Dear Friends,

As you have undoubtedly heard by now, on May 19 President Clinton announced the long-delayed U.S. decision to recognize the Republic of Angola while meeting with Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa at the White House.

Clinton’s decision came in response to a rising chorus of voices, including many of yours, calling for a definitive end to the hostility which had plagued U.S. relations with Angola since independence in 1975. Moreover, this decision was a recognition that the strategy of appeasement of UNITA was only resulting in delaying tactics at negotiations in Abidjan, where UNITA refused to sign a new cease-fire agreement endorsed by the UN, the U.S., Portugal, Russia, and the Angolan government. U.S. recognition clears the way for a new start, and for practical U.S. involvement in addressing the humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs in Angola.

But the war continues. Over 1.9 million people are at immediate risk of famine. UNITA has several times fired on UN relief planes, causing the World Food Program to suspend flights to the interior of Angola. The United Nations is seeking some $226 million in donor support for Angola at a conference in Geneva next week.

For your information I enclose excerpts from a FAO/WFP report that was prepared on the food situation in particular, as well as two press clippings on the current situation that you may not yet have seen. Peace talks are currently suspended; and most observers think Unita will return only when its military prospects are impaired, either by battlefield defeats or by a serious squeeze on its capacity to receive fuel and other supplies via Zaire and South Africa.

(continued on next page)
Today a small delegation representing the Washington Office on Africa and the NAACP met with Secretary of State Warren Christopher to discuss U.S. policy to Africa and the Caribbean. During this meeting the Secretary iterated the administration's desire to work with the Angolan government and to pressure UNITA. However, it is not yet clear how active the U.S. will be in putting pressure on these Unita war supply lines, or on working to overcome the enormous difficulties of supplying relief in the midst of conflict. I hope you will add your voice to ensure that U.S. recognition signals a real and ongoing effort to help in bringing renewed peace and reconstruction in Angola.

Sincerely,

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Clinton, chaos and cholera

The 30-year-old conflict in southern Africa took a new turn this week.
VICTORIA BRITAIN reports on the options now facing the protagonists

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S diplomatic recognition of the Angolan government this week opened a new phase in the 30-year-old war which has devastated southern Africa. The bill for South Africa's backing of UNITA guerrillas, which destabilised Angola in the 1980s, stood at $55 billion alone in 1989. The destruction of the past months in Angola is incalculable, in cash or in human terms.

Jonas Savimbi, leader of the Angolan guerrillas, and his long-time ally President Mobutu of Zaire, are now facing the most difficult choices of their careers.

They can take the Idi Amin option and accept the lifeline offered by retreat to a comfortable government villa, probably in Rabat or Abidjan, or continue an ethnic war of attrition which could still lead to a new fashion for democracy in Africa's potentially richest country.

The British government only washed its hands of Amin, a shameful mistake, after he had been driven from power by his own desperate population and the Tanzanian army. For the West and the South African military, Savimbi's defeat at the polls in Angola by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) last year should have been a similar watershed. But because Angola's future is the political touchstone for the whole region from Kinshasa to Capetown, from Luanda to Maputo — they abetted one last clandestine effort to keep the MPLA from power. Its history saw to that. Angola was post-colonial Africa's symbol of a non-racial, non-aligned, socialist state whose key allies were Cuba and the military wing of the ANC.

For the eight years of Ronald Reagan's presidency, Savimbi's forces were regarded as pillars of what was known as the Reagan doctrine — along with the Contra guerrillas fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua or Afghan guerrillas opposing the Soviet-backed government. Luanda, like Havana, Harare and Phnom Penh, was excluded from the international community wherever the American writ ran.

Savimbi's reversal came with recognition couched as a warning to all those in the region who believed that the West's new fashion for democracy in Africa was selective, that old American clients, from Savimbi and Mobutu to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi could still play by the old, violent rules.

The next test for America is what it does on the ground in Angola and with the Kamina base in southern Zaire which was for years the centre for the CIA, Israeli and South African support for UNITA.

