Angola Weekly News Summary

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THE U.S. AND ANGOLA

Following the Congressional ban on secret U.S. aid to UNITA and FNLA, Henry Kissinger, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that the Ford Administration "is now seriously considering overt financial aid" to the two groups.

Kissinger claimed that there are now 11,000 Cuban troops in Angola, and said that "it is the first time that the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit." Kissinger also said this was "the first time the Congress has halted the executive's action while it was in the process of meeting that kind of threat," despite the fact that Congress eventually cut off funds for the war in Indochina.

Following the hearings, the Senate passed the Military Aid Bill which contained a provision prohibiting military aid for Angola.

Kissinger testified that the CIA is not involved in the recruitment of mercenaries in Angola, but when asked by Senator Charles Percy if U.S. funds are being used directly or indirectly to recruit American mercenaries, Kissinger answered, "it depends on how you define indirectly."

MERCENARY RECRUITMENT IN ENGLAND -- A COVERT U.S. OPERATION

Over one hundred British mercenaries, almost a third of whom are former Special Air Service soldiers, are reported to have left Britain for Angola.

The group is part of over 1,000 mercenaries being sought in Britain. According to John Banks, a "military advisor" to the FNLA who fought in Nigeria with the Biafra secessionists and in South VietNam, "the money and men are available." Mr. Banks says he gets his money from an unidentified European source. "I don't ask where the money comes from. I ask him for the money and he gives it."

The first group of mercenaries which totalled 128 was recruited by Security Advisory Services (SAS). According to two different spokesmen for SAS, a liaison officer in the American Embassy in London is working with SAS. He was identified by one of the SAS representatives as Major James L. Leonard, who is officially listed as an Assistant Army Attache. The American Embassy denied that Mr. Leonard or the Embassy has been involved in mercenary recruitment.
John Best, one of the spokesmen for SAS said his firm had received almost $600,000. SAS is being paid $412 per recruit plus a servicing and handling charge. Privates in the mercenary army get over $300 per week, officers over $400. Contracts are for six months, at the end of which time those who do not wish to stay on get a ticket to anywhere in the world. A $50,000 bonus has been offered for any Soviets captured. Best says he has received money through courriers and from the Zaire embassy in London, by bank transfers from Belgium, and from a doctor in Leeds.

Zaire has "officially" outlawed foreign mercenaries traveling through its territory. But the action was seen as purely diplomatic. One mercenary was quoted as saying, "It has all been arranged through the Zaire government." Shortly after the move, UNITA issued a call for foreign mercenaries.

While SAS claims it has terminated its contract due to "differences", the recruiting continues. According to the London Telegraph, more than $20 million, mostly from the CIA, is to be spent on recruiting British mercenaries. Recruiters hope to sign up 1,000 by the end of February in a big drive that is expected to last some six months. Britain has a high unemployment rate and recently demobilized 8,000 soldiers in army cutbacks. It is not illegal to recruit mercenaries in Britain for service outside British jurisdiction. A Labor Party MP is planning to introduce a bill that would prohibit such recruitment, but it is not meant to pass.

Under U.S. law, any citizen aiding a foreign government, colony, district or people in an act of war can be sentenced to three years in prison and a $2,000 fine.

ON THE FRONT

MPLA continued last week to press the military advantage it took so decisively late January, but fighting was light and war news slim.

The Popular Movement is maintaining pressure throughout the south of Angola, notably on the port city of Lobito, on UNITA's headquarters in Nova Lisboa (Huambo) and on Luso in east central Angola. Most Western reporters said that MPLA's advance was slowed by difficult terrain, lengthening supply lines, and extensive mining of roads and bridges, but the London Daily Telegraph added that MPLA "firmly retains the initiative while UNITA is almost entirely on the defensive." An MPLA spokesperson said South African troops are still defending Huambo.

MPLA now appears to control outright almost half of Angola from just outside Lobito in the west and Luso in the east to the northern border with Zaire.

According to the New York Times, MPLA's January offensive caused the complete collapse of the FNLA fighting force in the north. Refugees in Zaire reported that the retreat brought with it widespread looting, largely by units of the Zaire Army fighting alongside FNLA. "The retreating troops reportedly pillaged the towns to which they withdrew and that they are still holding," the N.Y. Times reported. (January 30) Four towns in northernmost Angola have been completely
sacked, according to refugee reports, and their populations have fled.

A spokesperson for MPLA said on February 4th that the Popular Movement had beaten back an attempt by a column of white mercenaries to advance southward from a point near the Zaire border.

**SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA**

In revealing interviews with Washington Post correspondent Bernard D. Nossiter (Washington Post, Feb. 3), South African Defense Minister Pieter Botha conceded that "4,000 to 5,000" South African troops are in Angola. He claimed that these forces were concentrated within a "buffer zone" 59 miles wide and stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Zambian border. This is the first admission by any South Africa official of the size of the South African invasion.

This statement about the number of South African regulars is significant in a number of respects. In the first place it confirms the large scale attack force deployed by South Africa in invading Angola. And secondly it exposes very clearly the duplicity of the U.S. Government. The latter has all along either not acknowledged the presence of significant numbers of South African troops in Angola, or spoken of vague estimates of between 1500 and 2,000 men. Official concealment of the extent of South African involvement thus adds further confirmation to the unfolding evidence of the collaboration between the U.S. and South Africa in launching the white racist attack on Angola.

In the same article correspondent Nossiter quotes Botha as stressing that the South African intervention in Angola needs the blessing of "at least one 'free world' power." Botha would not identify the power as the U.S. but it is noteworthy that he gave an evasive answer and did not make any outright denials of this. Nossiter quotes the South Africa press as contending that the "Angolan adventure" was arranged by the C.I.A. and B.O.S.S. (the Bureau of State Security, South Africa's secret police agency). When these reports were put to Botha, he is quoted as replying: "If it were so, it was not the only channel." Nossiter also cites "informed sources" in South Africa as saying that Patrick Moynihan (former U.S. ambassador to the UN), and the local U.S. Ambassador in South Africa, William Bowdler, were directly responsible for carrying through the U.S. initiatives to their South African counterparts.

These disclosures by Botha of his regime's direct collusion with the U.S. may be provoked by a feeling that South Africa had been abandoned by the U.S. Administration. On the other hand it may suit both the South Africans and the U.S. Government to give the impression of a rift between them as part of a new strategy of covert cooperation under a smokescreen of mercenary recruitment.

Nossiter also reported interviewing Robert Sobukwe, the banned Pan African Congress leader who spent many years on South Africa's notorious Robben Island prison and is now under house arrest in a small South African town. "Sobukwe," said Nossiter, "hopes and expects -- like most blacks here -- that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola will triumph in Angola." Sobukwe also told Nossiter that Mozambique shattered the myth of white South African invincibility, and that what was left of the image of white power received another blow from
THE CRISIS IN ZAMBIA

Politically and economically troubled Zambia released its annual budget for 1976 to the public last week. The budget revealed that in 1976 the Zambian Government will receive no revenue from copper, its primary commodity which, in previous years, has brought in up to 90% of Zambia's export income. (New York Times, Jan. 31) Two days before announcing the new budget, the Government imposed a national state of emergency. President Kaunda explained the need for such a drastic measure as necessary to combat "foreign subversion" and a faltering economy, both precipitated in part by the war in Angola.

Three British citizens, a professor at the University of Zambia, Lionel Cliffe, and two journalists, one from the Financial Times, and the other from the Daily Telegraph, have been detained by the Zambian Government. No reasons for their detention have been disclosed, nor is it known whether Zambians or other foreigners have been arrested since the imposition of the state of emergency.

Kaunda argues that the state of emergency is in large measure a response to fears of growing Soviet influence in Zambia and the threat to Zambia of a "Soviet dominated" MPLA victory. In an attempt to provide proof of outside intervention in Zambia, the Government has alleged that student demonstrations at the University protesting Zambia's failure to recognize the MPLA-led Government of Angola were organized by embassies of countries supporting the People's Republic of Angola, particularly the Soviet Union. Raising the spectre of a "Soviet menace" is a strategy often used in the western world to build support for strong authoritarian political action. In Zambia, this argument serves to divert attention away from the fundamental elements of Zambia's political and economic dependency which are at the core of its present crisis.

As a dependent economy, Zambia's economic development has relied totally on the extraction of copper controlled and financed by western capital. As a result, Zambia suffers from such agricultural underdevelopment that it has had to import basic food products. Since the present ruling elite in Zambia has derived its power and status from this single industry economy, economic diversification has not been a priority because such diversification would broaden the political base for a potential challenge to those in power who are closely linked to western copper interests.

The price of copper is determined by the world market which is dominated by western capitalist interests. When the copper price falls as it has recently, an economy dependent on copper is extremely vulnerable and, as is the case with Zambia, severely weakened.

