REPORT ON SEMINAR ON ANGOLA

HAVANA, CUBA

February 26-29, 1976

(Prepared by James E. Bristol)

The MPLA of Angola had asked the Cuban government to host a seminar, to which people from the United States would be invited from two communities: 1) the Black community, and 2) the peace and anti-war movement. The purpose of the seminar would be to receive information about the situation in Angola. All arrangements for the seminar and the implementation and the logistics were handled by ICAP (Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples).

Unfortunately, the Air Cubana plane from Mexico City to Havana on the night of February 23 (a 7 p.m. flight that left about 3 a.m.) could accommodate only thirteen of our twenty six people. The seven U.S. journalists, plus six others of us arrived at the Hotel Libre (formerly the Havana Hilton) about 7:15 a.m. The remaining thirteen arrived Wednesday evening in time for a reception at which the three MPLA people were present. Tuesday and Wednesday were spent on tours of a school and several museums while we waited for the others to arrive. A list of the twenty six members is attached.

A profile of the U.S. delegation reveals that there were five women, twenty one men; fifteen were Black, nine were white, one was Puerto Rican, and one Chicano; twenty one from the East Coast, four from the West Coast, one from the Mid West. There were seven journalists(five working journalists with no advocacy role), and nineteen organizations were represented.

MPLA Delegation

The members of the MPLA delegation were as follows:

Commandante Dibala,
Member of the Central Committee & Political Commissar of the Eastern Front

Olga Lima,
Director of Political Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Relations

Pedro Zinga Baptista,
Department of Foreign Relations, MPLA

Commandante Dibala and Olga Lima spoke English fairly well. Pedro Zinga Baptista spoke French (in addition to Spanish and Portuguese). Some of us were able to converse with him informally at "break" times in French. The delegation members stressed that they represented military, political and economic facets of the Angolan picture.

Perhaps I should have stated earlier that Michael Simmons, Community Relations Division staff and representative of the Third World Coalition, shared in the seminar. Mike will probably be writing a report of his own, but many of the impressions I report are shared by Mike (as I have discovered in conversations here in Philadelphia during the past two days). Mike made a tremendous contribution to the entire week.
His ability to speak out of his experience with the South West Workers Federation was of considerable value. Mike spoke for more of a constituency than many other American participants.

Mike did share with me admiration for the ability, patience, and quiet competence of the MPLA delegates. He spoke about the quiet assurance of the MPLA people, of their unspoken confidence that they would run their own nation according to their own principles and understandings. He and I both have remarked that the MPLA did not attack the USA, nor the Chinese, nor were they vitriolic in their attitudes toward the FNLA and UNITA. True, they said that the leaders of FNLA and UNITA were criminals and should be punished, but they welcomed the rank-and-file of the other movements as fellow-Angolans, and were counting on them to work in harmony on the common tasks of nation building. Moreover, even in response to leading questions they did not dwell upon atrocities committed by the enemy. They were under-keyed, calm and self-possessed. Nor did they treat the Russians as gods.

The Seminar Pattern

The MPLA delegation was in charge of the seminar. Let me emphasize that the Cubans had absolutely nothing to do with the way in which it was organized. The MPLA suggested that it be divided into two major parts: 1) statements by the U.S. participants (up to fifteen minutes each) about their organizations, what those organizations have been doing on the Angola issue, and what they plan to do in the future; 2) information from MPLA about what has been and is occurring in Angola, and what are the general political, social and economic goals of the People's Republic of Angola. In accordance with that suggestion the North Americans spent all morning and afternoon and part of the following morning making such statements. The variety was great; some explained the philosophy and convictions of the organization, some were very heavy with rhetoric; some simply listed what had been done; two were quite short. Mike and Jim wrote their statements, copies of which could be furnished upon request. George Houser of ACOA expressed the hope that he was not being presumptuous when he addressed nine questions to the MPLA at the end of his statement.

The following morning after the last of the U.S. statements had been made Commandante Dibala made a comprehensive statement, replying to George Houser's nine questions, plus a few others that had been submitted to him in writing. Let me attempt to give a digest of his replies.