Savimbi still has huge reserves of arms and ammunition and control over the diamond areas which are funding the Zaire operations of his 50,000-man army. Fuel supplies are his weakest spot. American logistics could do much to help disrupt supply lines and will deter the South African network which started flying in men and material last October.

WASHINGTON has been on the verge of amending US visas for Mobutu, and is considering with France and Belgium seizing his personal fortune, which may be worth as much as $10 billion. Decisive action, and US support for the reformed Zairian government led by Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi and opposed by President Mobutu, could finally end the kleptocracy which is responsible for the collapse of the state in Zaire, as well as for so much of Savimbi's logistics.

Yesterday all Angolan men aged between 20 and 22 were called up for military service. And in Luena, just one town in the east, yesterday, 100 people were killed and wounded. The wounded will almost certainly die too as Luena has been under siege by UNITA for four months and is a paralysed and destroyed town. The original population of 100,000 is swollen with uncounted thousands of refugees. The embattled administration and small military force has no resources to maintain a semblance of order. There is no economy, no money in the bank, no electricity, no clean water, no medicines, few doctors, and food had practically run out a month ago before UN aid flights were stopped after UNITA troops brought down a World Food Programme plane with a ground-to-air missile.

Luena's tragedy is the whole country in microcosm. Every year, Luanda, the capital, has been without regular electricity or water for months, hundreds of new cases of cholera are registered every week and inflation is rocketing.

US recognition of the government is just the first small step in redressing a humanitarian and political crisis so extreme that, were it in Europe, or visible on television screens, it would long since have awakened an international outcry.

After the US move it is now up to the United Nations to take the next logical step. For six weeks the credibility of the UN as overseer of the transition to peace has been mocked as talk in Abidjan saw UNITA officials refusing to accept either a ceasefire or the base line of the Bicesse accord of May 1991, when they pledged to withdraw from the territory they occupy and to demobilise their forces.

The UN, like the Americans until this week, opted for the wooling and face-saving of Savimbi. In a travesty of justice they have, throughout the 17 months run-up to the election, and at least until late January, overlooked or minimised UNITA's strategy of violence in an effort to appear neutral between the two parties. The policy backfired badly as it fed Savimbi's intransigence and allowed him to paralyse relief efforts. Now the UN can shift gear and, with US back-up, start a vast humanitarian emergency supply programme which cannot be held to ransom by an insurgency condemned by the whole world.

Savimbi's own future remains the sticking point it has been since negotiations began in the late 1980s. He made it clearer than ever in the past eight months that there can be no peace, and therefore no guarantee of the safety of the UN, as long as he remains in the country.
A LARGE SECTION OF ANGOLA'S POPULATION THREATENED BY FAMINE

OVERVIEW

A RECENT FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION HAS FOUND THAT, WITH HARVESTING DUE FOR THIS MONTH, AND MUCH OF THE AGRICULTURAL LABOUR FORCE INTERNALLY DISPLACED, A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF 1992/93 COARSE GRAINS CROP IS LIKELY TO ROT IN THE FIELDS. APART FROM A DRY SPELL IN JANUARY, WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE MAIN GROWING AREAS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY FAVOURABLE SINCE OCTOBER. LOCALIZED DROUGHT HAS HIT SOUTH-WESTERN AREAS. THE MAIN CONSTRAINT TO PRODUCTION HAS BEEN THE FIGHTING, WHICH HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY INTENSE IN THE AREAS WHICH CONTRIBUTE MOST TO AGGREGATE CEREAL PRODUCTION. THE 1992/93 CEREAL CROP IS PROVISIONALLY ESTIMATED AT SOME 320 000 TONS, WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE 1991/92 LEVEL OF 450 000 TONS.

