INVISIBLE CRIMES

U.S. PRIVATE INTERVENTION IN THE WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE

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Kathi Austin
The war in Mozambique between 1975 and 1992 claimed more than 700,000 victims, overwhelmingly civilian, from a population of 16 million. The trauma imposed on this impoverished country was comparable to that imposed on Europe by World War II. Although the Mozambique conflict had elements of a civil war, foreign actors decisively influenced both its origin and course. The conflict was part of the endgame struggle to retain white minority rule in Africa, and it was among the prime examples of “freedom-fighter” insurgencies celebrated by the international right wing during the last decade of the Cold War, a test case for practitioners of “low-intensity conflict.” This case study examines the responsibility of U.S. actors for systematic human rights abuses during the war. It goes on to suggest possible mechanisms for assessing such accountability in future conflicts.

After Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 under the leadership of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), it granted refuge to Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting for majority rule in Rhodesia. The white Rhodesian army supplemented raids into Mozambique against those guerrillas by sponsoring the Mozambican National Resistance, known first as MNR and later as Renamo. When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, the South African government took over Renamo sponsorship and dramatically augmented Renamo’s military capacity. Despite a 1984 non-aggression pact signed between Mozambique and South Africa, covert support continued and Renamo operations escalated. Intermittent peace talks between the Mozambican government and Renamo, beginning in 1990, finally led to a cease-fire in October 1992. As this case study is written, a much-delayed peace process is scheduled to culminate in elections in October 1994.

Within Mozambique, the current priorities are clearly reconciliation and compromise. Peace must come first, even if it means accommodating war criminals in the hope they will accept the shift to peaceful political competition. Yet amnesty and reconciliation should not beget amnesia. A political actor’s credibility in the post-war period should have some relationship to that actor’s record during the years of conflict, whether or not this is recognized in formal agreements or tribunals.

Human rights advocates are rightfully concerned that comparative judgments of behavior may be used to exonerate less offensive parties from their responsibility for human rights abuses. In some cases, however, the severity of the violations, coupled with the systematic and deliberate scale of abuses, demands distinct treatment — comprehensive evaluation at a minimum, if not formal investigative tribunals or war crime trials. The war by Renamo and Renamo’s sponsors in Mozambique is surely such a case.

External actors who fomented the war in Mozambique should be held accountable. Unlike Mozambicans caught up on all sides of the conflict, foreign officials and private individuals...
whose actions had decisive effects on the war do not have to live in the resulting environment. At the height of the war in Mozambique, U.S. government officials accused Renamo of responsibility for "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II." Simultaneously, however, a small group of U.S. citizens was actively engaged not only in propagandizing but in providing military support to the perpetrators of that holocaust.

The evidence to date, presented in this case study, indicates that a handful of individuals and organizations in the United States:

1. provided direct, militarily significant material aid to Renamo;
2. successfully propagandized for Renamo in narrow but influential right-wing circles within both the private sector and the U.S. government; and
3. failing to get Renamo on the official list of approved insurgencies, nevertheless enjoyed immunity from any government action to stop their continued, material support for Renamo.

The right to propagandize on behalf of a foreign cause, even with gross distortions of the truth, is among the fundamental rights of private U.S. citizens and should be protected. When the result is complicity in human rights abuses and war crimes, however, then those activities at least deserve public scrutiny. If advocates cross the line between support for a political cause and substantial assistance for violent acts, the matter of legal recourse must be addressed.

Official U.S. policy, despite detente with the Mozambican government in the mid-1980s, never addressed the issue of continuing external support for Renamo, whether from South Africa, from African allies of the U.S. such as Malawi and Kenya, or from private American sources known to U.S. officials.

This case study of U.S. private support for Renamo examines all these issues. It also addresses the general issue of accountability for private as well as public international involvement in future conflicts around the world. Even when governments refrain from officially instigating or aggravating strife in foreign countries, there are many cases where foreign individuals and private groups — motivated by profit, ideology or even humanitarian concerns — can and do provide enough resources to have significant effects. The mechanisms for evaluating such involvement, assessing the responsibility for such effects, and judging when such involvement becomes illegal promotion of violence or complicity in the systematic abuse of human rights, are not well-defined. This study concludes with recommendations to human rights groups and public officials for improving mechanisms to assess and enforce accountability in such cases. The legal appendix to the study documents the lack of any effective legal remedy to hold private actors accountable for their part in foreign conflicts.
“When crimes begin to pile up they become invisible. When sufferings become unendurable the cries are no longer heard.”

—Bertolt Brecht
INVISIBLE CRIMES

INTRODUCTION

A hidden war ravaged the southern African country of Mozambique in the 1980s and into the early 1990s, with a toll in human suffering that easily rivaled if not surpassed more publicized conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or Afghanistan. Mozambique, however, rarely appeared on television screens around the world. Turmoil in South Africa captured media attention in the mid-1980s, but few international observers made the critical connection between the apartheid regime’s violence at home and its role in fomenting war in Mozambique. For the most part, the killing in Mozambique went on unremarked.

Although the conflict had elements of a civil war, its origins and continuation were overwhelmingly influenced by external factors. It was part of the endgame of the struggle against white minority rule in Africa, and it was among the prime examples of “freedom-fighter” insurgencies celebrated by the international right wing in the last decade of the Cold War, a test case for practitioners of “low-intensity conflict.”

The term “low-intensity conflict” distinguishes guerrilla wars and other unconventional warfare from “medium- and high-intensity” conventional wars on the spectrum culminating in nuclear confrontation. However gauged in terms of human suffering, “low-intensity” is a monstrous misnomer. Large-scale battlefield encounters were indeed rare in Mozambique, but the cumulative toll of violence, year-in and year-out, plus the fact that the victims were overwhelmingly civilians, imposed a trauma easily comparable with that imposed on Europe by World War II.

The war in Mozambique began almost immediately after the country achieved independence in 1975 under the leadership of the Mozambique Liberation Front, known by its Portuguese acronym Frelimo. Frelimo granted refuge to Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting for majority rule in Rhodesia. The white Rhodesian army supplemented raids on Mozambique against Zimbabwean guerrillas fighting for majority rule in Rhodesia. The white Rhodesian army supplemented raids on Mozambique against Zimbabwean guerrillas with sponsorship of the Mozambican National Resistance, known at first as MNR and later as Renamo. When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, South Africa took over sponsorship of Renamo and dramatically augmented its military capacity. Despite a 1984 non-aggression pact between Mozambique and South Africa, Renamo operations continued to escalate, with covert support from South Africa and other foreign sources. Intermittent peace talks beginning in 1990 finally led to a cease-fire in October 1992. As this study is written, a much-delayed peace process is scheduled to culminate in elections in October 1994.

When wars are won unconditionally, the victors may judge and punish the defeated for their conduct. The victors’ faults only emerge later in the judgments of historians. In Mozambique —
as in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, and Angola — the postwar imperative is reconciliation. Outsiders have marveled at the capacity of ordinary southern Africans to live, work, and even govern jointly with former enemies many of whom are guilty of atrocities. The process — both necessary and admirable — requires a bracketing out of the war period as one in which ordinary people found themselves in a position to commit inhuman crimes, for which they are subsequently not held responsible.1

Yet human rights groups also rightly protest that total amnesty and a presumed blank slate may simply perpetuate human rights abuses afterwards. Those effectively granted immunity for abusive practices during wartime may not easily abandon their practices. Ignoring or distorting inconvenient portions of the historical record may build in time bombs that may sabotage a durable peace and democratic reconstruction. If criminal prosecution is ruled out by the necessity for postwar political compromise, then at minimum what happened during wartime should be exposed to public scrutiny. That is the rationale for open inquiries such as the Truth Commission in El Salvador, internal investigations undertaken by the African National Congress, and calls — as yet unanswered — for a similar accounting by the former South African regime.

In Mozambique, reconciliation and compromise are clearly the current priorities. Peace must come first, even if it means payoffs to war criminals in the hope they will accept the shift to peaceful political competition. There will be no Nuremberg trials in Mozambique, nor a formal Truth Commission with the responsibility of tracking down hundreds of poorly recorded or undocumented incidents stretching over almost two decades of war. The individual truths will emerge piecemeal, if at all. Because many of those guilty of atrocities, including child soldiers, did so as part of military machines they entered under duress, no blanket judgments about culpability are plausible.

Yet amnesty and reconciliation should not imply amnesia. The credibility of political actors in the postwar period should have some relationship to their record — positive or negative — during the years of conflict. Responsibility for reconstruction should have some link to responsibility for destruction, whether or not this is recognized in formal tribunals or agreements. This applies in particularly strong measure to the external actors who fomented the war in Mozambique. Unlike Mozambicans caught up on all sides of the conflict, foreign officials and private individuals whose actions had decisive effects on the war do not have to live with the consequences of their actions.

This study focuses primarily on one set of such individuals: private U.S. citizens and groups who became involved in Mozambique to wage an anticommunist crusade, a few from the early days of Rhodesia’s creation of Renamo in the 1970s, many more in the 1980s as South Africa sought deeper deniability for its official role. To evaluate U.S. responsibilities in Mozambique, now and in the future, one must scrutinize the role of these private actors and, by extension, the role of U.S. government policies during the same period. In addition, this study raises the general issue of accountability for private as well as public international involvement in future conflicts around the world.

The issue of human rights accountability — of responsibility for actions leading to death, injury and other abuses against the human person — has moral, political, and legal implications. The question of where responsibility should be lodged — with individuals, groups, national governments, and/or international bodies — is necessarily being rethought in the new post–Cold War environment. In contrast to the Cold War period, in which it was common for partisans on both sides to condemn abuses by the other side and to seek excuses for abuses by their own, there is an emerging consensus that some standards should apply universally. Human rights groups increasingly seek to assess the responsibility not only of established governments but also of insurgent groups. Still, the evaluation of the conduct of outside parties is a particularly murky area.

