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# WASHINGTON NOTES ON AFRICA

## ICA Enlightens South Africa

Although in the public media Kissinger is usually linked to "dialogue" with South Africa and Carter with "confrontation," little-noticed, behind-the-scenes private diplomacy has been going on year in and year out to show South Africa how to defuse the coming revolution. Using America's experience with civil rights, US cultural and educational exchanges are intended to speed reform and protect US corporate interests by aiding moderate blacks and liberal whites to construct a non-violent solution.

A large part of this diplomacy is now centralized in the new International Communication Agency headed by John Reinhardt, a black foreign service officer. Reinhardt headed State's Public Affairs program and served as ambassador to Nigeria before heading ICA. ICA's informational, cultural and educational programs, once housed at State, include Voice of America broadcasts, information centers and libraries abroad, preparation and distribution of literature and films about the US, scholarship programs and a broad array of cultural and educational exchanges.

The design of ICA's South Africa work originates with a program laid out in 1973-75 by the present ambassador to South Africa, William Edmondson, when he was directing the Africa programs of State's Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs. He was assisted by James Westmoreland, whose wife, "Maggie," and her superior, Charles Bell, are presently responsible for ICA's South Africa program.

ICA's South Africa program is intentionally political. More money is spent on ICA's South Africa program than anywhere else on the continent.

## ICA's Visitor Program

Through its international visitors program, ICA will fund this year visits of some 100 South African "leaders" and "opinion-makers" to this country. Two-thirds of them will be African, Coloured or Indian. They are chosen initially by ICA's twelve specialists in Capetown, Durban or Johannesburg and by the US embassy in Pretoria. But Maggie Westmoreland and Charles Bell have the final word on who comes, and in some cases they designate certain South Africans for ICA visitor status on their own. Each year the number of visitors has been growing by about 10 to 15 names.

This year's special emphasis is on "verligtes" (enlightened Afrikaners). Dr. Johannes Degenaar, head of the Department of Political Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, for example, toured the United States this summer. Another verligte visitor was Ms. Ilse Treurnicht, cousin of Andries Treurnicht, whose hard-line "verkrampste" policy makes him a powerful nationalist cabinet member. Ms. Treurnicht leads a political discussion group at Stellenbosch University which is said to be open to dialogue.

While some of these choices are intended to show South Africa that the US programs are "evenhanded," it also reflects a judgment that Afrikaners have a deep bond to their land, and a special interest in working something out with moderate blacks. ICA had plans to bring over one Afrikaner who is prominent in the Broderbond because he favored dialogue but the plan has not yet been executed. Dutch Reformed ministers are also on ICA's "wish list."

ICA's African, Indian and Coloured visitors from South Africa have often been church officials. The Roman Catholic Church's Auxiliary Bishop of Cape Town, Stephen Naidoo, and his Anglican counterpart, Suffragan Bishop Monwabisi Matolengwe, have made recent ICA-funded and programmed

tours. With black political organizations banned, churches are seen as an increasingly important channel of communication from and to the black community.

While international visitors' vocations are quite varied, editors and journalists, clergy and educators are chosen in greater numbers than others.

Thirty to forty-five day visits to the United States often lead to ongoing linkages between US and South African institutions. For example, when Cape Town University's H.W. van der Merve visited Chicago, he invited the head of the Justice Department's regional Community Relations Division, Richard Salem, to give a lecture series on conflict resolution at the university's Center for Intergroup Studies. ICA picked up the tab for Salem's visit. Salem says he mediated confrontations at Wounded Knee, Skokie and Kent State. When questioned as to whether a dialogue wasn't too narrow if it excluded jailed and exiled African leaders, Salem said his work convinced him that one has to start with those in the center.

### **Educational Programs for South African Blacks**

While ICA's program of "communication for change" focusses on established leadership, it is engaged in an even more important effort to educate and train South Africa's black population for the future "when they will be running things."

ICA sent a multiracial seminar team to Witswatersrand University recently to help construct an affirmative action program with open admissions and compensatory education in all fields. The seminar was designed to do "consciousness raising" among faculty. Wits is expected to raise its black enrollment from 200 to 500 this next year. Such educational efforts have preliminary backing from one US foundation as well. This spring Carnegie Corporation sent Dr. Carl Fields, a black consultant on education, to survey the feasibility of raising the level of African student intake at Wits to 2000.

Meanwhile, ICA's South Africa desk has been working with multinational companies to set up an alternative school system in Soweto. Control Data and ICA are setting up what they claim to be "a very innovative" program "to meet community needs" and to train computer operators. While Control Data claims to have "pioneered in teaching the unteachable," its credentials are tarnished by its sales and leases to the South African police state.

