Dear Friends,

As AFSC's Southern Africa International Affairs Representative, Edgar (Ted) Lockwood carries responsibility for writing reports, initiating conferences, seminars, and personal contacts that support the work of the member nations of the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) in fostering greater regional development and economic cooperation. To be included on the mailing list write to AFSC, Africa Program at the above address. Contributions to defray mailing and duplicating costs are welcome.

My room at Maseru, Lesotho's Victoria Hotel had a glorious view. Beyond the roofs of the bustling town, the sun shone on a ring of handsome brown buttes with craggy cliffs. Could Moshoeshoe, the founder king of the Basotho nation, have used these very hills for his defense against the Orange Free State? Where was Thaba Bosiu, his famous fortress mountain which had never been conquered, symbol of national pride and history?

Invisible threats were also apparent. Behind the Victoria are the Kuena Apartments, where a year ago South African Defense Force (SADF) soldiers shot and killed Matumo Ralebitso, daughter of a former cabinet minister. She had had the misfortune to live next door to Mrs. Limpho Hani, the wife of an ANC leader. The SADF threw their grenade in the wrong apartment. Twelve Basotho died in that night raid in addition to thirty ANC refugees.

Down the main street a mile was the border post where South African border police held up hundreds of Mosotho trying to leave or enter South Africa in May, in June, and in July of 1983.

But South Africa was not just present as threat; it was present as fantasy: money, the good life of the consumer, the excitement of sex and violence.

As I cashed my travelers' checks at Barclay's, the teller asked: "Rands or Maloti?" I took Rands because I knew they would be easier to cash somewhere else. On the newsstand I could buy the Rand Daily Mail or The Star or The Friend every day. The Lesotho paper is weekly. I could buy Scope, South Africa's equivalent of Playboy or Guns and Ammo, a magazine about mercenary adventures, electronics and automobiles, or Ron Reid Daly's book about the Selous Scouts, which he used to head. The culture of violence was there. Where were the books about liberation? Where were the "progressive" books? Not available it seemed.
On the cover of the Lesotho telephone book is the beautiful, litesome body of an almost naked woman. Her small breasts are topped by inadequate triangles of beadwork. At her waist is a tiny G-string and a tiny beadwork loincloth. Her face is hidden. Is she black? Is she white? She seems to be ambiguously both. The Hilton Hotel, whose advertisement this is, promises a "5-star fantasy" and a "change that is as good as a holiday".

For me, the woman symbolizes Lesotho. Her history, her pride and tradition still there but sheltering a promiscuous ambiguity, subjected to prostitution by the invisible forces of power, money, domination, exploitation. Lesotho seems more victim than actor, more hostage than protagonist.

Is she living out a defiance of South Africa that is a 5-star fantasy? What changes are ahead for her as South Africa destabilizes her, by threats and by promised?

Destabilization: The SADRA Conference.

Destabilization and development were the themes of the inaugural conference of the Southern Africa Development Research Association (SADRA) at the national university in Roma, Lesotho.

We began with a thoughtful introduction by Moshoeshoe II, a monarch clad in traditional African dress whose gentle scholarly ways and democratic inclinations have made him popular on campus and in the nation. When he said that economic development and democratizing the political systems of the region were the most urgent and demanding tasks of our time, I wondered what the implications were for Lesotho. Of course, he must mean elections, but he is said to have no "clout".

The keynote address by Lesotho's foreign minister was a masterpiece of spontaneous rhetoric. It was an exposition of Lesotho's dilemma, caught between its commitment to fight apartheid and its vulnerability to South Africa's threats and promises.

While the conference papers that followed were interesting, I think I will simply summarize what I learned from them and from other conversations rather than try to report them in detail.

South Africa's Strategy As It Faces Crisis.

Since 1974, South Africa has been faced with a mounting crisis. With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, it lost two buffer states which could be counted on to cooperate in fighting liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia. After the failure of South Africa's military invasions into Angola and the scandal of Muldergate, which led to Prime Minister Vorster's fall, South Africa laid out a "total strategy" in a 1977 White Paper on Defense. No longer would South Africa rely simply on winning the hearts and minds of influential people; it must deal with objective realities rather than people's minds. If objective realities could be manipulated, if military force and economic incentives and disincentives were applied, then minds and hearts would follow.

