This paper presents an analysis of Unity In Action's decision and action process, focusing on the refinement of these methods and behaviors over time. Examined are four key areas utilizing initiation, estimation, selection, and implementation.

Ideological Principles

The name Unity In Action is itself an ideological principle. This factor, it seems, is seldom apparent to those who have become aware of the organization for the first time. After resisting pressures to establish false unity with barely-active, incorrect, or otherwise rival groups, the ANC of South Africa proclaimed 1982 to be the "Year of Unity In Action". The ANC declared that the only way to achieve meaningful unity was to have unity in action on the battlefield. Echoing this theme, Elombe Brath, who later founded Unity In Action Network in New York, observed, "We (vanguard anti-apartheid activists in the U.S.) understood that if you wanted to have unity, it could only be in action...and that's what we hold to."

Consequently, the name Unity In Action has implied a joining together to carry out a serious program of work toward the elimination of apartheid. Therefore, a condition of membership within UIA has required of a person or organization a minimal commitment to a) unify with others and b) engage in a serious program or work designed to eradicate apartheid.

Layered over this key founding axiom were important other ideological principles of unity. These were decision by consensus, no domination by a single group or ideology, the African continent as the primary focus, non-sectarianism, and the right of member organizations to operate independent of the coalition.

Unity In Action's development/adoptions in October, 1982, of ideological/founding principles has been central to the initiation phase. Experience had taught that without prior adoption of criteria for membership, prioritization of objectives, democratic decision making, and resolution of internal conflicts, our failure as a coalition was assured. Unity In Action's initial ideological principles significantly impacted upon the process of estimation, selection, and implementation as well. Accordingly, UIA's program design, its ongoing political feasibility analyses, and its "carrying out a program of actions", respectively, attest to full utilization of the three phases subsequent to initiation, as elaborated upon later.

By the spring of 1983, following skirmishes with external pro-apartheid elements and some anticipated internal disputes, UIA began tightening its ideological parameters. The eventual departure of a few incompatible persons cleared the way for the adoption of Pan Africanism and anti-capitalist/socialist ideology as added requirements for core-group members and key decision-makers. Nearly two years later, in December, 1985, a struggle developed over the selection of targets for picketing and the question of equal, subordinante, or no relationships whatsoever between UIA and certain opportunistic/collaborationist forces within the anti-apartheid movement. At the center of the last internal struggle, culminating in September, 1986, was an attempted power-grab, camouflaged by misuse of the principle of criticism/self-criticism and by character assassination.

Following the September debacle and a sober, more earnest attempt at estimation, the circumstances leading to the earlier problems were broken down and simplified. UIA concluded that the willingness to engage in criticism/self-criticism by the entire organization on a regular basis was a principle critical to its survival and continued success. Unity in Action's contributions to the victims and opponents of apartheid, given often during periods of intense organizational turmoil, validate the adage that "growth is impossible without adversity," A model combining self-evaluation and peer-evaluation utilized by Central Committee members of the New Jewel Movement in Revolutionary Grenada has been proposed, discussed, and its final adoption appears certain. The Grenada model provided for each member performing a self-evaluation on a scale of 0-5 on themselves as well as all other members of the Central Committee. In turn, variations in ratings for each were analyzed and criticized constructively with the aim of improving the Central Committee's effectiveness. In similar fashion, with 30 being the highest possible score, UIA has adopted the following 6 categories for scoring: discipline, ideological clarity, work performance, relations with the masses, character, and analyzing ability. It may be useful to recall that at its inception, UIA's deliberately minimal ideological principles were designed to ensure the broadest response possible from Africa-oriented groups and individuals to its call for unity. Today, in an effort to increase the possibilities for success and narrow the range of uncertainty, UIA has refined those principles based on five years of program implementation or actual practice.


