In This Issue

The Mozambican - South African Talks

On March 16, 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed a non-aggression agreement which, if respected by both sides, would prevent either country from being used as a base for launching military actions against the other. The Nkomati Agreement, as it is also known, was signed in a ceremony near the Nkomati River which borders both countries. The signing of the security agreement was preceded by weeks of intense discussions between the two countries and immediately became the subject of discussions and speculations worldwide.

After the Nkomati Agreement was signed, talks continued on the use of energy from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam by South Africa, and dock and rail use, and tourism.

In this issue we try to answer some of the questions about how and why talks between Mozambique and South Africa came about and to present documents and articles which explain what Mozambique's position has been in relation to these talks. To accommodate the material to do this, we have suspended from this issue some newsletter departments, which will reappear in the next issue.

Other articles of special interest include a report of SADCC talks by Carol Thompson, who attended the last SADCC session this past February, and an article on US-Mozambique relations by historian Allen Isaccman.

Floods Follow Drought

The worst drought in Mozambique's recent history—lasting almost four years— has now been followed by one of the worst floods of all time. Floods which overran southern Mozambique at the end of January caused 109 deaths, dozens of disappearances and the loss of homes for over 49,000 people. In addition, 350,000 people lost their family farming plots.

The first floods came after 22 hours of continuous rainfall accompanied by hail on January 28. The cause of the storm was tropical hurricane "Domoina" whose winds blew at speeds of up to 50 miles per hour. The storm was devastating: waves in the port reached 22 feet, and the Salamange River rose more than 50 feet above its normal level.

In the hours following the hurricane more than 600 persons were rescued by boats and helicopter. Five thousand people were forced to evacuate their homes.

"Domoina" also hit regions of Swaziland and South Africa, which worsened the situation in Mozambique because receding waters from these regions must past through Mozambique.

The country's National Disasters Commission estimated that the total cost of the damage done by floods is about $75 million. The cyclone and flood wiped out almost the entire cashew nut harvest, which is one of Mozambique's main export crops and was expected to have been especially large this year. Ten thousand tons of sugar were lost as well as 55,000 tons of maize, 15,000 tons of beans, 20,000 tons of vegetables and the entire banana crop. Damage to the citrus crop was put at $6.5 million.

At the time of the floods, thousands of families in Maputo were getting ready to harvest their first crops of

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What does it mean when one of the most progressive countries in Africa signs a security agreement with the most racist, belligerent country on the continent?

Many people in the United States who follow events in southern Africa have termed Mozambique's signing of the Nkomati Agreement a "set-back," or a "retreat." Some even go so far as to call it a "sell-out." They feel that Mozambique should never have even considered talking to South Africa, the continent's arch villain, until South Africa's internal and external political policies changed. The problem with this assessment is that it assumes options and other paths of action for Mozambique that either did not exist or were more devastating.

Some see the Nkomati Agreement only as a sign of victory for South Africa, as if it were really a surrender agreement by Mozambique. The truth is that while difficulties in Mozambique resulting from South Africa's destabilization campaign are great, Mozambique is not yet a beaten country. Mozambique is still strong in many areas. And while Mozambique desperately wants and needs peace within its borders, Mozambican officials have stressed repeatedly that they do not want it "at any cost."

Mozambique's decision to pursue a security agreement with South Africa does not at all appear to be a decision they arrived at lightly. They better than anyone, knew what choices they had and understood the consequences they faced from each. That they chose this path means they saw in it a way to get something they wanted without giving up what they wanted to keep most—their independence and their commitment to an end to oppression in the region.

Consider Mozambique's dilemma. Imagine for a moment that you are a young, black socialist nation in southern Africa. To the south you have a neighbor with internal and external policies you are strongly opposed to—as they are to yours. This neighbor is militarily superior and can strike at any time without warning. This neighbor also supports terrorism within your borders and manipulates your economy. You have other friends close by but they can't help you much because they have their hands full fighting back attacks from this same hostile neighbor.

You take your case to international forums where your neighbor is verbally condemned, but the international forums have no mechanism for bringing your neighbor into line. Meanwhile, you are slipping more into debt, food lines grow and you are spending money you could be using for food on building up your army. Your people are very patient but even they are growing tired.

You know that your neighbor's strength comes from the support he gets from his stronger allies far away who prefer your neighbor's political outlook over yours. You and others try to talk to your neighbor's allies about the chaos the neighbor is causing in your region. But in turn, they only want to talk to you about your relationship with their arch enemy thousands of miles away. What are your options?

Mozambique's options were few:

1. They could sit tight and continue to do what they have been doing in the hopes that they would be able to reverse the situation before time and money run out. They could continue to build up the army and devise new strategies for fighting the MNR, which has access to arms and material equal to their own, while at the same time building up defenses to ready themselves for an all out attack by South Africa at some future date.
2. They could, if not concerned about internationalizing the conflict, call on friendly, stronger nations to give them direct military assistance in the defense of their country against the South Africans.
3. They could, if not firm in their convictions, disavow their political and social philosophies in the hope of gaining favor with South Africa and its allies so that they would no longer be seen as a threat to oppression and imperialism in the region.
4. They could talk directly with South Africa as one sovereign nation to another, offering South Africa something it wanted in exchange for something Mozambiqua would be able to train militarily in Mozambique and cross over into South Africa, it does not and cannot diminish in the least the pressure for change already within South Africa's own borders, or the ANC's ability to influence it.

South Africa also saw certain economic benefits to be gained through improved country to country relationship.

What South Africa gains most from the accord is the propaganda points to be made from the fact that it "appears" to have taken a sudden turn toward sanity. What must be remembered is that occasionally even countries like South Africa must oblige their allies. In this case the current U.S. administration, with the upcoming elections, needs to have something concrete to show for its poorly conceived policy of "constructive engagement" in southern Africa. The talks between Mozambique and South Africa as well as those between Angola and South Africa provide the kind of highly visible return needed. There is also the added advantage to South Africa of being able to use the Nkomati agreement to break out of its diplomatic isolation.

The Mozambique-South Africa talks do not signal the start of a new friendship between two enemies. Nor does it signal a return to the pre-independence economic relations between Mozambique and South Africa. What the talks do present is the use of a new tactic on the part of both to ob-
During the talks between Mozambique and South Africa, it is believed that the South African government supplied the MNR with large amounts of equipment and material to keep the pressure on Mozambique and to ensure that even after the agreement was signed the MNR actions would not disappear overnight. The MNR in turn kept up its attacks against economic targets as well as against the Mozambican population.

At the end of January, the pipeline connecting Beira and Zimbabwe was attacked. In the same month a bus traveling along the road between Maputo and the port city of Inhambane was attacked. The bus attack resulted in 27 people killed and the injury of 23 people. The bus was ambushed by MNR rebels who then burned the bus with many victims believed to be still alive inside. Five of the victims were members of one of Mozambique's leading dance groups who were touring Inhambane province at the time.

On February 3, armed bands attacked a passenger train killing six and wounding 11 others. The train was sitting in the station at Chinhanguanie (a small town in southern Maputo province about 38 miles from the South African border). While the train was awaiting orders to proceed to Magude, the next stop, it was hit by a bazooka which exploded into instant fire. Most passangers managed to get out of the train. But the rebels then sprayed the train cars with machine gun fire.

The station chief, who managed to escape during the attack, ran six and a half miles to the nearest station where he telephoned the main station to report the attack.

On February 26 the assistant editor of Maputo's daily newspaper Noticias was murdered along with his family as they traveled by car from Maci (Gaza Province) to Maputo. The armed groups which blockaded the road, attacked four cars in all, killing five people and wounding two. Pedro Tivane, his wife and youngest child were in the second car and all died.

According to eyewitness reports, the bandits waved down the vehicle. Tivane stopped, possibility thinking that it was a FPLM road check. As he

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Floods Follow Drought
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corn, beans, and sweet potatoes after the long drought. State farms as well as family plots were washed away.

But as in all stories of tragedy, there are heros. Men and women risked their lives to go in boats searching for survivors before the state's rescue efforts could reach their areas.

Local citizens who wanted to give what they could to help their neighbors volunteered to help those affected by the flood. The first priority was to provide clothing and housewares to the more than 9,500 families who had lost everything in the flood. Donations were collected in the 96 barros of the capital and a system was set up to collect and distribute all items as needed. Local grupos dinamizadores (dynamizing groups) cooperated with the solidarity campaign for flood victims to coordinate the efforts.

