

MOZAMBIQUE: VULNERABILITY AND PRINCIPLES

On March 16, 1984, the People's Republic of Mozambique signed with the Republic of South Africa an "agreement on non-aggression and good neighbourliness" called "The Accord of Nkomati," after the river that forms part of the common border between the two nations.

Reaction in the West has been varied. Knowledgeable students of southern African politics were not entirely surprised, especially since Angola too had reached an understanding with South Africa only the month before. The Western establishment—governments and the mainstream press—saw this as success of Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy and of South Africa's policy of "thump and talk." They have claimed that this was further vindication of those policies and a harbinger of peace and stability in southern Africa. Anti-apartheid forces and their supporters, on the other hand, have been skeptical. Viewing the Accord as coercion of a principled but vulnerable Mozambique, they have described it as a setback since South Africa appears to be successfully, even if only temporarily, diverting attention from the single root cause of southern Africa's instability: the apartheid system. Finally, most observers have wondered about the causes, terms, and implications of the Accord: Has Mozambique sold out? Has South Africa imposed, through the barrel of a gun, harsh terms that Mozambique will abrogate at the first safe opportunity? Has the African National Congress (ANC) been crippled? Will South Africa keep its end of the bargain and stop destabilizing Mozambique?

This ISSUE BRIEF seeks to throw some light on the circumstances surrounding the Nkomati Accord. It examines both American relations with Mozambique and the internal situation in that country. It also reproduces the text of the Accord. The examinations are preceded by an interview with Roberta Washington who lived in Mozambique for over four years working for the Ministry of Public Works and is currently the coordinator of the Mozambican Resource Center in New York City.



"THE SIGNING OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD REFLECTS AN ATTEMPT BY MOZAMBIQUE TO GAIN SOME BREATHING SPACE TO IMPROVE SOME SITUATIONS INSIDE THE COUNTRY. IT IS A NEW TACTIC, NOT A CHANGE OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES."

Roberta Washington, Coordinator, Mozambican Resource Center, New York City.

Does the signing of the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa signal a fundamental change in policy or principle on the part of the Mozambican government?

WASHINGTON: No. The signing of the Nkomati Accord reflects an attempt by Mozambique to gain some breathing space in order to improve some situations inside the country. It is a new tactic, not a change of fundamental principles. By signing a non-aggression pact they hope to gain some small measure of peace and security, enough to allow them to develop the country in the manner they have planned to since independence.

Has a more pro-Western element assumed control of FRELIMO?

WASHINGTON: No, not at all. There has been a great deal of confused talk about Mozambique's turn to the West, which I think goes back to the way the U.S. and other countries have viewed Mozambique. Immediately after independence Mozambique was portrayed as pro-Chinese; later it was described as being pro-Soviet; today it is the notion that Mozambique has become pro-Western which is being publicized. Basically, the fundamental orientation of the FRELIMO government is that of non-alignment, and they believe in doing what is necessary in that regard. As a sovereign nation they need to have relations with many countries and to exercise their independence without being labeled pro-Western or pro-Soviet.

Many people have said that they understand why Mozambique had to sign the Accord but at the same time they question the manner in which it was done. Would you care to comment?

WASHINGTON: I think the question concerns what Mozambique's options were. In the final analysis it is only the government and people of Mozambique who can best define their options.

What are the implications of the Nkomati Accord for SADCC, the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Council?

WASHINGTON: Mozambique's point of view seems to be that by signing the Accord they will have the freedom and security necessary to carry on the kinds of projects needed to make SADCC a success. Of course this assumes that South Africa will actually end its sponsorship of the MNR, and that the Mozambican army will then be able to eliminate the MNR. Many of SADCC's projects involve the development of railroads and are meant to provide the landlocked members easy access to seaports without going through South Africa. A major problem has been that these projects could not be implemented because of MNR's attacks. One of the reasons South Africa's destabilization program targeted Mozambique's infrastructure was to destroy SADCC. In addition, Mozambique's historical dependence on South Africa started long before independence, and although SADCC was designed to eventually alleviate this, the reality is that some structural dependence still exists.