When Pieter W. Botha came to power in 1978, he not only brought a mind seasoned by military reasoning (he had been Defense Minister) but a mind attuned to the strategic thinking of the major capitalist powers. He proposed that
South Africa, as the leading defender of capitalism and the strongest opponent of socialism in the region, should create a constellation of anti-socialist and pro-capitalist regimes tied to South Africa by joint projects so that by strengthening the economic dependency of the lesser states on South Africa, the black members of the constellation would be reduced to impotent political vassalage to the "mother" country, South Africa. The key to this concept was the installation of Bishop Abel Muzorewa as the leader of a "majority-rule" state, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

But when Zimbabwe's free elections gave Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 57 seats out of 100 and Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) only three, the key to the proposed constellation crumbled and broke into dust.

Even the most conservative states which are deeply dependent on South Africa's economy rejected the constellation concept. Instead, a loose regional grouping of independent black states was formed, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), one of whose avowed aims was to lessen dependency on South Africa.

At the same time South Africa's internal reforms, coming in the wake of growing strength and militancy of the African labor movement and the student movement, were overwhelmingly rejected. The success of the ANC in executing a growing number of attacks on government installations marked increasing danger.

A new strategy or at least a more careful precision of the strategy's requirements was needed. In 1980 Deon Geldenhuys, a leading academic consultant to the Botha Government, was commissioned to make a study. In a paper published in January 1981 Geldenhuys anticipated many of the subsequent South African moves. These were his main points:

A. Objectives:

1. Compel neighboring states to police their areas in order to prevent liberation movements from making incursions into South Africa, to deny them training facilities, transit routes or even offices.

2. Make certain that the Soviet bloc does not gain a political or military foothold in Southern Africa.

3. Strengthen all existing economic ties with black states.

4. Get black states to argue against mandatory sanctions (against South Africa).

5. Get black states to soften their anti-apartheid rhetoric.

One objective which is missing from the Geldenhuys' list but which remains a priority on South Africa's list of objective was to obtain recognition of bantustans by a member of the OAU which is vulnerable and which can then count on "culturally oriented" African states such as Senegal et al., to follow it.

B. Soft Option Tactics:

Geldenhuys recommended the following options, which rely on the vulnerability of the black states:
(1) Limiting or prohibiting use of rail and harbor facilities by manipulating use or availability of railway equipment or berthing facilities, by levying surcharges on goods or by restrictions on exports. (Already used against Zimbabwe.)

(2) Limiting the import of labor from black states (Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho?)

(3) Making access and movement through South Africa difficult by deliberate border post delays. (Lesotho)

(4) Curbing crucial imports by black states; i.e., food, oil, machinery, spares?, etc. (Zimbabwe)

(5) Withdrawing technical expertise. (Mozambique)

To make this program appear as something other than sanctions, which they are, "explanations" must be offered. Locomotives are withdrawn because traffic requires them elsewhere, etc., not because South Africa is bending Zimbabwe's back to achieve political ends. Lesotho's arms are "delayed" in Durban while end use is investigated. There is no boycott. Since South Africa argues that sanctions are economically irrational in her own case, she must not be seen to practice what she denounces in theory.

At the same time, South Africa is prepared to offer various "carrots" to achieve its ends. For example, Swaziland is offered part of Kwa Zulu and Kwa Ngwane or a new rail line that crosses its eastern side and links it to Richards Bay rather than Maputo.

C. Hard Option Tactics:

While Geldenhuys and other academic liberals see some hard option tactics as counter-productive, others, like R. K. Campbell of the Department of International Relations at Witwatersrand, reject all diplomatic considerations and presumably soft options that rely on diplomacy.

"All terrorist concentrations...must be attacked and destroyed... So called diplomatic considerations must not be allowed to interfere--that is the road to defeat." South Africa must not be deterred by Frontline state "propaganda". There must be no artificial limit imposed on the depth into Angola which the South African Defense Force (SADF) can penetrate in its operations against SWAPO." Detention without trial is a feature of every successful anti-terrorist defense. (Paratus April 1983).

To implement its Hard Option Tactics South Africa has perfected its use of specialized operations:

(1) Commandos to do hit and run operations.

(2) Use of Portuguese and white-Rhodesians in self-imposed exile and black specialist mercenaries.

(3) Ethnic battalions composed of the same language and cultural group as are present in a neighboring state for subversion, incursion and support of (4).
(4) Client "resistance" movements such as Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which are supplied, led and directed by the SADF. Genuine political base based on past work a plus but not necessary.