Sizable contributions of food were also received from many nations. Some fifteen countries have promised or already donated cereals and other food commodities. The U.S. government contributed large quantities of maize, powdered milk, oil, butter and cheese. Private charities and other organizations in the US, such as the American Friends Service Committee, also have made plans or already delivered seed, clothing or other necessities to drought and flood victims.

The donations continue to come in, but more clothing, blankets, and food are needed. Seeds are also badly needed for replanting. Although attention has most recently been focused on flood victims, the flood combined with a prolonged drought has had devastating consequences. The drought caused more than 100,000 deaths in Mozambique. While 350,000 others were affected by the loss of their crops in Maputo province alone as a result of the drought and an estimated 1,411,771 were affected by the drought in six provinces including Maputo.

"I was sleeping in the hut. In the morning, I woke up with water at knee level. I ran with my wife and the two children. We put the children on our backs and climbed the highest tree there. I climbed with the children and afterwards cut a branch to bring up my wife. When we finished doing this, the water was already rising around the tree. Then I climbed a little more and took a belt and arranged the two children on the highest branch.

"We stayed there for four days. Sleep? No, we had to stay awake to hold the children. We also didn't eat, we didn't eat anything.

"I was asleep when the water arrived. It was very fast and I didn't know that it would rise so fast. I am going to look for another place to live now."

Daniel Gumele, Salamanga
(Maputo province)

To many people the signing of a non-aggression agreement between Mozambique and South Africa happened very suddenly. In fact, the accord is the result of a long and multi-phased, Mozambican strategy which began shortly after independence.

Below is a chronology of events leading up to the Nkomati Agreement as outlined in the March 17 issue of Noticias.

For the People's Republic of Mozambique's policy of co-existence to become a reality it was necessary to have a series of diplomatic contacts with South Africa.

The contacts began immediately after independence. Sergio Viegi and Brand Fourie were involved in these conversations.

Sergio Viera, the present Vice Minister of Defense, was at that time the Director of the Office of the President. Brand Fourie was then the Director General of Foreign Affairs in Cape Town. He is now the South African Ambassador in Washington.

The contacts between the two continued after Sergio Vieira became the Minister-Governor of the Bank of Mozambique, though there was no ministerial-level participation.

The first negotiations between the two governments at the ministerial level took place in Komatipoort, a South African city bordering on Maputo Province, in December 1982. Talks were again held at the same location in May 1983.

In these contacts, the Mozambican delegation was led by Major-General Jacinto Veloso, then the Minister of Security. The South African delegation was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roelof Botha.

In both meetings, Mozambique presented the fundamental points for a non-aggression and good neighborliness accord: neither one of the territories must be a base for attacks against the other, obliging South Africa to immediately abandon its support for the armed bandits.

The South African delegates insisted on economic accords, pretending ignorance of any links to the bandits, although the South African army train-
External Debt Rescheduled

At the beginning of February, the Mozambican government announced, after a long and thorough analysis of the economic and financial situation in the country, they had decided to request a rescheduling of their external debt by their creditors. The total being discussed for rescheduling is $1.5 billion owed to Western creditors.

Several factors contributed to the need for the debt rescheduling, including managerial or operational problems in some of the enterprises run by the state. Other factors involved situations which the government was not responsible for and has no defense against, including drought and the subsequent flood, and the world economic depression. But the overwhelming cause of Mozambique's current economic situation is the disastrous state of affairs inherited from the Portuguese at independence in 1975. The government has made important strides to reverse these conditions.

Another factor is the fact that Mozambique is a country which has been involved in wars for more than 20 years. Since independence Mozambique has known only one brief period of short-lived peace—between the time Zimbabwe became independent and South Africa's attack on ANC houses in Matola less than a year later. Mozambique supported ZANU and the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle against Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia. As a result, economic projects as well as Zimbabwean refugee centers became targets of Rhodesian attacks. When Mozambique, in compliance with international sanctions, closed its borders with Rhodesia, Mozambique lost more than $550 million.

As an extra weapon to break FRELIMO's determination, Smith organized and sponsored a group of anti-government armed bands—known as the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance) to operate inside Mozambique. After Zimbabwe's independence, South Africa assumed the sponsorship of the MNR.

According to a Mozambican government report made at the time the request for debt rescheduling was announced, direct and indirect South African aggressions accounted for a large share of Mozambique's current economic stagnation. In the last two years more than 900 commercial establishments, over 490 primary schools and over 140 villages were destroyed.

A History of Dependence

In 1917, one-third of Mozambique's revenues came from customs duties and shipping charges paid by South Africa. When Mozambique became independent in 1975 the country was still overwhelmingly dependent on these revenues and revenues from trade with Rhodesia to offset their balance of payments problems. Mozambican laborers were recruited to work in South African mines early in the century to provide payments in gold to the Portuguese colonial authorities. And until recently, the South African government continued to make these payments. But in an effort to isolate Mozambique economically, South Africa has reduced its use of Mozambican ports by 16 percent over the last five years and the number of workers in South African mines has been cut by 60 percent.

Much of Mozambique's economy is tied to South Africa. And although Mozambique has tried since independence to break the cycle of dependence—through its participation in regional economic formations such as SADCC and its efforts to find new investment monies to put into industries and other areas dominated by South Africa—to a large extent Mozambique still remains tied to the previous pattern of dependence on South Africa.

The total cost of South Africa's non-declared war of aggression against Mozambique was put at $3.3 billion. The break-down is as follows:

- $2.547 billion—abandonment of South Africa's previously established scheme of selling gold to Mozambique at a reduced rate in quantities based on the number of Mozambicans working in South African mines. This gold was then sold on the world market at the going rate.
- $333 million—MNR aggressions
- $568 million—reduction in the level of Mozambican workers in South African mines from 120,000 at independence to 45,000 in 1982.
- $248 million—reduction of port and rail usage by South Africa from 6.8 million tons in 1973 to 1.1 million tons in 1982.

The French government agreed to coordinate a group of Western creditors belonging to the Organization of Cooperation and Economic Development in the negotiations. The Bank of Mozambique explained that credit granted after February 1, 1984 will not be affected by the rescheduling process.

Commentary

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tain some short term objectives each needs. But the diametrically opposed long-term objectives of each country has yet to be addressed. While the signing of the accord may eventually result in peace from MNR attacks within Mozambique's borders, it does not eliminate South Africa's potential as the greatest threat to peace in the region. True peace in southern Africa will only come when the peoples of Namibia and South Africa have won their battle against South African oppression and apartheid.
Chronology of Talks

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ed and organized them. Mozambique maintained its initial position: there could not be any accord of an economic nature between the two countries without first having a security accord.

South Africa responded to these two encounters with more aggression. Pretoria increased its support for the bandits. The number of direct aggressions also increased.

In the majority of Western capitals, the dominant attitude was favorable to South African aggression. Western governments continued to see the conflict in southern Africa in the context of the so-called East-West confrontation. For these governments, South Africa continued to be "allied with the West"—even though apartheid was verbally condemned—and Mozambique was viewed as a "satellite of the Soviet Union." In Washington, Ronald Reagan's administration continued to analyze southern Africa only in terms of the global conflict with the Soviet Union.

The fact that most Western media organizations have regional offices in South Africa, with South African propaganda, contributed to the poor understanding of events in southern Africa.

This reality, dangerously adverse to the national interests of Mozambique, was studied in detail at the Tenth session of the central committee of the FRELIMO party in August 1982. The central committee took three decisions at that time: to transform the Mozambican economy into a war economy; to launch a coordinated military offensive against the armed bandits; and to launch a diplomatic offensive in the West.

In August 1983, the army's offensive began to bear fruit with the destruction of many bandit campsites in various provinces of the country.

The trip of President Samora Machel to the Western countries in October of last year broke the mounting isolation of Mozambique. In Portugal, France and England, Western leaders finally came to understand that Mozambique never was and never will be a client of any foreign power. They understood conclusively that many of the difficulties the country is facing come from the fact that FRELIMO chose above everything the maintenance of sovereignty. To this new and correct perception, add with more clarity and consequence the comprehension that in southern Africa the Pretoria regime is the center of destabilization. It was not a surprise then that Roelof Botha found many doors closed when he went to Europe just after the return of Samora Machel to Mozambique.

Shortly after his trip, the Mozambican president received in Maputo the first emissaries who, in the name of Prime Minister Pieter Botha, came with a South African request: South Africa wanted to return to the negotiations process which Mozambique had initiated.

And it was thus that the meeting of December 20, 1983, in Mbabane, Swaziland came about.