How important a problem do you think the MNR has been?

WASHINGTON: The MNR has been one of the most devastating problems Mozambique has faced since independence. It has been more than just an element responsible for the deaths of many. Its acts of random terror have created a tremendous feeling of insecurity: farmers have been afraid to go out to their fields because of fear of attack; villages have been raided, people kidnapped and killed. Not only have Mozambicans been terrorized, but foreigners working on economic development projects have been similarly threatened. No government wants the lives of its citizens endangered in foreign lands and the resources it has invested in aid projects jeopardized, so countries which had been lending assistance began to pull back. At the moment, the MNR is still a problem. The Accord requires each country not to allow the use of its territory as a base for armed attacks on the other; and yet during the talks South Africa supplied the MNR with enough armaments and materials to allow them to intensify their activities. There are still many acts of violence. While MNR activity was localized in the central part of the country before the talks, the focus now seems to be in Maputo Province. The army, though effective in many areas, cannot be every place at once in a country as large and with borders as long as Mozambique's.

The MNR has little popular support and the FRELIMO government could really get rid of it if the Accord were abided by. However, they will not go away overnight, and

the Mozambicans were not expecting it to. At the same time, they know that until they get rid of the MNR they cannot have the kind of country-wide development which is necessary. People in the country must be made to feel secure and to believe that the society they are trying to build is possible. Civilians are now asking to be allowed to join the militia which means arming more and more citizens and spending more and more money for arms. The money spent on security and defense could otherwise be used for education and health facilities, and a host of other things needed to improve the quality of life.

What impact has the Accord had on Mozambique's relationship with the ANC?

WASHINGTON: The ANC, probably better than anyone else, understands the crisis inside Mozambique. The Accord does not have to mean—and I do not think that either Mozambique or the ANC would allow it to—the breakup of their relationship. If there is such a breakdown or negative change it would play into the hands of South Africa.

South Africa shouldn't think that the Accord will eliminate the ANC because the ideals that the ANC is fighting for are shared by the majority of South Africans. Even if ANC members leave Mozambique, it does not mean the end of ANC; it just means turning to new tactics. No one should think South Africa can destroy the ANC through the signing of agreements with any or all of the frontline states.

The press has reported that Mozambique credits constructive engagement with the recent developments in Southern Africa and hopes for Reagan's re-election so that U.S. policy will be consistent. Can this be true?

WASHINGTON: Several press reports which seemed to suggest this were not, as far as I could ascertain, based on any official Mozambican policy statement. I do not believe that anything positive has happened in Southern Africa because of constructive engagement—a policy which has left South Africa free to systematically destabilize Mozambique and other nations in the region. An effective U.S. policy would have said to South Africa "You cannot attack your neighbors; we are not going to put up with it." Instead, constructive engagement allowed South Africa to bomb and invade with impunity. The Reagan administration put no real pressure on South Africa to change either its internal system of apartheid or its relationship with other countries in the region.

Do you expect this Accord to last?

WASHINGTON: It is hard to tell. I think that the Mozambicans will hold up their end. Mozambique hopes the Accord will last because they would like to get rid of the MNR. It is difficult for me to have the same kind of faith in South Africa, but it is possible that Pretoria will fulfill it too. At the present time there is no concrete evidence that South Africa has violated the terms of the agreement. However if MNR attacks continue the way they have, Mozambican officials may justifiably become suspicious.