In the field of social work, ICA is making special efforts to show South Africa's professionals how the US does it. This May an inter-racial group of fifteen South African university teachers and directors of social work visited US universities which stress "community involvement and negotiation skills." The group attended the annual National Social Welfare Forum in Philadelphia where four papers were presented by members of the South African group. Professor Ceceil Muller of the University of Witswatersrand heard her presentation attacked by South African exile Don Morton for whitewashing apartheid and distributing South Africa Foundation propaganda. Morton forced an admission from Dr. Bopape, head of the black social workers association, that the government controls and licenses all social work. Dr. Muller and four other visitors were sponsored by Anglo-American Corporation, and four others by American corporations. The visit was planned mainly by Dr. Morris Cohen of the University of North Carolina, which, with Western Michigan University, conducts programs for South African social workers under ICA contract.

Although ICA funds close to 50 graduate scholars in the humanities, undergraduate programs run outside ICA by African-American Institute, the Phelps Stokes Fund and the

Robert Moton Memorial Institute have a much larger number of students and deal with technical education. ICA, however, also uses AID money for shorter-term educational grants to help some 200 black South Africans to study US methods in labor relations, social work, journalism and small business.

### **ICA's Unofficial US Ambassadors**

Meanwhile, ICA is commissioning, briefing and funding its own unofficial ambassadors to explain America, its people and its policies. "Everyone wants to go to South Africa," Ms. Westmoreland says, but ICA grantees must be "absolutely topnotch and articulate." ICA wants spokespersons who can talk about human rights, social justice, civil rights and the role of the church and law in social change. Spokesmen need not be 100 percent in agreement with policy, but those who advocate a radical break with South Africa or sanctions will not be chosen.

The dangers as well as the usefulness of such unofficial missions can be illustrated by ICA's sponsorship of Allard Lowenstein. Lowenstein's trip to South Africa before Rhodesia's April elections branched off into Rhodesia where he began an intensive canvassing of a "moderate solution" with Muzorewa, Smith and other internal settlement figures. While ICA disclaims responsibility for this excursion, it funded him thereafter. Furthermore, Brzezinski and Vance were briefed by Lowenstein more than once and gave him informal blessing on his mission while "retaining deniability." Lowenstein's trip to observe the April elections under Freedom House auspices and a second trip soon thereafter left the impression with many that the US government was engaged in two-tiered diplomacy.

ICA is anxious to have prominent blacks with civil rights experience travel to South Africa. One ICA grantee, Millard Arnold, a black lawyer who heads the South Africa project of the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights under Law, has recently returned from six weeks in South Africa where he assisted defense counsel in a trial under the Terrorism Act. While ICA did not pay for his stay in South Africa, it has funded his travels to nearby black African countries. Last year ICA helped Arnold attend a meeting for prominent African and American officials hosted by the African-American Institute in Khartoum. Thereafter he visited Zambia where he conferred with the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front. "He did a terrific job of explaining American foreign policy," one ICA source said.

South Africa was chopped off the itinerary of Washington, D.C. mayor Marion Barry's ICA-funded trip to Africa this July. ICA and some prominent blacks had been anxious for Barry to go there but Courtland Cox, his assistant for minority business, and other advisers successfully urged him not to go. The South Africa issue went with Barry on the trip, however. He was accompanied by Carter Dove, a vice president of Riggs National Bank, which has lent over \$7 million to South Africa since 1973. The D.C. Bank Campaign which has made Riggs a target was critical of Barry's invitation to Dove. While Barry had brushed aside such criticism as coming from non-Africans, President Nyerere told him flatly that US businesses should get out of South Africa. Mayor Barry apparently intends to take up Riggs' South Africa loans with its President.

Meanwhile Riggs' Dove declared that he had found investment opportunities for Riggs in all the countries the Barry group visited. "As a result of Mayor Barry's trip probably there is going to be some business between our bank and the countries visited." ICA's Michael Baskin was equally pleased: "Marion Barry was an ideal person. He's the mayor of our capital city; a black, a civil rights leader, somewhat radical in fact; and now he's made it in our system."

## The Impact of ICA

The "communication for change" policy that ICA is implementing has serious limitations. There is no evidence that dialogue or communication can in themselves bring about change. While the task has been going on, South Africa has been building its strategic arsenal, closing loopholes in its security laws, carrying on a genocidal war in Namibia and an invasion of Angola. While the United Nations and African countries have called for an end to western investments and loans and for economic sanctions, these measures are invariably opposed by the United States government and its western partners.