A LARGE SECTION OF ANGOLA'S POPULATION WILL BE VULNERABLE TO FAMINE IN THE YEAR AHEAD. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL PROVINCES ESCAPED THE WORST OF THE FIGHTING, A SEVERE DROUGHT HAS REDUCED BOTH CROPS AND LIVESTOCK HERDS IN MANY PARTS AND THE FOOD SITUATION IS CRITICAL. RELIEF FOOD DISTRIBUTION TO MOST NORTHERN AND CENTRAL AREAS CONTINUES TO BE SEVERELY CONSTRAINED BY CIVIL STRIFE, NECESSITATING EXTENSIVE USE OF AERIALS.

PENDING THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE HARVEST, THE CEREAL IMPORT REQUIREMENT FOR 1993/94 IS TENTATIVELY ESTIMATED BY THE MISSION AT 435 000 TONS. DUE TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONSTRAINTS COMMERCIAL CEREAL IMPORTS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO EXCEED 100 000 TONS, LEAVING A CEREAL FOOD AID NEED OF 335 000 TONS. SOME 60 000 TONS WILL BE REQUIRED AS PROGRAMME FOOD AID FOR MARKET SALE AND 275 000 TONS FOR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE. AN ADDITIONAL 62 000 TONS OF OTHER EMERGENCY FOOD (PULSES, VEGETABLE OIL AND BLENDED FOOD) WILL ALSO BE REQUIRED.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A TOTAL OF 1.9 MILLION CONFLICT AND DROUGHT-AFFECTED PERSONS, INCLUDING DISPLACED AND RETURNES, WILL REQUIRE 337 000 TONS OF FOOD ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING 15 200 TONS OF BLENDED FOOD, DURING THE COMING 12 MONTHS. DUE TO THE FIGHTING, HOWEVER, AND TO LIMITED ROAD ACCESS CAUSED BY MINES AND DESTROYED BRIDGES, THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME ESTIMATES THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO DELIVER ONLY ABOUT 193 000 TONS OR 57 PERCENT OF THESE FOOD REQUIREMENTS. SHOULD THESE CONDITIONS PREVAIL, WFP EXPECTS TO BE ABLE TO DELIVER APPROXIMATELY 12 900 TONS PER MONTH BY ROAD, AND 3 200 TONS PER MONTH BY AERIAL. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WILL BE URGENTLY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THIS LARGE LOGISTICS OPERATION, INCLUDING THE AERIALS PORTION ESTIMATED TO COST APPROXIMATELY U.S.$ 300 PER TON.

PRODUCTION OF CEREALS

ALTHOUGH PROGRAMMES OF SEEDS AND AGRICULTURAL TOOLS DISTRIBUTION FOR THE 1992/93 CROPPING SEASON ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO 70 PERCENT OF THE TARGET DURING THE DRY INTER-SEASON, AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED BY THE RENEWED HOSTILITIES. PLANTINGS OF CEREALS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISTURBANCES IN OCTOBER, AND MOREOVER DURING THE CROPPING SEASON AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT NORMALLY AS A RESULT OF THE POPULATION DISPLACEMENT, MINING OF FIELDS AND GENERAL INSECURITY. REDUCTIONS OF
CEREAL PLANTINGS, AS COMPARED WITH THE PREVIOUS YEAR, HAVE BEEN ESTIMATED AT 21 PERCENT; REDUCTIONS OF CASSAVA PLANTINGS WERE ALSO REPORTED, WHICH WILL HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE FOOD SECURITY OF THE POPULATIONS DEPENDING ON ROOT CROPS.

WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE MAIN PRODUCING AREAS HAVE BEEN FAIR FOR CROP GROWTH. RAINS STARTED SEASONALLY IN EARLY OCTOBER OVER MOST OF THE COUNTRY. RAINFALL DURING OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER WAS GOOD OVER MOST AREAS (CLOSE TO AVERAGE OR ABOVE AVERAGE) WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF THE MARGINAL CEREAL PRODUCING PROVINCES OF KUNENE, NAMIBE, BENGENA, THE SOUTHERN PART OF HUILA, AND THE WESTERN PART OF KWANZA SUL, WHERE BELOW TO WELL BELOW RAINFALL WAS REPORTED. JANUARY RAINFALL WAS BELOW NORMAL. ALL OVER THE COUNTRY AND CROPS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY IN MALANGE, BENG scrolls, KWANZA SUL, BENGENA, HUILA, AND THE SOUTH OF HUAMBO AND BIE.