What followed were simultaneous meetings in Maputo and Pretoria on January 16, 1984. On February 20, there was another meeting in Maputo. On that day President Samora Machel received the three ministers of the

South African delegation, Roelof Botha, Minister of Law and Order Louis LeGrange, and Defense Minister General Magnus Malan.

In the following week the Mozambican Council of Ministers approved the principles of the non-aggression accord, which was then taken to the meetings in Cape Town March 4. In both the principles and the proposal, the points of view presented by the Mozambican delegation at the first meeting at Komatiport in December 1982 remained fundamentally unchanged.

In Cape Town, the Mozambican delegation, headed by Major-General Jacinto Veloso, had a meeting with the South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha.

The communiqué of the final Cape Town meeting stated that the meetings between the two ministerial delegations and Samora Machel on February 20 and Pieter Botha on March 2 had been vital to the positives steps which followed (which led to the Nkomati Accord).

(Translation by MRC)

Cahora Bassa Discussions

Cahora Bassa (known as Cabora Bassa before independence) is the second largest dam in Africa. It was constructed over the Zambee River in Tete Province to provide hydro-electric power to the region. The Portuguese originally began construction of the dam in the late 1960s using both their own capital and capital they solicited from other Western countries, including France and West Germany as well as South Africa. FRELIMO which was engaged in heavy fighting against the Portuguese, saw Portugal's efforts to secure Western investors as an attempt to involve other countries in defending Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique against the forces of liberation.

In 1969, Portugal agreed to sell electricity to South Africa for about 1/2 cent per kilowatt hour. When Mozambique became independent, the governments of Mozambique and Portugal agreed to respect the previous accord with the understanding that ownership of the dam would gradually pass to Mozambique during the period of the repayment of the loans used for its construction. This process was estimated to take about 35 years, or until the year 2014. By that time it would also be providing a large share of electricity to Mozambique as well.

Although Mozambique now owns a 18.4% share of the Cahora Bassa electricity project, Mozambique has never collected any revenues from operations. The R40-50 million paid by South Africa each year the dam was in operation, went to the Portuguese company Hydroelectrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB) which operates the dam. But even these payments have not covered more than the basic operating costs.

For South Africa, the electricity provided by HCB represents their cheapest source of power. The other power station, which uses coal to provide electricity, does so at about 1.79 cents per kilowatt hour. A nuclear powered electricity plant which just began operating, has projected costs two or three times higher than this. There is therefore great interest on the part of South Africa in continuing to receive electricity from Cahora Bassa. Pre-

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The Nkomati Accord

AGREEMENT

On non-aggression and good neighbourliness between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique

The government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, hereinafter referred to as the high contracting parties,

Recognizing the principles of strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and the inviolability of the borders of all states,

Considering the internationally recognized principle of equal rights of all peoples,

Considering the obligation of all states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

Considering the obligation of states to settle conflicts by peaceful means, and thus safeguard international peace and security and justice,

Recognizing the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states.

Conscious of the need to promote relations of good neighbourliness based on principles of equality of rights and mutual advantage.

Convinced that relations of good neighbourliness between the high contracting parties will contribute to peace, security, stability and progress in southern Africa, the continent and the world.

Have solemnly agreed to the following:

Article One

The high contracting parties undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and, in fulfilment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

Article Two

(1) The high contracting parties shall resolve differences and disputes that may arise between them and that may likely endanger mutual peace and security or peace and security in the region, by means of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means, and undertake not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.

(2) For the purposes of this article, the use of force shall include inter-alia

a. attacks by land, air or sea forces,

b. sabotage,

c. unwarranted concentration of such forces at or near international boundaries of the high contracting parties.

d. violation of the international land, air or sea boundaries of either of the high contracting parties.

(3) The high contracting parties shall not in any way assist the armed forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other.

Article Three

(1) The high contracting parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organizations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.

(2) The high contracting parties, in order to prevent the acts or the preparation of acts mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article, undertaken in particular to:

a. forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,

b. eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centers, places of shelter, accommodation and transit for mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,

c. eliminate from their respective territories communication and telecommunication facilities between the command and the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,

d. eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and co-ordination of the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,

e. eliminate from their respective territories radio broadcasting stations, including unofficial or clandestine broadcasts, for the elements that carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,

f. exercise strict control in the respective territories over places which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) of this article,

g. exercise strict control in the respective territories over elements which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) of this article.

Article Four

The high contracting parties shall take steps, individually and collectively, to ensure that the international boundary between their respective territories is effectively patrolled and that the border posts are efficiently administered to prevent illegal crossings from the territory of a high contracting party to the territory of the other, and in particular, by elements contemplated in article three of this agreement.

Article Five

The high contracting parties shall prohibit within their territory acts of propaganda that incite a war of aggression against the other contracting party and shall also prohibit acts of propaganda
aimed at inciting acts of terrorism and civil war in the territory of
the other high contracting party.

Article Six

The high contracting parties declare that there is no conflict be-
tween their commitments in treaties and international obligations
and the commitments undertaken in this agreement.

Article Seven

The high contracting parties are committed to interpreting this
agreement in good faith and will maintain periodic contact to en-
sure the effective application of what has been agreed.

Article Eight

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as detracting from
the high contracting parties right to self-defense in the event of
armed attacks, as provided for in the charter of the United Nations.

Article Nine

(1) Each of the high contracting parties shall appoint high rank-
ing representatives to serve on a joint security commission with
the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of this
agreement.
(2) The commission shall determine its own working procedure.
(3) The commission shall meet on a regular basis and may be
specially convened whenever circumstances so require.
(4) The commission shall
a. consider all allegations of infringements of the provisions
of this agreement,
b. advise the high contracting parties of its conclusions, and
c. make recommendations to the high contracting parties con-
cerning measures for the effective application of this agree-
ment and the settlement of disputes over infringements of
alleged infringements.
(5) The high contracting parties shall determine the mandate of
their respective representatives in order to enable interim
measures to be taken in cases of duly recognized emergency.
(6) The high contracting parties shall make available all the
facilities necessary for the effective functioning of the commis-
sion and will jointly consider its conclusions and recommenda-
tions.

Article Ten

This agreement also be known as "The Accord of Nkomati".

Article Eleven

(1) This agreement shall enter into force on the date of the
signature thereof.
(2) Any amendment to this agreement agreed to by the high con-
tracting parties shall be effected by the exchange of notes between
them.

In witness whereof, the signatures, in the names of their respec-
tive governments, have signed and sealed this agreement, in
quadruplicate in the English and Portuguese languages, both texts
being equally authentic.

Thus done and signed at the common border the banks of the
Nkomati River, on this sixteenth day of March 1984.

Pieter Willem Botha
Prime Minister of the
Republic of South Africa

Samora Moises Machel
President of the People's
Republic of Mozambique

Document:

Samora Machel Speaks At Nkomati

Below we reprint the text of Mozambican President Samora
Machel's speech at the signing of the Nkomati Accord on
March 16, 1984.

The signing of the Agreement of Non Aggression and
Good Neighbourliness is a high point in the history of rela-
tions between our two states and a high point in the history
of our region.

The principles we have enshrined in the Accord of
Nkomati are universally valid ones that govern relations
between sovereign states regardless of their political,
economic and social systems. They are principles that
open new perspectives for the relationship between our
states, in so far as they guarantee a solid and lasting
peace between the two neighbouring countries. They are
principles that establish a new situation in our region, a
situation of peace and good neighbourliness.

The Accord of Nkomati is a unique document among the
states of our region. The need for it arose not so much from
the differences between us, but above all from the process
of confrontation that developed and created the awareness
that this was not the road that would best serve the in-
terests of our two countries.

We have undertaken here a solemn commitment not to
launch aggressive actions of any sort against one another,
and we have created conditions for the establishment, with
honour and dignity, of a new phase of stability and security
on our common borders.

We do not want Southern Africa, and our two countries
in particular, to be the theatre for a generalised conflict.
That is why we have enshrined in the Accord of Nkomati
the principle that our states will not be used by any other
state or group of states to jeopardise the sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity or independence of our countries.

We are thus laying the foundation for a definitive break
of the cycle of violence that has been established in this
region of the continent. A violence that was above all the
result of the burdensome legacies we carry with us. A
violence that began some centuries ago, when the dignity
and personality of African peoples were trampled on by the
aggression, domination and exploitation of European col-
onialism. Africa was ravaged by the brutality of slave wars
and colonial conquest, which brought division, humiliation,
poverty and destruction to the peoples of the continent.
We are a continent of survivors. We survived slavery, we
survived wars of conquest and we survived the brutality of repression when we wanted to become masters of our own destinies.

For that reason we are fully cognisant of the value of peace and of the need to reject the legacies that divide us.