Furthermore, black South Africans in increasing numbers are calling for such measures of isolation rather than for dialogue. Indeed they insist that meaningful dialogue requires the release of political prisoners and an end to police-state repression. The reforms of the educational system in which ICA is investing may be creating skills, but they are also clearly intended to create a black leadership that will buffer South Africa from more radical changes—changes that might upset corporations' interests.

Similarly it seems naive to suppose that a purely civil rights approach can be transferred from the United States where blacks are a minority to a country where they are a majority. South Africa's intransigence on the central question of political rights has only grown stronger with dialogue. It's position is crystal clear. South Africa is not prepared to share political power with Africans unless whites continue to retain dominance. ■

## Rhodesia Since the Elections

David Smith, Minister of Finance in the Rhodesian government, recently announced that 30 percent of the total budget for 1980 will be spent on defense. The planned defense expenditure of \$600 million highlights the weakness of the Muzorewa government. However, the escalating war is only one of several battles that Muzorewa is losing.

### Internal Splintering

Muzorewa has not been able to garner the support of even those leaders who took part in the internal settlement. On April 23, Reverend Sithole, the second largest vote-getter in the April election, denounced the Muzorewa government on the grounds that there were irregularities in the election. Sithole later characterized the Muzorewa government as "an African face and a white substance." James Chikerema, a former Vice-President of Muzorewa's party, split off from the United African National Council with six other members of the Parliament. It is likely that Land and Natural Resource Minister George Nyandoro will leave Muzorewa's camp as well. He and Chikerema are long-time political associates. This splintering leaves Muzorewa without a majority in Parliament. The white Rhodesia Front which holds 28 seats will thus be in a key position to make a majority for him on their terms.

In the most shocking incident to date, on July 20 the white security forces killed 183 of their own black auxiliary forces, most of them loyal to Sithole. An August 1st *Washington Post* article stated that in African suburbs of Salisbury "the incident was seen as an outright massacre." The government called the dead soldiers "ill-trained auxiliaries operating in Mafia-style gangs." This incident and the resulting charges serve to corroborate Patriotic Front statements that



it has been the private armies and government forces who have been terrorizing the population with inhumane tactics.

### The War Continues

The April 20th election has often been described as a vote for peace. Yet the election of Bishop Muzorewa has had little effect on the course of the war which continues to escalate. The government reported that 843 people died in April and 891 died in May; the two highest monthly tolls of the war. These figures translate to more than one person dying each hour. In early June, Patriotic Front sources estimated that 3600 people had died since government preparations for the election began. The Commander in Chief of Combined Operations, Commander Lieutenant General Peter Walls, saw no immediate end to the hostilities. On June 11, he said:

"I reckon we've got a bloody few months ahead of us now. No question about it, we got a hell of a fight ahead of us and a hell of a lot more people are going to die."

As long as the war continues, Muzorewa will be subservient to the white military leaders of Rhodesia. The court recently denied Muzorewa the power to commute death sentences in martial law cases. General Peter Walls is the only one with this power. Rhodesian sources report that hangings can be ordered by any security force member the rank of lieutenant or above.

Efforts to get Patriotic Front troops to defect have had little success. US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose estimated that fewer than 100 people had defected by July 25. On the course of the war, a senior official in the elite Territorial Unit was quoted in *Soldier of Fortune* of June, 1979 as having said last Christmas

"We've all but lost the war. The way things are going now, the Terts have beaten us at our own game, and anyone who thinks otherwise is in Mickey Mouse Land."

### Alliance Formed with South Africa

In the face of the worsening military situation, both South Africa and the Muzorewa/Smith government want to establish a mutual defense alliance. On April 19, South African Prime Minister Botha announced his plans to form a Southern Africa fortress—a military alliance between South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. Ian Smith hailed this plan as "manna from heaven." In mid-June, Smith talked with a group of South Africans in Salisbury about the benefits of defending Rhodesia rather than waiting to defend the north of South Africa.

Muzorewa has led Rhodesia closer to a comprehensive military and economic alliance with South Africa. Muzorewa's first official visitor after assuming power was South Africa's

resident diplomat Pret Van Vuren. From June 14 to 18, Muzorewa went to South Africa to meet with South African Prime Minister Botha. Senior Rhodesian officials have admitted that the South Africans have made offers of significant military and economic support. On June 20, the *Washington Post* reported that the number of white South Africans fighting in the Rhodesian army has increased greatly. The South African government has let its soldiers know that a one-year leave of absence will be given to those who go to fight in Rhodesia. On his willingness to deal with South Africa, Muzorewa said, "If I get in trouble and the devil comes to help me, and says I am going to save you, I will let him."

