



AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

SOUTHERN AFRICA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REPORT

LETTER NO. 6
from Ted Lockwood
Harare, Zimbabwe

February 22, 1984

Dear Friends:

As AFSC's Southern Africa International Affairs Representative, Edgar (Ted) Lockwood carries responsibility for writing reports, initiating conferences, seminars, and personal contacts that support the work of the member nations of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in fostering greater regional development and economic cooperation. To be included on the mailing list write to AFSC, Africa Program at the above address. Contributions to defray mailing and duplicating costs are welcome.

I returned a few weeks ago from a conference in Lusaka, Zambia which was a "first ever". Thirty-four organizations from seventeen countries met there from January 27 to the 30th to discuss how they could further the aims and aspirations of the Southern Africa Coordination Conference (SADCC). The conference, coming just before the annual donors' conference at which SADCC makes its project proposals, was primarily for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from donor countries but there were national NGO representatives from SADCC countries as well.

The conference came at a critical moment. Three years of drought, economic depression, depressed export markets, lack of critical foreign exchange and escalating South African military aggression have raised the necessity of regional cooperation to a critical level.

SADCC's History

SADCC was conceived in 1979 when Zimbabwe and Namibia seemed on the point of emerging as newly independent countries. In part, it represented a logical continuation of the cooperation of the five frontline states during the Zimbabwe liberation war and its extension into areas of reconstruction. People spoke grandly of a Marshall Plan for southern Africa. The initiative certainly had the support of key staff in the Commonwealth Secretariat, the European Economic Commission (EEC) and the international development agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

After a preliminary organizing conference held in Arusha, Tanzania in July, to set goals and priorities, the present nine states of SADCC (the five Frontline states - Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Zambia - plus Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe), met in Lusaka in April, 1980 and adopted the Lusaka Declaration. This document builds on the goals of Arusha and creates a program of action. The goals, which remain acceptable to a broad band of political opinion, including the South African liberation movements, were:

1. Reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa
2. Forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration
3. Mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies
4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation

It was clear from the start that a membership ranging politically from Malawi and Swaziland on the right to Mozambique and Angola on the left, could not agree on a common overt political program. For the hostage states, Swaziland and Lesotho, subject to the inexorable forces of South African political and economic muscle, such a program could have suicidal consequences. Instead, the emphasis was on a pragmatic agenda of economic development, on which all nine could agree.

While the second goal speaks of integration, the process chosen so far has been a relatively loose and voluntary one, a process of coordination of mutually beneficial projects rather than one of economic and political integration. SADCC is not a customs union or a free trade area nor does it have a central staff of any size. Its headquarters in Gaborone boasts no more than six people, two of whom are seconded by EEC. Actual sectoral development work, planning and financing are assigned to individual member countries. Thus Mozambique, for example, was assigned the top priority sector of Transport and Communications, which has its own commission. Zimbabwe has Food Security and Agriculture. Angola has Energy.

Perhaps at this point, it might be useful to review the status of those sectors particularly important or relevant to NGO's, as presented to the NGO conference.

Agriculture and Food Security (Coordinated by Zimbabwe)

The SADCC strategy for food security is based on these goals:

1. To satisfy the basic need for food of the whole population of the region and to improve food supplies for all people
2. To achieve national food self-sufficiency in terms of supply
3. To eliminate periodic food crises

While food production rests primarily on national efforts in each country, SADCC aims at supporting that process by guaranteeing "inputs" through regional production of seeds and animal reproducers, tools, agricultural equipment, fertilizers and pesticides.

Because of the drought, now in its third year, SADCC sees regional production of seeds as a critical need, in order to develop grains such as sorghum and millet that are resistant to drought stress. This will probably mean vigorous hybrids that push down roots faster than traditional strains.

At the moment, many countries face an inability to obtain any seeds at all for planting because of prolonged drought, aggravated in the case of Mozambique by war and floods. In many cases seeds that would normally have been planted have been eaten for food.