Thus, the military intervention in Somalia has exposed the inadequacy of current mechanisms for judging the impartiality and other aspects of the conduct of international forces
brought in on a mission defined as purely humanitarian. Even the Truth Commission's report on El Salvador only opened the door to the possible systematic examination of complicity by U.S. officials. Even when no outside military force is directly involved, the capacity of contending parties to wage war in a multitude of conflicts depends in large part on their success in gaining other outside support. Not only supplies of weapons, but also of nonlethal equipment and even purely humanitarian assistance can significantly affect military balances. When governments refrain from involvement, there are many conflicts where foreign individuals and private groups — motivated by profit, ideology, or humanitarian appeals — can and do provide enough resources to have significant effects. The responsibility and the mechanisms for evaluating such involvement, and for judging where it steps over the line into illegal promotion of violence or complicity in systematic abuses of human rights, are not well-defined.

"One person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter," runs the well-worn adage. Indeed, the voluminous literature on terrorism is notorious for restrictive definitions that conveniently include bombers or hijackers who attack Westerners while excluding groups backed by Western governments. In recent decades in southern Africa, it was the movements fighting against white minority rule that were labelled terrorists. Their offenses against civilians, however, were far less numerous than those of the governments that opposed them or of the groups such as Renamo and the Angolan rebel group the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) used against the Frontline States. Human rights advocates are rightfully concerned that comparative judgements of better and worse not be used to exonerate any party from responsibility for human rights abuses. However, there are some cases where the enormity and the systematic and deliberate scale of the violations calls out, at a minimum, for comprehensive evaluation if not formal war crimes tribunals. The war waged by Renamo and Renamo's sponsors in Mozambique is surely one of those cases.

At the height of the war in Mozambique, U.S. government statements accused Renamo of perpetrating "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II." Simultaneously, however, a small group of U.S. citizens was actively engaged not only in propagandizing but also in providing militarily relevant material support to Renamo. The U.S. government, aware of this group's involvement and of the parallel involvement of clandestine and semiprivatized military networks in South Africa and elsewhere, took no more than token efforts to stop such actions.

The full story of the private U.S. connection, like many other aspects of the war in Mozambique, is still obscured by secrecy, but investigative research by the author and others has uncovered the principal links and some additional details. The results, presented in summary form in this study, sharply underline the fact that public debate has not yet adequately addressed the issue of accountability in Mozambique — nor are there adequate guidelines for addressing future cases of "invisible crimes."
For many newspaper readers, the horror of the war in Mozambique crystallized for the first time in 1987, when news reports highlighted "the worst atrocity of a savage eleven-year war." On July 18, Renamo forces attacked the small town of Homoine in Inhambane province, killing 386 civilians (two weeks later the count reached 424). Survivors told Western reporters that the victims included pregnant women, children, and other patients in the town's clinic. Some were shot with automatic rifles, others killed with machetes.

The response to the first reports prefigured later debates over responsibility for the war. Renamo spokesmen in Lisbon and Washington denied that the organization was responsible for the massacre, suggesting instead that local militia had clashed with government troops or that government forces had disguised themselves as rebels. Senator Jesse Helms, in the midst of a campaign to win U.S. government support for Renamo, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the charges were a "setup." A U.S. military attaché, visiting the site a week later, noted skeptically that damage to buildings was limited and that the people "did not appear to be devastated, on edge or very angry as one would expect."

Skepticism might have prevailed had not there been an American eyewitness, Mennonite agricultural worker Mark Van Koevering (see box). As it was, the Homoine incident, together with the cumulative impact of reports by journalists, aid workers, and diplomats, consolidated an international image of Renamo as brutal and ruthless. A report by State Department consultant Robert Gersony in 1988, based on interviews with refugees and displaced persons, held the group responsible for 95 percent of the abuses of civilians in the war, including the murder of as many as 100,000 civilians (see box).

A United Nations study in 1989 estimated that Mozambique suffered economic losses of approximately $15 billion between 1980 and 1988, five-and-a-half times the nation's 1988 Gross Domestic Product. By the end of 1988, 976 rural health clinics — almost half the total in the country — had been destroyed or forced to close due to Renamo attacks. UNICEF estimated that 494,000 Mozambican children under age five died between 1980 and 1988 from war-related causes, both direct deaths and those due to the war's effect of increasing famine and disease. By the 1992 cease-fire, at least 700,000 Mozambicans had died; as many as half a million children were orphaned or separated from their families. There were some 1.7 million refugees outside the country; in all, some 5.7 million of the total population of 16 million had been displaced. No one had precise figures for the cumulative toll of destruction, as indicated by the round numbers in the totals. The full impact on the nation was incalculable, but the scale was undeniable.

Still, the question of responsibility remained elusive. As the war ground on, even after direct negotiations with Renamo began in 1990, Mozambicans and foreigners alike often limited
On July 11, 1987, [Aniva Sulemane Isuf] went to visit her family in Homoine. Refugees had been streaming into the town for weeks, alerting the FAM [Mozambican government troops] that Renamo guerrillas were closing in on Homoine. The government forces had been sending messages to the garrison in Maxixe, about twenty miles east, requesting fresh arms and ammunition. But no action was taken to respond to the requests. At 5:00 a.m. one morning, the woman and her family were awakened by the sound of heavy gunfire, which lasted about an hour. The family remained in their hut. They could see that FAM troops were fleeing, and she believes that they had run out of ammunition.

Several hours later, uniformed soldiers came to the vicinity of her family's house and ordered everyone to come out. A young boy who worked as a servant for her family attempted to flee and was immediately shot dead. She and hundreds of other civilians were gathered in the center of town. There were many bodies on the streets. She estimated that the group of armed soldiers numbered 600.... The civilians were told to line up and prepare to march.

We left Homoine at 16:00 with 150 head of cattle, six motorcycles and many, many people. The Matsanga [Renamo] told us to walk and not stop. We could not even go to the bathroom. Whoever runs is killed. They killed ten people who could not make it. The first was a fifty-year-old man. They killed him with a knife. The commander said he could not let them return because they would give information to Frelimo.

When I reached Nhamunge [Renamo base], they took all my clothes and told me to sleep in the house of a mujiba [Renamo policeman]. There were lots of troops at the base, maybe 1,500 including recruits. The commander was called Trovoada, who is an Ndau. The Political Commissar was named Paulo, and there were other important commanders called Sousa and Major Jeremiah. The next day, commander Trovoada held a public meeting and claimed credit for organizing the Homoine operation. He said that Renamo was ready to take power.

Aniva Sulemane Isuf, interviewed in Maputo by Africa Watch, March 1992

A Renamo fighter who was trained at Nhamunge base in 1984 identified Trovoada as the provincial commander and Sousa as a brigadier and commander of Renamo's Third Brigade. The fighter, who was captured by FAM forces in April 1987, said that plans for an assault on Homoine were already under way. The plan was for Renamo's Grupo Limpa, a unit of special forces, to lead the raid. He identified Grupo Limpa as "the ones who kill civilians."

Simão Lakenecome, interviewed by Africa Watch at Machava prison, November 1990

themselves to blaming the war for everything, no longer caring to allocate responsibility or judge between the contenders. Researchers noted that in some areas of the country Renamo's actions were not as consistently brutal as indicated by the Gersony report. The government's military forces, under the constraints of economic structural adjustment programs as well as an unwinnable war, were increasingly plagued by corruption and indiscipline. The necessity to negotiate with Renamo and to persuade it to participate in a peaceful political order led to a public deemphasis on the record of Renamo atrocities.

The role of external actors in sponsoring and directing Renamo also became increasingly fuzzy over the course of the war. At the beginning, in 1976, Renamo was totally dependent on its creator and sponsor, the Rhodesian security forces. From 1980 until 1984, it was fully integrated into South African covert operations, with Renamo officials and some troops receiving regular salaries from South Africa. After the 1984 Nkomati Accord pledging South Africa and Mozambique to refuse any support for armed activities against each other, the situation became more confused. While South African support did not stop, its official character and significance, as compared to that of other new Renamo supporters, was unclear. The goals of Renamo's foreign supporters became a topic that was just as confusing and debatable as the group's own objectives.
Burnt body lies beside the shell of a bus of the state transport service, ROMOS, in Maluana on the main road 50 kilometers north of Maputo where RENAMO ambushed a civilian convoy on November 29, 1987.
**EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT FROM HOMOÏNE**

On the morning of July 18, a large disturbance took place in Homoine, near the provincial city of Inhambane in southern Mozambique. Renamo had no forces in the district at the time but sources, including monitoring of Frelimo's radio communications and reports coming in from the field, indicate that a large group of local Frelimo militia fired on the headquarters of Frelimo regulars of the same locale. Following the uprising, the Frelimo regulars, acting on orders from Maputo, retaliated in force against the militia and residents of Homoine.

Renamo press release by Washington representative Luís Serapião, July 29, 1987

My name is Mark Van Koevering. I am an American agronomist working for the Mennonite Central Committee and the Christian Council of Mozambique. I have been living in Mozambique since May 1987.