On the "McNeill/Lehrer Report," a public television news show, Muzorewa curtly replied "that is none of your business" to a question about whether a firm military alliance with South Africa had been formed.

## Relations with Independent Africa

While enjoying close but unofficial relations with South Africa, Muzorewa has been universally denounced by the rest of Africa. No African nation has recognized his govern-

## Eximbank Restrictions Still Up in the Air

Nine months have passed since the Congress adopted legislation restricting Export-Import Bank financing for South Africa. But the State Department still hasn't published regulations implementing the law. Happily, this means that no financing at all has been going to South Africa.

Political arguments within the State Department and among members of Congress involved in drafting the compromise language have stalled completion of the regulations. All loans, loan guarantees and insurance will be denied the South African government and the parastatal companies it controls. That much was clear from the legislative mandate. The problem is how to judge whether private South African companies are "moving toward implementing" fair employment principles and can therefore receive financing to purchase US exports.

Legal officers at State have drafted a questionnaire that companies would have to satisfactorily complete in order to meet the new application procedure. The questionnaire itself has few problems, but the lack of required on-site inspection to check the companies' reporting, and of explicit benchmarks by which their answers will be judged acceptable has drawn criticism from Congressional liberals who originally favored a complete Eximbank cutoff for South Africa.

Meanwhile, the flow of capital from the US to South Africa has ended since the Soweto uprising in 1976. According to *Business Week* of July 16, "after net gains of \$1 billion a year on the capital account in 1975 and 1976, foreign investors have turned to using overseas debt repayments, license fees to parent companies and other devices to get their cash out. The result in 1977 and 1978 was a net outflow of \$1.2 billion a year. That trend is continuing."

The value of US imports from South Africa has increased greatly in the same period. From 1977 to 1978 imports from South Africa increased from \$1.25 to \$2.25 billion. Exports to South Africa increased only from \$1.05 billion to \$1.07 billion. The boom in imports comes from jumps in the dollar value of minerals, especially ferro alloys, platinum and precious and semi-precious stones whose prices have skyrocketed. US exports to South Africa continued to be mostly manufactured goods and machinery. ■

ment. A delegation from his government to the Ivory Coast was not allowed to leave the airport. Other pro-western governments like Liberia and Kenya have denounced the government unequivocally. Muzorewa was not invited to the recent OAU meeting where a resolution was passed recognizing the Patriotic Front as the "sole authentic representative" of the people of Zimbabwe.

Africa can hardly recognize the Muzorewa government so long as Rhodesian armed forces continue to attack Zambia and Mozambique. Muzorewa has acknowledged responsibility for five such attacks—two into Mozambique and three into Zambia. In one attack on Lusaka, 22 people were killed, and many others wounded.

## The Role of the White Minority

White minority power and privilege limit Muzorewa's ability to assert himself as a ruler. Although he succeeded in getting Jack Gaylard, a close associate of Ian Smith, to resign as Secretary of the Cabinet, his nominee for a successor, an Indian, was turned down by the white-dominated Civil Service Commission. The commission formulated an all-white list of candidates from which Muzorewa selected the eventual successor. The first legislative program introduced by the Muzorewa government to Parliament on June 26 made no attempt to enact reforms in areas such as minimum wage for black labor, unemployment, health care, education, or income redistribution. Furthermore, Muzorewa told US policymakers that he was unprepared to advocate changes in the flagrantly racist constitution.

## Reforms Haven't Brought Real Improvement

Muzorewa's inability to bring about promised changes in the way the country is run illustrate his role, a cosmetic face-lift for continued white power. Bishop Lamont, the exiled Bishop of Umtali, denounced Muzorewa's decision to allow banned missionaries to return as a "political ploy designed to compromise the integrity of the missionaries." On July 7, an Italian missionary doctor was killed by Rhodesian government forces for allegedly running a roadblock. Church sources believe they have conclusive evidence that the doctor was not at a roadblock. They are planning to call for an investigation shortly. Forty people connected with Marymount mission in the northeast of Rhodesia are currently missing. Some church sources believe that they may have fled to Mozambique to avoid government harassment.

In a July 17 *Washington Post* article, Caryle Murphy reported Muzorewa's claims of offering universal free education to all are misleading. Fees in many previously all-white schools have been increased significantly. One-quarter of the schools have been sold to "concerned white parents" who plan to turn them into private schools.

