other tasks. Marcelino dos Santos, FRELIMO's Secretary for Economic Planning, was appointed Governor and First Party Secretary of war-torn Sofala.

THE MNR AND THE PEOPLE'S COUNTEROFFENSIVE

(Continued from page 3)

made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates. Nevertheless, it has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies.

Early in 1982 the Mozambican leadership moved to initiate a new military and political strategy to combat the MNR. Admitting that the replacement of guerrillas with a conventional army and the disbanding of many rural militia units had left the country unprepared for the MNR's resurgence in late 1980, in May 1982 FRELIMO reactivated more than 1,500 former guerrillas. These have been organized in counter-insurgency forces, whose job is to harass the MNR deep in the bush. The rural militia has also been strengthened, a move aimed at regaining the support and confidence of the peasants. As of August 1982 about 40 percent of the adult rural population in Sofala was armed, and in the capital, the newly formed militia boasted upwards of 30,000 men and women. High Mozambican military officials with whom we talked attribute the failure of the early 1983 MNR offensive to the new counterinsurgency forces and the increased confidence of the rural militias.

FRELIMO's task is not an easy one. For more than five years, many peasants in the affected areas have been subjected to attacks by Rhodesian and then MNR forces against which the FPLM (the Mozambican army) could not protect them. Commenting on this, one close advisor to President Machel told us, "FRELIMO used up a lot of its political capital during the Zimbabwean war" by assuring peasants that peace in Zimbabwe would bring prosperity to Mozambique. The peasants have legitimate grievances which the government must continue to address. Armando Guebuza, ranking member of FRELIMO's Central Committee, and Resident Minister of war-torn Sofala, stressed this when he told us, "We cannot stand idly by, but must attack the economic and social problems, especially the lack of material goods."

(Continued next column)
and affected by the struggle for equality and independence in the southern Africa region. They are Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

**Linkage**
The act of linking together. The term is used in reference to the linking by South Africa of Cuban troops in Angola to the issue of Namibian independence.

**National Resistance Movement (MNR)**
The group of South African backed anti-government guerillas operating inside Mozambique.

**People’s Movement For The Liberation of Angola (MPLA)**
Liberation Movement established in 1957 to bring about the independence of the people of Angola. MPLA is now the ruling party of Angola.

**Organization Of African Unity (OAU)**
Organization of independent, decolonized states in Africa which act as a body in attempting to promote welfare and resolve conflicts on the African continent.

**Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)**
Liberation movement founded in 1963. ZANU is the current ruling party in Zimbabwe.

**Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)**
Alliance formed in 1980 by Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania for the purpose of developing joint projects which would allow them to break the economic dependence on South Africa set up by their colonial predecessors.

**South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO)**
Liberation movement founded in 1960 to advance the independence of Namibia from South Africa which is currently waging armed struggle in Namibia (South West Africa) against South African forces.

**OFFICIAL NAME**
The People’s Republic of Mozambique.

**AREA**
303,070 square miles (about twice the size of California).

**POPULATION**
12,136,000 (1980) with about 94% living in rural areas.

**PRINCIPAL CITIES**
Maputo, the capital (formerly Lourenco Marques) a major port town. Beira, second largest city and also a major port site. Nampula, northern city known for cotton production.

**MAIN EXPORTS**
Cashew nuts, shrimp and lobster, raw cotton, tea and sugar.

**MAIN IMPORTS**
Industrial raw materials, food products, equipment, crude oil, spare parts and textiles.

**LANGUAGES**
Official language — Portuguese. National languages — Shonga, Maconde, Macua, Nyanja, Changana and many others.

**GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS**
Ten provinces with between 7 and 18 districts each.

**MAIN RELIGIONS**
Christianity and Islam. No official religion.

**IMPORTANT DATES**
- June 25 — Independence Day
  (1962 — The founding of FRELIMO)
  (1975 — Date of Independence)
- September 25 — Armed Forces Day
  (1964 — Armed struggle began)
- February 3 — Hero’s Day
  (1969 — FRELIMO’s first president, Eduardo Mondlane assassinated)
- April 7 — Women’s Day
  (1971 — Death of women’s organizer Josina Machel)
- September 7 — Liberation Day
  (1974 — Signing of Lusaka accords in Zambia which formerly recognized the independence of Mozambique from Portugal.)

**MASS ORGANIZATIONS**
OMM — Organization of Mozambican Women, founded in 1968.
OJM — Organization of Mozambican Youth, founded in 1977.

**PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**
National Journalists Organization (1978)
National Photographers Organization (1981)
National Teachers Organization (1981)
National Writers Organization (1982)
(Formation of trade unions is in progress.)

**EDUCATION**
Illiteracy — 93% at Independence, 73% in 1980.
Primary School Pupils — 672,000 at Independence, 1,330,000 in 1982.
Agricultural Schools — 7 new schools since Independence.
Higher Education — 1,748 graduates since Independence.
Note: Before Independence only 40 of the 3,800 students at the University were black.
A Look Back at the Past, To Understand the Present

The Founding of FRELIMO

The establishment of FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Movement) on June 25, 1962, marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. As early as 1960 the nationalist fervor sweeping through Africa had captured the imagination of a small, but growing number of Mozambicans in exile who organized UDENAMO (the Mozambique National Democratic Front), MANU (the Mozambique African National Union), and UNAMI (the National Union of Independent Mozambique). From the outset, however, each had a relatively narrow regional and ethnic character. In a country with a multitude of ethnic and language groups parochialness posed obvious organizing problems.

The one effort of any of these organizations at political mobilization, the peaceful demonstration in 1960 at Mueda, Cabo Delgado to demand independence resulted in the shooting down of 600 unarmed men, women and children. What was revealed was the lack of a coherent strategy for gaining independence, a problem shared by all the exile organizations. Influenced by nationalist gains in the neighboring British colonies, all believed in the efficacy of petitions, protest letters and non-violent demonstrations. They failed to realize, however, that because the retarded Portuguese economy needed colonialism to extract Mozambique’s human and natural resources, the colonial regime would use all available repressive measures to frustrate their nationalist objectives.

Small in numbers, detached from internal bases of support, lacking a coherent strategy, and periodically engaging in self-destructive exile politics, the three organizations hardly posed a credible threat to the Portuguese colonial regime. In an effort to overcome the mutual suspicion which divided them, President Nyerere of Tanzania invited the three in 1962 to establish their headquarters in Dar es-Salaam and work toward the creation of a unified movement. Prodded by Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana and CONCP (the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies), the three movements—UAMI rather reluctantly—agreed to merge into FRELIMO under the leadership of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane.

Insurgency ran deep in Mondlane’s family. His father and his uncle had both fought in anti-colonial struggles at the end of the nineteenth century. After attending missionary schools in southern Mozambique and South Africa, Mondlane received a scholarship in 1947 to Witwatersrand University in South Africa where he came into contact and collaborated with students opposed to racial segregation, causing his deportation two years later. Back in Mozambique he helped to organize, and was a leading force in the Mozambican Student Movement (NESAM). His powerful critique of Portuguese colonialism and the value he attached to Mozambican culture and history inspired a whole generation of younger high school students, a number of whom subsequently became prominent members of FRELIMO. His activities brought police surveillance, interrogations, harassment and a decision that he be sent to Portugal. In the face of intensified police surveillance, Mondlane fled Portugal and continued his education in the United States. The doctoral degree he

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received in 1960 made him Mozambique's first Ph.D.

In 1961, protected by diplomatic immunity as a United Nations employee, Mondlane returned home a hero. In shanty towns on the outskirts of Lourenco Marques, and in his rural Gaza homeland he met secretly with dissidents who detailed the increased oppression and urged him to organize a nationalist movement. He was also courted by Portuguese officials. Mondlane rejected their advances and left Mozambique inexorably committed to the struggle for independence. A little more than a year later he arrived in Dar es-Salaam and was elected President of FRELIMO.

Mondlane's immediate objective was to forge a broad-based insurgent coalition which could effectively challenge the colonial regime. At FRELIMO's First Congress in September 1962, a platform designed to be acceptable to all the diverse interests was adopted. The overarching concern—independence—dictated unity. Unity also meant incorporating into the movement all Mozambicans, of whatever social class or strata—peasants, workers, merchants, artisans and chiefs—who supported the common struggle. Thus, its objectives and composition made FRELIMO a fairly conventional nationalist front uniting ideologically divergent groups on the basis of patriotism and opposition to foreign domination.