But it is not enough to produce food. It must be efficiently delivered to market in marketable condition. Of paramount importance is the reduction of food losses after production, conservation, storage, and food processing technologies, particularly in the peasant family farming sector. In Zimbabwe, for example, losses after delivery to the Grain Marketing Board are no more than 1%. But village storage facilities to prevent loss or spoilage are often quite rudimentary. Critical also for the improvement of village-level production is the availability of credits or grants that will enable peasants to buy fertilizer, and the delivery of technical help from extension workers.

In order to prevent food crises, the SADCC agricultural plan projects:

- an early warning system, in case of drought, first at national and then at regional level
- prevention of plagues and diseases
- creation of national and regional reserves of food
- regional mechanisms for emergency external aid

Ten projects to carry out these objectives have been developed.

The first of these is a technical assistance program which has financed meetings of the Consultative Technical Committees for the SADCC Agriculture Sector and various workshops, seminars and technical meetings. USAID (United States Agency for International Development) has provided most of the money for this program.

An early warning system costing \$6,383,181, of which national governments would pay a third, has been reported on favorably by FAO and funding is being sought.

A regional information system to gather scientific data costing \$758,000, may get Dutch funding and has initial FAO aid to start implementing the project now. A regional inventory of agro-ecological zones, soils, rainfall and irrigation possibilities and actualities, fertilizer resources, livestock, will take four years and cost \$520,380.

Other regional projects include a food reserve, post-harvest loss reduction, processing, marketing, and food aid studies. In addition, a study of recruitment and retention of professional and technical personnel is projected. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has agreed to fund the latter.

Henceforward, national projects with "regional implications" will be more commonly the order of the day than strictly regional ones. In fact, SADCC-approved national food security projects with regional implications now total \$110 million, as compared with the \$7 million sought for strictly regional projects.

Drought

Before SADCC had begun to implement its plan for regional projects, the area was struck by a series of droughts which have been the worst in the last fifty years and perhaps in all of known history. A conservative estimate of losses in U.S. Dollars for each SADCC country is as follows:

Botswana	\$120 million	
Lesotho	\$123.7 million	
Malawi	\$13.4 million	
Mozambique	\$154.1 million	(Angolan figures not available: drought area is under occupation by South Africa. Figures for Tanzania not available.)
Swaziland	\$29. million	
Zimbabwe	\$479. million	
Zambia	\$21.7 million	

These figures do not include losses in commercial and industrial sectors dependent on agriculture.

Rainfall in the area this year seems once again headed for a serious shortfall.

Under the present catastrophic conditions, countries in the region would be foolhardy not to accept emergency food aid even while recognizing the inherent dangers of relying on this assistance as opposed to strengthening the long-term ability of the region to overcome or eliminate such crises. These losses come at a time of world recession, high national debts and critical shortage of foreign exchange.

Estimated emergency food aid requirements are as follows:

(U.S. Dollar Million)

Botswana	\$ 41,116.
Lesotho	\$ 67,500.
Malawi	\$ 13,425.
Swaziland	\$ 1,074.
Zimbabwe	\$119,600.
Zambia	\$ 24,912.
Tanzania	\$ 30,357.

These figures do not reflect additional losses suffered by Swaziland and Mozambique in the wake of a cyclone which struck those countries January 28th and 29th with devastating effect causing floods in which agricultural crops, pesticides, fertilizers, infrastructure and livestock were destroyed. Mozambique

estimates that 225,000 hectares of food crops, due for harvest in February and March have been destroyed and 5,000 cattle killed. Material losses amount to \$6 million. Because of the foreign exchange crisis Mozambique cannot replace the equipment, animals and seeds without outside help. There is an immediate need for 1,000 tons of corn (open pollinated short season maize), 2,000 tons of peanuts and 1,000 tons of Nhemba peas to arrive before August.

Beyond emergency food aid, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have submitted proposals which seek to address the longer-term issue of crisis prevention through various irrigation schemes and infrastructure projects. Botswana is understood to be preparing a proposal for the use of the waters of the Okavango swamp in irrigating 250,000 hectares capable of producing 2.5 million tons of grain. But most schemes for irrigation so far are more modest in scope.