On July 4, Muzorewa released 141 political detainees of the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front. Informed sources estimate that at least 1000 political prisoners are still being held. Also, Amnesty International has reported that about 25 prisoners were secretly executed on June 22.

A few blacks have risen to more prominent positions in the government, but positions in which they have no effective power. For instance, there is now one black on the three-man civil service commission, but the whites still hold the power to make decisions. No concrete programs have been set up to promote the advancement of blacks to higher-level jobs.

In sum, any impartial observer would have to agree with Assistant Secretary of State Moose who recently testified that the only significant change to date in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was the actual installation of the new government. ■

# One More round on Rhodesia

Great Britain has unfinished business in Rhodesia—business that it would very much like to be rid of. Fourteen years after Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Britain still has not fulfilled its responsibility to grant independence to a government accepted by the majority of the people. The United States, too, would like the Rhodesia "problem" to go away, since Africa regards it as a crucial test of whether the west will break its ties with white minority rule in southern Africa.

Rhodesia has been an intractable problem. Successive Liberal and Conservative British governments tried time and again to negotiate with Ian Smith to achieve an acceptable solution. By the mid-seventies, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had built a strong African resistance movement and the war for liberation could no longer be ignored. The Patriotic Front was brought into negotiations, and the United States, beginning during the Ford Administration years, came in to support the British. Two years of active Anglo-American diplomacy were washed down the drain when Ian Smith, Abel Muzorewa and other black politicians signed the internal settlement agreement on March 3, 1978. Ian Smith had once again defied Britain and won; he forced the British government to respond to new conditions which he created.


Now Britain is trying one more time. Prime Minister Thatcher's agreement to the new Commonwealth proposal on August 6 in Lusaka represents an admission that granting legal independence to Rhodesia under the Muzorewa/Smith government could not meet the test of African acceptability,

and that that government could not end the war. The Commonwealth agreement also means the US will again take a back seat to Britain on the Rhodesia diplomacy, a position the State Department appears relieved to be in.

It looked very much as though the new Conservative British government had hoped it could build somehow on the internal settlement to "return Rhodesia to legality." On July 1st Thatcher said in Australia that she expected that the Conservative Party-controlled Parliament to end sanctions in its annual renewal debate on November 9th. The Commonwealth proposal, which was worked out in consultation with the Frontline states, halted a major confrontation between Britain and independent Africa which was already brewing.

The Commonwealth proposal calls for an all-parties conference to arrive at a new constitution, a ceasefire, and new elections supervised by Britain with Commonwealth observers. But the proposal leaves key questions unanswered, particularly the disposition of the security forces and the Patriotic Front guerillas, and who will control the transition period.

There is no cause for immediate optimism that the plan will work, or that it will be accepted by either of the parties to the dispute. Abel Muzorewa has already called a new election "totally unfair and, in fact, an insult," since it challenges the legitimacy of the April 20th election which made him the nominal leader of the country. Ian Smith, a few weeks before the Commonwealth meeting, told the Rhodesian *Sunday Mail* that he couldn't "bluff" Rhodesian whites again. "A few months later [saying] we are going to change all these things again . . . will be the end of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia." South Africa said it would continue to back Muzorewa and Smith if they decide to reject the plan. From the other side, the Patriotic Front has refrained from hasty judgment of the proposals which leave out so many key aspects.



## Carter Judges the Muzorewa/Smith Government

The Carter Administration has already come to realize that the Muzorewa/Smith government couldn't be viable. It also sought to establish that any new negotiations would have to include Muzorewa as a key figure because of his April election victory. On the bottom line, the US did not see it in its interest for the Patriotic Front to gain exclusive power in Rhodesia through a military victory.

President Carter's major Rhodesia speech on June 7th blended a principled critique of the internal settlement with a pragmatic appeal for continuing sanctions. Carter found that the Rhodesian election was not "free and fair." He criticized the constitution because it preserves extraordinary power for the tiny white minority and because it was not ratified by the 96 percent of the population which is black. The exclusion of the Patriotic Front also marred the election.

### AID Completes Southern Africa Study

Congress hasn't yet responded to the one million dollar Agency for International Development (AID) study on southern Africa which was distributed on Capitol Hill in March. The voluminous project which was mandated in 1977 contains nine country papers and eleven sector reports. The central theme running through the hundreds of printed pages is the need to overcome the present dependence on South Africa. The study recommends a regional approach and suggests seven areas of potential cooperation: river basin development, transportation and communications, telecommunications, research and specialized training, livestock disease control, intraregional trade, and the establishment of a Southern Africa Development Bank.