In the dead of night on September 25, 1964, FRELIMO soldiers, trained in Algeria with logistical assistance from the surrounding population, attacked the Portuguese administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado. Despite reports by a loyalist chief of guerrilla movement in the area, the colonial authorities were taken by surprise, and the guerrillas were able to damage the post, kill one policeman and wound several others before they melted back into the forest. The colonial regime responded quickly. It dispatched heavily armed troops and secret police (PIDE) agents to Chai, arrested and beat a number of suspected FRELIMO sympathizers, but was unable to track down the guerrilla band or crack down the FRELIMO network. In retaliation, colonial troops committed a number of atrocities.

The raid at Chai marked the beginning of the armed struggle against the colonial regime. Employing classical guerrilla tactics—ambushing patrols, sabotaging communication and railroad lines, and making hit-and-run attacks against colonial outposts—and then rapidly fading into inaccessible backwater areas, FRELIMO militants were able to evade pursuit and (Continued on page 10)
A program to relocate thousands of unemployed city dwellers to rural areas engaged in agricultural production started in mid-June. In the first phase, those unemployed were encouraged to sign up and indicate their preference for the district to which they would be assigned. Those with skills were promised that all efforts would be made to place them in work relating to their area of specialty. Thousands did sign up across the country. But many who did not are now subject to forceable removal unless they can produce pressing reasons for not leaving. In principal, all individuals over 16 without permanent employment are subject to this action but there are many categories of exemptions such as those for students and housewives. Local hearings are being held across the country to examine the circumstances of others who may be exempt.

The Minister of Justice and other officials have assured the population that all aspects of legal procedures are to be upheld during the process of relocation and citizens have been encouraged to report any abuses. 'Operation Production' is part of the Government's answer to several of the problems currently plaguing the country. The next issue of Mozambican Notes will examine the background, impact, execution and expectations of this program in detail.

OMM PLANS NATIONAL MEETING

Sixty-three participants assembled in Maputo July 27—August 2 to begin planning for a national conference of the OMM—the Mozambican Women's Organization. The conference will examine problems which primarily affect women in the society. Themes to be discussed at the upcoming conference include initiation rites, premature and forced marriages, adultery, abandonment and separation, divorce, prostitution and other social situations relating to the lives of Mozambican women.

The document coming out of the preparatory meeting spoke of the necessity of paying attention not only to problems related to intergating women into the work force but also to problems relating to consolidation of the family and women's active participation in education.

MOZAMBIQUE AND THE UNITED STATES NAME NEW AMBASSADORS

A new American ambassador was designated for Mozambique by President Reagan. He is 45 year old career diplomat M. Peter Jon de Vos. From 1980-83 he was the ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Jon de Vos replaces Willard de Pree who left in 1980.

Mozambique's new ambassador to the United Nations arrived in New York in early September. He is Manuel dos Santos. He was formerly Mozambique's ambassador to Tanzania. Mozambique also announced the name of its first ambassador to the United States. He is Valeriano Ferrao who was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

RUTH FIRST'S DEATH COMMEMORATED

A series of lectures relating to Ruth First and her work is part of the commemoration activities planned to remember sociologist Ruth First who was killed by a letter bomb on August 18, 1982. At the time she was in her office at the African Studies Center on the campus of the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.

Ruth First was a white South African who after years of challenging the apartheid policies of her country and being jailed there fled to England. She resettled in Mozambique in 1978 where she became the Director of Investigations at the African Studies Center. She was the author of several books including Black Gold, The Mozambican Miner, a study of the impact and consequences of the Mozambican labor flow to South African mines, published posthumously this year.

Ruth First was killed because of the close identification of her husband and herself with the ANC and its goals. Agents of the South African regime are believed by the Mozambicans to be responsible for the attack which also wounded Brigett O'Lauqlin, an American professor who worked with Ruth First at the Center.

MINING TECHNICIANS KILLED

In the dawn of August 21, a group of armed bandits overran a mining installation in Zambesi Province. Two Mozambican militia members who worked at the mine were killed defending the installation. Two Soviet geologists, there as part of an international cooperation agreement between the two countries, were killed by machine-gun fire in their bedrooms. Twenty-four other Soviet technicians were kidnapped from their residence. Other foreign workers were left unharmed, but two Mozambican women and two young children were also reported kidnapped.

Attacks singling out foreigners working in Mozambique by the MNR go back many years with the kidnapping and murders of Portuguese workers. Since then workers of many other nationalities have been kidnapped. An Italian employee of the electric company kidnapped in April was released in July.