The MPLA believes in creating a harmonious society, without large differences between people. Their goal is to build a modern society, in which their people can enjoy all the achievements of science. There should be no tribal, racial nor religious differences that result in prejudice or discriminatory treatment. Only a socialist society can do all this. MPLA is not a political party; MPLA is a liberation movement.

The Number One Priority for the new nation is to develop agriculture. The revolution must solve the problems of the peasant; he was the person most exploited by colonialism. MPLA will not follow a rigid pattern of development. Differences in tradition, in background, in tribe and region must be taken into account. The Second Priority is to provide adequate medical care and to improve the health of the people. MPLA does not plan to use traditional medicine, but to introduce modern medicine into the many parts of Angola that know nothing about it. The Third Priority
is to provide education for the people who are at present 90% illiterate.

Relations to Other Nations and to Corporations

The MPLA policy is one of non-alignment, based on non-interference in the internal affairs of Angola and in respect for the sovereignty of the nation. MPLA wants to re-establish normal relations with the USA. MPLA desires diplomatic recognition by the USA.

As regards South Africa: MPLA will support the peoples in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa in their struggle for freedom. Specifically, MPLA will support SWAPO in the Namibia liberation effort. Thus MPLA does not envisage having normal relations with the racist regime of South Africa.

As regards Zaire: that regime has opposed the peoples of Angola. It is a puppet regime, supported by outsiders; it is not the only puppet regime in Africa, but it is close to Angola (with a long border in common). Zaire depends on the Benguela Railroad; therefore, Zaire wanted to control that railroad. On the basis of past history MPLA does not anticipate having normal relations with Zaire. (Jim's note: a few days later Angola and Zaire established normal relations.)

Zambia, however, is in a quite different category. Zambia in the past did give aid to MPLA; Zambia helped us to develop our guerrilla potential, and provided camps for us. We cannot forget what Zambia has done, in spite of present differences. We are convinced that we will have normal relations with Zambia. (Jim's note: thus far as of 3/9/76 those normal relations have not been established.)

In regard to outside corporations: MPLA has no problems. Technicians forced to leave because of war difficulties, but we kept working diamond mines and oil fields as best we could. Specifically as regards Gulf: MPLA controlled Cabinda; MPLA troops defended the physical integrity of the Gulf facilities. MPLA has talked twice to Gulf officials outside of Angola, and has no problems relating to a working relationship with Gulf. MPLA will demand the signing of new agreements, because Gulf violated the old contract, one drawn up between Gulf and the Portuguese. (Jim's note: as of 3/9/76 the State Department has permitted Gulf to pay the impounded royalties to the Angolan government, and Gulf is ready to begin operating the Cabinda oil fields again. The State Department ban on delivery of the two Boeing planes that MPLA had already paid for was also discussed during the seminar. Since that time delivery of those planes has been approved by the State Department.)

FNLA and UNITA Relations

There are no problems relating to and including the common people in these two movements in the nation-building effort. The common people, most of whom are illiterate, were deceived and thus drawn into these two movements by the leadership of those movements. The leaders themselves are criminals and must be punished. With the rank-and-file there are no problems. FNLA and UNITA troops have already laid down their arms and have turned over their weapons to MPLA. These troops are being incorporated into the common constructive effort and are already at work helping to move the country forward.

Freedom of Women

The women of Angola were subject to two colonialisms - the Portuguese, and that of male domination. In the new constitution the freedom of women is guaranteed, but we are granting women nothing, we are giving women no favors. The women fought for freedom
themselves. The women fought next to the men against the enemies of Angola; they achieved freedom themselves.

**Multinational Corporations**

The sophisticated machinery provided by modern technology cannot be operated by unskilled people. As stated earlier, MPLA will concentrate on developing agriculture in the rural areas, but industrial development is necessary also. Multinational corporations are quite acceptable, if ready to help Angola. Angola is richer in resources than Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique, and is therefore of greater interest to multinational corporations and capitalists than the other two countries. MPLA is ready to have them continue to operate in the country, or to have new corporations operate, if they keep the interest of Angola before them as well as the interest of the corporation.