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545 Eighth Street S.E., Suite 200
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Niikwao Akuetteh Research Fellow
Cecelie Counts Contributor
James Steele Research Assistant
Menda Ahart Administrator
Randall Robinson Executive Director

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U.S. administrations historically have paid little attention to African countries and Mozambique has been no exception. What fleeting interest policymakers have shown has been only on occasions when it had been judged that "more important concerns" were at stake. In Mozambique's case these concerns have been three:

- strategic—Mozambique's bearing on the situations around the Horn, the shipping lanes around Africa's southern tip, and Western domination of the Indian Ocean;
- ideological—a self-proclaimed Marxist regime, the FRELIMO government could become a disturbing example of a successful, blackruled, socialist nation;
- white rule—Mozambique's principled support of the forces opposing white supremacist systems threatened these systems and their Western supporters.

The formation of FRELIMO in 1962 and its subsequent launching of armed struggle in 1964 were overshadowed by U.S. concern over political developments on the other side of the continent. Not until 1969, when the U.S. perceived Western hegemony over the Indian Ocean threatened by the new Siad Barre regime in Somalia—especially its request of Soviet aid and its desire to oust U.S. forces from bases in Somali territory—did U.S. officials awaken to the potential significance of Mozambique. Ever since, political events within Mozambique have been evaluated by U.S. government officials chiefly for their potential impact on the escalating rate of change in southern Africa. When faced with the prospect of new socialist African governments after the 1974 coup in Portugal, the U.S. elected to concentrate its destabilization efforts not in Mozambique, but in mineral rich Angola—the only Portuguese colony ever to have been profitable for investors. Even though American policymakers found FRELIMO's political ideology problematic, they quickly recognized the new Mozambican government, in contrast to Angola where they not only denied the MPLA government recognition, but subverted it through covert action.

Rhodesia and South Africa, on the other hand, viewed the 1975 triumph of FRELIMO as a direct political threat, since for these white settler regimes, colonial Mozambique had been both a political buffer and an economic conduit. Once the Zimbabwean liberation struggle intensified in 1976, the critical assistance that the new FRELIMO government provided to Robert Mugabe's ZANU put Mozambique at heightened risk. While Americans evaded the Rhodesian sanctions, Mozambique sealed its borders, losing millions of dollars as a result. The U.S. government offered only mild protests when Rhodesia bombed Mozambique repeatedly.

Citing several reasons—ideological differences, Mozambique's refusal to vote with the U.S. in condemnation of the Soviet role in Afghanistan, FRELIMO's support of the ZANU forces, and questions about Mozambique's human rights record—American officials refused to certify Mozambique for further economic assistance until 1980. While in 1976 Congress did allocate the sum of ten million dollars to help Mozambique uphold the sanctions, it prohibited further aid unless and until the Secretary of State certified that such aid would be in the interests of the United States. When in 1981 Maputo announced its infiltration of a local CIA network supplying South Africa with sensitive information, and subsequently expelled several U.S. embassy officials, the U.S. suspended five million dollars of humanitarian aid. In contrast, during that same year when South Africa expelled a U.S. embassy official for espionage, the U.S. retaliated only by ordering a South African of comparable rank to leave the U.S. Later the U.S. did contribute to SADCC but specified that Mozambique and Angola were ineligible for any such funds. When the U.S. later announced that it would contribute to an international emergency assistance fund for Mozambique, this was considered a major breakthrough.

As important to American-Mozambican relations and to the Nkomati Accord as the direct policies have been, the US policy that has had the most profound effect by far is one that ostensibly has little to do with Mozambique: the Reagan policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. However, it takes little insight to realize that but for "constructive engagement" the Nkomati Accord would be unlikely at this time. Not only did it give South Africa a free hand in destabilizing its neighbors, but its chief architect, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, actively participated in bringing Mozambique and South Africa to the negotiation table and keeping them there.

The U.S. government has given FRELIMO little credit for its accomplishments during the first five years of independence: increasing the number of children attending school from 700,000 to 1.7 million; enrolling 400,000 adults in literacy programs; and devoting one-third of the national budget to the provision of free healthcare and education. Rather, the U.S. media systematically distort the Mozambican picture. The country is rarely covered except negatively. Thus the FRELIMO regime has been portrayed as a Soviet puppet. The problems created when Maputo's population jumped by more than 100,000 in only 18 months were given far less attention than was the government's decision to issue city resident cards.