The aim of such attacks is to frighten off foreign technicians and close down projects of special economical importance to Mozambique.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CREATIONS OF TRADE UNIONS

A conference to establish trade unions in Mozambique is scheduled to take place on October 13. Preparations for the conference, including elections of delegates from each province, were started months ago. A meeting of production councils held on June 30 urged all workers to participate. In August, small groups went into factories to explain the importance of the new union formations to workers throughout the country.

Go See For Yourself... The Mozambique Resource Center is presently organizing a summer 1984 visit to Mozambique for interested individuals. It is a trip planned to provide maximum exposure to modern Mozambican society. Details will be announced soon. Organizations wishing to visit Mozambique as a group should contact the Mozambique Resource Center for information.
SOUTH AFRICA ATTACKS AGAIN

South African refugees—some ANC members—who lived on the outskirts of Maputo. But the 1981 attack against ANC homes in Maseru, Lesotho, coinciding with the Beira oil facilities assault, was a warning to Mozambique that Maputo would be next. This January MNR initiated an offensive to capture—or at least isolate—southern Mozambique, including the capital. According to Sebastiao Mabote, Mozambique’s chief of staff, by April MNR forces in the area had been routed.

It is against this backdrop that South Africa launched the recent air attack on Maputo. Ostensibly, the attack was in reprisal for an ANC attack in Pretoria several days earlier. Although South Africa claimed that it struck only ANC military bases in Mozambique, a group of reporters touring the area unescorted said, “All the victims appear to be civilians and there was no evidence of hits connected with the ANC, and no sign of Mozambican missile installations.”

There was a clear message in the attack, which occurred in Matola, Mozambique’s principal industrial zone: Mozambique’s fragile economy will be held hostage. Many fear the next target will be the Limpopo valley, the nation’s breadbasket, located within easy striking distance of the South African border.

Despite South African attempts at intimidation, Mozambique leaders remain both firmly opposed to the racist system of apartheid and committed to providing sanctuary for South African refugees. Based on their own wartime experience, however, they remain convinced that revolutionary change in South Africa cannot come from the outside but only through the internal struggle of the South African people. For Mozambique’s unflinching opposition to apartheid, its commitment to create a non-racial socialist society and its efforts to forge an independent regional economy, the young nation will undoubtedly suffer many more South African attacks, along with other frontline countries such as Zimbabwe and Angola.

LESOTHO: SOUTH AFRICA TRIES BLACKMAIL

Lesotho is a small independent nation which has the misfortune of being surrounded completely by another country—South Africa. All access to the sea and other African countries is controlled by South African border patrols. South Africa is using this peculiar geographic situation to dictate to Lesotho what its refugee policies should be.

Lesotho officials say that between 3000-4000 black South Africans have official UN refugee status in Lesotho. The South African government claims that Lesotho is a launching base for ANC attacks against South Africa and has demanded that all ANC members be expelled. South Africa’s definition of ANC militants includes anyone who may oppose the regime’s apartheid policies whether they are actual members of the ANC or not.

Both economic blockading and direct military attacks have been used against the tiny nation. Last December, 42 people—mostly non-South Africans—were killed in a raid by South African troops in Maseru. Lesotho’s capital. Lesotho fears a repeat attack and without international intervention on its side, it will be forced to severely restrict or expel black South Africans in Lesotho.

NAMIBIA: INDEPENDENCE TALKS STALLED

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, traveled to southern Africa in August to talk with South African officials and SWAPO leaders in an attempt to overcome the impasse in talks on the implementing of U.N. Resolution 435 which would end South African control over Namibia.

In a new twist on an old theme, South Africa dropped two of its previous objections to certain parts of the plan and made the presence of Cuban troops in Angola the central issue.

The Cuban troops were requested by the Angolan government in 1976 to help during fighting with UNITA, a black anti-government group backed by South Africa. South African troops invaded at the time threatened to overrun much of the country. Angolan officials have long said that Cuban troops would be asked to leave once the threat of South Africa invasion or occupation was removed.

The question of "linkage" of the issue of Cuban troops in Angola to the independence of Namibia has been rejected by most countries and international organizations including the OAU. The U.S. government continues to support the viewpoint of South Africa.

The issue of Namibian independence will be one of the principle topics debated at the next UN General Assembly.

ANGOLA: THE FIGHT FOR CANGAMBA

For eight days, in August, the South African backed UNITA forces with as many as 3000 men attacked the town of Cangamba in the central zone of Angola. South African bombers supported the anti-government forces of UNITA in their attempt to occupy the vila. Cangamba is strategically important because of the road access to other areas located there and its proximity to Luanda, the capital.