Agricultural Research (Coordinated by Botswana with major collaboration with Zimbabwe)

The largest regional projects in agriculture are in research:

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Improved land and water management | \$11 million |
| 2. Regional sorghum and millet | \$18 million |
| 3. Grain Legume Improvement | \$18 million |
| 4. SADCC Agricultural Research Center | <u>\$ 5 million</u> |
| | \$52 million |

Most of the money so far raised for these projects comes from USAID, but the political difficulties caused by Reagan Administration policy brought about a major behind-the-scenes controversy over the funding of the sorghum and millet project at the Lusaka meeting.

In November 1983 USAID-Zimbabwe and ICRISAT, the International Center for Agricultural Research in India, had signed an agreement for the project in which USAID would cover 14.8 million of the funding required. But at Lusaka USAID stipulated that Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola could not benefit from the grant. This conditionality flowed from basic constraints imposed by Washington. Tanzania cannot get aid until it clears up debt arrears. Congress has blocked aid to Mozambique. The United States does not recognize Angola.

Acceptance of regional aid which imposed donor-selected exclusions would vitiate SADCC's principles. Concretely, it would mean that scientists, research technicians and students from the affected countries could not participate in the training programs.

After hours of negotiations with USAID Official Head, Roy Stacey, a compromise was reached. The exclusionary language was withdrawn and the U.S. commitment was put in positive terms: aid would go to six of the nine countries. Funding for the participation of the three other countries would be sought elsewhere. It appears likely that Italy may be willing to pick up the tab. Clearly, Mozambique and Angola were unhappy with the result, which seemed to acquiesce to a degree the pick-and-choose policy of the United States, which penalizes the three countries of the region worst hit by South African aggression and/or economic crisis. While Mr. Stacey said he had been "pained" by the controversy and

assured NGO's that the three countries would benefit, the struggle did not enhance U.S. standing in SADCC circles.

Transport and Communication (Coordinated by Mozambique)

This sector, selected from the beginning as the single most important one, has had its own commission since 1981. A ten-person technical staff of Scandinavian and Italian experts works in Maputo.

Its first concern was to define concrete areas for a program of action, which would total an estimated \$2.5 billion dollars to complete. In order of priority these are:

- (a) rehabilitation and upgrading of existing regional transport systems
- (b) telecommunications
- (c) new projects
- (d) feasibility studies for new transport links

Capital investment projects in surface transport are grouped into systems which serve five ports: those in Mozambique, Maputo, Beira, and Nacala; one in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam; and one in Angola, Lobito. In addition, a group of intra-regional projects are focusing on upgrading major trunk roads and bridges.

Telecommunications projects involve rehabilitation, regional microwave radio relay systems, earth satellite systems, international telephone switching centers and telex exchanges. At the moment, much of the region's internal communications have to pass through Europe or South Africa and are considerably less efficient than its external service.

A number of regional airports are undergoing improvement.

Of primary concern to the Commission is the efficiency of ports and shipping. Containerization and facilitation of paperwork are key problems in SADCC ports, which have lagged behind in technical progress. More progress is visible in the field of rail and telecommunications operations.

Mr. Figueredo, representing the Commission, told us that "we are quite happy with the response up to now" of the international donor countries. \$678 million or 24% of total projects have been committed and \$450 million is under discussion. The Nordic countries have been the principal donors to this sector thus far.

In 1983, concrete results on the ground were for the first time visible even though financing, negotiated not by the Commission, and by the member state or states where the project is to be carried out, is a slow process.

The highest priority project at the moment is the Dar es Salaam port and its transport corridor. The need for locomotives on the Tazara rail system is one problem that has been solved. However, signals, training and maintenance are still under discussion with EEC, the Danish development agency (DANIDA) and the Italian Government.

In Mozambique, Finland has agreed to finance a containerization terminal at Nacala while France, Canada and Portugal have jointly financed the rehabilitation of the rickety Nacala-Malawi rail link to the extent of \$91.9 of the \$195 million dollars required.

The largest problem is not financing, but South African-backed destabilization, a process which should be seen as affecting not simply Mozambique but the entire region and the SADCC design. Blowing up a railroad bridge on the Beira line directly affects traffic from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana. In addition, South African propaganda through broadcasts and other channels undermines the confidence that SADCC countries have in each other by the dissemination of lies and distortions.