RAINFALL RESUMED DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH. HOWEVER, EARLY INDICATIONS SHOW BELOW NORMAL RAINFALL OVER THE IMPORTANT CEREAL PRODUCING AREAS OF HUAMBO AND BIE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DROUGHT AFFECTED PROVINCES OF KUNENE AND HUILA, AS WELL AS THE DRY SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL COASTAL AREAS RECEIVED IMPORTANT BUT ERRATIC RAIN SHOWERS; WHILE THESE WERE TOO LATE TO SUPPORT A LATE SEASON CROP, THEY BENEFITED PASTURES.

CEREAL IMPORT AND FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS

WITH THE POOR 1993 HARVEST AND LOW CARRYOVERS, THE DOMESTIC AVAILABILITY OF CEREALS IS PROVISIONALLY ESTIMATED AT 337 000 TONS. TOTAL DOMESTIC UTILIZATION IS CALCULATED AT 772 000 TONS.

THE AVERAGE ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF CEREALS IS PUT AT 65 KG (INCLUDING 5 KG TO COMPENSATE FOR PART OF A LIKELY SHORTFALL IN CASSAVA OUTPUT). THIS CORRESPONDS TO ABOUT 600 KCAL/DAY. CASSAVA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE FOOD BASKET; ITS ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IS ESTIMATED AT 145 KG (430 KCAL). OTHER IMPORTANT STARCHY CROPS IN THE DIET ARE TUBERS (SWEET POTATOES, YAMS) AND PLANTAINS. IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTH EASTERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, THE DIET IS PRINCIPALLY BASED ON ROOT AND TUBER CROPS, AS WELL AS ON PLANTAINS. IN THE CENTRAL PLATEAU AREAS, MAIZE AND CASSAVA ARE THE MAIN FOOD CROPS. IN THE SOUTH, THE DIET IS BASED ON SORGUM, MILLET AND MAIZE. IN THE TOWNS ALONG THE COAST, WHEAT FLOUR AND RICE, ALONG WITH DOMESTIC MAIZE AND CASSAVA, ARE THE MAIN FOOD.

EMERGENCY FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS

THE CIVIL WAR WHICH HAS SPREAD OVER MOST REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAS PREVENTED BOTH THE NORMAL CYCLE OF PLANTING AND HARVESTING AND THE DELIVERY OF RELIEF GOODS BY ROAD AND (TO A CERTAIN EXTENT) BY AIR. AT THE SAME TIME, SEVERAL SOUTH-WESTERN PROVINCES HAVE EXPERIENCED A SERIOUS DROUGHT. FOR THE REST OF 1993 AND MOST OF 1994, THEREFORE, ANGOLA WILL ACTUALLY REQUIRE ON A MONTHLY BASIS, FOOD ASSISTANCE AS FOLLOWS:

- 4 800 TONS BASIC FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR SOME 344 000 PERSONS DISPLACED BY THE WAR;
- 1 560 TONS FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR 112 000 RETURNEES FROM ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA;
- 16 870 TONS FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR APPROXIMATELY 1 209 000 CIVILIANS AFFECTED BY THE WAR, I.E., UNABLE TO GROW OR OTHERWISE OBTAIN FOOD BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT;
- 3 570 TONS FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR 256 000 PERSONS AFFECTED BY DROUGHT; AND
- 1 270 TONS BLENDED FOOD FOR SOME 423 000 CHILDREN (INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE FIGURES) AGED 1 TO 5 YEARS, AFFECTED BY THE CIVIL WAR OR DROUGHT.