Vulnerability: The Precondition for Destabilization: Lesotho's Case.

Military Vulnerability.

Lesotho is a prime target for soft options because it is super-vulnerable. If South Africa is a military elephant, Lesotho is a mouse. How can a paramilitary of 2,000 persons confront one of the largest and best military forces on the African continent?

Lesotho's Foreign Minister Sekhonyana put it this way:

"We will not cut off our nose to spite our face. Who wants to start singing in front of a sclerotic elephant? We can never use Lesotho as a springboard of attack against South Africa because we can't afford to. It's just that simple. We just don't have options. Period."

Economic Vulnerability

Lesotho is an island of scarcity surrounded by plenty. It has no exits or entrances except via South Africa. Botswana has Zimbabwe; Swaziland has Mozambique, but Lesotho has no such options. Theoretically, Lesotho could be supplied to some small degree by air, but it is not a practical alternative, although the new 49-million dollar airport will accommodate Boeing 737's, 727's and 707's.

Exports are only 8% of imports. Imports in 1982 were over 500 million Maloti (Rands); exports were only 42 million, of which 15 million were in diamonds. A large part of the imports consist of purchases made by Basotho workers in South Africa, but approximately 30% of imports consists of food produced in South Africa or elsewhere.

How on earth, we must wonder, does Lesotho make up the difference between exports and imports?

First of all, it counts on the fact that South Africa gives employment to 150,000 Basotho. These immigrants send home 290 million Maloti a year in support of their families. Almost four times as many Mosotho work in South Africa as in formal employment in Lesotho. Most of the migrants are employed in the South Africa mines. In 1982 there were 117,683 (down from 123,513 in 1981). They sent home 51 million maloti in remittances to wives and families and another 76.7 million they had banked for them as deferred pay.*

Collections received from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are another important source of government revenue. South Africa collects, administers and remits all customs; excise and other direct taxes on behalf of itself.

*The government makes quite a fat profit from investing the deferred pay "float". With some $60 million on deposit it invests in South African debt securities at high interest rates while it pays the miners a mere five or six percent.
and the BLS (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) states in accordance with a formula worked out in the 1969 agreement, still in effect. Money from SACU amounted to 76 million maloti in 1982. Until 1980 Lesotho didn't even have its own currency. There are still more rands than malotis in circulation. They are totally interchangeable.

Hopes for new foreign investment based on cheap labor and liberal income-tax incentives have proved illusory. The South African market is heavily protected in favor of its own manufacturers. Lesotho cannot match the favorable infrastructure or generous industrial incentives of South Africa, nor does it have skilled labor or technological expertise. Its best bets seem to be textiles, auto components and electronics aside from the processed fruit, vegetables, and meat which are already exported to some degree. The asparagus, peas and beans I saw growing along the road to Roma were for the European Economic Community (EEC) not for home consumption.

One may ask: "How did such a state of dependency come about?"

One fact that should not be ignored is that only 13% of Lesotho is arable land capable of agricultural production. The remainder is pastureland and mountains. In 1969, the treaty which ended Moshoeshoe's war with the Orange Free State also took from his kingdom the rich wheat land west of the Mohokare River. Ladybrand, Ficksburg and Wepener once were Sotholand. As Basotho refugees piled across the river onto the arable lowveld which fringes the mountains, the overpopulation problem began.

Today, the chiefs have little or no land available to allocate to newly married couples. Seventy-five percent of all rural households in Lesotho have some member working in the mines, factories and farms of South Africa. The wages in South Africa are better than those in Lesotho. The result is a drain of young male adults that creates a village of young women who raise children alone. Migrant contracts now run 12 months where they were seven months five years ago. Migrants spend less time in Lesotho. You get a 50 Rand bonus if you report back in two months. Those with a migrant worker in the family average 1,500 Rands in income, those that do not average 400 Rands. The alternative is to stay at home and eke out a living as 465,000 people do by joining the "informal sector", selling whatever they can: tomatoes, etc. Only five percent of Lesotho's farms are profit-making.

Political Vulnerability

In addition to this sort of economic dependency, which arises necessarily out of conquest, population growth, and lack of resources, Lesotho has developed a political vulnerability, spawned by autocracy and South African meddling.