**More Questions**

After a break the MPLA asked for a discussion of proposals of what the Americans might possibly do as regards Angola, but those of us from the States had more questions to ask in order to amplify some points. Finally, thirty one questions were asked and listed, and during the balance of the morning and throughout the entire afternoon session the MPLA delegation responded. As with the earlier questions, I will present only a digest of the answers (the questions being implicit in the replies). Once again this is a digest of answers given, and in this case only of answers to the more important questions.

In response to a question about oil deposits in northern Angola, our MPLA friends admitted that they did not have sufficient knowledge to answer the question. We did learn that the Cabinda oil fields had been operated at a minimal level during recent months, with the oil being used only for domestic purposes. If Gulf should begin to operate the fields again, we were told that it would be up to Gulf to export the additional oil (coming from full operation of the fields) as Gulf sees fit. After all, the oil was the property of the corporation, and Gulf was to decide how to export it to suit Gulf's purpose.

Recognition by the United States is desired, but Angola will not beg for recognition. It must be mutual and bi-lateral. If the U.S. is not interested in establishing normal relations with Angola, so be it.

There is no threat of Zaire invading Cabinda. Zaire has learned its lesson about such matters.

Our discussion can be entirely open; there are no secrets here. The Americans here are the only ones who might want to think about using discretion in what they make public about the discussions.

The MPLA has absolutely no evidence of the presence of U.S. mercenaries, either Black or white in Angola. The European mercenaries had I.D. cards, but there appear to have been no U.S. mercenaries who got to Angola.

The threat of guerrilla war, conducted by FNLA and/or UNITA, is not serious. Commandante Dibala pointed out that guerrillas need 1) the support of the common people and 2) rear-guard aid. Guerrillas in Angola now will have neither; the people are now opposed to the guerrillas, and South Africa (the only possible rear-guard support) is totally unacceptable to the people; they would never stand for it. Zaire cannot
provide rear-guard support; Zaire's effort to do so was not effective even during the so-called "civil war". The same is true of Zambia. No African nation will support guerrillas in another nation, because they are far too vulnerable to the same thing in their own nation. Guerrillas can operate against a colonial regime or against a neo-colonial regime, but not against a bonafide African government. Dibala cited the failure of UPC guerrillas in Cameroon after independence. (George Houser pointed out to me that the MPLA was in sympathy with UPC; he thought it added strength to their argument that they cited the defeat of a movement which they themselves supported.) Finally, he stressed again the need for rear-guard support, illustrating how both MPLA and FRELIMO had relied upon Zambia, Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania; no such support is possible for guerrillas now trying to operate in Angola.

The central role of the peasants in the struggle for freedom must be recognized. The MPLA was started in Luanda on 2/4/61 by workers, but it spread to the country. MPLA continues to be a movement of workers as well as peasants. MPLA will not allow multinational corporations to dominate workers. Corporations must discuss and sign new contracts in independent Angola. There must be provision for day care centers, health safeguards, educational developments, etc. as a part of the operation of the corporation.

MPLA has people supporting both the "minimum program of MPLA", and those supporting the "maximum program of MPLA". Those who support the minimum program were attracted to the heart of MPLA; they were willing to and did give their lives in the struggle. Those in the maximum program are a much larger number; they are people who hold to the ideals of MPLA. Regardless of whether they are communists, religious, socialist, Catholic, or of another persuasion, they are all welcome to work in the MPLA movement, if they hold to the ideals.

In response to a question about the Caleque Dam near the border with Namibia, we were told that the Portuguese and South Africans had entered into an agreement to build the dam. It is in Angola, and supplies hydroelectric power for Namibia and parts of South Africa.