We thus assume, before the world and before history, responsibility for guaranteeing the perpetuity of this Agreement and eliminating the root causes of violence, war and confrontation.

The differences between our political, economic and social concepts are great and even antagonic.

We recognised these differences honourably on the hard and difficult road of frank and open talks that led us to this Agreement. We shall continue to be aware of the remaining contradictions but we recognise that we are indissolubly linked by geography and by proximity.

Peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and relations of good neighbourliness are the only rational alternative for our future to be free of the spectre of violence and destruction.

The People's Republic of Mozambique cherishes peace as the most precious possession of mankind, the deepest aspiration of all peoples. Peace and coexistence are written into our Constitution. Based on our socialist policy of peace we have proposed, since the first meeting between our governments on 17 December 1982, that we should agree, formally or informally, to let peace and coexistence prevail between our states.

Peace is when there is respect between states for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Peace is when there is harmony, and physical, material, spiritual and social tranquility.

Peace is when the life, liberty, equality and dignity of man is respected without any discrimination.

Peace generates the conditions of progress, economic development and social wellbeing.

After a long period of armed conflict, hopes of peace are emerging. They must be converted into reality. They must be fertilised and enriched so that they may blossom and grow.

The prospect of peace opens possibilities for developing the vast resources in which our region abounds. These resources must as a matter of priority be exploited for the benefit of the people, while always safeguarding the national interests of each state.

Economic relations between our states must develop in a healthy and correct manner.

We neither can nor should ignore the fact that our relations have a historic tradition, which enhanced the geographical contiguity of the two countries.

But we must also recognise that relations of economic dependence are not conducive to stability and harmonious progress. For this reason our state rejects any type of relationship that might in any way limit its independence or make it economically dependent on another country.

In the economic sphere let us find ways of developing resources, infrastructures, and circumstances which, being part of the experience of our relations, are likely to bring reciprocal advantages and benefits on the basis of equality.

It is within this context that the Agreement of Non Aggression and Good Neighbourliness has an important role to play, as there can be no development without peace and tranquility.

We have established relations of cooperation with the states of Southern Africa in the framework of SADCC.

As we have already had occasion to state, SADCC was not created against South Africa. Its central objective is to eliminate hunger, wretchedness and illiteracy and to improve the standard of living of the peoples of the region. Its member states refuse economic dependence on South Africa as on any other country.

These objectives are solemnly proclaimed in the Lusaka Declaration which created SADCC, and we would like to reaffirm once again our total fidelity to these principles.

Our states have been able to map out the path of coexistence. They have been able to discuss between themselves. Between themselves they have been able to define their interests and objectives. Many have been surprised at the speed with which we found answers, and by our ability to do so without external interference.

We, the Mozambican people, want to develop friendly relations with the South African people. None of us, Mozambicans or South Africans, have another country. We are not foreigners to our continent or countries.

We have to live together on a basis of mutual respect, freedom, equality and justice. These are fundamental principles of our state, principles that are the very essence of our concept of a free and democratic society. They are principles with which we remain consistent and to which we are intransigently loyal.

Our objective is that our region should assert itself as a model of peace. We do not want Southern Africa or our continent to be the basis for any armed conflicts. In particular we do not want to be the ones to trigger off a confrontation on a worldwide scale.

The liberation struggle of the African peoples was a struggle to achieve peace.

The whole of Africa is continuing the struggle to become a zone of peace, and for her oceans to be thoroughfares of peace, unity, friendship and cooperation between peoples. The whole of Africa is fighting to avert the horrors of a nuclear holocaust from the continent.

The peoples of Africa have always struggled to eliminate the motive causes of conflicts, tension and wars. They have always struggled to eradicate foreign domination and exploitation, and to build progress, prosperity and happiness in peace.

In this struggle to affirm the dignity and personality of the African man the Organisation of African Unity was and continues to be an important instrument for materialising the legitimate aspirations of the people of our continent.

We cannot lose this opportunity to pay our tribute to those who founded and inspired the OAU. More than twenty years ago a galaxy of illustrious African leaders had the lucidity, the historical vision and the courage to give form to the aspiration of unity so that the struggle of the African people for the liberation of our continent could continue.

In this great epic, the liberation of Africa, many were the heroes who sacrificed their lives for the noble cause. It is with deep emotion that at this moment we evoke their memories. They will remain immortalised with affection and respect in the history of Africa.

We would like to emphasise the decisive role of the
leaders of the Front Line States with which we have been united for a long time in the cause of the liberation of our continent and in the search for peace and progress, for justice and equality, in this region of Africa.

We salute Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Doctor Kenneth David Kaunda, those distinguished figures who transformed their peoples into firm and unwavering allies in the liberation of the Mozambican people. This respectful tribute to the peoples of Tanzania and Zambia is extensive to all peoples who made our struggle for peace and freedom their own.

The Agreement we have concluded is a significant contribution towards these noble objectives. Furthermore it enables the region to concentrate its efforts on the prime struggle of the continent and humanity—the struggle against hunger, disease, ignorance, poverty and underdevelopment.

Let Africa emerge as a region of progress where reason prevails over hate and prejudice and where the efforts of Man are concentrated on the struggle for development and wellbeing.

Peace, security, stability and progress have always been objectives of the Mozambican people's struggle.

In 1964 our people launched the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism to win national independence and eliminate one of the factors that disturbed peace in our region. In 1974, ten years later, that objective was attained. Another ten years have elapsed, and we are here to establish the basis for a climate of good neighbourliness and peace to prevail between two states of the Southern region of our continent.

The effort to achieve peace required determination, a correct historical perspective and steadfastness. The moment has come when for us, what counts for more than legal texts and formulations is the given word, the sense of commitment and good faith.

The Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique will keep its word both in letter and in spirit.

We have always fought for peace, equality and progress proclaiming FRELIMO's watchword, THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!

Today the struggle continues for equality, for democracy, for justice so that on our continent we should all be equal.

Today, for peace, stability, good neighbourliness and progress,

A LUTA CONTINUA

Thank you very much

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**OAU Statement on Situation in Southern Africa**

Meeting in Addis Ababa in early March, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted the following statement on the situation in southern Africa.

The OAU Council of Ministers,

1. EXPRESSES its deep concern for the undeclared war being waged by racist South Africa against the independent States of Southern Africa, which constitutes a serious threat to peace and security in Africa and international peace in general;
2. VIGOUROUSLY DENOUNCES the intensification of destabilizing military, political and economic actions carried out by the racist regime of South Africa against the independent States in the region, particularly Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique;
3. CONDEMNS the South African regime for its destabilizing policy against neighbouring countries and particularly the recruitment, training and financing of armed bandits and mercenaries directed against the independent and sovereign States in the region;
4. STRONGLY CONDEMNS the military occupation of parts of the territory of the People's Republic of Angola by the racist South African army in violation of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the elementary principles of international law;
5. DEMANDS the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the South African occupation army from the territory of Angola, according to the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the OAU;
6. FULLY SUPPORTS the efforts and measures undertaken by the Angolan Government, according to Article 51 of the United National Charter in order to guarantee and safeguard the territorial integrity and national sovereignty;
7. CONDEMNS the South African barbaric raids against the Kingdom of Lesotho and against the People's Republic of Mozambique;
8. DEMANDS the immediate cessation of acts of aggression and destabilization carried out by the Pretoria regime against the independent and sovereign States of the region;
9. REAFFIRMS that the policy of Apartheid, a crime against the conscience and dignity of the whole mankind, is incompatible with the Charters of the United Nations and the OAU and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
10. PAYS TRIBUTE to the Frontline States and to the Kingdom of Lesotho for the sacrifices made in resisting against the policy of blackmail and intimidation of the Apartheid regime aiming at forcing them to give up their firm and courageous position which they have always adopted towards the struggles of the Peoples of Namibia and South Africa;
11. EXPRESSES sympathy and deep understanding for the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the People's Republic of Mozambique in order to preserve their independence and national sovereignty, thus giving their contribution in seeking a solution to the serious situation prevailing in southern Africa;

12. URGES all the African States and all justice and peace-loving peoples to give their political, diplomatic and material support to the independent States in the region in particular to Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique.

13. UNDERTAKES to take all necessary steps to consider appropriate ways and means of helping the liberation movements in southern Africa to pursue the struggle for the independence of Namibia and the elimination of Apartheid in South Africa.