When asked whether SADCC states were willing to forego some of their national interests in favor of longer-term regional development, Mr. Figueredo stressed that there is a "natural willingness to cooperate" in the area of transport.

While a great deal of financing does involve aid tied to purchases of goods and services from the donor country, there is competition among donors and in some cases, local products and services are used. The technical unit does provide assistance in negotiating contracts to safeguard donee interests.

Training projects seem to be the area where NGO's could most logically make a contribution.

Energy (Coordinated by Angola.)

Since 1982 the Technical and Administrative Unit for Energy has had its headquarters in Luanda under the direction of the Angolan Minister of Energy.

The first step in the SADCC approach was to secure accurate data. With the assistance of Belgium, Angola carried out a study of the supply and demand for energy which was completed by September, 1982. Out of a detailed technical analysis of the regional energy situation a set of projects was developed as a first step to a comprehensive and integrated approach.

Four study projects have so far been financed. A preliminary study of self-sufficiency in oil has been completed. Since Angolan fuel oil is difficult to market because of its heavy characteristics, the possibility that other refineries may be able to treat it is under study.

Other projected studies are in the field of coal exports, conversion of the vast coal reserves into liquid fuels, electric grid links, and rural electrification.

Intermediate and low-level technology is the field most suited to NGO project participation. Some of these projects might be, for example, the conversion of waste materials into artificial fuel briquets, the development of efficient cooking stoves, or the training of rural populations in the preservation of forests. Two-thirds of SADCC's consumption of energy comes from burning wood; it is therefore apparent that conservation and replenishment of wood stocks are important goals. "The indiscriminate cutting of trees worries us a lot", the Angolan representative told us.

The Nongovernmental Organizations' Role
Perception of Home Countries

If there was one subject on which there was general agreement among NGO representatives from seventeen countries it was that SADCC is virtually unknown to the general public. It remains a topic known to a restricted circle of development agencies, academic experts and Africanists. In Europe, North America, Australia and even in the SADCC countries themselves, little or nothing appears in the popular media to assist in popular understanding. The exception may be the Nordic countries, who are major development partners in Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

In Germany, according to Martin Staebler of the Association of the Churches Development Services, Protestant development agencies regard their relationship with local churches as determinative rather than the vision or image of SADCC. Joris Biemans of Cebemo in Holland warned that NGOs must be "realistic" and not overestimate their influence on the Machiavellian real-politik of the cold war, on the public nor on the Dutch corporate and immigrant linkage to South Africa. In Belgium, France, and Portugal SADCC is not well-known, according to representatives of NGOs from those countries, nor have their governments made major commitments of aid to SADCC.

Brian Rowe of the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) reported that Canada is attracted to the "soft option" SADCC represents, i.e., assistance that is consistent with commercial interests and which does not require disinvestment or sanctions against South Africa. The anti-apartheid movement is stretched then to cover the issues surrounding the elimination of the system of apartheid. Presently, Concern for Central America has overshadowed southern Africa issues.

For the United States, Gail Hovey of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) reported that American aid to SADCC countries is tied to whether the United States has good political relations with the country. Thus Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, which are linked closely to South Africa and espouse no socialist goals get more aid per capita than Zimbabwe, which itself is now being punished for its political positions on such issues as Grenada. Mozambique and Angola do not get aid except for emergency food assistance. The anti-apartheid movement sees action on South African destabilization as the contribution it can most logically make to SADCC goals.

Terry Lacey of Cooperation for Development (U.K.) reported that there could have been no SADCC without EEC, that it perhaps represented the emergence of a European as opposed to an American foreign policy toward southern Africa, a policy which would encourage intelligent multinational capital to move from south to north while maintaining an "organized ambiguity" toward South Africa, i.e., simultaneously maintaining investment, intelligence and strategic links to South Africa. EEC NGOs should be wary of undermining SADCC objectives by undertaking EEC projects in South Africa.