Zambia's economic dependency is heightened by its landlocked geographic position. To get to the world market, Zambian copper must be transported to the sea through a third country. One route is by
rail through Angola, now closed because of the war. Another is by rail through Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) to ports in Mozambique, but President Kaunda closed the border with Rhodesia in 1973 in support of the international sanctions policy imposed against the illegal white minority Smith regime. A third outlet is through Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, but this port does not have the facilities for handling large quantities of copper.

A reopening of ties with Rhodesia is being advocated by some members of Zambia's ruling elite. However, unless there is some type of resolution of the struggle between the Zimbabwean Black majority and the white minority government in Zimbabwe, such a drastic reversal of Zambia's foreign policy would be difficult for the Zambian Government to justify both to the more progressive sectors of the population within Zambia and to other African countries.

During the 1960s, Zambia has given strong support to the liberation movements throughout Southern Africa: FRELIMO in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, and SWAPO in Namibia. For a long time, UNITA was prohibited from operating inside Zambia. Zambia's policy switch and current support for UNITA and role as a major conduit for both U.S. and South African assistance can best be understood in the context of Zambia's faltering economy which has led in turn to the political instability threatening the very survival of the Kaunda Government.

Last week's disclosure of the annual budget did not call for drastic economic outbacks as expected and rumors of substantial low-interest or interest-free loans from South Africa persist. In this light, it is hardly likely that Zambia would agree to play a major role in furthering U.S. interests in Angola unless Zambia was receiving substantial American assistance in return.

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PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, LOPO DO NASCIMENTO, SPEAKS OUT ON ANGOLA'S FOREIGN POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT

"It is unnecessary for me to underscore the fact that we intend to carefully guard our newly won independence, for which we have fought for so long. It is the pivot around which the main lines of our foreign policy are organized."

"To be frank, it goes without saying that the basis of our attitude will be nonalignment. This obviously does not exclude relations with any country willing to respect our independence, our sovereignty, our proletarian internationalism and the progressive nature of our revolution."

"No aid will be rejected and we can affirm that no foreign power will install military bases in Angola."

continued...
"A revolution cannot be exported. We are prepared to cooperate economically with neighboring countries if they respect our basic orientation... Cooperation, as I was saying, with the sole exception of imperialist and racist South Africa, against whom we will always support our African brothers in their struggle against apartheid and colonialism."

(This interview appeared originally in Afrique-Asie and the English translation in the Guardian (New York), Feb. 4, 1976)

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** NEWS FLASH NEWS FLASH NEWS FLASH NEWS FLASH **

Sierra Leone and Cameroon officially recognized the People’s Republic of Angola during the past week, bringing the total of African countries extending diplomatic recognition to the PRA to 25, more than a majority of the member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Membership in the OAU follows automatically when a government has been recognized by a majority of the member states, but unless another special meeting of the OAU is called, the PRA’s membership will not become official until the next OAU meeting in June.

** MONEY NEEDED FOR THE ANGOLA WEEKLY NEWS SUMMARY **

We need your support badly. If you haven’t corresponded with us recently to either make a donation or to tell us why it is important for you to receive the AWNS, please do so. We may have to start dropping people from our mailing list whom we have never heard from.

Also, buying MPLA solidarity buttons is one way to both support us financially and to publicize the MPLA and the struggle of the Angolan people, especially if you buy them in quantity and sell them in your community. So far, we have sold over 7,000 buttons. We would like to sell 10,000 more.

PRICES: 50¢ each; 35¢ for 10 or more; 25¢ for 100 or more.

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ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT THE PRA

The Southern Africa Liberation Committee (SALC) in East Lansing held a two-day conference on the "Angola Crisis" at Michigan State University on January 29-30. The program featured a speech by Winslow Peck of Counter-Spy on the role of the CIA. Workshops were held on organizing -- on a statewide level and among youth -- around legislation to oppose U.S. involvement. SALC is circulating a petition on Angola which they hope to place as an ad in papers in Michigan. They have prepared a two-page chronology on Angola and an article on the CIA in Angola. Their address: 1118 S. Harrison, East Lansing, Mi.

In San Francisco, many demonstrators marched outside the Fairmount Hotel on February 3 while Henry Kissinger delivered an address on US-Soviet relations before the World Affairs Council. Pittsburgh has joined the list of cities in which demonstrations will be held on February 7. The Pittsburgh demonstration will be held outside the international headquarters of Gulf Oil.