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Final Communique of Recent Frontline State Meeting

The Frontline States' Summit Meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, on Sunday, 29th April 1984 to consider the recent developments in Southern Africa. The Heads of State and Government present were: President Quell Masire of Botswana; President Samora Machel of Mozambique; President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania; President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Also in attendance were: Comrade Oliver Tambo, President of ANC of South Africa; Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of Swapo of Namibia.

The leaders stood for one minute of silence in tribute to the late Edward Moringe Sokoine whose very valuable and practical contributions to the liberation struggle of South Africa will be greatly missed by the Frontline States and the Liberation Movements.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements reaffirmed their total and unqualified commitment to the liberation struggles of the people of Namibia against colonialism, and of the people of South Africa against apartheid. They reassured their conviction, and that of the Organization of African Unity, that the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and apartheid is essential for the security of all the independent states of the Continent, in particular the Frontline States.

Further, they reiterated that the root cause of the problems in Southern Africa is apartheid itself. Apartheid is the cause of Africa's hostility to the South African racist regime and of the existence of South African and Namibian refugees. None of these things is caused by the Frontline or other states neighboring South Africa. Apartheid has been condemned in categorical terms by the United Nations, and by the leaders of Europe, America, Australia, and Asia, as well as by Africa. It cannot be made acceptable by the use of South Africa's mercenaries and traitors. The Heads of States and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the understanding reached by the Peoples Republic of Angola and the Pretoria regime and welcomed South Africa's commitment to withdraw its troops from Angola and hoped that it will honour its commitment to withdraw from Angola. This withdrawal will constitute an opportunity for the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 of 1978. They welcomed Angola's reaffirmation of its continued commitment to the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO. The Heads of State and Government expressed their support for the Angolan actions against the externally supported armed bandits who are causing death and misery to the Angolan people and destruction to the economic infrastructure of the state.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and the South African government. They expressed the hope that the South African government will live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilization of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits and gave their support to the Mozambican actions aimed at the total elimination of these vicious bandits. They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political, and diplomatic support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid and for the majority rule in South Africa.

The Heads of State and Government and the leaders of the Liberation Movements declared that the immediate objective for Namibia is and must be rapid implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, in order that Namibia may attain full and internationally recognized independence on the basis of self-determination by all the people of that country. They reiterated the continuing role of the UN Security Council and of the Secretary-General in the implementation of Resolution 435. The leaders of the Frontline States reaffirmed their support for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

For South Africa, the objective of the Frontline States and Liberation Movements is the abolition of apartheid by whatever means necessary.

The leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means. This can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representative of the people of South Africa, who are unrepresented in the present government structure of the country. A pre-requisite for any such discussions would be the unconditional release from prison, detention, house arrest or "banning", of Nelson Mandela and all other political leaders. Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African
government, there is no way to peace in Southern Africa except through discussions between the South African government and the African people of South Africa. To avoid any misunderstanding, they stressed that the phrase "African People" includes all those who have been classified as being citizens of the so-called independent homelands in South Africa. The denial of their South African citizenship is not recognized in international law, nor by any independent state apart from South Africa.

The alternative to free negotiations within South Africa aimed at the ending of apartheid will inevitably be continued struggle against that system by others means, including armed struggle. This struggle is being and will be conducted and led by the people of South Africa themselves, on their own initiative, and within their own country. However, their struggle is, and is seen by Africa to be a struggle for the freedom and security of all the peoples of this continent, and for the human dignity of all men and women, regardless of colour. It therefore receives, and will continue to receive, the full support of the peoples and the nations represented by the Heads of Government of the Frontline States.

Involved in this struggle for the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is the consolidation of the freedom and the security of the states which have already achieved independence. To that end, and in the light of the difficult circumstances which do, from time to time, confront such states, the leaders of the Frontline States and the Liberation Movements reaffirmed their understanding of steps which are taken for this purpose by states which are fully committed to the liberation struggles. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the internationally recognized boundaries in South Africa as

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**Noticias Editorial**

The following is a reprint of an editorial that appeared in the Maputo-based daily Noticias the day after the signing of the Nkomati accord.

The Nkomati Accord will have come as a surprise in some political circles which were expecting to see in the text something like the surrender of a "small country" (Mozambique) to a "military power" (South Africa).

The text does not reflect anything like this. On the contrary, it reflects that the South African government admitted that in the history of the last two years in the sub-continent they played the role as the belligerent.

When the ministerial delegations of the two countries met for the first time in Komatipoort in December 1982, Mozambique proposed that the two sides arrive at a security agreement without which it would be impossible to maintain any type of relationships in various other areas.

The South Africans rejected this position, proposing economic relations and insisting that Mozambique accept the idea of Apartheid, the bantustans and expel all members of the ANC from Mozambican territory.

The conversations followed an intensification of violence. Twenty-seven months later, the Nkomati Accord did not contain a word against the right of each State to allow whomever they wished to live within their territory. Mozambique continues to maintain ANC offices in Mozambique and its political, diplomatic and moral support to the movement remains unchanged.

What the Accord does stipulate is that neither one of the parties can permit their territory to be used as a departure point of aggression against the other.

In no part of the Accord does it say that both parties recognize the internal politics of the other. Unchanged is Mozambique’s position of non-recognition of Apartheid and the bantustans, just as South Africa continues its disapproval of Mozambique’s socialist policy.

But, what the Accord does say, in the third article, is that neither of the parties will organize or permit the organization of “armed bands” in their territory, “including mercenaries.” History is still too fresh in people’s minds to forget South Africa’s recent strategy of destabilization against Mozambique which makes it clear that that is what is being referred to in the Accord.

A LUTA CONTINUA
Chronology of South African Aggressions against Mozambique

What follows is a chronology of South African aggression against Mozambique as published in TEMPO magazine. It gives a clear idea about the level of intensity of the South African assault on Mozambique. It does not however give details about all of the hundreds of MNR attacks during the period or of all of the Mozambicans, and other nationals, killed, disfigured, injured or kidnapped. Nor does it reveal much about all of the hundreds of successful FPLM assaults on MNR positions or acts of bravery of local militia men and women in defending their villages.

The chronology highlights only a few of the better known South African backed military activities intended to destabilize the country. But it is a reminder of the reign of terror unleashed by South Africa against Mozambique, and Angola, that should not be overlooked.

1980

April 18 - The Independence of Zimbabwe

July 1 - FPLM (Mozambican Armed Forces) launched a successful assault on the principal base of the MNR at Sitatonga.

1981

January 30 - South African commandos, including mercenaries, assassinated 12 South African refugees in an attack on three houses in Maputo. The body of one of the attackers is left behind in the retreat.

March 17 - An incursion of South African armed forces is repelled when they penetrated a mile into Mozambican territory at Ponta do Ouro.

September - Armed bands cut off the ears of three peasants at Machaze, in the district of Mossurize.

October 14 - Three members of the South African army are killed by FPLM while they were preparing to mine the Beira-Machipanda railroad in Manica province. Also killed were three MNR collaborators accompanying them.

October 30 - A group of South African saboteurs dynamite two bridges over the Pungoe River, one a roadway and the other a railway and an oil pipe line which carried oil from Beira to Zimbabwe.

December 2 - It is announced that five South African agents who enticed into Mozambique to destroy the bridges on the Matola River, were captured by the 3rd Company of Interference's Order and Security Force during the year.

1982

January 20 - Armed bands launch an attack on several commercial establishments in Inhambinga in the district of Cheringoma, Sofala Province, where they looted food and other products. They threaten the civilian population, assassinating two persons.

February 25 - FPLM forces kill more than 15 MNR members when they try to loot the villa of Gorongosa. The MNR kills one civilian and wounds three.

March 10 - Mozambican Information Agency, citing military sources, announces the destruction of a MNR base in Papatane, near Vial Mabote, in the center of the country. In the operation, FPLM forces killed 13 MNR members and captured seven. They also captured diverse war material.

August 17 - A letter bomb kills Ruth First, professor at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo. Several co-workers are also wounded including one American (See September 1983 MOZAMBICAN NOTES).

August 22 - During the early morning hours two Mozambicans, one Portuguese were assassinated by a group of South African commandos who also kidnapped three Mozambicans about 2½ miles from Namaacha.

March 6 - President Machel, states in Chibuto Gazu District that FPLM operations in the area has reduced the activities of MNR bands in the area.

(Continued on page 19)
U.S.-Mozambique Relations:
An Overview of Recent Developments

by Allen Issacman

In an attempt to reduce the spiral of rural impoverishment and terrorist attacks, Mozambique has turned increasingly and more publicly to the West for economic, diplomatic and even military assistance in the past two years. This strategy does not represent a reversal of its commitment to a socialist path of development but rather is seen as one element in Mozambique's creation of an autonomous foreign policy that best serves its national interest. It also reflects a realization that the socialist countries may not be able to provide the aid and development capital which Mozambique desperately needs and that these resources may be available from the West. In addition, only the West can pressure South Africa to cease its military aggression.