On July 18, 1987 the small town of Homoine in Inhambane was attacked by bandits who call themselves the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR or in Portuguese Renamo). I was staying at the only hotel in town when the attack occurred. At 5:45 a.m. two loud blasts ignited the battle which would last until 2:00 p.m. I stood at my second-floor window overlooking the main intersection in town as a flood of bullets flew overhead... In a few moments people began fleeing from the makeshift villages that surround the town. Most of these families had been displaced from their rural homes by earlier attacks throughout the year. They had come to Homoine for sanctuary. The sound of gunfire intensified and soon people were streaming from their homes within the town itself, pulling sleepy children by their arms. I ran to the front of the hotel to escape as well. But the street was deserted except for the flares of passing bullets. It was impossible for me to leave the hotel.

I returned to my room where I met the only other hotel guest, a Mozambican from Maputo. Together we peered out of my bathroom window as the attacking bandits came into the town. This particular bandit group numbered 40 to 50 men. They were well-equipped. All wore new uniforms, shiny boots and carried new weapons... Then I saw the bandits shoot 6 or 8 women who had huddled together on the sidewalk, some of them carried small children wrapped around their bodies. While I stared at this murder, two bullets smashed through the window just over my head. We lunged to the floor and crawled from the room into the hallway. We found... 

While many details and nuances remain obscure, abundant evidence from a wide variety of sources confirms several general conclusions:

- **Renamo was responsible for abuses against civilians on a far wider and more systematic scale than were government troops.**

  Renamo's deliberate strategy and tactics involved targeting civilians for massive human rights abuses. This was apparent both in direct attacks on civilians and in military operations aimed at medical services and relief operations.

  Reports by Africa Watch and other groups documented abuses by both sides, particularly in the course of forced relocation of civilians by the government as well as Renamo. In areas of relatively secure Renamo control and closest ethnic affinity to Renamo leaders, violence against civilians was much less in evidence. The largest-scale massacres by Renamo were primarily in southern Mozambique. In the later years of the war in particular, economic hardship and social disorganization led to the increase in nonpolitical criminal violence in urban as well as rural areas, sometimes attributed to Renamo or to the government. Nevertheless, as Africa Watch concluded, "it is undoubtedly the case that Renamo has been guilty of a wider range of abuses ... on a larger scale, more frequent, more systematic and with less recourse to justice for the victims."17

- **Renamo abuses, for the most part, were deliberate consequences of strategy and tactics dictated from the top, rather than the result of indiscipline or the initiatives of local Renamo troops and commanders.**

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Invisible Crimes: U.S. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique
refuge in a small mud-brick hut that was built adjacent to the hotel. We remained hidden inside the hut for the next 8 hours.

After the bandits were pushed from Homoine, I left the hiding place, picked up wounded people and started for the coastal town of Maxixe. I had to swerve through the streets to avoid the bodies. The following day several of us returned to help the wounded. I saw elderly women who had the backs of their heads cut open from axes or machetes, a six-year-old boy’s arm had been cut off, several people had been beheaded, a pregnant woman was cut open and her baby removed; and in the hospital, patients were killed in their beds including newborn infants. The final death toll was 424, almost half were women, 44 were children. In addition, 298 people were taken captive.

Contrary to some reports in the western press, this is not a struggle of one political ideology against another. It is not a case of tribalism. We would prefer such straightforward answers, but those who present the war in Mozambique thusly are gravely mistaken. In fact, many of the MNR targets are the same people they are presumed to represent, pastors, shopkeepers and private-sector farmers. Homoine, for example, was a model of the new government policy to encourage private- and family-sector farming.

Some of you may be asking how I am so certain that the attack was from the MNR. I am relying on three pieces of evidence. First, the soldiers who attacked Homoine were much better equipped than the government troops in the area and they spoke a northern dialect not common to Homoine; second, government troops and militia defended the town against attack and thirdly, the people of the area had no doubt about the source of the attack. I travelled with a local pastor for three days as he visited family and friends in the area. I also informally interviewed farmers and shopkeepers in Homoine. These people expressed no doubt this massacre was a result of the MNR.

I am not working for the government of Mozambique and I did not volunteer to work in Mozambique because of a political philosophy which would favor one form of government over another. I am in Mozambique because I am a Christian, sent by a Christian organization, to serve the Christian churches of Mozambique.

I urge you to continue supporting the government of Mozambique; to refrain from any form of support, direct or indirect, public or private, financial or material that would benefit the MNR and I ask that we as a nation pursue ways to block South Africa from continuing their support for the MNR.


Some observers linked the extremes of Renamo violence to conditions of social disorganization or local conflicts, or to the psychological consequences for young boys forcibly incorporated into the Renamo forces. However, the fundamental source of the scale of violence came from the war strategy adopted by Renamo’s top commanders. It was not primarily “collateral damage” or a cultural aberration due to the stress of the war. As shown after the cease-fire, surprisingly to some observers, Renamo was a relatively well-disciplined army. The Renamo rank-and-file, largely recruited by force, obeyed orders regardless of their personal feelings, under the credible threat of execution for disobedience.

The rationale behind Renamo’s strategy was to undermine support for the Mozambican government by convincing the people that the government could not protect them, and by destroying social services and economic infrastructure to make ordinary civilian existence impossible. This strategy, massively implemented during the period in which South African officers were in direct command of Renamo operations, was rational and deliberate. Creating terror among civilians was one of its fundamental objectives. As researcher Ken Wilson concluded, “Renamo’s violence is not a peripheral aberration, reflecting for example poor military discipline, but is on the contrary one of Renamo’s central operational tools and has been elaborated for this purpose to become virtually a cult.”

South African special forces continued to provide essential military support to Renamo until the end of the war, although on a diminished scale after President F.W. de Klerk took office in 1989. After the
THE GERSONY REPORT

The author conducted a field visit of nearly three months to forty-two different locations in five countries — Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Tanzania. In 25 refugee camps, separated by as many as 1,500 miles, he spoke at length and individually with nearly 200 randomly selected refugees. They came from 48 different districts of Mozambique, including northern, central and southern provinces. Some came from areas of predominant Frelimo government control, others from areas of Renamo prevalence.

The great majority of the total of 196 interviewed refugees whose migration was caused by conflict violence cited Renamo actions as the reason for their flight. Roughly 40 percent reported personally witnessing the murder of civilians principally by Renamo combatants and Renamo police in the absence of resistance or defense. The 169 refugees who arrived at their current locations in 1987-1988 reported roughly 600 such murders. [This does not include] about 200 persons killed in crossfire between Renamo and Frelimo government soldiers, which this report attributes to neither side in the conflict. The approximately 600 murders attributed to Renamo represented about 94 percent of such murders reported by these refugees (of the remainder, about 3 percent were attributed to Frelimo and about 3 percent were attributed to "unknown" parties)....

[Captives] who have served as porters reported uniformly that discipline on these forced marches is extremely harsh. Those who cannot keep up, who rest without authorization, drop their burdens, or refuse to continue, are routinely beaten very severely, sometimes until they are dead. Over half those who had served as porters said they were eyewitnesses to cases of porters beaten to death or executed for the reasons described above.

The level of violence reported to be conducted by Renamo against the civilian population of rural Mozambique is extraordinarily high. If the refugee reports are generally accurate and the sample reasonably representative, it is conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by Renamo in this manner.... That the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who fled from northern, central and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents by undisciplined combatants.

Excerpted from Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique, Robert Gersony, Consultant to Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State, April 1988

Nkomati Accord of 1984, there was an increase in supplies through Malawi from a variety of public and private sources as well as from "privatized" supporters in South Africa. These sources came to dominate after President de Klerk took office.

Although South African support for Renamo was always covert, it was particularly blatant during the period from 1980 until the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. Documents captured in 1985 nevertheless reveal that the South African military kept a secret commitment to provide continuing support in violation of the accord. Despite repeated public denials by the South African authorities, regular supplies from South Africa continued over land and by air, with involvement both of private Renamo supporters and of the same covert special forces units that had earlier been assigned to Renamo operations. It was increasingly unclear how much of this flow was authorized by the South African government, and at what level. These supplies apparently diminished after President F. W. de Klerk took office, but post-cease-fire news reports documented some regular support coming from South African military units to Renamo bases in southern Mozambique up until the October 1992 cease-fire.

Nevertheless, in the post-Nkomati period, supplies into central and northern Mozambique through Malawi took on increasing importance. Those implicated in these supply operations included South African military intelligence officers, Malawi security police and the Malawi paramilitary Young Pioneers movement, the Kenyan government, and a range of private right-wing groups and entrepreneurs involved for both ideo-

Invisible Crimes: U.S. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique
CHILDREN OF MOZAMBIQUE

The gathering of information for this report stems from the ongoing work of the Save the Children Federation (SCF) in Mozambique. It is based on interviews with 504 children from war-affected areas of Mozambique. The 504 children come from 49 districts representing seven of Mozambique's ten provinces. All the children (100 percent) reported they had witnessed or were personally subjected to abuse by Renamo. Fewer than ten percent (9.4 percent) of the same children reported they had witnessed or were subjected to abuse by government troops.

[At the hands of Renamo forces]
- 77 percent witnessed killings.
  The majority of deaths witnessed by children were not the result of civilians caught in the crossfire of the two opposing forces. Rather, most were intentional; the victims ranged from adult civilians to infant children. The methods used to kill ranged from beatings to decapitations.
- 37 percent witnessed family members killed.
  A minority of children's slain family members were killed for political reasons — they were Government officials or soldiers, community leaders, teachers or health workers. Most children reported that their family members were killed for other reasons — they tried to protect themselves, their families or their property, or they displeased their Renamo captors in other ways.
- 63 percent witnessed rape or sexual abuse.
- 64 percent were abducted from their families.
- 75 percent of the abductees served as porters.
- 28 percent of the abductees trained for combat.