In New York, two teach-ins were held on February 4, MPLA day. The Pan African Students Organization in the US sponsored one event at Columbia University, and the U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement held another in Brooklyn. Both featured speakers on the meaning of the liberation struggle. In Toronto, a major demonstration was organized by the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa and other groups.

MPLA Solidarity Committees have recently been formed in Binghamton, New York and in Seattle, Washington. The Seattle group is sponsoring an Evening of Solidarity with the Angolan People on February 7th. Their address is P.O. Box 15171, Wedgewood Station, Seattle, Wash. 98115. In Binghamton group has already sent in contributions to the MPLA Material Support Fund as well as some signed petitions.

SEND US NEWS OF ACTIONS IN YOUR AREA!!

RESOURCES

-- Two books which provide excellent background information on the current struggle in Angola are now available for purchase through the MPLA Solidarity Committee:

Davidson, Basil, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People  price $3.00

Africa Research Group, Race to Power: the Struggle for Southern Africa  price $3.50
(proceeds from this book go to liberation movements in Southern Africa--ask your local bookstore to stock this book)

-- The American Committee on Africa (305 E. 46th St., N.Y., N.Y. 1001) has put together a comprehensive information packet on Angola which sells for $1.50.
By MICHAEL T. KAUFMAN
Special to The New York Times

LUANDA, Angola, Jan. 30—The place is called Rangel, a sprawl of tin-roofed mud shacks without running water or electricity in which 40,000 people live. It is one of the 15 Luanda slums that ring the modern center of this city and that together house some 300,000 people.

The dirt roads of Rangel are teeming with life as many of the balconied apartments overlooking the sea are shuttered, abandoned by their Portuguese owners. In Rangel yesterday morning groups of men helped each other brick over the shacks children sang revolutionary songs in day-care centers and women in a recently improvised market sold merchandise ranging from hurricane lamps to beans and juju herbs.

All of this activity has been spurred by an unusual unit of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola called the Division for the Organization of the Masses, commonly referred to here by its acronym Dom. At the regional offices in Rangel several dozen men and women were lined up yesterday with their photographs seeking their Popular Movement membership cards.

Inside the building, an official, Constainato dos Santos, who calls himself Tinito, explained that there are three forms of membership: "There are the sympathizers, then there are the adherents who have shown a greater commitment and then are the mills who are the soldiers." Tinito, a 29-year-old former law student who spent seven years in a Portuguese prison camp for his Popular Movement activities, said that 700,000 people had so far been enrolled in the movement in the greater Luanda region, each given the identity cards bearing one of the three designations.

A System of Cells

"When the people apply we have them checked by members who are their neighbors and then we assign them to groups or cells of 10 or 12," he said, adding that the form of Dom organization follows that of the originally clandestine Popular Movement, the nationalist force that was largely born in these slums.

He said that together with the worker's councils, which have either taken over or joined with management to run industrial plants, the Dom councils represent "the people's power."

He said that the councils served as both vehicles for political education and something of a social-work agency. Requests for schools, housing materials, and transport facilities originate at the cell level and are transmitted through regional centers to the movement's central committee, which then allocates resources to the central DOM agency which in turn funnels them to local units.

During a three-hour walking tour of Rangel with Tinito as a guide it was impossible to determine how efficiently or widely the resources were being distributed. But it was apparent that a revolutionary enthusiasm and neighborhood cohesion had taken hold.

Women using brooms made of twigs swept common dirt alleyways. A man and three boys were patching a damaged wing of a house belonging to a crippled neighbor. At a day-care center establishing by the movement a 16-year-old volunteer teacher led 4-year-olds in a militant song. Slightly older children did elements of the Portuguese sentences.

Growth Lag Discussed

"We think that this kind of organization," said the bearded French-speaking organizer, "is our own revolutionary adaptation and comes from our special experience. It is an irony that if we were given independence in 1961 like other African countries we would not have had a chance to develop our consciousness and nationalism through struggle. We might have been a neocolonial country but now we have achieved real unity."

Much of the fervor in Rangel and in the daily political dialogue throughout this city is reminiscent of discussions of participatory democracy on United States campuses in the late 1960's, though here the rhetoric gains something in authenticity when the presentations are often illiterate and poor.

Some skeptics suggest that this mood is ephemeral, doomed to expend itself once the war ends and diverse elements of the Popular Movement come into political conflict.

They are answered by men like Tinito, who claim that the momentum of popular power cannot be subverted.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JANUARY 31, 1976