Lately however, Americans appear to have begun changing the negative attitude towards Mozambique. Journalists have reported detecting a sudden "turn to the West" on the part of Mozambique. While this interpretation ignores FRELIMO's consistent attempts to establish normal relationships with the U.S. as well as Maputo's role in Zimbabwe's independence negotiations, it does help explain recent developments in U.S.-Mozambican relationships. In 1983, the first U.S. private investment since independence began with Exxon's decision to begin on-shore oil exploration. A new U.S. ambassador was appointed and a partial waiver of the State Department's ban on developmental assistance was granted after Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord.

News of Mozambique's decision to open talks with the World Bank on the subject of membership, and to attend a meeting of the Lomé Convention as an observer, was reported with glee by Reagan administration officials seeking to claim African policy successes. However, some observers of American politics are skeptical of this sudden election-year understanding of independent Mozambique's long standing aspirations. □

The modern state of Mozambique won its official independence in 1975; however, the burdensome characteristics of its political economy developed over a long, largely colonial, period of some 500 years. Three of these characteristics are particularly significant in understanding Mozambique's current predicament: an economy strongly linked by colonial rulers to South Africa's; the high cost of independent Mozambique's support of liberation forces in southern Africa; and a weak food system.

When the Portuguese first "discovered" Mozambique in 1498, they found an already vibrant economy based on external trade largely with the Arab World and Asia. Although Portugal's subsequent control allowed the West access to Mozambique's resources, the colonial authorities chose to concentrate on two main activities: first, exploitation of the indigenous labor force, and second, regulation of trade and transportation.

Easily the most populous of all the Portuguese colonies, Mozambique's human resources carried important economic significance for the Portuguese. While precolonial Mozambique had evidenced instances of indentured servitude, and while its location spared Mozambique the worst ravages of the Atlantic slave trade, the Portuguese colonialists carried the treatment of people as merchandise to new depths. Not only did they establish an elaborate system of domestic slavery, but they also exported able-bodied Mozambicans as a primary source of foreign exchange. The flow of Mozambican labor to South Africa began as early as 1857, forty-two years before officials formally sanctioned (in 1899) the transition from slavery to the forced labor system. A decree "allowing" Mozambicans to work in South Africa's Cape Province was signed in 1875, and by 1897, the first monopoly over the flow of Mozambican labor to South Africa had been granted. By 1909, the foundations had been established of what became a formal bilateral agreement in 1928.

Besides labor, transportation was the second major element of colonial Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa. The 1928 agreement required South Africa to use Maputo port facilities for at least 47.5 percent of all exports from and imports to the Transvaal. By 1917, a third of all Mozambique's revenue came from customs duties and shipping fees paid by South Africa. South Africa's development of Mozambique's transportation system^{®MDNMπ} continues to haunt Mozambique today.

Thus the economy inherited by FRELIMO is dangerously dependent on South Africa—a situation the apartheid regime continues to exploit. South Africa decreased its employment of Mozambican workers by 60 percent once Portuguese rule ended, and in 1978, stopped paying wage remittances in gold. This resulted in an immediate Mozambican loss of 2.6 billion dollars in foreign exchange, almost twice the \$1.4 billion Mozambique then owed to foreign creditors.

In addition, Mozambique's unique geographic and historical circumstances thrust it into Zimbabwean affairs, a role for which it has paid a high price. As a concrete act of solidarity, FRELIMO closed Mozambique's borders to Rhodesian trade in 1976, losing approximately \$500 million in fees during the four years which preceded Zimbabwe's independence. Mozambique's support of the Rhodesian not only resulted in a severe shortage of foreign exchange, but also invoked the wrath of the Smith regime. Rhodesian forces attacked Mozambique more than 350 times, destroying key bridges and agricultural projects. Trains and trucks were sabotaged disrupting external trade. Damage was estimated at a minimum of \$50 million. In addition, the Mozambican people had to share their meagre resources with Zimbabwean refugees.