For their part, the Western European countries have shied away from their cold war stereotypes and have begun to accept Mozambique's domestic and international orientation on its own terms. To be sure, Mozambique's "Opening to the West" poses new sets of contradictions, but it is nevertheless perceived in Maputo as a necessary risk if Mozambique is to experience peace and to obtain foreign capital; both of which are prerequisites for any meaningful social transformation.

It is against this backdrop of an overall policy of "opening to the West" that relations with the United States must be examined, keeping in mind that since 1978 Maputo has sought to enter into frank negotiations with Washington based on the principals of "strict equality, absolute respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and reciprocity of benefits." Indeed, at a 1978 meeting between President Samora Machel and President Jimmy Carter in New York, the Mozambican leader offered "to wipe the slate clean" and forget the long history of U.S. support for the Portuguese colonial regime.

Despite this gesture, relations between Mozambique and the U.S. did not improve substantially. And when Ronald Reagan came into office, his administration intensified American economic and military ties with South Africa.

Relations between Maputo and Washington deteriorated further in 1981 when the Mozambicans expelled four US embassy personnel who they accused of spying for the CIA and providing the South Africans with strategic information that facilitated Pretoria's attack on Matola in 1981. The Mozambicans produced a lengthy document detailing the charges.

Since 1982 there has been a perceptible thaw in relations with Washington, and a discernible increase in diplomatic activity. The thaw began in the fall of 1982 when Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano met with US Secretary of State Shultz at the United Nations. It was soon followed by a series of visits to Maputo by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker and his deputy Frank Wisner. According to Mozambican leaders, it was at these high level meetings that the American representatives begrudgingly accepted the proposition that Mozambique was an independent, non-aligned state and not a puppet of the Soviet Union. Speaking to the Portuguese newspaper Diario de Noticias late in 1983, Samora Machel emphasized that "The American administration has, without a doubt, a more lucid attitude toward cooperation with Mozambique. They discuss things with us frankly and we appreciate this."

Whether the Reagan administration actually accepted the Mozambican claim of non-alignment or calculated that there were other strategic advantages to be gained through dialogue is unclear. The fact of the matter is that this flurry of diplomatic activity has produced some important results. The U.S. appointed a new Ambassador in October 1983, after leaving the post vacant since Mozambique expelled the four diplomats accused of being CIA agents. Mozambique's first ambassador to the U.S. was also named at that time.

American food aid, which had been (Continued on page 15)
**US-Mozambique Relations**

(Continued from page 14)
terminated in retaliation for the expulsions, was also renewed. In a sharp reversal of previous policy the Reagan administration allocated more emergency food aid for Mozambique than for any other African country and there are reports that the 1984 US AID supplemental food package, estimated at $90 million, contains substantial emergency assistance for Mozambique. Coming in the aftermath of a devastating three year drought which has left hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans on the verge of starvation, the 78,000 tons of grain sent during the past two years, as well as the March 1984 announcement that the U.S. would provide funding to repair the critical Umbeluzi water treatment plant, has certainly helped to improve bilateral relations.

But the critical issue remains whether the Reagan administration and the other Western nations are prepared to condemn publicly South African aggression and to continue to pressure privately the Pretoria regime to cease its policy of destabilizing Mozambique. As of early 1984, Washington's long-term policy remained ambiguous, at best. The United States did condemn South African aggression against Lesotho, and in a departure from past policy the Reagan administration, through a State Department spokesperson, acknowledged and tacitly criticized Pretoria's support for the MNR. The U.S. charge d'affaires in Maputo, moreover, did join with representatives of England, France, the Soviet Union and China to condemn South African aggression. Whether such pronouncements will reduce hostilities remains to be seen.

The outcome of the security agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, which Washington helped to orchestrate, may provide an early indication of the Reagan administration’s willingness as well as its ability to pressure Pretoria. Reports both by Western observers and Mozambican officials that South Africa resupplied the MNR with substantial caches of war material just prior to the negotiations cast serious doubt on Pretoria’s long term objectives.

Should the South African backed terrorists intensify their activity and continue to destroy Mozambique’s economic and social infrastructure and should the West, in general and the United States in particular, countenance South African violations of the negotiated security agreement, Machel’s government will have few options left. “If international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from escalating its aggression,” Foreign Minister Chissano recently warned, “Mozambique, in the long run may require more and more military assistance from the socialist countries...[most of whom] belong to the Warsaw Pact.” Such a decision, which would further internationalize the conflict in Southern Africa, carries profound implications which extend beyond the continent. It would also represent a serious setback in FRELIMO’s long-term effort to formulate an autonomous foreign policy that best serves its national interest.

“...The Lusaka Accord (Between Angola and South Africa) and the Nkomati Accord are gestures which could significantly alter the relationship between forces on the southern corner of our continent.”

“We take note of the political courage necessary for President Samora Machel to conclude the bilateral accord with their powerful neighbor. We share your opinion that one does not choose one’s neighbors, but only your friends.”

“In the midst of anyone of our countries, there has never been any questions of altering our political practice in these few years of in-regime or the support to the struggle of our brothers of SWAPO and ANC. Complete proof of this affirmation is the Bissau Declaration whose foundations is irrefutably confirmed by our political practice in those few years of independence. For this we had to identify the enemy and his numerous extentions. For this we had to identify those reponsible for the actual situation. It will not surprise anyone that we are speaking of the economic difficulties of our countries. Aren’t those responsible for theses situations the same?”

“The new ‘Modua Vivendo’ being established in the region is symptomatic of the evolution of the situation in Southern Africa.”

Joao Bernardo Vieira, President of Guine Bissau in a speech before the April 27 meeting of heads of states of “the Five” (Portuguese speaking African Countries).
Mozambique In SADCC

By Carol Thompson

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formed four years ago (April 1, 1980) to coordinate economic relations among nine states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe). The coordination is to pursue four objectives: 1) reduction of external dependence, especially on South Africa; 2) creation of operation and equitable regional integration; 3) mobilization of resources to reduce dependence and build genuine regional coordination and 4) joint action to secure international understanding and practical support for the SADCC strategy. Mozambique Finance Minister Rui Baltasar dos Santos Alves stated that SADCC is "the political answer to the colonial principle of divide and rule."

Each state accepts responsibility for a sector, and Mozambique is in charge of the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC). The goal of SATCC is to upgrade the transport and port system to facilitate increased trade and to reduce dependence on South Africa. Five rail systems are considered key to SATCC; they link the land-locked states to the important parts in the region: Maputo, Beira Nacala Mozambique Dar es Salaam and Lobito in Angola. Mozambique Senior Planning Officer, Ministry of Ports and Railways, Mr. P. Figueiredo stated that "1983 showed the beginning of concrete results with several projects which have reached the construction stage, such as the Nacala-En Selagdos Railway. There are new projects in the construction-delivery stage in each sub-sector of transport and communication and in each state."

The total cost of all SADCC projects is $2.351 million to January 1984. Funds committed are $700 million and $400 million is under discussion. The principal donors to date have been the Nordic countries who are helping with the technical work of the Commission. However, UN agencies have also contributed, with a consortium of Canada, France, and Italy helping to rehabilitate the railway to Malawi. The People's Republic of China is rehabilitating part of the Botswana railway. SATCC provides the technical coordination, does feasibility studies and sets priorities, but the states involved negotiate with the donors.

Finance Minister Rui Baltasar said, "SADCC is successful because it has established a permanent dialogue among the nine over common interest. Cooperation is from a common base, not from generalities or a grand theoretical scheme." SADCC rejects a custom union approach which emphasizes a free trade area; members say that trade will develop only after production is increased through coordination.

The major problem for SADCC is sabotage by South Africa, through the MNR, which regularly blows up rail lines expressly to prevent development of alternative transport routes. At the recent Lusaka SADCC conference, 2-3 February 1984, the members repeated their accusation that Western Powers should not be so foolish as to contribute to SADCC and then continue economic support of South Africa which subverts SADCC.

Other difficulties which present problems for SADCC's future is the domination by Western contribution to the projects. For example, the U.S. tried to donate $17 million for a sorghum-millet research project but wrote a clause excluding Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania from the benefits. The exclusionary clause was rejected by SADCC, and USAID rewrote it positively to include the six and encouraged Canada to finance the other three. A Mozambican delegate to the Lusaka conference said that they were not happy that the six agreed to the rewritten clause but accepted their decision.