In 1965, the Basotholand National Party (BNP) defeated the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP). Chief Leabua Jonathan became Prime Minister the following year. At the next election, however, in 1970, when it appeared that the election results were running against him, Jonathan declared the elections null and void, suspended the Constitution and has ruled ever since through a Council of Ministers and an appointed assembly.

The Basotholand Congress Party went into exile in 1974 and later began a small-scale war of harrassment against BNP through the "Lesotho Liberation Army". These tactics, associated with the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle, are not universally approved by BCP inside Lesotho. BNP retaliated with repression that involved many human rights' violations.
Ironically, the BNP, which was originally considered pro-South Africa, is now accused of giving military support to the liberation movements in South Africa and is considered aligned with communist countries. In the past it was viewed as very anti-communist, reflecting the conservative influences of the Roman Catholic Church. The BCP, now seen as a South African ally, was linked with the PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress) and other Pan-Africanist liberation movements, such as ZANU. Thus it was seen as socialist, and dangerously radical. Politics make strange bedfellows and strange reversals.

After the January, 1981, SADF raid on ANC staff quarters in Matola, Mozambique, Lesotho chose to strengthen its ties with ANC and to initiate diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of Korea, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Cuba and Vietnam. These moves, designed to bolster Lesotho's position by bringing in the socialist world, alarmed conservative elements of the Catholic Church. At the same time, South Africa drew on Washington's store of anti-communist paranoia by alleging that Lesotho had turned into a pro-communist nest of intrigue. At the same time, the use of South Africa for bases, training and advice changed the character of BCP's liberation army in the eyes of many to a South African puppet.

**South African Tactics: The Lesotho Case.**

This state of vulnerability gives South Africa enormous economic and political leverage on Lesotho:

(A) **Manipulating the hunger for land.** After independence, Lesotho advanced its claims to portions of the Orange Free State. South Africa insisted that only the eastern boundary could be discussed. It then turned over a disputed portion of Griqualand, which had been in contention, to the Transkei and told Lesotho to discuss it with the Transkei, a suggestion which would have required Lesotho to recognize the reality of the Transkei.

(B) **Offering the big carrots.** For the past three years South Africa has stalled on implementing the recommendations of the Customs Union Commission. These recommendations would have increased the share of the SACU revenues to BLS states. Lesotho's foreign minister believes the delay is political:

"The view of South Africa was that were Lesotho to participate...in a broad regional dispensation perhaps this (objection) might fall away...South Africa was talking about a Constellation of States rather than maximizing and improving the customs union."

Joining the Constellation of States would bring many, many carrots:

- 100% loans for industrial projects.
- 60% loans for working capital.
- Rental subsidies for 20 years.
- Unskilled wage allowances of 30 to 100 Rands per month per person for seven years.
- Railway rebates 50 to 60%.
- Harbor rebates up to 50%.
- Training grants of up to 135% of costs.

But it would also mean accepting the bantustans as "independent" co-partners in the development scheme.
South Africa's Economic Sticks: Lesotho's Border Traffic.

Following the ANC Pretoria bomb blast in late May 1983, South Africa retaliated against Lesotho. Border security checks kept Basotho migrant workers sleeping on the ground for three nights on the South African side. Food deliveries were delayed. There was no fresh milk; South African newspapers disappeared. Lesotho urgently requested talks aimed at normalizing relationships.

For three months South Africa continued to exercise its squeeze. At a decision meeting with Lesotho, South Africa demanded that Lesotho turn over to it refugees whom it claimed were ANC "terrorists" or expel them to some third country not bordering South Africa. Lesotho denied that the ANC refugees were a security threat to South Africa or that they engaged in any anti-South Africa military or paramilitary activity. Of the names on South Africa's list, 26 had never been in Lesotho; 21 had come and gone and 21 were genuine political refugees who had never been involved in any crimes or subversive actions.

But in early September, a group of 24 of the most prominent ANC members in Lesotho including Phyllis Naidoo, left Lesotho for other parts of Africa. (One hundred had left for Maputo after the December 9, 1982 raid.) Whether they left "voluntarily" or were "booted" out is beside the point. South Africa's squeeze had succeeded. While Lesotho had appealed to the United States to mediate the dispute with South Africa, the United States had been in fact only too delighted to see ANC people leave Lesotho. The United Kingdom and the U.S. had said "Let them go!"

South Africa's Military Sticks: LLA/SADF.