Dibala was certain that South Africa will withdraw from the dam, and will not fight to defend it. He believes that South Africa will negotiate with MPLA through a third party. Both the OAU and the UN have condemned South Africa for intervening in Angola. If by chance MPLA is wrong and South Africa does fight, the People's Republic of Angola will fight South African troops, and will accept the help of Cuban troops in that fight. At another point Dibala was not willing to estimate the number of Cuban troops in Angola, but did say that there are Cuban troops now in the south of Angola close to the South African troops.

As regards Namibia: although MPLA supports the struggle for freedom in Namibia, "revolutions are not exported". MPLA will not attempt to export revolution to Namibia. Namibians must liberate themselves "just as we did". Namibians must die for their independence "as we did". We will not fight in Namibia. (Jim's note: an AP dispatch in the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER of 3/9/76 states that "the MPLA leader, Dr. Agostinho Neto, has said his forces would help free South West Africa."

MPLA will not fight in either Zaire nor Zambia. There are Black African leaders in both countries which makes war against them unthinkable.

MPLA has always had good relations with the Portuguese, and we assume that we will continue to do so, although the Portuguese "walked out on us" at the time of the South African and Zaire invasions. Angolans have had five centuries of relations with Portugal; we assume that we can have normal relations, though not warm, with Portugal. In an informal conversation Dibala made the point that in October the troop
movements from Zaire and from South Africa had been synchronized in a joint invasion that resulted in the MPLA forces being caught in a pincers. MPLA lost territory and desperately needed assistance. MPLA needed artillery and the skills to use it. In that situation the USSR provided the artillery and the Cuban troops the skill to use and operate it.

The Portuguese were "great lords of coffee and cotton". Some were reactionary; many fled to Portugal, but those who remain in Angola are for the most part willing to work and cooperate with us. The majority of Portuguese worked against independence and freedom. We will not accept them back into Angola.

Excellent and fairly detailed answers were given to questions about what US organizations might do to assist the People's Republic of Angola, both as to relations with the U.S.A., and as to assistance in nation-building in Angola. Because these became matters that we discussed at length in the American delegation, and finally made certain decisions about, I will not give the answers here. The answers did form the bases for discussion that finally led to the agreement on resolutions that will appear at a later point in this report.

One point to emphasize is that the MPLA government is quite ready to accept U.S. aid, once the U.S. recognizes Angola. At present there is no recognition by the U.S.A., and therefore no aid is possible. If, however, recognition comes, MPLA will be quite ready to accept U.S. government aid, and sees no objections to that. One of our people pressed Dibala on this, trying to find out how eager MPLA was for U.S. recognition. He replied by emphasizing that MPLA is firmly committed to non-alignment, and that relations with the U.S. government can only serve to strengthen that non-alignment policy (that is, non-alignment with large military blocs). MPLA has regularly participated in large non-alignment conferences. MPLA does not want to be forced into one bloc or another; therefore, MPLA desires U.S. recognition in order to strengthen its non-aligned position.

Decisions of the U.S. Delegation

After the MPLA trio had given full and careful answers to our questions we began to discuss how we might best respond to them, especially to some of the specific information that had been given us as answers to questions we had raised about what we might do to assist the people and government. After initial discussions among the American delegates (meeting without our MPLA friends) it was decided to ask three people to draft an agenda for a discussion on the following day. The agenda was carefully drafted, with the result that after several hours of discussion it formed the basis for resolutions that were unanimously agreed upon by the American delegates. Actually, only twenty one delegates participated in these discussions and decisions. Five journalists were in a position to serve only as journalists, reporting on the seminar. The journalists from BLACK SCHOLAR and FREEDOM WAYS MAGAZINE were able to commit their organizations to participation in Angola-related activities.

Jim Bristol was conscious of the "broken phonograph record" fashion in which he stated several times that he could not commit the AFSC to anything, although he knew that the AFSC would seriously consider all the findings of the seminar. Obviously, this was true of many other organizations as well. He also stressed that he did not think the AFSC, nor any other organization, should take the ball and run with it. In whatever we do we should consult and inform the other organizations represented in the "Angola 26" (really the "Angola 21").