Further, because SADCC is based on common national interests, it cannot do more than what each state allows. The Mozambican government felt it very necessary to include Malawi in SADCC - for transport and trade reasons - but there are clear limits to the degree of coordination between the two. For example, SADCC is putting together a booklet of the separate investment codes of the nine; there is no discussion yet about a single or even coordinated code.

SADCC, however, will greatly increase port traffic and rail service fees to Mozambique. Coordination of food production (by Zimbabwe), with emphasis on early warning systems and cooperation over regional aid, will have now been surveyed (by Angola) and will also be coordinated. SADCC cooperation may become one alternative for alleviating the region's economic dependence on apartheid South Africa.

In the next issue...

The significance of Mozambique's talks with South Africa to relations in the region - the ANC, the SADCC and other Frontline States.

The Cahora Bassa Discussions

(Continued from page 6)

sently 9% of South Africa's total energy needs are supplied by HCB, when the dam is in operation. The conclusion of the second phase of construction, will increase this amount.

The high voltage lines between Mozambique and South Africa have often been targets of MNR activities and are presently not functioning. Some observers speculate that the attacks by the South African sponsored MNR armed gangs on the power lines may have been carried out to "demonstrate" that the MNR is independent of South Africa and perhaps in the mistaken belief that the damage to the line prejudices Mozambique's economy. In fact, although Mozambique fights to prevent all MNR sabotage on their territory, the losses were borne by Portugal which lost revenues and South Africa, which lost their cheap source of electricity.

Antonia Branco, Mozambique's Minister of Industry and Energy, has stated that while the MNR's sabotage has "aggravated the situation," it is not the principal problem the HCB faces. "The sabotage aggravated the situation, but without solving the situation of the financial structure of the enterprise, it can't function in an economically viable form," he said.

The new agreement reached by Mozambique, South Africa and Portugal which was signed May 2, triples the present cost of electricity to 1.5 cents per kilowatt hour (which still makes it South Africa's cheapest source of power). Parallel talks between Portugal and Mozambique recognized Mozambique's position that because the dam is located inside its territory, Mozambique should share directly in the revenues made by selling electricity to South Africa.

Technical questions relating to the experimental system used for the transmission of direct current to South Africa are also being discussed. The security of the transmission lines is to be taken up by the Security Group within the framework of the Nkomati accord.
showed his identification card, other bandits appeared from the bushes. Tivane was hacked to death and his body placed back in the car which was then shot up. The car was set afire with his wife and child also inside.

Recently, there have been many other reported MNR attacks in Maputo Province. One was the attack on a train near Manhica which resulted in one death and thirty-one injuries, of which fourteen were serious.

Mozambique’s armed forces have stepped up their activities and those of the militia in all areas of the country. The military offensive launched at the end of 1982 resulted in the capture of more than 3,500 MNR armed bandits through October 1983.

The FPLM has intensified its drive to wipe out the MNR. According to FPLM sources, 33 MNR bases were destroyed and 529 bandits killed in 332 military actions launched throughout the country from January to March of this year. During the same period 201 members of the armed bands were captured and 1,106 persons being held captive were liberated by FPLM forces.

In various speeches made to the Mozambican population since the start of the talks between Mozambique and South Africa, Mozambican officials have warned the population that now is the time for increased vigilance. Officials believe that as the MNR becomes more desperate, many members will discard their uniforms and try to integrate themselves into remote villages as peasants.

"To be revolutionary, to be democratic, to be communist in Africa in 1984, requires the defense and consolidation of socialist revolutions in Africa. The touchstone of internationalism in Africa is a concrete attitude in relation to the first liberated zones on the continent."

"The strategy for the struggle for peace in Africa requires making the forces of war and expansionism abide by the rules of relationships between civilized nations. The strategy of struggle for peace in southern Africa consists of forcing the beligerent circles to accept coexistence with sovereign states of southern Africa, with states free of racism; to oblige the anti-communism to co-exist with socialist states."

SERGIO VIERA, MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN AN INTERVIEW WITH NOTICAS.

President Samora Machel Speaks To The People

Quotes From Speech Before The People’s Assembly on April 5th.

On Mozambiques History of Negotiating:

When portuguese fascism fell on the 25th of April, the colonialism that oppressed us did not fall with it automatically. So we saluted the courage of the captains of April, but we refused to sacrifice our peoples' interests. We had not yet achieved the objective for which we were fighting.

However, the possibility of dialogue came immediately into being. As the dialogue advanced towards the fundamental objectives of our struggle, it became possible to conclude the Lusaka Peace Agreement on the 7th of September 1974. All wars end in negotiations for the establishment of peace. The Lusaka Agreement was made possible with the acceptance of the conditions that always constituted and were the basis of our struggle.

In keeping with the socialist principles of peace, the Mozambican government supported and actively participated in the struggle leading to the release of the Zimbabwean leaders and in the search for a peaceful solution at Victoria Falls in August 1975.

Despite increasing Rhodesian aggression, we participated in all the peace initiatives, seeking a negotiated solution to the independence as Zimbabwe. We participated in the Geneva meeting in 1976, we were in Malta in 1978, we participated in all the United Nations and OAU initiatives, we supported the Anglo American proposals.

Our state was active in the process that led to the peace talks at Lancaster House. The Agreement signed in London eliminated forever Smith’s illegal regime, as a factor against peace in our region.

Lancaster House was a unique moment in the history of the Zimbabwe people. For us, this Agreement brought to an end one more chapter of confrontation and war, it represents the extinction of a bellicose force that has always sided with colonialism against the people's independence.

Like the Lusaka Agreement, the Lancaster House Agreement was a victory for peace for the peoples of the region and of Africa.

On South Africa’s Attempt To Destabilize Mozambique

When the illegal Smith regime could no longer be the main instrument of aggression and destabilization against our country, South Africa had to intervene directly. For that purpose it gathered together the remnants, the dregs of the Rhodesian army and integrated them in its own operational forces. The selous scouts, the Muizorewa "auxiliaries", the armed bandits, the mercenaries were incorporated into the South African regular army, to be used in its regional strategy of destabilization.

South Africa then assumed the central and direct role in the undeclared war in the region in particular against Mozambique.

The objective was to overthrow the socialist and progressive systems of the region. In relation to our country the objective was also to destroy our popular and revolutionary state. The objective was to destroy the alternative civilization which Mozambique represents.

The policy of regional destabilization did not have the desired effects. South Africa did not achieve the political objectives for which it launched the war. In every country of the world where armed banditry has been used:

- it has failed to achieve military victory
- it has failed to become an internal political opposition
- it has failed to gain international recognition

In short, armed banditry has never been successful.

(Continued on page 20)
On Mozambiques Attitude Towards Negotiating With South Africa

We have said that war is made to achieve objectives that cannot be achieved by peaceful means. The enemy had clear objectives that were not achieved through this war. In this war we had no objective other than to defend our country and peace.

Despite South Africa's aggressive policies the P.R.M. has always kept the initiative in the search for peaceful solutions for our region. We took constructive part in the different proposals for the decolonization of Namibia and were present at the Geneva meeting of January 1981. In our direct relations with South Africa we have always been available for a negotiated solution.

The positions we defended since the beginning of the talks with South Africa in December 1982, prevailed in the Accord of Nkomati. Our government made the need to establish an understanding on security a prerequisite of our relationship with South Africa. No agreement was possible without attributing responsibility for the destabilization in Mozambique.

By negotiating with the Mozambican government, South Africa recognized de facto the inexistence of any political opposition in our country.

On The Significance Of The Signing The Accord of Nkomati

With the signing of the Accord of Nkomati, the main project, the destruction of our state, failed. In signing the Accord of Nkomati we guaranteed the objectives of our fight - Peace.

Only with Peace can we achieve our objective:

- to defend our country
- to conquer underdevelopment
- to build socialism

If it is true that Nkomati crowned our socialist policy of peace with success, it is also true that we came out of this fight with severe wounds.

Only future generations will show the precise dimension of the social trauma among Mozambican families by the horrors and barbarism of the armed bands.

The children who witnessed atrocities and repugnant acts of violence and destruction will grow up with the nightmare of their tragic memories.

This Accord opens up a new era where our working people can concentrate more attention on the development of our country, a development severely affected by the successive wars we had to bear.

This agreement brings about favorable prospects for growing cooperation with all countries, for multifaceted cooperation with reciprocal benefits with economic and financial entities.