In early May 1979 two bombs exploded in Maseru heavily damaging the central post office and various electrical installations. It was the opening attack in the Lesotho Liberation Army's war against the BNP Government. Later, LLA insurgents attacked Lesotho paramilitary at Butha-Buthe, an area in the north where a projected water supply tunnel for South Africa is to exit.

Assassinations of BNP and ANC sympathizers followed.

Meanwhile, the government undertook repressive counter-measures forcing BCP sympathizers to flee the country. Evangelical church people say that pro-BNP "goon squads" and government paramilitary forces have been guilty of many human rights' violations, including use of routine intimidation.

While Foreign Minister Sekhonyana emphasized that present LLA activities have shifted to the Transkei, other LLA factions operate from farmlands in the Orange Free State, from Qwa Qua, and in the northwestern mountains. In September and October, armed attacks were made on houses belonging to government cabinet ministers and on prominent BNP officials in various parts of the country.

While collusion with South Africa appears to be an issue within the LLA and the BCP, LLA inevitably is forced to use South African territory for its base and must have the support of South Africa in order to operate.

Meanwhile, military supplies ordered by Lesotho have been stacked up in Durban for seven months.
SADF Commando Action. The Herrenvolk Strike Back.

South Africa has not been satisfied with LLA's small-scale war. As 1982 wound to a close, South Africa was determined to show Maseru its own military muscle. The December 9 raid left 30 ANC refugees and 12 Mosotho butchered in cold blood.

For Foreign Minister Sekhonyana the raid illustrated the dominance of South Africa's military.

It was in his view the result of the "herrenvolk syndrome".

"Insofar as the boss is concerned, instant punishment to the native who has misbehaved is part of it...diplomatic initiatives in South Africa are today being swallowed up by the hawkish strategy of the military."

In his view, the South African attacks also reflect an unsophisticated and gullible intelligence system which buys wholesale information supplied by paid informers and then feeds government Ministries what they are all ready to believe. As an example, he cited the case of three Sotho girls, shopping in Ladybrand, who had sold South Africa "state secrets", invented tales which create paranoia about attacks from Lesotho.

"...in order to maximize Lesotho's security, it would probably be very helpful to give foreign aid to South Africa on intelligence gathering..."

Lesotho's Big Carrot.

Lesotho may be militarily defenseless and economically vulnerable, but she has one resource that South Africa's industrial heartland desperately needs: water.

While it's true that South Africa could pump Orange River water up from the Verwoere dam in the Orange Free State, it would be easier and cheaper to let the highland waters of Lesotho's Maluti mountains, where the Orange originates, flow north by gravity into the Vaal system that feeds the Johannesburg, Pretoria and Vereeniging complex.

The European Economic Community has provided a grant of 5.6 million Maloti from the European Development Fund to help Lesotho carry out a detailed feasibility study which will ultimately cost about 12 million. (South Africa is carrying the other half of the cost.) The pre-feasibility study contemplates a $1.4 billion project (1980 prices) over 20 years (1986-2006) with a series of five dams diverting water into a tunnel which will deliver 35 cubic meters a second to a reservoir in South Africa. The Ox Bow scheme first broached in the 1950's and later in 1970 contemplated only a tenth of what is now proposed to be delivered.

The EEC head representative I spoke with was most enthusiastic:

Lesotho will be selling water to South Africa instead of men. They will get 3½ times their present budget in revenues!" (3½ x M 269.7 million = 943.95 maloti, a truly astronomical sum for Lesotho.)

Two experts I talked to thought the revenues would run around 185-200 million malotis and that debt service might take 100 million of that. Furthermore,
the costs of the first phase (10 years +) are much higher than the later phases but will deliver only a third of the water. So it will probably be 1998 before the project breaks even, let alone makes money although, this is only a tentative projection and does not reflect the bargaining that must be done or the conclusions of the present study.

On the other hand, Lesotho may get an electric power system through the construction of three hydropower stations, if this is found feasible. (Lesotho presently gets all of its power from South Africa.) A diversion pond is planned so as to assure that if South Africa refuses delivery of water, electricity can still be generated. There also is the benefit of employing 3,000 construction workers. Lakes for fishing and motor boating would create a tourist attraction for South African holiday makers.

The church people I talked to raised some troubling questions:

What will happen to the rural communities whose valleys will be flooded?

Why is the government more interested in supplying water to South Africa than in supplying drinking water and irrigation to local communities that need them?