Requiring children to murder others as a part of training is a step in the formation of the child soldier. Estevan and Orlando, two 12-year-old boys from Gaza, explained how this happens:

Estevan: Three boys from a different village [than the rest of us] were making mistakes and falling behind. The bandits asked us what we should do with them. Jorge said they should be sent back to the base to work with the women. The bandits said no, they should be killed. They gave Jorge a bayonet and told him to kill them. When Jorge didn't move, one of the bandits cut his stomach with the bayonet. He gave him the bayonet back. This time he killed the three boys...

Orlando: The bandits caught an old woman trying to escape. ... The bandits pointed to Manuel and told him to kill her. He took his bayonet and stabbed her in the stomach. The bandits told Manuel to cut off her head. He did it, and they saw he was brave and made him the chief of our group.


logical and commercial reasons. Renamo received income from ivory smuggling and other looting, and from protection payoffs from companies involved in Mozambique, particularly Tiny Rowland's Lonrho. The precise relationships of both cooperation and competition among the different covert actors involved in this link, which provided the primary entry point for private U.S. involvement, are still obscure, but there is no doubt that together they made a substantial contribution to Renamo's viability as a guerrilla organization.
II. THE U.S. CONNECTION

At the annual Soldier of Fortune conference in Las Vegas in 1990, an audience of professional mercenaries and other enthusiasts heard a different account of Mozambique. Keynote speaker at the featured lecture series was Major Robert MacKenzie, an American veteran of several wars in southern Africa. Looking like poster-perfect recruiting material in his maroon Rhodesian beret, MacKenzie was speaking on "The Continuing War in Mozambique." "His in-depth knowledge of international fighting forces serve [sic] him well in world hot spots," advertised the conference brochure.24

Playing to the sympathies of his audience, MacKenzie started his talk with negative images of Mozambique as communist-dominated. He quickly moved to the strategic reasons for being interested in this country, with its location on the Mozambican channel of the Indian Ocean and its "unexplored potentially very valuable mineral and other natural resources." In a mesmerizing voice, MacKenzie denounced the usual list of complaints against Renamo and offered an unconditional defense.

Renamo, he claimed, has "spent a great deal of time developing a political platform." Women "are given virtually equal status" in Renamo. "The only problem Renamo has with young boys is keeping them away; because every boy in the country wants to belong to Renamo, they don't have to press-gang anyone." "Duress is not required, nor are any of these barbarous practices that the media like to invent about events in Africa." "Wherever you go... the people genuinely, not from fear of their lives, but genuinely, enjoy" Renamo coming for a visit. "No one is starving to death in Renamo areas." and "private industry flourishes." Renamo "has no external support, either logistically, politically, or financially," he boasted.25

Tagging along with MacKenzie at the conference were his bride Sibyl Cline and her father Ray Cline, a former CIA deputy director for intelligence, as well Cline's colleague Richard Secord, who played a starring role in the Iran-Contra supply of arms to the Nicaraguan contras and sales of weapons to Iran. Sibyl Cline had just produced a pro-Renamo booklet for her father's U.S. Global Strategy Council, in which she credulously quoted a Renamo education official as claiming the movement had established 950 secondary schools.26

However inaccurate the information they conveyed, MacKenzie and his wife spoke from personal knowledge about Renamo. Indeed, their activities personify the wider issues of U.S. responsibility for the human tragedy in Mozambique. The right to propagandize on behalf of a foreign cause, even with gross distortions of the truth, is among the fundamental civil liberties of U.S. private citizens and should be protected. If the result is complicity in terrorist atrocities such as described earlier in this paper, however, then those activities at least deserve public scrutiny. Those who contribute funds to such a cause thinking they are serving humanitarian or reli-
gious ends must be confronted with the facts. The
effect of such activities on public policy toward
overseas conflicts should be the subject of public
debate. If advocates cross the borderline from
political support for a cause to material support
for acts of violence, the issue of legal recourse
must be addressed.

The story of U.S. private support for Renamo,
in which Robert MacKenzie was a key figure from
the start, poses all these issues. The evidence to
date strongly indicates that MacKenzie, along
with a handful of other key individuals,

1) provided direct material aid of military signifi-
cance to Renamo,

2) successfully propagandized in favor of
Renamo in narrow but influential right-wing
circles in both the private sector and the U.S.
government, and

3) failing to get Renamo on the list of approved
anti-Marxist insurgencies, nevertheless en-
joyed immunity against any official action to
stop continued support for Renamo.

Official U.S. policy in turn, despite detente
with the Mozambican government in the mid-
1980s, never addressed the issue of continuing
external support for Renamo, whether from South
Africa, from African allies of the U.S. such as
Malawi and Kenya, or from private American

sources that U.S. officials knew were involved.

As MacKenzie explained in his lecture, the
story began with Americans in Rhodesia.

RHODESIAN ORIGINS

MacKenzie was introduced as a member of the
elite Rhodesian military unit that helped “get
Renamo on its feet and moving” and as the “most
highly decorated American to serve in the
Rhodesian forces.” Describing Rhodesia’s res-
ponsibility to “help organize, train, and, to a
limited extent, equip an organization first called
the MNR and later called Renamo,” MacKenzie
recalled knowing Renamo leader Afonso
Dhlakama “in 1979 when he took over.” Admit-
ting “having served in the South African army
myself, in the unit that was involved in the early
80s with supporting Renamo,” MacKenzie also
acknowledged that training and equipment had
been provided to Renamo by South Africa. As he
claimed, “We used to take them back into South
Africa and give them reasonably high-powered
instruction, particularly in the fields like medi-
cine and demolition, which are a bit hard to
teach out in the bush.” Since returning to the U.S.
in 1985, his audience knew from reading Soldier
of Fortune magazine, MacKenzie had made re-
peated trips back to Mozambique. “I met
[Dhlakama] as recently as six months ago,” he re-
minded the crowd.27

The Professional Mercenary

MacKenzie was only one of more than 500
Americans who joined the Rhodesian army for
adventure or to fight yet another battle in the war
against communism. The white-minority Rhodesi-
an government, illegally in rebellion against
British rule and the subject of mandatory United
Nations sanctions, was nevertheless seen by many
as another Cold War domino. By the early 1970s,
Zimbabwean guerrillas posed a major challenge
to the white regime. If Rhodesia falls, wrote Robin
Moore, an American advocate for the Rhodesian
regime, “South Africa will go Communist next ...
the seaways around it will be denied the Western
world ... and Americans just born will be fighting and dying closer to home, in the Americas. *28*

MacKenzie was one of the first Americans to join the Rhodesian army, three years after being discharged from the U.S. army in Vietnam in 1967 as a result of a bullet wound in his arm. He joined the Special Air Service (SAS), the elite commando unit with special responsibility for external operations. MacKenzie was in the SAS from 1970-1980, rising to the rank of captain and to the top command in “C” squadron, one of the three units into which the SAS was divided. *29*

Beginning in 1972, SAS units began operating regularly in Mozambique, not only in reconnaissance and interdiction of Zambian guerrillas, but also in cooperation with Portuguese colonial troops in attacks against Frelimo guerrillas and Mozambican civilians. After Mozambique became independent, Rhodesian forces escalated the attacks and expanded the range of targets. Roads, villages, shops, military and civilian vehicles were all fair game.

MacKenzie regularly participated in SAS missions into Mozambique, such as the January 1977 Operation Cockleshell Heroes in which his squadron laid land mines, destroyed boats, ambushed vehicles, and destroyed villages along Lake Cahora Bassa. *30* Leaving a booby-trapped grenade at the site of a burned Land Rover with ten unidentified bodies, MacKenzie quipped in his log: "It's easy to be a terrorist." *31* In May of the same year, MacKenzie took charge as commander during a
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Our trip would have been impossible without the generous contribution made by James Blanchard III. In addition to paying for airplane tickets, Mr. Blanchard, a Louisiana businessman, also provided a significant amount of medical and communications equipment for the guerrillas.

Robert MacKenzie, alias Bob McKenna, in Soldier of Fortune, May 1987

You will remember that I tried (unfortunately unsuccessfully) to meet you in person while in Africa in September of 1986.

Before and after that trip, I have been an active supporter of RENAMO in the United States. I have been working with Tom Schaaf, Neil Blair (of Free the Eagle), Dr. Jack Wheeler and Francisco Nda Maosé, to actively encourage support for Renamo here in the United States.

I am enclosing with this letter the first issue of the historic “Free Mozambique” one-ounce silver coin. Our company, James U. Blanchard and Company, Inc., was responsible for producing this coin and will be responsible for a wide distribution of the coin in the United States, under the name of an organization called Freedom Inc. We are hopeful that this will raise significant funds for Renamo. Through whatever means, we will continue to support the cause of freedom in Mozambique.

I think Tom Schaaf is doing a superb job of organizing support for RENAMO in Washington. He deserves your continued support for RENAMO. He is very effective!

James U. Blanchard III, in a letter to Renamo President Dhlakama, October 26, 1987

Invisible Crimes: U.S. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique
The elder Schaaf returned to the U.S. to work on Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign in 1980, but his son stayed, having added a covert personal agenda to his agricultural work. An ardent right-wing ideologue in both political and religious terms, Schaaf6 fell in with a network of groups who combined religious fervor with a willingness to dabble in political and military intrigue. It is not clear whether Schaaf also joined the Rhodesian military, but he was once photographed in Rhodesian battle fatigues atop a Rhodesian tank.37

Schaaf remained in Zimbabwe as a government agricultural worker after independence. In September 1982, he began working for the parastatal firm Agritex, based in Mutare. According to Schaaf, he first met Renamo leader Dhlakama during his travels to Manica province in Mozambique while working for Agritex on the blue mole disease.38 After this initial contact, Schaaf both facilitated organizational meetings for Renamo and worked with the One Way Christian Centre in Mutare to provide material assistance to Renamo.