FOR 1993/94 A TOTAL OF 337 000 TONS OF BASIC COMMODITIES, INCLUDING 15 200 TONS OF BLENDED FOOD, WILL BE REQUIRED. AGAINST THESE REQUIREMENTS, WFP, CARE, CRS, CARITAS AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS HAVE A TOTAL OF 11 400 TONS IN STOCK IN COUNTRY AND 37 500 TONS IN THE PIPELINE. NET REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS ONE YEAR PERIOD ARE THUS 288 100 TONS.

REGIONAL COMMENTARY

IN CABINDA AND ZAIRE PROVINCES, RAINFALL WAS NORMAL AND CROP GROWTH CONDITIONS GOOD. CIVIL DISTURBANCES, INCLUDING SABOTAGES AND ARMED CONFRONTATIONS, WERE HOWEVER INTENSE AND HAD SEVERE EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVE AND TRADE ACTIVITIES. IN ZAIRE, THE NUMBER OF WAR DISPLACED PEOPLE IS SAID TO HAVE INCREASED. THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED AS COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

IN KWANZA NORTE AND UIGE, THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS ARE OCCUPIED BY UNITA. LARGE POPULATION MOVEMENTS TOWARDS MUNICIPAL TOWNS WHERE SECURITY COULD BE MORE ASSURED WERE OBSERVED. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CASSAVA, IT COULD BE CONSIDERED THAT THE CURRENT CROPPING YEAR IS LOST, AS MOST FIELDS HAVE BEEN ABANDONED.

IN BENGUELA, AROUND 20 000 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DISPLACED FROM THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL (CAXITO) TO LUANDA. RAINFALL HAS BEEN POOR IN THE REGION AND THE TOTAL CROP PRODUCTION WILL BE CLEARLY BELOW LAST YEAR'S.

IN MALANGE PROVINCE, ALTHOUGH WEATHER CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN FAVOURABLE, THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN THE PROVINCE AFFECTED THE AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES; ALREADY LARGE AREAS OF CROPPED FIELDS HAD TO BE ABANDONED. IN MALANGE TOWN, THE NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE CONTINUES TO INCREASE WHEREAS, AS A RESULT OF THE TOWN'S ISOLATION, FOOD SUPPLY IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. IN CACUSO (WEST OF MALANGE) LARGE GROUPS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE WERE OBSERVED MOVING TOWARDS CAMBAMBA AND LUANDA.

IN MOXICO, LUNDA NORTE AND LUNDA SUL PROVINCES, RAINFALL HAS BEEN WELL DISTRIBUTED AND GENERALLY ABOVE NORMAL. ARMED CONFLICTS RESULTED IN LARGE NUMBERS OF VICTIMS AND DISPLACED. IN THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS, ISOLATED FROM THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, THE FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION REMAINS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

HUAMBO AND BIE PROVINCES ARE THE MAIN MAIZE GROWING REGIONS. PLANTINGS IN 1992 WERE INFERIOR TO LAST YEAR'S AS A RESULT OF THE OCCURRENCE OF CONFRONTATIONS AT PLANTING TIME. IN ADDITION, AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES HAD OFTEN TO BE DELAYED. WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE FAVOURABLE IN OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, BUT GENERALLY DRY WEATHER DURING JANUARY AND PART OF FEBRUARY (AT FLOWERING AND GRAIN FILLING STAGES) IS BELIEVED TO HAVE HAD DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON YIELDS. MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY VIOLENT IN THESE PROVINCES AND THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS LARGE. SEVERE DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE. BEING PROVINCES WITH HIGH POPULATION DENSITIES, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE HAVING NO ACCESS TO PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY IS VERY HIGH, AND THAT SUBSTANTIAL EMERGENCY FOOD AID NEEDS ARE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, BOTH PROVINCES BEING MAINLY UNDER UNITA CONTROL, ACCESS TO AFFECTED PEOPLE IS CURRENTLY VERY DIFFICULT.