In Australia, SADCC gets a mention "once in a blue moon" according to Russell Rollason of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid. While there are cutbacks in development aid, he saw the possibility of government and NGO interest in SADCC, especially in view of growing climatic similarities between dry-land areas of Australia and farming areas here in southern Africa.

Reporting on regional NGOs, Ibbo Mandaza of the African Political Science Association based in Harare, Zimbabwe, said that SADCC is not as well-known

regionally as are the Frontline States. Especially in the last two years, there tends to be popular skepticism about SADCC, particularly as governmental officials of the member states avoid the political aspect inherent in regional cooperation. The economies of the different countries seem nationally focused, and thus it is difficult to think regionally as each country sees its own interest first.

A Role for NGOs?

Reginald Green, who has been a key economic adviser to SADCC from the beginning, warned NGOs not to expect to be in on Council of Ministers' deliberations nor to expect to have much influence on donor countries' delegations. NGOs could work best with small projects at local levels perhaps in such areas as drought, improved seeds, food security, reforestation, and community services.

Terry Lacey of the Cooperation for Development suggested the following approach to project work:

NGOs might be able to work with special sectors within SADCC or in fields like health and education where bilateral aid is dominant. The sorts of "micro" projects which might be possible, he suggested, were:

transport: intermediate technology; training in vehicle repair

energy: economizing on wood fuel; development of wood stoves

agriculture: the field with most potential for NGO's - improvement of livestock, funding inputs to peasants, helping the system to work better without expatriate involvement, big technological change or intervention

In some cases, NGOs could work with their own governments in finding a place within a project dossier. In emergencies NGOs could best be of aid by avoiding the lone ranger approach and self-perpetuating emergency relief projects. In Mozambique and Angola, in particular, he recommended a slower, more coordinated NGO-consortium approach.

As Brian Rowe of CUSO pointed out, NGO's operating in the region are as diverse as the countries of SADCC. Some focus on relief, some on technical aid, others on fundraising. Some work closely with their own or SADCC country governments, some do not. Funding may be large or small. Some have operations on the ground; others work only through local partners. It was pointed out that there were many more national and regional NGO's than were represented at the conference who had a potential interest in SADCC's goals.

Agreed Actions In the discussion which followed, there was general agreement on the need to increase public awareness and support for SADCC's goals concentrating attention on churches, trade unions, political parties and development agencies. Specifically we agreed:

- a. to furnish a circular information letter on SADCC and the SADCC region to interested NGO's for a year
- b. to prepare a joint pamphlet on SADCC for campaign work
- c. to consider a joint film on SADCC

- d. to hold national seminars on SADCC
- e. to encourage journalists to tour the SADCC region

We agreed to explore the possibility of a greater degree of regional cooperation in our development programs.

If SADCC felt it appropriate to do so, NGO's would be willing to participate in discussions of SADCC's long-term plans in sectors such as food security, training, agricultural development and small-scale energy sources.

A Final Word on the Lusaka Meeting of SADCC.

The focus of the main session in Lusaka was on drought and agriculture, as was only logical, given the present crisis in the region. Senator Denis Norman, Minister of Agriculture of Zimbabwe, has reported that \$10 million toward drought relief and a fifth of the \$557 million total for agriculture had been pledged; final results will not be apparent for at least another month or so.

The United States tends to favor national projects or projects in agriculture and manpower managed by the "moderates". The United Kingdom appears unlikely to make fresh commitments. Canada is making a quite substantial new contribution -- worth \$125 million in Canadian money in the fields of agriculture, energy and transport to regional as opposed to national projects.

While SADCC's goals are widely accepted, a number of controversies have surfaced around its achievements, possibilities and future.

Dependence Given the desirability of SADCC countries to reduce their dependence on South Africa and on other sources of dependence as proclaimed in the goals, can SADCC at this point show progress in either of these directions?

Dr. Ibbo Mandaza, secretary general of the African Association of Political Science, in addressing a recent convocation of the association noted that major SADCC initiatives, almost all funding and even attendance at meetings reflects the dominance of North American and Western European countries.

"And in the meantime, these North American and Western European countries are trading with South Africa. The SADCC has become for them a soft option, a face-saving commitment and a dubious counter-balance to their involvement in South Africa."