The Centre was established in the late 1970s by South African immigrants who in the early 1980s also created a subsidiary mission center and program inside Mozambique. Schaaf’s visits to Mozambique, in his capacity as an agricultural worker, provided the opportunity for evangelical mission contacts for the Centre, and those in turn served to conceal direct meetings with Renamo. Other members of the Centre were also involved, including Schaaf’s colleague at Agritex, Buster Holmes, who worked closely with Schaaf, lending his home to the cause for recruitment and planning meetings.39

Schaaf was also in close touch with a group called Shekinah Ministries in the small town of Chipinge, 85 miles south of Mutare. There, Rhodesian army veterans Michael Howard and Rodney Hein and Hein’s wife Ellie were also engaged in support operations for Renamo. Howard was leader of the church and a charismatic figure who travelled extensively in South Africa, Malawi, Israel, and the U.S. raising money for the group. Shekinah received significant financial support from Christ for the Nations, Inc. (CFNI), headquartered in Dallas, Texas, and from Don Normand Ministries of Melrose, Florida. (CFNI is also affiliated with the Rhema Church, based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, which has become the largest fundamentalist organization operating in South Africa.) During the early 1980s, the End-Time Handmaidens, of Jasper, Arkansas, served as an operations base for Shekinah Ministries in the U.S.40

**IN THEIR OWN WORDS**

We have already had great success with this strategy in convincing most of the Republican party candidates that RENAMO deserves our support. Certainly we have been very successful in converting Congressman Jack Kemp and Governor Pete du Pont into becoming strong advocates for RENAMO. Also, we have had good success on the general freedom fighter issue with Senator Dole and Vice President Bush. ... I might go so far as to say that for the real conservative wing of the Republican party, we have made the issue of support for RENAMO the cutting edge of whether or not they will receive the dedicated and enthusiastic fundraising support from the wealthy wing of the party.

When it comes to human rights (or as I like to refer to them as “individual” rights), I think the key issue here is the right to property. Too many Third World countries have made the mistake of paying lip service to what they call “human rights,” meaning some so-called right of the government to pay for education, social welfare, etc., and not pay any attention to the basic underlying right of the individual to make his own life, free of government interference. This includes the inherent absolute right to property.

James U. Blanchard III, in a letter to Renamo representative Francisco Nota Moises, October 26, 1987

I exchanged correspondence with Alfonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, and I am now totally convinced that Renamo is not just another brutal anti-communist army for just power. They legitimately want to restore democracy to Mozambique and freedom to the people of Mozambique. They are not only anti-communist but understand the destructive forces of collectivism on the economy, and they are very pro-free market.

In Renamo territory, Ellie Hein, center, is distraught to find religious adherents of an indigenous sect at worship where she was planning to preach.

Ellie Hein, whose father was killed and brother wounded in the Rhodesian war, saw herself as saving Mozambique from godless communism. She and Rodney made their first missionary trip to Mozambique in 1982, three years after their conversion. Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, she was convinced that in Mozambique “brutal murder or imprisonment is the order for all professing Christians.” In subsequent years, Rodney and Ellie Hein, as well as Michael Howard, travelled repeatedly to Mozambique. At first they entered legally with visas granted by the Mozambican government, but soon turned to clandestine border crossings, eventually making arrangements to work regularly with Renamo.

In late 1985, as Zimbabwean authorities collected evidence that they were combining evangelistic activities and humanitarian aid with other forms of support for Renamo, Schaaf, Howard, and the Heins fled Zimbabwe. Afterwards, in Washington and in Malawi, their Renamo support activities took on larger proportions.

**SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHER RENAMO PATRONS**

When Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe, thousands of recalcitrant white settlers headed south. South African special forces, including the reconnaissance commandos responsible for Renamo, received an influx of hundreds of veterans of the Rhodesian war, both white and black. Robert MacKenzie took this route, along with Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, commander of the Selous Scouts (another Rhodesian special forces unit) and a significant number of MacKenzie's SAS colleagues. Although some returned to civilian life in South Africa after their initial contracts expired, MacKenzie stayed on under Reid-Daly, who was...
Among the first U.S. citizens to make contact with Renamo, apart from MacKenzie and Schaaf, was self-proclaimed adventurer Jack Wheeler. On a worldwide tour in 1983-1984, financed by the Reason Foundation, Wheeler made contact with insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua. Failing to get into Mozambique in 1984, he interviewed Dhlakama by radio from a "neighboring country."46 He returned convinced that Renamo had the most potential of the anti-Soviet insurgencies to win, and began pushing the cause with right-wing connections such as the Mozambican government, saw Mozambique as a critical test of their campaign against State Department moderates whom they accused of undermining consistent support for anti-Marxist insurgencies around the world. Simultaneously, the Reagan administration was turning to privatization of support for the contras in Nicaragua to evade congressional restrictions. The Reagan Doctrine, proclaimed in 1985, set the context for an expanded right-wing crusade for victories over vulnerable Marxist regimes.

MacKenzie left South Africa to return to the United States in 1985, after U.S. officials reportedly raised questions about his alleged earnings from the Transkei Defense Force.43 Other individual U.S. connections to Renamo during the first half of the 1980s were not as prominent. Renamo’s modest efforts to build links outside South Africa were overshadowed by its military activities, and were concentrated on Europe, particularly Portugal and West Germany.44 The situation changed substantially, however, after South Africa and Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. While, as documented above, South African military involvement did not stop, several factors converged to make private U.S. involvement more prominent. The South African military sought greater deniability by encouraging the expansion of private support, both inside South Africa and elsewhere. Some Mozambican exiles who had previously hesitated to be associated with Renamo took Nkomati as a signal that there might be hope of victory and future rewards for involvement. U.S. right-wing groups, alarmed by improving relations between the U.S. and the Mozambican government, saw Mozambique as a critical test of their campaign against State Department moderates whom they accused of undermining consistent support for anti-Marxist insurgencies around the world. Simultaneously, the Reagan administration was turning to privatization of support for the contras in Nicaragua to evade congressional restrictions. The Reagan Doctrine, proclaimed in 1985, set the context for an expanded right-wing crusade for victories over vulnerable Marxist regimes.
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

The democratic anti-communist resistance, RENAMO, has liberated 85% of Mozambique from the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO regime. The people of Mozambique support RENAMO. They may have totally defeated the communists by now, except... George Shultz and Chester Crocker at the State Department are still supporting the unelected FRELIMO regime that oppresses the people—with YOUR tax dollars.

Unless we do something now, the pro-Marxist bureaucrats in the State Department will be one step further towards selling out freedom in Mozambique.

RENAMO is the fastest growing, and most successful, anti-communist insurgency in the world today. But their struggle is almost unknown and almost always misrepresented in the press. These brave freedom fighters have risked their lives and sacrificed everything because their [sic] know their cause is just. They have nothing but what they capture from the enemy.

We led the citizens' battle against the confirmation of pro-Marxist Ambassador to Mozambique, Melissa Wells. The eleven month controversy that resulted in the Senate, put Ms. Wells on-the-record and further exposed the unscrupulous bureaucratic alliance with the FRELIMO regime.

Just when RENAMO is close to victory, we cannot allow the cause of freedom to be undermined, sold-out, and sabotaged by State Department bureaucrats.

Thomas W. Schaaf, Jr., in a fundraising appeal for the Mozambique Research Center, undated, 1988

Heritage Foundation, the Conservative Caucus, and The Washington Times. In June 1985, he succeeded in making a two-week trip inside Renamo territory from Malawi, later written up in a two-part report for Soldier of Fortune.47

Renamo lobbying efforts in Washington moved into high gear after Tom Schaaf arrived in Washington in early 1986. After a clumsy false start under the alias Tom Curran and a public fight with the Conservative Action Foundation about who would represent Renamo, Schaaf founded the Mozambique Information Office (MIO)46 in August, with support from the Heritage Foundation and Free the Eagle, a right-wing group funded by investment analyst Howard Ruff. The Conservative Action Foundation backed Mozambican exile Artur Vilankulu as Renamo representative, while Schaaf backed another exile, Luis Serapião, a professor at Howard University. Renamo president Dhlakama eventually endorsed Serapião and Schaaf.45

Building support among conservative Republicans in Congress, Schaaf conducted a high-profile campaign against the Reagan administration's rapprochement with Mozambique and for a shift to active U.S. support for Renamo. In July 1986, when a delegation headed by former Zimbabwe Agriculture Minister Denis Norman visited Washington to seek investment in the Beira Corridor, Schaaf confronted the delegation in a public meeting with potential investors, shouting that Renamo would destroy whatever was built.48 The following month, Schaaf arranged a press conference with Congressman Dan Burton for visiting Renamo Secretary of Foreign Relations Artur da Fonseca. Da Fonseca also met with White House Director of Communications Patrick Buchanan.

In January 1987, Schaaf registered with the U.S. Department of Justice as a foreign agent for Renamo. That year was the height of the public influence of the Renamo lobby, which successfully held up the nomination of Melissa Wells as the new ambassador for Mozambique for ten months (see below, p. 35). But Schaaf's confrontational and deceptive style, along with new publicity about Renamo atrocities, undermined his credibility even in many right-wing Washington circles. In November 1987, Schaaf turned up in a group of conservative lobbyists who met with Reagan's National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci and the Africa advisor of the National Security Council Herman (Hank) Cohen. The White House later issued disclaimers saying that Carlucci had been unaware that Schaaf was an official Renamo lobbyist and that they were dismayed by his presence.51

By mid-1988, after the Gersony report had consolidated the image of Renamo atrocities in Washington policy circles, Schaaf and his colleagues had retreated to a lower-profile strategy: they concentrated on raising funds from true believers, privately lobbying friends within the government, and arranging trips to Renamo territory. For these activities, Schaaf relied on the
practical help of Robert MacKenzie and the financial backing of James U. Blanchard III, a prominent precious metals investor from Louisiana.