Like most documents prepared by AID, the southern Africa development study attempts to be apolitical and is couched in terms of US self-interest. "The mandate of the study was to analyze development needs and it was not intended to be a political paper," explained an AID official. He claimed that the study would never have gotten past the Executive if the project had taken a political line on the problems which dominate the region.

The study is meant to give a long-term view, he said, and to point out as strongly as possible the deteriorating conditions in the region, such as the growing number of refugees, in order to encourage the United States to increase its development assistance to southern Africa.

AID solicited opposing views at a three-day colloquium in January designed to critique the draft copy of the study. The gathering brought together more than one hundred "experts" which included United Nations officials, academics, development agency staff from donor countries, and consultants from firms specializing in development. AID reports that all of the papers were changed as a result of the colloquium.

However, the revised version still suffers from the failure to come to grips with fundamental political questions. For instance, the vast political difference between the countries in the region are glossed over, so that the socialist countries of Mozambique and Angola are hardly distinguished from South African hostage states like Malawi or Lesotho. Aside from the staff of the Namibia Institute, the liberation movements were not consulted because of a specific prohibition by the State Department; nor was the government of Angola. The feasibility of regional cooperation between nations with very diverse political systems is not debated, nor is the impact of possible revolutionary change. ■

With an eye on Congress, the President also appealed to protecting US interests. Lifting sanctions now would alienate African countries (like Nigeria) which are economically important to the US, Carter said, and would create opportunities for "outside powers"—meaning the Soviet Union and Cuba—"to take advantage of the United States." It would also align the United States with Africa in openly defying international sanctions in order to bolster the Muzorewa/Smith regime.

Secretary of State Vance presented the policy to Congress in terms somewhat more conciliatory to the Muzorewa/Smith government. He said on June 12 "I share the view of the Congress . . . that progress should be recognized." "A step has been taken away from total white control and toward majority rule." He said that the US might recognize the Muzorewa/Smith government if certain conditions were met—greater progress toward equal political rights, greater economic and social equality, efforts at accommodating opposition parties, and ending the war.

On June 26th Jeffrey Davidow was sent to Pretoria as a special US envoy to report on developments in Rhodesia. Officials explained that the appointment of a middle-level diplomat with a "watching brief" did not mean recognition of the Muzorewa/Smith government. But Davidow has now ended up in Salisbury instead of Pretoria, and senior State Department officials have confirmed that the US is also considering allowing Muzorewa to appoint a low-level diplomatic representative to Washington in exchange.

President Carter's July 12th meeting with Abel Muzorewa at Camp David gave Muzorewa new standing. The President could have said he was too busy with his consultations on energy and the impending cabinet shake-up and declined to meet with Muzorewa as he had refused to meet with Smith and Sithole in October.

But, overall, Muzorewa's visit to the US demonstrated the political weakness white domination imposes on his government. This was evident especially in contrast with Ian Smith's visit last October. While Smith came across on the television as a legitimate and self-confident leader, Muzorewa seemed hostile and defensive. Smith announced dramatically to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he was willing to attend an all-parties conference. Nine months later Muzorewa declared that he brought a "bombshell" of information, but it turned out to be a dud. "I don't have to take any further steps. I've done what needs to be done," he told journalists.

The Carter Administration's first monthly report on Rhodesia promised in Carter's speech found no improvement in Rhodesia under the Muzorewa/Smith government. Presenting the report to Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose said that Muzorewa had not yet improved the lives of the African people, gained control of the government, or presented social reforms to the Parliament. Africans were already disappointed that the April election did not bring the promised peace, he said. Moose also lamented that Muzorewa insisted that the problem he faces is sanctions, rather than the constitution or the war.

But Moose also chastised African countries for dismissing Muzorewa and throwing their full weight behind the Patriotic Front. He said the US and Britain lobbied members of the Organization of African Unity in July, urging them to oppose the resolution supporting the Patriotic Front as the sole authentic representative of the Zimbabwean people. Moose strongly criticized the resolution, which was adopted by unanimous vote, saying it would complicate the search for a peaceful solution.

## Department of Energy Aids South Africa

On April 25, the Department of Energy announced it has Department of State clearance to buy South Africa's Sasol I data bank from any private corporation that can arrange a deal with the South African government-owned parastatal which produces oil from coal. An April 28th *Johannesburg Star* article states that "the decision is likely to earn Sasol millions of rands in license fees for its various processes."

The Department of Energy wants to analyze Sasol's data bank because it believes that a Sasol-like technology may be useful in the short-term development of the US synthetic fuel program. John Deutsch, Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy said "knowledge of this practical experience could save the US three to five years in development of coal-to-coil plants if the decision were made to use the South African's Fisher-Tropsch Technology."