The severest price that the FRELIMO government continues to pay for its support of the southern African libera-

tion forces is the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). Rhodesian intelligence established, trained, financed, and supplied the MNR, supposedly to gather information on ZANU's activities within Mozambique. Today, the MNR continues to create internal havoc and terrorize the civilian population because South Africa assumed sponsorship of the MNR after Zimbabwe's independence. Since being adopted by the South Africans, the MNR has demonstrated increasingly sophisticated techniques. It has disrupted mineral surveys and stopped the detailed exploration of gasfields and iron ore deposits commissioned by the Mozambican government.

While it is Mozambique's infrastructure which has been the direct target of MNR attacks, South Africa's ultimate goal is to destroy the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) whose members (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) rejected South Africa's invitation to form a Constellation of Southern Africa States (CONAS) under South African leadership. The nine SADCC nations are seeking to lessen their dependence on South Africa and have established the Southern Africa Transportation and Communication Commission (SATCC) in Mozambique as the first step in that effort. Since Beira and Maputo are the only modern ports in the region not under South Africa's direct control, and since four of SADCC's members (Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are landlocked, the MNR's attacks on the railways and roads connecting these Mozambican seaports have been of serious concern to SADCC's membership. Thus 40 percent of SADCC's start-up resources have had to be devoted to the rehabilitation of Mozambique's transportation system.

In response to their joint victimization by MNR, Mozambique and Zimbabwe signed a mutual defense pact in 1981, and some 6,000 Zimbabwean troops now help to guard portions of Mozambique. Between 1982 and 1984, the cost of defending the country from South Africa and the MNR equaled the entire projected revenue from Mozambique's exports.

As if these attacks were not enough, the country has recently suffered from a series of natural disasters. At least 100,000 Mozambicans died during the last four years when one of the worst droughts in recent history swept the continent. The cattle population—already inadequate because of the prevalence of the tsetsefly—shrank further when tens of thousands of livestock died during each month of the drought, and 350,000 people lost crops in just one Mozambican province.

The drought was followed by a flood ranked among the worst of all time. It first overran Mozambique at the end of January 1984, just as the first crop since the drought was about to be harvested. Receding flood waters from Swaziland and South Africa then swept through Mozambique worsening the situation. Eighty percent of the citrus trees, the total banana crop, and almost the entire cashew harvest were destroyed. Huge quantities of stored food were lost, and the sick and hungry poured into Zimbabwe at an estimated rate of 1,000 per week. Relief officials estimated that for each one of the 150,000 Mozambicans who arrived safely in Zimbabwe, another had perished along the way.

Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that economic dependency, destabilization, and natural disasters forced Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord. Observers of conditions in southern Africa have suggested that as long as South Africa's defense budget equals Mozambique's entire GNP, FRELIMO had little choice. It remains to be seen whether an agreement imposed by a powerful and unscrupulous neighbor can result in a stable peace. □

AGREEMENT

On non-aggression and good neighbourliness between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, hereinafter referred to as the high contracting parties.

Recognizing the principles of strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and the inviolability of the borders of all states.

Considering the internationally recognized principle of equal rights of all peoples.

Considering the obligation of all states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

Considering the obligation of states to settle conflicts by peaceful means, and thus safeguard international peace and security and justice.

Recognizing the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states.

Conscious of the need to promote relations of good neighbourliness based on principles of equality of rights and mutual advantage.

Convinced that relations of good neighbourliness between the high contracting parties will contribute to peace, security, stability and progress in southern Africa, the continent and the world.

Have solemnly agreed to the following:

Article One

The high contracting parties undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and, in fulfilment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

Article Two

(1) The high contracting parties shall resolve differences and disputes that may arise between them and that may likely endanger mutual peace and security or peace and security in the region, by means of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means, and undertake not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.