Having made these introductory comments, let me produce below the verbatim copy of our decisions as recorded on February 29.
ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS OF THE ANGOLA 26 DELEGATION
(Adopted Sunday, February 29, 1976)

A. U. S. RECOGNITION OF ANGOLA

1. We pledge wholeheartedly to commit our resources to seeking recognition of Angola, by:
   a. Generating support among the American people through the dissemination of vital information by the press and all organizations represented by the Angola 26 Delegation; and
   b. Lobbying in Congress in support of recognition.

B. NATION-BUILDING SUPPORT

1. Provision of Medical Aid:
   a. Collection of pharmaceuticals and medicines which are especially used in tropical areas; and
   b. Providing medical-trained personnel.

2. Obtaining Fertilizers and Agricultural Equipment (Tractors):
   a. Finding corporations that could provide materials needed at least cost;
   b. Raising funds to supply tractors and fertilizers;
   c. Once U. S. recognition is obtained, lobbying in Congress for general agricultural aid to Angola.

3. Provision of Educational Aid:* Upon indication by MPLA representatives that such is needed or desired, to provide teachers and educational material.

C. DISPPELLING MYTHS ABOUT MPLA AND THE ANGOLAN SITUATION IN THE U. S.

1. Use all means available to disseminate vital information throughout the U. S. about Angola; and

2. Provide all of the Angola 26 Delegation with information about all efforts each organization conducts, as well as efforts of the press.

D. AVERT A UNITED STATES ECONOMIC BOYCOTT OF ANGOLA

1. Dissemination of information to the American people regarding efforts of the State Department to impose economic sanctions on Angola through pressure on Gulf and Boeing.

* Adoption of this section of the resolution is conditional upon indication by MPLA representatives that such aid is desirable.
ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS OF THE ANGOLA 26 DELEGATION

2. Utilize Congressional contacts who were most adamant about U. S. non-involvement in Angola to publicize U. S.-imposed sanctions.

3. If Gulf and Boeing have not performed by the time we return to the U. S., to build support for a general boycott and exposure of the two companies.

B. ANGOLA GROUP VISITATION / GRANTING OF VISAS BY STATE DEPT.

1. Extension of formal invitation to Angolan group to visit U. S.

2. Legal challenge to State Dept. on granting of visas both to press seeking to go to Angola and to Angolan groups seeking to come to the U. S.

3. Imposition of general pressure on State Dept. to grant visas to Angolans and persons seeking to go to Angola.

F. SEEK TO AVERT ALL MILITARY AID TO ZAIRE AND SOUTH AFRICA

1. Dissemination of information to American people about U. S. increasing military aid to Zaire and South Africa.

2. Lobby within Congress for defeat of further appropriations of such aid.

G. BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR ANGOLA

# 1. Organize a Working Conference (National) to be held in May; and

2. Organizations represented by Angola 26 Delegation to begin organizing regional meetings.

H. GENERAL NATIONAL COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES OF DELEGATION

1. Patricia A. Murray (National Conference of Black Lawyers) will act as National Administrative Director; and

2. The National Coordinating Committee will consist of:
   a. Barbara Barnes - MPLA Solidarity Committee.
   b. George Houser - American Committee on Africa.
   d. Anthony Monteiro - N.A.I.M.S.A.L. (Inter-Fraternity Committee on Solidarity with Africa).
   e. Prexy Nesbitt - U. S. Cut of Angola Committee.

*Jim's note: State Dept. can do nothing re: visas to Angola. Confusion.

Jassumee, be cleared up later.
These "adopted resolutions" are a full account of the decisions reached by the U.S. delegation. It now remains for the National Coordinating Committee to meet, to keep the rest of us informed, and to do the necessary organization in order that an important National Working Conference can be held in May - a conference to include a great many more organizations and people than those involved in the Cuba seminar.