3Class notes. PUB 500, 8 September 1987.
Organizing

In considering organizing relative to Unity In Action's decisions and work, there is an attempt in this paper to internalize/reflect the comprehensive appreciation of decisions" addressed in the text. Contextual mapping, which reflects the estimation phase, dovetails in the next paragraph with the effort to keep in focus "relationships", "interactions", and "multiples" vis-a-vis the framework and procedures of policy estimation.

The present multiple perspectives on how Unity In Action is to achieve its goal of inducing artist compliance with the Cultural Boycott or resolving the problem of cultural collaboration with apartheid South Africa includes the following: embarassing offenders by staging visible, loud, and angry protests at their concerts; threatening offenders with such protests; persuading them with rational arguments; enlisting support form fellow artists to help persuade offenders; and educating errant artists. The multiple perspectives of the past on this question differ from present ones in that, while present perspectives were also operative during preceding years, the staging of protests was the dominant tactic. Future multiple perspectives on how UIA is to achieve its goal include all of the above with the noteworthy addition of the proposed utilization of a three-month moratorium on picketing and an amnesty period for offenders.

Present multiple (organizing) goals for UIA are the prevention of artistic collaboration with the apartheid state, institutional and municipal disinvestment, and material and political support to anti-occupation/colonial forces in Namibia. Past multiple goals have included the above, as well as material aid to the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada. Future multiple goals, with the exception of assistance to Grenada, will include a renewed effort to close the South African consulate in Beverly Hills. As with ongoing previous efforts, once consideration of renewing such an effort withstands the test of political feasibility (selection), successful organizing will be the key to its effective implementation.

Unity InAction has striven, more in the recent rather than the earlier period, to make each activity that it sponsors an opportunity also to build the organization. The community it seeks to organize most is L.A.'s Black working class, which includes a cross section of blue collar and professional workers, students, and the unemployed. Organizing against apartheid has often been accomplished, in a massive or less-direct way, depending on the politics of

larger coalitions that UIA joins from time to time. The same has held true with public forums where the impact of UIA's organizing efforts have varied with audience politics and size.

**Interfacing with Artists and Media Strategies**

UIA has undertaken regular and consistent actions on a grand scale in an effort to promote the Cultural Boycott. The U.N. Centre Against Apartheid has often acknowledged UIA's contribution, referring on one occasion to its being "in the forefront of the struggle against apartheid South Africa," and again to "the enormous efforts [Unity in Action has] put into spearheading the cultural boycott of South Africa."

From the beginning of 1985 until the present, UIA-Los Angeles has secured more pledges of support from artists that previously played South Africa than has any other group in North America. The artists whose names have been removed from boycott rosters during the period cited, in part as a result of our efforts, are The Mighty Clouds of Joy, Tina Turner, Barry Manilow, Shelley Berman, Pia Zadora, the Osmonds, Terry Gibbs, Richard Roundtree, Buddy DeFranco, Tom Jones, and Danniebelle Hall. In addition, UIA validated pledges from Kenny Rogers and Jimmie Smith. These names represent many long (volunteer) hours of work and careful negotiating. In some cases, UIA and the artists have continued to work cooperatively toward clearing others of their colleagues and planning future actions to further the anti-apartheid movement.

While actor/producer Robert Hooks never travelled to South Africa, he has consistently supported the Cultural Boycott work and his assistance has been instrumental in securing pledges from several errant artists. In May, 1985, Mr. Hooks joined this writer on KPFK's Morning Magazine in a spirited debate with comedian Shelley Berman. At issue were Berman's three visits to South Africa in violation of cultural sanctions. In October, 1985, following a meeting with this writer and ANC representative Zakhele Cenge, Berman pledged his support to the Cultural Boycott. Berman conceded at the time that the earlier radio debate, in which Hooks participated, was a key factor in his conversion. Robert Hooks later helped UIA broker a pledge from Boycott violator Richard Roundtree. On yet another occasion, Hooks joined this writer in an intense two and one-half hour meeting with Ray Charles's manager, Joe Adams, for an exchange that may yet achieve good results. It should be noted that of all the artists in Hollywood,

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5 Excerpt, letter to Ron Wilkins, 26 November 1985, from Amer Arain, Senior Political Officer, U.N. Centre Against Apartheid.