Making the Gorongosa Connection

Upon his return to the United States in 1985, MacKenzie became a correspondent for *Soldier of Fortune* magazine and a consultant on low-intensity conflict. Maintaining his contacts in South Africa and Mozambique, he linked up with Schaaf to establish regular contact with Renamo's bush headquarters. The first of their trips together, in September 1986, was chronicled by MacKenzie in a May 1987 article in *Soldier of Fortune*, under the alias Bob McKenna. On this trip, MacKenzie later told New York Times reporter Robert Pear, they carried in "knives, walkie-talkies and other supplies" for Renamo.

Entering Mozambique from Malawi, MacKenzie, Schaaf, and their colleague Andrew Eiva made a rendezvous with Renamo guerrillas. One of their first contacts was a senior military officer named Commander Peter, who stared at MacKenzie and then said, "I know you. You trained me in Rhodesia in 1979." "He was correct," MacKenzie wrote, "and had a better memory for faces than I." Although the group was not able to travel to Renamo headquarters to meet with Dhlakama, MacKenzie was encouraged. "Having been involved with the movement since 1978, when it started armed resistance," his article concluded, "I was very pleased to see how close Renamo is to overthrowing the oppressive regime established by the now-deceased Samora Machel." This first trip sponsored by the Mozambique Information Office proved fruitful in establishing Schaaf as a facilitator between Renamo and American contacts. Schaaf established links with Paulo Oliveira, European spokesperson for Renamo in Lisbon. In this period, Schaaf was in touch with Oliveira two to three times per week by phone and fax. According to Oliveira, "Schaaf would relay messages through me to the base at Phalaborwa, South Africa, which was in constant contact with Renamo headquarters inside Mozambique."

Through Oliveira, Schaaf arranged two trips for MacKenzie into Renamo territory in 1987. Oliveira relates that he "personally relayed messages from Schaaf to Phalaborwa and back concerning the logistical details for two trips into Renamo territory by the American mercenary Bob MacKenzie." On a trip in May 1987, MacKenzie carried in radio transmission equipment for Zambézia and Manica provinces. He was also to provide training in the use of the equipment to Renamo personnel. "I arranged the date and times for the border crossing into Zambézia province from Malawi," stated Oliveira.

On a second trip later in 1987, which Oliveira also coordinated, MacKenzie was responsible for "the introduction of American radio equipment into Mozambique for use by Renamo units in coordinating attacks." According to Oliveira, he "also learned from Thomas Schaaf that Bob MacKenzie was planning some kind of further military training for Renamo members during this time." This second trip by MacKenzie was arranged after Renamo kidnapped a group of missionaries in May 1987, including a recently arrived American nurse. The group was released to MacKenzie in August, after an appeal by Senator Jesse Helms to Renamo.

This communications equipment, Oliveira noted, was particularly important for Renamo's military capability. Stationed in the South African headquarters base for Renamo in 1983-84, where...
he coordinated the Renamo radio station, Oliveira was in a position to observe radio communications between Dhlakama and field commanders, and between Dhlakama and the South African military. The effectiveness of Renamo's military operations depended heavily on this communications superiority over the defending government forces.  

*The Money Man*

The largest single donor for operating costs of the MIO was a Louisiana businessman, James U. Blanchard III, who told *The New York Times* in 1988 he had given between $50,000 and $75,000 to Renamo in the last two years. Blanchard was a self-described “gold bug,” editor of the *Gold Newsletter*, and chairman of the National Committee for Monetary Reform, which annually attracted thousands of gold standard enthusiasts and right-wing ideologues to a conference hosted by Blanchard in New Orleans. Blanchard and many of his fellow gold bugs were significant supporters of conservative officeholders in the Republican Party.

Blanchard’s financial support for Renamo began with contact, established through Jack Wheeler, with Renamo representative Francisco Nota Moises in Kenya. Although he failed to get into Renamo territory on a visit to Malawi with Moises in September 1986, he provided both money and political contacts for others involved in Renamo support, including Moises, Schaaf, and MacKenzie. Writing of his first attempted visit, Blanchard noted that he knew his activities were illegal: “We were given very strong warnings that if we tried to smuggle anything into Mozambique, we would be in defiance of the internal affairs of both nations. I am sure our Bowie knife, letters to President Dhlakama, secret documents, and confirmation of radio and medicine on the way would have been extremely incriminating if officials had searched our rooms or briefcases.”

Later Blanchard noted, “Today there are all kinds of laws prohibiting Americans from doing what Jim Bowie and Davy Crockett did for Texas at the Alamo, and I came under a great deal of criticism in *The New York Times* and other publications for helping Renamo.” Still, he decided to go forward, conceding that thereafter, “I increased my aid and support. I worked with other groups such as Free the Eagle and Freedom Inc.”

When he made contact with Blanchard, Moisés was prominent in the Renamo network among Mozambican exiles in Kenya. In the period after Nkomati, Kenya along with Malawi became increasingly important as a channel for external support to Renamo, including supply of weapons and even training of troops. In 1987, Moisés moved to Canada, explaining to Blanchard that he was gaining too high a profile in Kenya. “The condition for refugee status,” he explained, “[was] that we refrain from any political activities against Frelimo. We did some pretty work, clandestinely though. We did not get into trouble simply because some ‘high ranking officials’ had said that they would turn a blind eye to our activities as long as we did not make public statements.”

Originally financed by Blanchard while in Kenya, Moisés managed to persuade his patron to continue support while he engaged in propaganda activities in Canada and, in his words, continued “to work closely with my Nairobi team and also cooperate with Tom and his team in Washington and with other colleagues in Europe.” A former employee of the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service in Swaziland, Moisés was responsible for Renamo public relations and sought to sell Blanchard on the idea of providing equipment for a Radio Free Mozambique to broadcast from Renamo headquarters.

Although this grandiose scheme did not materialize, it helped with fundraising, which, together with Blanchard’s own money, sustained Moisés and Schaaf for some time, and provided for some equipment being delivered to Renamo. Beginning with a monthly contribution, Blanchard helped finance, among other goods, “spare parts for motorcycles, a radio system, an office with paper and typewriter — the kind of basics... that they could not hope to afford without some outside help.” Moisés continued to serve as one link to Dhlakama. “The boss is keen on the radio and uniforms for his soldiers,” he pointed out in a letter in October 1987.
Join The Struggle For Freedom

The nation may change, but the story remains the same. The world over, brave people are fighting in the cause of freedom. The patriots of Mozambique... Afghanistan... Angola... and Nicaragua all face the same enemy: The Soviet Union's puppets.

Barefoot freedom fighters in tattered clothes stand defiantly before the Soviet Goliath with only the most rudimentary weapons... and in the name of liberty, they lay down their lives for their families and their homelands.

They die from fever that could be cured with a handful of aspirin... from otherwise trivial wounds that become infected for lack of treatment. But they exact a deadly toll for every square foot of their homelands held by the enemy—a toll counted in the blood of their communist oppressors.

Sadly... disgracefully... our own government turns its head away in mute apathy toward the carnage.

Take A Stand For Liberty With Freedom Fighter Commemoratives

You can make a difference in the struggle for freedom.

Pro-communist freedom fighting organizations, RENAMO, the Jamiat-e-Islami freedom fighters of Afghanistan have commissioned Freedom, Inc. to create proof silver commemoratives for each of their groups.

When you purchase a Freedom Fighter Commemorative, a substantial portion of the purchase will go to freedom fighter organizations.

Your purchase of Freedom Fighter Commemoratives will help to buy medicine... clothing... supplies for field hospitals... and much more for the courageous freedom fighters.

In short, you'll be taking a stand for liberty with those who have given up everything to achieve it.

RENA MO Silver Proof:

The obverse of the piece features the image of a freedom fighter, rifle in hand. Over his left shoulder appears the rising sun. The reverse displays the silver content, the year and the RENAMO symbol, featuring a five-point star and five parallel arrows.

Afghanistan Silver Proof:

The obverse of this commemorative is decorated with a stylized map of the country, accented with a flag expressing the Muslim code of faith. Beneath the flag, a striking row of tulips in full bloom symbolizes bloodshed. The reverse is decorated with the date according to both the Gregorian calendar and the Islamic. Two swords cross to frame the inscription, "God is Great." In the center of the piece, an open book reads: "We will guide those who strive for our cause: God is with those who do right."

Two Full Ounces Of Pure Silver

The Freedom Fighter Commemoratives are dazzling Cameo Proofs, featuring almost blinding, mirrorlike backgrounds and sharp, frosty raised images. Each contains a full ounce of pure, .999 fine silver.

Each commemorative comes in a clear acrylic capsule—perfect as a gift... a family heirloom... or as a constant reminder of the courage of those who carry on in the cause of freedom.

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How Your Money Will Be Used

Dr. Jack Wheeler is known throughout the world for venturing behind the lines with the Muslim freedom fighters of Afghanistan and the Jamiat-e-Islami freedom fighters of Afghanistan... and with Angola's anti-communist freedom fighters.

Because of his knowledge of the world's freedom fighter movements and the great respect in which he is held by the leaders of the world's freedom fighters, Dr. Wheeler has been selected to supervise the funding of the Freedom Fighter Commemoratives.