IN BENGUELA, A GOOD PART OF THE PRINCIPAL MAIZE PRODUCING AREA HAS BEEN SEVERELY AFFECTED BY LACK OF RAIN. THE MOST AFFECTED ZONES ARE ALONG THE SUB-PLATEAU FACADE, ONE OF THE MOST AFFECTED BEING GANDA, WHERE THE FOOD SITUATION IS ALREADY SERIOUS. SEED DISTRIBUTION IN THE PROVINCE HAD MOREOVER BEEN SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE LOOTING OF THE SEED STORES OF ANGOSEMENTES IN BENGUELA TOWN. AS A RESULT OF FIGHTING, AFFECTED PEOPLE HAVE FLED TO THE MAIN COASTAL TOWNS.

IN KWANZA SUL, THE SITUATION IS MIXED. IN THE MUNICIPIO OF PORTO AMBOIM, LOWLAND MAIZE IS IN GOOD CONDITION; HOWEVER, IN OTHER PARTS REPORTS INDICATE THAT LARGE AREAS OF
MAIZE ARE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY WATER SHORTAGE.

IN THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN PART OF HUILA PROVINCE, THE MAIN CROP HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY DROUGHT, WHICH LASTED FROM DECEMBER TO EARLY FEBRUARY. FIELD VISITS MADE IN THE AREA CONFIRM THAT MAIZE YIELDS WOULD REACH A MERE 200 KG/HECTARE. ON THE OTHER HAND, SORGHUM AND MILLET ARE IN FAIR CONDITION, AND THE RAINS RECEIVED IN MARCH WOULD PERMIT REASONABLE HARVESTS. PLANTINGS ARE DOWN FROM LAST YEAR AS A RESULT OF THE LACK OF PLANTING SEED (DISTRIBUTION WAS FAR BEHIND SCHEDULE) AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTH AND EAST. DISTRESS SELLING OF LIVESTOCK AT VERY LOW PRICES WAS REPORTED FROM MATALA, MAINLY AS A RESULT OF THE RUSTLING OF CATTLE.

KUNENE AND NAMIBE HAVE BEEN MOST AFFECTED BY THE CURRENT DROUGHT. SOME RAINS FELL DURING SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER. PLANTINGS TOOK PLACE IN NOVEMBER, BUT DUE TO THE DRY WEATHER IN DECEMBER AND JANUARY, THE CROP WILTED. CROP PRODUCTION WILL BE INSIGNIFICANT IN BOTH PROVINCES THIS YEAR. RANGELAND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF RIVERINE AREAS, WERE DRY AND DISTRESS SELLING OF LIVESTOCK IN PARTICULAR TO NAMIBIA WAS REPORTED. SOME RAINFALL HAS BEEN REPORTED DURING FEBRUARY AND MARCH BUT THIS WILL BE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE LARGE LOCAL LIVESTOCK POPULATION (ESTIMATED AT AROUND 2 MILLION HEAD OF CATTLE AND 3 MILLION SMALL STOCK) UNTIL THE NEXT RAINY SEASON STARTS. CURRENTLY A LARGE PART OF THE POPULATION OF BOTH PROVINCES IS IN A CRITICAL FOOD INSECURE SITUATION. IN PARTICULAR, DISPLACED PEOPLE CONCENTRATED AROUND ONDJIVA TOWN OR NEARBY MUNICIPIOS ARE AT GREAT RISK.

IN KUANDO KUBANGO, RAINFALL CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN FAVOURABLE FOR CROP PRODUCTION, WHICH WILL PARTLY IMPROVE THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION. CROP PRODUCTION IS HOWEVER BELIEVED TO BE BELOW AVERAGE BECAUSE OF INSECURITY AND CONFLICT IN MOST AREAS.

THIS REPORT IS PREPARED ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FAO AND WFP SECRETARIATS WITH INFORMATION FROM OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOURCES AND IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. SINCE CONDITIONS MAY CHANGE RAPIDLY, PLEASE CONTACT THE UNDERSIGNED FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, IF REQUIRED.

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