6 Excerpt, letter to Ron Wilkins, 18 December 1985, from Pam Maponga, Associate Political Officer, U.N. Centre Against Apartheid.
Robert Hooks has been the most accessible to UIA. The successful implementation of UIA's program owes much to the important role of this outstanding cultural worker and anti-apartheid activists. UIA has been able to agree easily and quickly to request Hooks's intervention, given his demonstrated commitment and effectiveness.

Media strategies fit well with the selection phase since the publicity generated by picketlines has earned the organization its reputation and brought the Boycott success. Media attention, or its potential, has more often than not made the difference between an artist recanting past performances in South Africa or ignoring Boycott activists altogether.

Black organizations that have elected to flaunt cultural sanctions by backing Boycott violators have reaped embarrassing coverage from the media. Case in point: the NAACP was forced to withdraw "whitelisted" nominees from consideration for its Image Awards in December, 1984. Again in April, 1987, the NAACP suffered major public embarrassment when it presented Frank Sinatra, the Boycott's worst offender, with its Lifetime Achievement award. During a previously referenced meeting with Joe Adams, manager for Ray Charles, Adams conceded that Black artists are more vulnerable to demonstrations and can be hurt more. Black artists are expected to be more sensitive to the South Africa issues than are their non-Black counterparts.

More often than not, the press has been unfair. At the Grammy Awards in February, 1985, the L.A. Times reported that there were "about a dozen" protestors, when in actuality there were fifty. Many UIA protests have received no coverage at all. Mindful of this problem, the organization has on occasion submitted photographs taken by its own photographers to newspapers willing later to print them. UIA has been careful to plan and implement picketing only when politically feasible, and not to plan or to scrap pickets when adequate turnouts could not be guaranteed. To maximize its impact the organization has been able to prime sympathetic media with embarrassing questions for apartheid supporters. Gov. Deukmejian was asked, for example, "Governor, how can the U.C. Regents only consider divestment from South Africa, when seven of the twenty-one primary South Africa-invested corporations in which the University of California invests operate also in South African-occupied Namibia?" Tom Bradley was asked, "Mr. Mayor, how does your support at this time for L.A.'s anti-apartheid ordinance square with your presentation of the Key to the City to South Africa's Counsil General just a couple of years ago?"

7 L.A. Times. 27 February 1985, Dennis McDoughal, "Fans of All Stripes Keep Star Vigil".
Good media strategy has depended on a combination of the right elements—issue, timing, and good visibility for placard-carrying protestors when needed. L.A.'s distinction as a primary entertainment, film, and record producing center makes it ideal for cultural boycott activity. A key also to successful media strategy, not to be underrated, is Boycott publicity in the Black press. Aside from the Sentinel and Wave, the L.A. Weekly and Reader have occasionally given UIA's efforts exposure. Additionally, Black radio such as the Sheridan Network and KJLH have been supportive of the Cultural Boycott. Finally, this writer deems it useful to make note of unanimous passage of a resolution reaffirming the Pacifica Foundation's support to the Cultural Boycott at its September, 1987 board meeting. The resolution's passage and programming initiatives in this area have all been implemented as a part of long range media strategy. Accordingly, this writer has contributed to the growth of a vocal and active radio audience that supports the Cultural Boycott, through his hosting of "Continent To Continent: An African Issues Magazine", a 90 minute, bi-weekly program on KPFK-Los Angeles.

The recent pledge to the Cultural Boycott from Frank Sinatra on 20 October, the Boycott's primary offender, represents a major breakthrough. UIA locally staged the last public protest against Sinatra in May of this year which headlined television, radio, and print entertainment news nationally.

This paper has attempted to present an analysis of Unity In Action's decision and action process in four key areas utilizing initiation, estimation, selection, and implementation. The focus has been on the refinement over time of the methods and behaviors relative to ideological principles, organizing, interfacing with artists, and media strategies.