Heavy artillery was used to completely demantle the town which suffered many civilian casualties. South African troops are said to have fired directly on civilian areas as well as Angolan troop positions which were defending the town.

The Angolans managed to turn back the attackers after having inflicted heavy casualties among their ranks. After the complete destruction of the town by South African forces and the evacuation of the population to safer areas, Angolan forces withdrew to other defense lines.

Angolan authorities called on the international community to condemn the repeated invasions of Angolan territory by South Africa and demanded that South Africa and South African-backed UNITA forces withdraw from southern Angolan territory held by them since August 1981.

The South African regime’s attempt to destabilize Angola is partially in retaliation for Angolan support to SWAPO freedom fighters.
THE HISTORY OF FRELIMO
(Continued from page 7)
surveillance. In the two northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado FRELIMO's peasant network provided critical supplies and ammunition. Gradually, although not without setbacks, FRELIMO consolidated its power and drove the colonial forces out of the surrounding regions progressively expanding the liberated zones. By 1968 the insurgents controlled approximately 20-25 percent of the area and had opened a third front in the strategically important central province of Tete.

The expansion of the liberated areas, however, created new problems for FRELIMO—problems which required creative solutions. Once areas had been liberated, the colonial state apparatus dismantled and exploitative colonial economic institutions disbanded, new economic, social and political structures and relations of production had to be introduced. For these there were no precedents. Moreover, to guarantee the active involvement of the peasants in both the liberated zone and the areas of conflict, FRELIMO had to offer them more than just the end of the colonial order—what was demanded was a vision of hope for a new and just society.

From the outset of the armed struggle FRELIMO was forced to become more than just a nationalist movement. Despite the united front it presented to the world, FRELIMO really two entities throughout much of this early phase—"a conventional nationalist movement unable to secure an easy transition to power and a revolutionary movement struggling to be born."

The demands placed on FRELIMO by its successes heightened the conflicting ideologies which had been submerged within FRELIMO since its inception—the first, rooted in a narrow nationalist tradition, sought merely to capture the colonial state. The second, increasingly committed to revolutionary nationalism, recognized the necessity to transform basic social and economic as well as political relations. By 1968 these two different "lines"—as FRELIMO periodicals came increasingly to refer to them—each with a different social vision and class orientation openly contested for power.

(To be continued in the next issue.)

A View from Within

Americans in Mozambique

The word cooperatante is a Portuguese word for "one who cooperates with." In the case of Mozambique, it refers to those who work on contract for the government in one of its several ministries. Since independence more than 30 Americans of different professions, have spent from two to five years as cooperantes in Mozambique. Most left for Mozambique from the U.S. after 1977.

The reasons for going are as different as the personalities involved. Most desired to make a contribution in some way to the development of a newly independent country which they saw striving to drastically improve the lives of its citizens under great handicaps. For many it was the wish to work in a place where one's abilities are appreciated and critically needed.

Most of the cooperantes who have worked in Mozambique had followed FRELIMO's struggle to defeat Portuguese colonialists. For these individuals it was a chance to see and experience for themselves the reality of the Mozambican promise. No matter how well informed cooperantes may have thought they were about Mozambique before their departure, few were truly prepared for their new experience. The poverty is there, but so is the strength and determination to eliminate it. On a day-to-day level, the supply shortages which affect Mozambicans also affect cooperantes. War, which should have ended with independence, continued with Rhodesian and later South African invasions into Mozambique.

Cooperantes as others are affected by security measures, which are at times cumbersome, to ensure their own safety. The fear of violence can also make for anxious moments.

Few cooperantes found their "niche" on the first day at the job. Most had to work hard to find it. A new language had to be mastered first. Cooperantes had to adapt to work procedures or methods sometimes very different from what they had known back in the United States. Often they found themselves struggling to perform the same type of work done in the States but without the availability of equipement and material needed.

Mozambique is a beautiful country. Its beaches, its open fields and countryside are all special. However, the real beauty and strength of Mozambique is its people. Working in Mozambique provides not only an opportunity to contribute to a people's development but also provides a stimulant to the growth of those who go there.

Working in Mozambique is not without its difficulties as Americans there will affirm. But it has its own rewards. Views from Americans who live within will add another dimension which you will find valuable to the understanding of life in the New Mozambique. Future articles in this space will explore the reflections of past and present cooperantes on their lives in Mozambique.

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