Conclusion of Seminar

Sunday evening (2/29/76) the MPLA accepted our resolutions with thanks, speaking of "the beginning of a new day and of a new relationship". The MPLA did suggest that MPLA delegates might attend the National Conference in May - a suggestion with which we fully agreed. Expressions of appreciation and esteem were exchanged in the closing moments. The next evening (Monday) on the eve of our departure from Cuba we saw our MPLA friends again at a final reception which Commandante Dibala described to me as a "bye-bye cocktail party".

Obviously, the situation in Angola had changed drastically from the time we were first invited to the seminar until the gathering was held. We were meeting with representatives of a government, not with those from one side in a civil war. Had the outcome of the fighting still been uncertain, the content and even the tone of the seminar might have been different, but such was not the case.

Ten days after the conclusion of the seminar I have with me a deep impression of the quiet assurance, the lack of heavy-handedness and the excellent sense of humor of our MPLA friends.

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Private Discussion with MPLA Delegation (Mike Simmons, George Houser, Jim Bristol):

On the second day of the seminar (in response to my request for a chance to talk about AFSC concerns) we three were invited to lunch with the MPLA delegation at their hotel.

George Houser knows a number of MPLA people; there was considerable discussion about personalities, as well as about the way in which MPLA is organized at the local level. That organization is somewhat similar, but not identical to that of FRELIMO.

We went on to talk about who might represent MPLA at the United Nations. ACOA had been helpful in finding an apartment for FRELIMO people, and George offered his services in that connection for MPLA also. MPLA is at present recalling all their overseas representatives to Luanda in order to assess whom to place where and then assign their representatives accordingly.

I raised the question about having an MPLA speaker or perhaps a small MPLA delegation come to the U.S.A. in order to interpret the Angolan situation to the American public. Our three friends were completely cordial to the idea. We spoke of the possibility of several U.S. organizations cooperating in the scheduling of a person or persons. Though still cordial to the idea, they indicated that it is hard to think right now of sparing people for this purpose. The possibility of problems developing connected with the securing of U.S. visas for MPLA speakers was recognized. (See "E" in the adopted resolutions for further treatment of this matter.)

Because time was growing short I began to talk (apart from the general conversation) to Olga Lima about AFSC experience in a variety of projects and undertakings in Africa, I gave her AFSC descriptive literature, trying to sketch in briefly the nature of
what we were interested in and willing to do. I stressed our desire to be cooperators in the nation-building effort of Angola. I identified three types of program that AFSC is implementing in Africa: 1) projects within a country, as in Mali and Zambia; 2) the International Dialogues Program; 3) Bill Sutherland's work.

I mentioned Bill as a likely visitor, should visitation and exploration of project possibilities become appropriate. She had met Bill in 1975 in Lusaka when she was stationed there as an MPLA representative. I suggested she write to me, should there be interest in exploring further any of the types of program I had touched upon. I explained that Bill is very mobile, and will be in the U.S.A. relatively soon anyhow.

I did not ask specifically about an AFSC person to visit Angola to observe the situation there at first hand, returning after that to the U.S.A. in order to interpret Angola to a variety of American groups and individuals. The real reason for not doing so was that time ran out, but I also knew from a prior conversation with George Houser that he had earlier explored that possibility and gotten a negative response (negative because the MPLA people felt that too much needed to be done in Angola immediately, and that all their time and energy and that of their colleagues would be taken up, thus making it difficult to arrange for the visit of such a person). Interestingly enough, in later conversations with the U.S. journalists a positive response was given to the idea of a press delegation from the U.S.A. going to Angola. I can only guess at the reason, namely, that the MPLA people could see media publicity as disseminating more information to the American public in a tangible fashion than would be done by an ACOA or AFSC person speaking and meeting with groups. That, let me emphasize, is solely a guess.

There was simply no opportunity to discuss QUNO, the Quaker Program in Geneva, off-the-record meetings either at QUNO, or in Geneva, or in some places in Africa. I believe that was the only question (of those suggested by David) that I was unable to raise.

During "coffee breaks" I had talked haltingly in French three times to Pedro Zinga Baptista. He was interested in Friends, as a result of which I gave him a Howard Brinton book and a pamphlet, both in Spanish, that I had purposely gotten at the Casa in Mexico City. Before the seminar had ended he had done some reading in the book, and thanked me for it.