Africa Policy Information Center

Freedom Inc. fundraising flier.
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

My name is Robert MacKenzie. On the first of March 1988, I became the Executive Director of Freedom Inc. Still undaunted, if a little depressed at being so often on the losing side, I've continued to wield my sword in various other southern African & Central American conflicts...

Our basic aims are to assist anti-communist guerrilla movements worldwide to defeat this expansionism. Our help, for instance, is urgently needed by RENAMO. The anti-communist freedom fighters of Mozambique are winning their struggle militarily, but losing the media battle. FI. (Freedom Inc.) is assisting with public relations efforts, as well as providing funds for non-lethal material aid.

Here are some of the things we're doing. Others cannot be announced because the targets would be alerted to their imminent danger.

RENAMO Support

- Essential, non-lethal equipment which will enable the guerrillas to conduct their campaign more effectively has been purchased. In the near future, you'll hear just how effective this equipment has been.
- FI. has consulted with RENAMO representatives in Washington, D.C., planning a campaign to refute unfavorable publicity & create a positive press image. One example is the RENAMO article carried on page one of the New York Sunday Times on May 22, 1988. Another Times article on July 31 resulted from a trip paid for by FI. co-founder Harry S., who underwrote the charter fare for several journalists to visit guerrilla HQ.
- The first check from our FI. coin sales project had been delivered to a very happy RENAMO representative.

Robert MacKenzie, in Freedom Force, volume 1, number 1, 1988

While promoting Renamo as an advocate of free enterprise and a future Mozambique under Renamo as a promising investment opportunity, Blanchard sought to convince Renamo leaders to conform to the image he painted. "Although I support all the freedom fighter movements (such as those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola)," he wrote to Dhikama, "they do not have a true understanding of the powerful and positive forces of a society based on freedom, free enterprise, property rights, respect for individual rights and minimal government intervention.... Mr. President, you and Renamo could be the first freedom fighter organization to show the world that you have a full understanding and policy of an open society based on individual rights, with an emphasis on the right of an individual to be free from government interference."77

Fundraising and Propaganda: Freedom Inc. and the U.S. Global Strategy Council

Fundraising for Renamo soon acquired a larger base through another pair of investment newsletter gurus — Harry Schultz of Monte Carlo, listed for over a decade in the Guinness Book of World Records (1990) as the world's "highest-paid investment consultant," and Larry Abraham of Phoenix, Arizona, publisher of the Insider Report. Announcing the formation of Freedom Inc. in early 1987 issues of their newsletters, the two heralded a scheme to raise a one-time fund of $10 million "to fight US liberals, global socialists, the controlled left wing press, oppressive taxation/enforcement, CFR, Soviet propaganda, & communist-front organizations around the world."69

Contributors, solicited from other newsletter mailing lists as well, were invited to contribute the $10 million within six months, while Abraham and Schultz promised to add $5,000 to the fund for each $100,000 contributed and to refund all contributions if they failed to reach the goal. Contributors were invited to send their checks to a post office box in Zurich, Switzerland, and were offered memberships ranging from "Minimal Support" ($400) through a series of steps including "Front Line Freedom Fighter" ($50,000) up to "Supreme Sacrifice" ($1,000,000). The Freedom Inc. board of directors met for the first time in Toronto in May. Blanchard, accepting chairman-ship of the Advisory Council for the United States, pitched the cause of Renamo and reported his scheme for raising funds through marketing Freedom Fighter coins (see box, page 23). Abraham announced that Freedom Inc. would absorb the group Blanchard had formed to help Renamo freedom fighters in Mozambique.

In two years, Freedom Inc. raised approxi-
mately $700,000. They spent $300,000 on a failed effort to rescue the financially troubled Conservative Digest and $175,000 on a video on political action produced by Paul Weyrich's Free Congress Foundation. Deciding not to refund memberships, that left $225,000 for other activities. In the area of anticommunist insurgence, Abraham reported, they chose to concentrate on Renamo. The choice was prefigured by the selection of Robert MacKenzie as executive director. (see box, page 24)

MacKenzie's tenure with Freedom Inc. lasted less than two years, and the organization faded from public view after he left. For that brief time, however, it provided the vehicle for additional support missions for Renamo, which provided the organization with useful publicity and additional communications equipment.

The most prominent of these ventures was a July 1988 trip, "bankrolled by Harry Schultz of Freedom Inc.," which took reporters from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Newsweek to Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa. In addition to the relatively favorable publicity for Renamo, the flight delivered new solar-powered radio equipment paid for by Blanchard. As Dhlakama explained to the journalists, the new equipment would "link scores of guerrilla bases throughout Mozambique to the outside world by enabling them to send coded messages through laptop portable computers." "One of Renamo's main strengths, judging from observations of its operations here," commented the Post's William Claiborne, "appears to be its ability to communicate among its bases throughout Mozambique and coordinate military tactics and logistics."

Freedom Inc. sponsored another trip later that year, as MacKenzie was enlisted as an intermediary with Renamo in the release of an English freelance journalist, Nicholas della Casa. Della Casa had been arrested in June 1987 under suspicion of spying for the British intelligence services while visiting in Renamo areas. Despite his captivity, della Casa maintained a relatively favorable view of Renamo, and Dhlakama responded to a plea from Senator Jesse Helms that the journalist should be released. Freedom Inc. volunteered to help and successfully brought della Casa out through Malawi.

This second trip also served as an opportunity to bring new Renamo supporters including Sibyl Cline of the U.S. Global Strategy Council (USGSC), who accompanied MacKenzie, and retired Major General John K. Singlaub of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) into direct contact with Dhlakama. Cline, who later married MacKenzie, returned on another trip with MacKenzie and della Casa in 1989, publishing an account in Soldier of Fortune and using the material for a pamphlet published by USGSC.

Around the time of this trip, an independent conservative researcher in Texas named Landkamer, who had a personal grievance against a member of Freedom Inc.'s board, gained access to documents from the Freedom Inc. offices and became involved in a lawsuit with the organization. Harry Schultz formally withdrew from the organization. Freedom Inc. published its last newsletter in March, and Abraham let MacKenzie go.

In January 1989, Major General Singlaub reported on his trip to a small audience at the Russell Senate Office Building, praising Renamo
Renamo needs U.S. advisors to help implement a pro-freedom agenda since delicate constitutional issues will be on the table. It is estimated that a total investment of $214,000 will bring political and financial success. This is an urgent call for help, but the leader of the free Mozambique movement, President Afonso Dhlakama, has assured me that all contributors will be reimbursed with interest. The revenue from a new Beira accord should be at least ten million dollars each year.

William H. Ball, Jr., in February 1991 mailing to members of the Council for National Policy

In order to take advantage of the rare diplomatic opportunity presented by the Vatican-monitored peace talks, Renamo must immediately assemble a top flight advisory team from the West. Renamo's representatives, operating with almost no funds and under enormous pressure, are trying to pull together a battery of qualified advisors to sit in Renamo's corner in Rome. The cost of this team will run in the area of $214,000.

Anyone who makes a significant donation at this time will automatically be admitted to membership in the Mozambique Business Association, a serious business group dedicated to advising and assisting a freely elected government in Mozambique on ways to maximize its incredible resources. It is Renamo's vision that Mozambique, a resource-rich country the size of California, will become the "Hong Kong" of Africa.

Renamo's President Afonso Dhlakama personally advised me in a face-to-face meeting on November 1, 1990 in Nairobi that "With the full faith & credit of a free democratic Mozambique, all contributors will be reimbursed with my personal thank-you."

Julius Seffu, Renamo representative in U.S., beginning in 1990, enclosure in same mailing

and noting that he had been in contact with them since 1984. In April, he was one of the featured speakers at a Herndon, Virginia conference on southern Africa hosted by Howard Phillips' Conservative Caucus Foundation, again recounting his trip and praising Renamo. Neither event attracted much public attention.

Similarly, Sibyl Cline's pamphlet, published in December 1989, attracted little attention except within committed right-wing circles. The sponsorship of the publication by her father's USGSC, which had links both to moderate conservatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and to the extreme far-right networks of WACL, Reverend Moon's American Freedom Coalition, and others, nevertheless indicated that despite public reticence after the atrocity reports of 1988, support for Renamo was still respectable among many conservatives.

Fundraising and Advice

As indirect peace contacts between the Mozambican government and Renamo got underway in mid-1989, Renamo's U.S. funders found their contributions had bought considerable influence. In August 1989, Blanchard was "invited by President Dhlakama to be part of the Renamo delegation." Providing both funds and advice, Blanchard and other U.S. advisers brought into the process contributed to the confusion and multiple delays that plagued the subsequent negotiations. Seemingly unconcerned with the urgency of ending the war and with little nuanced understanding of the specifics of Mozambican realities, their emphasis seems to have been on promoting polemical right-wing ideology and keeping open the option for future windfall profits.

"I believe that one day President Afonso Dhlakama will be one of the most strategic leaders in Africa," Blanchard wrote, "and will be president of one of the most strategic nations in Africa — a free Mozambique."

Later that year, at the 16th Annual Blanchard Investment Conference in October, Blanchard announced the formation of a Mozambique Business Association. "Good faith demonstrated NOW," read the announcement, "will develop into the "ground-floor" opportunities of the future. All agree that Mozambique can easily become the 'Hong Kong of Africa'... Mozambique needs business friends NOW — to help reinforce and promote the peace process. It's the friends of today that will have those ground floor opportunities of tomorrow. And that 'tomorrow' is not far away — if we act today."