Still, as Dr. Mandaza admitted, there has been significant progress in the actual delivery of improvements in the physical means of transport, which have the potential to make Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Botswana less reliant on routes that traverse South Africa. This is not to say that the major SADCC ports are operationally efficient compared to those of South Africa. They are not primarily because of lack of qualified instructors and training, but this is a major target for improvement.

The goal has always been lessened dependence not elimination of dependence on South Africa. The Transport and Communications Commission predicts that trade to and from South Africa will increase by 28% by the year 2000 while regional trade intra-SADCC will increase by 44% by that year. That's a gain but trade with South Africa will still be almost four times as great as trade inside SADCC. Furthermore, they predict the major regional trade flows will continue to be

overseas and to other African states, rising by 2,000 to 10.2 million tons out of a 15.5 million ton total.

There are certainly some signs that Mozambique in particular may be prepared to accept in the short-term further dependence on South African capital in such areas as tourism and mining and an increase South African port traffic in order to win possible surcease from the destabilization havoc currently being wreaked by the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) with South African backing. MNR's violence and destruction has wrecked development schemes and immobilized food and fuel deliveries. Drought, aggravated by war, has already cost Mozambique an estimated 200,000 lives. 45,000-60,000 Mozambicans have fled to Zimbabwe, itself drought-stricken.

In these circumstances, it is scarcely to be wondered at that Mozambique is being forced to consider all alternatives, including closer economic relations with South Africa and restrictions on African National Congress presence in Mozambique rather than to risk national suicide.

Furthermore, critics of SADCC do not seem to have an answer to the question of where capital and technical expertise for development projects is to come from if it is not to come from the west. Internal capital accumulation and technical expertise will be slow in developing at best.

Trade and Industry; Which Comes First? If SADCC is to succeed, it will in the end require a common industrial strategy in which industries and factories are planned to be complementary to, rather than competitive with, each other. As Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Zimbabwe's Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, recently pointed out:

"We produce more or less the same commodities and we end up competing among ourselves for markets in Europe, America or Japan."

Dr. Shamuyarira said that if regional cooperation is to succeed a common industrialization strategy must be developed. Major industrial projects such as pulp-making and steel should be sited in a country with the best advantage rather than in every country that can attract capital. (Zimbabwe's steel and wood products industry are having difficulties at this time.)

According to Reginald Green, the experience of the East African Community demonstrates that free trade does not lead to a more equal development but, on the contrary, benefits those countries already most industrialized and developed. ECA benefited Kenya most (although Idi Amin's reign contributed to its demise at an earlier date). SADCC deliberately chose not to have a trade sector and while discussions have been and will be held on a common trade policy, trade up until now is left to member states to negotiate, either by making barter arrangements or by negotiating over tariff protection issues on a bilateral basis. Zimbabwe and Botswana, for example, have recently negotiated an agreement on textiles whose import from the South African Customs Union area into Zimbabwe was undercutting local textile manufacturers.

Five of the SADCC states belong to the Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa (PTA) which is being promoted by the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. PTA aims to reduce tariffs through detailed general agreements. The Financial Gazette of Zimbabwe reports that seven SADCC members want trade to be a subject area and argue that improvement of trade links can be furthered by small projects. Zambia and Zimbabwe, it is reported, want some immediate accommodation

with PTA. At the moment, the conflict over what to do about trade and PTA remains unresolved.

ECA's advocacy of a different trade approach has included charges that SADCC is under northern domination. Vice President Mmusi, Minister of Finance and Development Planning, without naming ECA, pointed out that there was "no excuse for misunderstanding the nature and purpose of SADCC".

"SADCC is a product of the political will and the perceived economic needs of all our members."

That general statement reflects both the strength and the weakness of the SADCC structure. It was a genuinely African decision that created it. Yet its decentralized nature and its lack of political agreement do limit the extent to which it can proceed along the line of economic liberation from the grip of domination. Accepting development aid from industrialized "northern" countries may involve risks as well as genuine gains. But SADCC is a process in the course of evolution. Whatever its limits, its necessity seems equally clear.