Since 35% of the outflow from Lesotho will be diverted from the Orange, what will be the effect on Namibia's economy? (The Lesotho water engineering expert I talked with said that SWAPO's objections are based on a misunderstanding. The Orange is not Namibian but South African. Its north bank was fixed by the same treaty that stipulates that Walvis Bay is South African.)

What is the net effect on the SADCC concept of lessening dependency on South Africa? The Nordic countries and some SADCC members are understood to be unhappy over the plan, arguing it will make Lesotho more dependent not less. South Africa is the sole possible customer for the water. While Lesotho argues, "We are asking for every ounce in the pound of flesh", there are clear limits to what can be demanded. Now the question may lie in Lesotho's willingness to pay South Africa's price.

U.S. and Western Involvement in Destabilization.

Clearly, it would be misleading to discuss destabilization without discussing western influence and interest in the region and particularly the U.S. role.

Most participants in the SADRA Conference saw the United States as the senior partner at least in South Africa's plan of destabilization.

Foreign Minister Sekhonyana argued that the United States advocates a sort of Monroe Doctrine for South Africa. As the dominant regional power, U.S. spokesmen like Lawrence Eagleburger claim that South Africa has the right to exclude foreign (i.e., non-Western and non-African) powers especially those who "import" violence. U.S. policies in Latin and Central America make it impossible for the United States to play "holier than thou" by criticizing South Africa's "kragdadigheit (toughness)".
The West would like to give growing western investments in the bantustans consular and diplomatic protection. Because of OAU objections, recognition could only be given to them if a member of the OAU broke ranks. Lesotho claims it has been selected as the OAU member that must do it, the most vulnerable one. It is now the key state.

But Lesotho has refused. It would amount to consenting to the de-nationalization of millions to South Africans.

"I do not know of anything which has been more sinister since Nazi Germany...than what the denationalization policy involves.

The trauma...is incalculable. This is sin...a crime against human nature."

(E. R. Sekhonyana)

On this issue, Lesotho stands firm even though it has buckled under the strain in regard to ANC's most prominent refugees.

But while western countries are circumspect about bantustan recognition, they also find Lesotho an important country in which to invest foreign aid. Foreign aid cannot be sent to South Africa but Lesotho can receive aid which also benefits South Africa. The most conspicuous example is the Highlands Water Project already mentioned. But there are others. A $4 million abattoir financed by the Danes will serve EEC countries with privileges of the Lome Convention, but for the immediate future (15 years +) the beef will be originating in South Africa's Orange Free State.

U.S. aid to Lesotho runs to $21 million, close to $20 a person. That is more than twice the aid the U.S. gives to Zimbabwe on a per capita basis. (Zimbabwe gets $60 million for 8 million population.) Swaziland, which gets $82 million, also gets more than Zimbabwe on a per capita basis. In both these countries aid is used for educational purposes, i.e., to construct an educated class of Mosotho imbued with Western ideas and concepts and to develop agriculture on a Western model.

But development aid does not seem so far to have produced self-sufficiency nor to have tackled the basic problems of a country that has too many people, too little fertile land, not enough skilled labor, too few resources, too few jobs and too much vulnerability.

What the Future Holds.

Lesotho has appealed to the United Nations for help in sheltering its refugee population. It seems doubtful that the United Nations will be able to do much to protect Lesotho from the kind of pressure that South Africa's sticks and carrots can apply. Lesotho has also asked the United States to pressure South Africa to desist from destabilizing Lesotho just as Mozambique and Zimbabwe have done, in regard to themselves. But the constructive engagement policy seems more like an endorsement of destabilization than its opposite. Clearly the United States wants Lesotho clear of ANC people and clear of socialist influence as much as South Africa does. Ten thousand of South Africa's refugees are in Lesotho. How many are "voluntarily" deported remains to be seen.
One clear consequence of the last year's destabilization efforts is the growing realization by the Lesotho Government that it must build a democratic united front if it is to survive the pressures that surround it. On November 11, 1983 the Lesotho Government announced it would hold elections next year but did not specify a date. Evangelical church people told me that the government is very unpopular and might not win a single seat. Similarly, BCP has scoffed at the election announcement as contrary to BNP interests especially in view of the alienation of the Roman Catholic Church. Such announcements have been made in the past but without effect.

But it may be that elections and broadened democratic politics are the only alternative in view of international condemnation of Lesotho's autocracy, its violation of human rights, and its own need to resist South African aggression.