This agreement finally makes it possible for our children not to grow up under the traumatic permanent spectre of war, not to grow up in the midst of violence and barbarism. We want our children to grow up free and happy, emotionally balanced, in love of peace whose flag they will have to defend as the men to tomorrow. We want our children to grow asking for toys that free their imagination and skill, that encourage beauty and love, that kindle keenness for study and scientific knowledge, instead of toys that symbolize violence and death.

The agreement is an instrument of peace and tranquility for our people.

The Accord of Nkomati defends the first state of workers and peasants in the region, that is building socialism based on the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism. It defends the first state in the region to bring about profound economic and social transformations, that brought scientific conception of life and of the world, that brought the freedom of all creeds, that brought a new type of democracy that proclaimed the rights of children, the only privileged group in our country, that brought new relations among men, regardless of tribe, region or race.

But the Accord of Nkomati is not only reflected in the national political scene, or that of the area.

The Accord is part of the movement to contain the arms race and for detente. It is a step toward removing the danger of local conflicts becoming conflicts on a world scale.

The success achieved in Nkomati does not have simply a tactical dimension. It is part of the strategy of the countries which are building socialism in that peace is the very essence of socialism.

The Accord defends the revolution, defends the cause of socialism, defends the people's deepest and most legitimate aspirations. It is an act in solidarity with all initiatives occurring in the world today aimed at Peace. It is a concrete demonstration of our long declared support for the proposals such as those of the Warsaw Pact states, the proposal of the government of Sweden for the creation of a demilitarized zone in Europe and the immediate positive response from the GDR, the proposal by the Contadora group for a peaceful solution to the problems that affect Central America, the proposal of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea regarding tripartite talks for national reunification, the UN proposal for decolonisation in Namibia, the OAU proposals to end the conflicts in Chad and the Western Sahara, the proposal for the creation of a free and independent Palestinian state.

The Accord we signed on the banks of the Nkomati River is an important step towards our economic and social progress.

The Accord, by bringing about the conditions for peace, creates the objective conditions for the Mozambican people to dedicate their main efforts, their work, to resolving their main problems.

On Efforts by Opportunists To Undermine Principles Of Co-Existence Established in Nkomatic Accord.

As our own history has taught us, voices will be raised which, under various pretexts, will try to undermine what cost so much to build.

Rightist opportunists will appear, who sparring the patriotic significance of the Accord, will seek to give a defeatist content to its implementation, endangering the people's conquests and our country's independence.

Domestic and foreign leftist opportunists will appear and will use adventurist ideas and pseudo revolutionary arguments to divide the progressive and revolutionary forces to spread confusion and intrigue.

There will be arms smugglers, mercenaries, unscrupulous persons that live off the hyenous trade in death. There
SAMORA MACHEL SPEAKS
(Continued from page 18)

will be those who, having lost a market for their arms, will spread slander and intrigue against the Accord of Nkomati.

Their voices will be joined by the militarists, the promoters of the politics of force and confrontation, those who want to draw our country and our region into their zone of influence, which they consider to include their “vital interests.”

Those who will never forgive our people for having installed yet another liberated area of mankind in this part of Africa, will rise up against the accord.

Just as in the past, those who always aimed to destroy Frelimo, destroy our independence and sovereignty, destroy Mozambique, an African, non-aligned, and socialist country in order to impose on our people, puppets submissive to their designs of domination, will act against the Nkomati Accord.

In this complex and delicate process of consolidating peace, forces will emerge that will want to revive the cold war climate, cementing distrust, theoreticians will emerge who, with their demagogic and falangist arguments, will try to undermine the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, universally enshrined by the international community.

This principle, and others that guarantee security among nations, are conquests of mankind and that is why we are proud. By implementing these principles in an area of tension and local conflict such as Southern Africa, we are making an important contribution to world peace.

Our independence created the first marxist-leninist state in the region and this fact, for the first time in the history of Southern Africa, made possible the presence of countries from the socialist community, enabled our people to get to know their revolutionary experiences and their example in building socialism, their solidarity, their fight for peace.

 Chronology of South African Aggressions
(Continued from page 13)

April 19 - An inclusion by South African agents made with the objective of creating an insecure atmosphere during the Fourth Party Congress is detected and dismantled near Namaacha, close to the frontier with South Africa. The group entered the country as civilians and disbanded after one of their members shot at Defense and Security Forces. The security forces find in sacks that South African agents abandoned 64 sticks of explosives and timers used in putting together time bombs.

May 24 - South African Air Force units cause six deaths and leave 40 wounded in a bombing raid on various residential areas, a factory and a daycare center in Matola (Maputo province).

May 30 - A South African military telecommunication airplane is shot down in Maputo.

August 21 - During the early morning hours, a MNR band attacks the installations of the Mozambican Mining Enterprise in Murrua, in the province of Zambazi. In the assault four workers (two Mozambican workers and two Soviet geologists) were murdered. 24 Soviet geologists and two women and two children, all Mozambicans were kidnapped. Housing, a health center and a store were looted and buildings and equipment destroyed.

August 29 - Bands armed by South Africa and war material captured are presented at Maxixe Vila, in Inhambane province.

September 24 - 16 armed bands, some of whom were trained in South Africa are presented to the press in Magul, in the province of Gaza.

October 11 - The destruction of the MNR base at Tome, in Inhambane province is announced. The attack on this base and others was part of a campaign launched during the celebration of President Machel's 50th birthday.

October 17 - Three bombs exploded in the offices of ANC in Maputo. The attack, for which South Africa took credit, resulted in the injury of five and considerable material damage.

December 7 - Two South African refugees are seriously wounded in Xipanamine Bairro, in Maputo.

December 10 - The destruction of MNR bases in Maua and Macaringue, in Inhambane province is announced.

December 20 - FPLM drives away armed bands in the Vila of Maringue, in Sofala province.

"The enemy tries in every way possible to use the Nkomati Accord to their advantage against us. This is one of the challenges. We were not ignorant of this when we signed the accord on March 16. But who could have made such a heavy decision without having considered the consequences?" "Only someone who hasn't had the experience of 20 years of fighting against enemies who always use treacherous and changeable tactics." "This is not us. We make our decisions based on 20 consecutive years of bloody war during which the armed struggle was combined with political, ideological and diplomatic struggles. "...The Nkomati Accord is the culmination of efforts made consciously to formalize the peace initiative of the People's Republic of Mozambique. It is not the acceptance of an imposition coming from outside. It is an initiative with very clear objectives, the most important of which is the DEFENSE OF THE MOZAMBIAN REVOLUTION." "Who is it that can not rejoice with us when we defend the revolution? Only our enemies. Perhaps also opportunists of the right. It is true that there are also leftists, shortsighted revolutionaries, who always rejoice in applauding our death." "They do not hesitate in inciting us to die so that we can be applauded as heroes. We appreciate your applause when it refers to useful sacrifices as in the case of the liberation struggles in our country and Zimbabwe. But we must say to you that our people do not die to be applauded. They do not die to merit statues. We are already to give our lives, yes, when the Revolution demands it. And then, yes, the statue of eternal life to the hero." 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER JOAQUIM CHISSANO, EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH BEFORE THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY.
SAMORA MACHEL SPEAKS
(Continued from page 19)

On Mozambique's Direction Following The Signing of Nkomatic Accord

In town and countryside, in agriculture and industry, in education and health, in transport and construction, in mining and fishing, on all fronts, we must draw the maximum benefit from existing infrastructures, available raw materials and local resources. Above all, using our own efforts we can now engage more actively in carrying out the tasks defined by the Fourth Congress of the Frelimo Party.

We must revive the spirit of the Political and Organizational Offensive. It is imperative that we once again take up the relentless and systematic struggle against incompetence and carelessness. In each trench of the battlefield of production, in the social sectors, in the enterprises, in the civil service, on the battle for legality, we must fight against laziness, negligence, slovenliness, apathy, inaction, arrogance and abuse.

On The Lessons Learned From South Africa's Attempt to Destabilize Mozambique

Throughout the undeclared war waged against our country we became clearer about the nature of the enemy. Today all our people are conscious of the fact that the enemy has no colour, no tribe, no race, no religion, no country. From their own experience the Mozambican People have learned that the enemy is always perfidious and criminal. The enemy has no ethics, no scruples, does not hesitate to murder his own parents, brothers and relatives.

Today our people have a deeper understanding of the class enemy.

Today our people possess a deeper sense of patriotism.

In the fire of the daily fight we have strengthened national unity, strengthened our country, the country of FRELIMO. Today, from the Rovuma to the Maputo we are all FRELIMO.

Today the country demands renewed determination, greater commitment, more work.

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