(2) For the purposes of this article, the use of force shall include inter-alia

- attacks by land, air or sea forces,
- sabotage,
- unwarranted concentration of such forces at or near international boundaries of the high contracting parties,
- violation of the international land, air or sea boundaries of either of the high contracting parties.

(3) The high contracting parties shall not in any way assist the armed forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other.

Article Three

(1) The high contracting parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organizations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.

(2) The high contracting parties, in order to prevent the acts or the preparation of acts mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article, undertaken in particular to:

- forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,
- eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centers, places of shelter, accommodation and transit for elements who intend to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,
- eliminate from their respective territories centers or depots containing armaments of whatever nature, destined to be used by the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,
- eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and co-ordination of the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,
- eliminate from their respective territories communication and telecommunication facilities between the command and the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,
- eliminate and prohibit the installation in their respective territories of radio broadcasting stations, including unofficial or clandestine broadcasts, for the elements that carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article,
- exercise strict control in the respective territories over elements which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) of this article,
- prevent the transit of elements who intend or plan to commit the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article, from a place in the territory of other to a place in the territory of the other or to a place in the territory of any third state which has a command boundary with the high contracting party against which such elements intend or plan to commit the said acts,
- take appropriate steps in their respective territories to prevent the recruitment of elements of whatever nationality for the purpose of carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (a) of this article,
- prevent the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article from carrying out from their respective territories by any means of abduction or other acts, aimed at taking citizens of any nationality hostage in the territory of the other high contracting party, and
- prohibit the provision on their respective territories of any logistic facilities for carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article.

Article Four

The high contracting parties shall take steps, individually and collectively, to ensure that the international boundary between their respective territories is effectively patrolled and that the border posts are efficiently administered to prevent illegal crossings from the territory of a high contracting party to the territory of the other, and in particular, by elements contemplated in article three of this agreement.

Article Five

The high contracting parties shall prohibit within their territory acts of propaganda that incite a war of aggression against the other contracting party and shall also prohibit acts of propaganda aimed at inciting acts of terrorism and civil war in the territory of the other high contracting party.

Article Six

The high contracting parties declare that there is no conflict between their commitments in treaties and international obligations and the commitments undertaken in this agreement.

Article Seven

The high contracting parties are committed to interpreting this agreement in good faith and will maintain periodic contact to ensure the effective application of what has been agreed.

Article Eight

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as detracting from the high contracting parties' right to self-defense in the event of armed attacks, as provided for in the charter of the United Nations.

Article Nine

(1) Each of the high contracting parties shall appoint high ranking representatives to serve on a joint security commission with the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of this agreement.

(2) The commission shall determine its own working procedure.

(3) The commission shall meet on a regular basis and may be specially convened whenever circumstances so require.

(4) The commission shall

- consider all allegations of infringements of the provisions of this agreement,
- advise the high contracting parties of its conclusions, and
- make recommendations to the high contracting parties concerning measures for the effective application of this agreement and the settlement of disputes over infringements of alleged infringements.

(5) The high contracting parties shall determine the mandate of their respective representatives in order to enable interim measures to be taken in cases of duly recognized emergency.

(6) The high contracting parties shall make available all the facilities necessary for the effective functioning of the commission and will jointly consider its conclusions and recommendations.

Article Ten

This agreement also be known as "The Accord of Nkomati."

Article Eleven

(1) This agreement shall enter into force on the date of the signature thereof.

(2) Any amendment to this agreement agreed to by the high contracting parties shall be effected by the exchange of notes between them.

In witness whereof, the signature, in the names of their respective governments, have signed and sealed this agreement, in quadruplicate in the English and Portuguese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Thus done and signed at the common border the banks of the Nkomati River, on this sixteenth day of March 1984.

Pieter Willem Botha
Prime Minister of the
Republic of South Africa

Samora Moises Machel
Marshall of the Republic
President of the People's
Republic of Mozambique

The high contracting parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organizations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.

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