I discovered at the opening night reception that Manuel Jorge (Clarens—1971) had defected from MPLA. He was one of a group of twenty "intellectuals" to do so. So much for our"link" to MPLA!

It would be quite erroneous to end on that last note. I am certain that both Mike and I formed good relationships with the MPLA people, and that these could prove mutually helpful in the future.

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Appreciation to our Cuban Hosts:

It is very difficult to give adequate expression to my sense of gratitude for the warm, gracious, friendly hospitality of which we were the happy recipients from the moment we set foot on Cuban soil. Our interpreters and guides constantly went
the second, third and fourth mile in helping us to reach people, in answering innumerable questions, in offering useful suggestions, in making our entire stay in Cuba relaxed and delightful as well as exceedingly meaningful. We will long remember our friends of ICAP, who literally "knocked themselves out" (a phrase I used in public once that proved an addition to their English vocabulary) in our behalf. They actually did, you know. To them all whom I can see so clearly now before me, a final "muchas gracias".

3/10/76

Appendix

Since completing the above I have read George Houser's report. He has very kindly given me permission to quote four paragraphs from his report as a supplement to my own.

"(1) About the MPLA

"The MPLA is not a political party, but it is a peoples movement. It does not represent one ideology, but many. It has a general socialist orientation, but one which is attuned to the particular situation that exists in Angola. The basic work in the community by the MPLA is done through local MPLA committees. These are organized in all communities and probably will grow rapidly as the MPLA expands the area of its influence and control.

"Historically the MPLA has had both a minimum and a maximum program. Under the minimum program the nationalist objective of independence had to be accepted and the necessity of struggle (including armed struggle) against Portuguese domination. The maximum program outlined more in depth what the MPLA hoped to build in the future. All tendencies were represented in the MPLA from communist and socialist to liberal and church-oriented people."

"(11) Foreign aid

"The MPLA delegation made clear that they are going to need foreign assistance, both financial and technical. 'We don't have the know-how and so it must come from abroad.' There is a large team of Cuban doctors working in Angola now for instance. Another large group was arriving soon from Yugoslavia. There are also doctors from Algeria and two Brazilian doctors. Dibala said, 'I am absolutely convinced that we are going to receive aid from technicians from all over the world. These technicians will take the place of many Portuguese who have left. The Angolan government might be open to U.S. government aid, but certainly not unless there is recognition.

"Angola will also welcome non-government aid from friendly organizations. They would seek advice from their friends abroad about the advisability of any particular non-governmental person who applied to come to Angola to be of assistance. They would not want any persons to come who would in any way interfere in Angolan matters."
PARTICIPANTS OF THE HAVANA SEMINAR
(February 25 - 29, 1976)

MPLA

Commandante Dibala - a member of the Central Committee and Political Commissar of the Eastern Front

Sra. Olga Lima - Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Relations

Pedro Zinga Baptista - from the Department of Foreign Relations of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

Organizations represented at the Seminar were:

1. Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workers of North America (AFL-CIO)
2. American Committee on Africa
3. American Friends Service Committee
4. Black Economic Research Center
5. CASA - General Brotherhood of Workers
6. Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (NYC)
7. Coalition for a New Foreign Policy
8. MPLA Solidarity Committee
10. National Conference of Black Lawyers
11. National Council of Churches (Africa Office)
12. Partido Socialista Puertorriqueña
13. Prairie Fire Organizing Committee
14. Third World Coalition/Southwest Workers Federation
15. U.S. Out of Angola Committee and Chicago Committee for Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné
16. Venceremos Brigade
17. Washington Office on Africa
18. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
19. Youth Against War & Fascism

Members of the Press represented:

1. Afro-American Newspapers (Baltimore Afro-American)
2. Bilalian News (two journalists attended)
3. Black Scholar
4. Freedomways Magazine
5. San Francisco Sun Reporter

One free-lance journalist also attended.