Fluor Corporation, the US multinational which has been the major contractor for the building of the Sasol plants in South Africa, has estimated that any synthetic fuel development in the US would take about seven years to operate effectively. Thus, Deutsch is not talking of immediate relief.

The Department of Energy is spending millions of taxpayer dollars already on the funding of several smaller demonstration plants using more advanced technologies. On July 15th the *New York Times* pointed out that, although South Africa's Sasol I is the only commercial-scale indirect liquification plant in the world, "the economics of the process are in question. By far, the preferred technique is direct liquification at this point . . . Two direct liquification plants are in operation [in the US]."

Reliance on the rapid development of Sasol-type plants in

this country raises other questions as well. A recent Rand Corporation report states, "if we go too fast one way, we forego the opportunity to develop other technologies later." There are also unresolved environmental problems. In a July 10 report to the Council on Environmental Quality, a group of scientists warned that if the trend toward burning synthetic fuels continues, "climatic zones will shift and agriculture will be displaced . . . It could threaten the stability of food supplies.

In the meantime, the Department of Energy's willingness to deal with Sasol, even indirectly, represents a political victory for South Africa. An April *Rand Daily Mail* article declared:

"The United States dramatically brushed aside scruples yesterday and decided to allow American firms to seek vitally needed oil from coal technology from South Africa."

Representative Moorhead of Pittsburgh, who lobbied for the Department of Energy decision, claimed that it was "the most encouraging news the American people had had in weeks." Moorhead probably senses the political bounty of being out front of the rush to save the US consumer the long wait in the gas lines. Moorhead's district borders on large coal reserves and is also the headquarters of Allegheny Ludlum Steel, a corporation whose management has been an active proponent of continued business ties with South Africa.

The Sasol project is becoming an integral part of South Africa's public relations effort to portray the US as more dependent on South Africa for resources and technology than the other way around. While South Africa insists that it can make important contributions to western technical knowledge, the facts are quite the reverse. South Africa couldn't have built Sasol without Fluor's worldwide engineering skill and market connections. ■

## The Last Chance for Negotiations

For the United States and Britain, one more negotiating effort is probably the only option open to them. The central reality in Rhodesia is the war, which extends throughout virtually the whole country. No amount of reform of one side would end the conflict. Muzorewa has given inordinate attention to maintaining white privileges, since his power base and military backing comes from the white minority. Muzorewa does not have the internal support to chart an independent course. Given this reality, backing the Muzorewa/Smith government would have required massive economic and perhaps even military aid. Such a course would have brought strong American popular opposition.

The Commonwealth proposal solves some domestic political problems for both the British and the Carter Administration. It gives Thatcher an excuse for not implementing her unrealistic campaign promise of recognizing the Muzorewa/Smith government under conditions which would be internationally acceptable. The less up-front role given to the United States means Rhodesia will not be such a contentious issue for President Carter as he begins campaigning for reelection. It will also mean at least a stalling of the move to lift sanctions, since Congressional conservatives had tied their strategy so closely to the British.

"This is absolutely the last chance to gain a negotiated settlement," Tanzanian President Nyerere said in Lusaka. While observers point out that both the Patriotic Front and Muzorewa and Smith may be forced to the negotiating table because the initiative for the new proposal came from both the Frontline states and the British, that does not necessarily mean they will come to an agreement. The proposal contains very little that is new, and it excludes the tough issues over which earlier negotiations broke down. ■

## The Continuing Sanctions Saga

Just before leaving for its August recess, Congress acted to lift sanctions against Rhodesia by November 15th unless the President determines that it would not be in the national interest to do so. But, if the President decides to retain sanctions, the Congress has 30 legislative days to overturn the decision by a concurrent resolution—which does *not* require Presidential approval.

This compromise, reached as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1980, is the latest chapter in the year-long confrontation between the Congress and the President over whether to lift sanctions against Rhodesia as a result of the internal settlement signed on March 3, 1978. The compromise language was proposed by Senator Jacob Javits, ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, who also authored the amendment passed last year which began the slide toward the lifting of sanctions. The so-called Case-Javits amendment, passed in August of 1978, provided that the President would have to lift sanctions against Rhodesia if he determined that the Rhodesian government was willing to negotiate and had held "free and fair" elections.

## The Senate Moves First

The Senate has consistently looked more favorably on lifting sanctions than has the House. In May, the Senate preempted the decision that it had demanded of President Carter. If overwhelmingly adopted—by a vote of 74 to 21—

an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization bill, based on a resolution by Senator Schweiker (R-PA), expressing the sense of Congress that the President should determine that the Rhodesian government had held free and fair elections and was willing to negotiate, and that sanctions should therefore no longer be enforced.

On June 7, the President held firm. He decided not to lift sanctions. Immediately Senate conservatives rushed to a second attack, following the Rhodesian foreign ministry's strategy of "amending every piece of legislation possible so that the attack on the Carter Administration comes from all sides at once." On June 12th the Department of Defense Authorization bill came to the Senate floor with an amendment already having been agreed to by the Armed Services Committee which would have the effect of lifting sanctions unconditionally on June 30th. A Church-Javits floor amendment, which would have instead lifted sanctions on December 1st *unless* the President determined it was not in the national interest to do so, was tabled by a vote of 52 to 41. This defeat left the Committee's provision intact. White House spokesmen announced that the President was "quite likely" to veto any bill that would force the immediate lifting of sanctions, and pointed out that 41 votes were sufficient to sustain a veto.

### Pragmatic Interests Prevail in the House

In the House of Representatives, the President's June 7th decision to continue sanctions had a greater impact. The shift in sentiment was exemplified by a "Dear Colleague" letter sent out by Illinois conservative Republican John Erlenborn. It said,

"When our constituents are already worried about gasoline shortages this summer, why risk rash action by the Nigerians to interrupt oil supplies or jack up the prices? . . . We should let the British assume the lead, not take them off the hook . . . By hastily lifting sanctions, Congress would play right into the hands of the Soviets and Cubans, who could assume the mantle of 'defenders of the case of black majority rule' while painting us as 'agents of continued colonial domination'."

Buoyed by this rising spirit of pragmatism, African Subcommittee chairman Stephen Solarz fashioned a compromise which might undercut conservatives' amendments to lift sanctions immediately. While House Democratic leaders held up other major foreign policy bills, Solarz brought to the Foreign Relations Committee a separate bill, HR 4439, which gave the President discretion as to whether sanctions should be lifted after October 15th. This operative language was the bottom line the liberals were seeking to maintain, but, to get it, they gave way substantially on the political judgment of the internal settlement. The bill's preamble called the April election "a significant step" and said that US national interest required encouragement of "multi-racial democracy" with "majority rule and protection of minority rights" in Rhodesia. The liberal Africa Subcommittee had adopted language saying sanctions should not be lifted until the Rhodesian government had demonstrated by its actions that it was exercising "genuine majority rule." But this was too partisan for the full Foreign Affairs Committee, and more neutral language was substituted, linking the lifting of sanctions instead to US national interest. The full House adopted the language passed by the Committee by a huge margin of 350 to 37, after defeating an amendment deleting the President's discretion by a 100-vote margin.

The latest compromise in conference on the Foreign Relations Authorization bill moved the US one step closer to

lifting sanctions. While it retained the appearance of Presidential discretion, it actually appropriated for Congress the President's power to veto the sanctions decision. Liberals accepted a further political concession in conference, adding to the preamble a statement that the April election brought a "transfer of power to a black majority government" in Rhodesia.

### What to Expect Next

What will happen next in Congress depends to a large extent on what happens in Britain. The *one* point on which everyone from Jesse Helms to the Black Caucus agreed is that the US should not lift sanctions before the British do. Conservatives like Helms agreed to this on the assumption that Britain's lifting sanctions on November 9th was a foregone conclusion. But Britain's actions are not that predictable. The Thatcher government has to be more attentive to the political realities in Rhodesia and their political fall-out in independent Africa than do members of the US Congress. African nations put maximum pressure on the Thatcher government during the Commonwealth meeting in August. Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum's \$150 million share in the Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, and Zambian President Kaunda opened the Commonwealth meeting with a strong statement condemning Thatcher's support for Muzorewa. As a result, Thatcher has now agreed that a new election as well as constitutional changes are necessary in Rhodesia.

One year ago when the Case-Javits amendment was adopted in order to avoid a close up-or-down vote on lifting sanctions, the Administration and Congressional liberals were allowing conservatives to set the terms of how the internal settlement would be judged, and under what conditions sanctions should be lifted. Liberals were fighting primarily for time. A State Department official made the surprising admission in response to recent Senate debate that "we made a pact with the devil, and now the devil has come to collect."

American conservatives may not win on the sanctions issue in the end. If the backers of the internal settlement lose, it will be conditions in Rhodesia and independent Africa that defeat them more than the politics of Washington compromise. ■

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