One such friend who responded to Blanchard's call was Lawrence W. Reed of Mid-
land, Michigan, president of a conservative think tank, The Mackinac Center. According to Blanchard, Reed wrote "a kind of Declaration of Independence for Renamo," a free-market manifesto that Dhlakama assured Blanchard would be incorporated into the Mozambican constitution once Renamo prevailed. Reed travelled to Nairobi to meet Dhlakama in 1990 and joined the Renamo delegation as an adviser at the sixth round of peace talks in Rome.

While public lobbying on behalf of Renamo diminished after 1988, with both Freedom Inc. and the Mozambique Research Center inactive if not defunct, Schaaf, MacKenzie, Blanchard and Wheeler all continued their involvement in lower-key efforts behind the scenes. Blanchard and Wheeler were members of the Council for National Policy, a group of several hundred right-wing activists who met regularly to coordinate strategy. The organization, with funds from Texas billionaire Nelson Bunker Hunt and the Coors family of Colorado, included among its prominent members Major General Singlaub, already committed to the Renamo course; Howard Phillips of the Conservative Caucus; and Paul Weyrich of the Committee for Survival of a Free Congress.

The extent of involvement elicited from such conservative networks is still incompletely documented. One individual whose involvement is confirmed, however, is William H. Ball, Jr., an Indiana businessman active in both the Conservative Caucus and the Council for National Policy (see box, p. 26). Later that year, Bruce Fein, a lawyer formerly associated with the Heritage Foundation who had served in the Reagan Justice Department, registered as an agent for Renamo for a payment of $40,000 a month in addition to $125,000 paid to him earlier in 1991 for drafting a constitution and supplementary explanatory documents. The draft constitution, apparently never translated into Portuguese from the original English, was ridiculed in the Portuguese as well as Mozambican press for its undignified language and espousal of favorite U.S. right-wing causes. Its only apparent effect on the negotiations was to divert attention from the agenda of reaching a peace accord.

The Malawi Connection

From 1986, one of the key links between Renamo and external sponsors other than South Africa was the Blantyre Christian Centre, a missionary enterprise led by Ellie and Rodney Hein after they fled Zimbabwe. The Heins' efforts, backed largely by funds from right-wing church sponsors in the U.S. and tolerated by Malawi authorities, included evangelization for their version of Christianity and humanitarian aid. But they, and some of those drawn into their activities by Tom Schaaf, Michael Howard, and others, also became engaged in communications and supply functions with direct military significance. The evidence to date is not sufficient to evaluate the quantitative significance of these activities for Renamo, in comparison with other clandestine sources provided through Malawi, over the land border from South Africa, or by sea from South Africa or Kenya. Moreover, it is likely that most of the U.S. contributors were unaware of the military components of the Heins' involvement, but there is no doubt that it made a material contribution to Renamo's military capacity.

Some details of the Heins' operations were revealed when Ian Grey, a 26-year-old Australian member of the Assemblies of God, a volunteer missionary, was arrested in November 1987 while crossing Mozambique from Zimbabwe to Malawi carrying messages for Renamo. Grey, it turned out, had been recruited in early 1986 by Shekinah Ministries as a regular courier into Mozambique, and was assigned to work out of the Heins' Blantyre Christian Centre. Although disturbed by the secular and military character of some of the visitors who accompanied him into Mozambique — he noted in a later interview an "extremely foul-mouthed senior editor" from The Washington Times — Grey's doubts were accentuated in prison in Mozambique when his father, who had travelled from Australia, was allowed to visit. Meeting his son just before the trial, the father recounted being received in Maputo by thriving congregations of the pentecostal faith, worshipping without fear of government harassment. Grey concluded that he had been duped, and admitted that the messages
Sponsored predominantly by American churches, evangelical missionary Rodney Hein pilots a plane loaded with advisors and supplies for Renamo.

he carried had often been of a military character. Sentenced to ten years, Grey was amnestied and released by Mozambican authorities in August 1989.90

Among the South African partners of the Shekinah network was Peter Hammond, of the Frontline Fellowship, a "missionary group" organized among members of the South African army, which recruited its membership particularly among South African and ex-Rhodesian special forces veterans.91 Hammond circulated fabricated information on government repression of religion in Mozambique and on atrocities by government troops.92 In October 1989, Hammond, along with six Americans from the Christian Emergency Relief Team International, of Carlsbad, California, were arrested after illegally entering Mozambique from Malawi. Despite suspicion that they were engaged in military support for Renamo, they were released seven days later after appeals by the U.S. Embassy to the Mozambican president.93

Documents captured by the Mozambican army at the Renamo base of Nhamagodoa in Sofala also reveal extensive and regular contact between Hein (code-named "Joseph") and Renamo President Dhlakama.94 Joseph served as one contact with a Malawi official code-named "Marcos," and he worked with Francisco Nota Moisés to establish contacts for support for Renamo from the Kenyan government. On May 11, 1988, passing on information from Moisés in Kenya, Joseph relayed an offer from President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya to aid Renamo. Moi stressed the need for strict secrecy because "your friends in the South and in the U.S.A. want this operation to succeed and that secrecy be maintained."95 In a later message, Joseph stressed that only he and Moisés should be used as intermediaries, and he passed on a request from the Kenyan president for Dhlakama to provide "a budget for any financial and material needs."96

The Kenya connection, as later reports revealed, served not only for diplomatic contacts in Nairobi as part of the peace process but also developed into the supply of weapons and military training.97 Although the scale of this operation, and its financing, are among the points that remain obscure, there is little doubt that the Kenya connection, through Malawi, was of military as well as political significance to Renamo.

A VISIT WITH THE HEINS

The connection the Heins provided functioned without interruption from 1986 into the 1990s. Researcher Kathi Austin, invited to accompany them on one trip in 1991, describes how it worked.

I first met Renamo leader Dhlakama in Nairobi in March 1991. Dhlakama, his presence in the Kenyan capital an official secret, instructed his secretary to give me a contact name and number in Malawi. In this interview he confided to me that Renamo's American supporters, including MacKenzie, Schaaf and Blanchard, had provided him with critical money and other support. I was told that if I called "Joseph" and gave my flight information for arrival in Malawi, I would be met at the airport by Malawian officials supportive of Renamo who would see that I was immediately cleared through customs.

From my hotel in Blantyre, I called Joseph again to make arrangements for the trip into Renamo-controlled territory. The next day, I and my American colleague Steve Galster were picked up by Joseph in a four-wheel-drive Range Rover, recently supplied to him by American churches. Joseph picked up several others who would be
SAME EVENT, DIFFERENT VISIONS

The people had started arriving enmasse — way over 1,000, with more on the way. A special new church had been built for the meeting in one of the outer bases of the Renamo camp.... The Renamo soldiers had actually built a brand new village for us, with grass huts and beds made of new cane.... On top of that, they provided us with special cooks and servants who cooked for us, washed our clothes in the nearby river, and ironed them with large irons filled with red-hot coals.... We were treated like royalty. We walked to the meeting place early each morning, where crowds waited in long lines in front of the kitchens. Each carried his own battered plates and bowls, ecstatic to get something to eat.... They were so hungry for the Word of God. Most of them were not even born-again.

Their needs were so great we wished we had more time ministering to them. Some had walked hundreds of miles. A group of twenty Baptist pastors had walked forty-two days. Others had walked for weeks. 


A group of bandits invaded Nauela on 6 April, starting with the property of the merchant Almeida Ferreira, smashing everything in their way. They burnt houses, looted shops, stole animals and household goods. Many people fled into the woods but were recaptured and forced to carry loot and sheets of corrugated iron, stripped off the roofs, towards the Malawi frontier.

I was returning by car from a visit to outlying church members at Gurue and was stopped by two traders who were running away and begged for a lift back to Gurue, so I took them. I returned to Nauela after the bandits had left but someone had seen me rescue the traders and told the leader Herculano, who sent men to find me and bring me to their base for questioning. They said I would be shot. But after a week they let me go home but kept my car.

In June the bandits demanded to see all the religious leaders in Nauela. There were 120 of us and they forced us to walk to Morrumbala with a guard of 30 men. (It is over 300 kms as the crow flies) We slept on the ground and it took 19 days. We had nothing to eat except leaves or roots. In the base at Morrumbala were a group of 20 white Christians, some who were South Africans and others from the United States among whom was a Portuguese woman called Graça who interpreted.

The bandits kept questioning me about the traders and making threats. They wanted to kill them. Then I and my church colleagues were all questioned by the group of Christians.

I had time to observe what was going on. The camp was divided into three parts. In the first were the captive civilians whose daily work was to find food for the bandits. In the second were the bandits and their leaders and the third part was for the whites. There were also many pens of farm animals stolen from the people of Gurue, Nauela and Alto Molocue.

Another thing I saw were some 200 armed children in the camp. The bandits were always taking children of 12, 13 or 14 and teaching them to fight. After some two and a half weeks they sent us back to Nauela with an armed guard.

plete with Renamo insignia on his shoulder badges. The 6-passenger one-propeller plane, an old model refurbished with money from Joseph's church sponsors in the U.S., displayed a Pilots for Christ decal in the passenger window. Our flight from Malawi to Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa was extremely hot and bumpy at times; we flew barely 75 feet above tree level in order to avoid detection.

On arrival at the dirt landing strip, we met additional South African advisors to Renamo, a South Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) crew, a German and a British journalist, David Hoile (a prominent British supporter of Renamo),98 and more employees of ESKOM. We waited until after nightfall for DWakama to pick us up. After dark, a convoy of motorcycles arrived at the landing strip with Dhlakama himself leading the way. After riding back and forth on the strip in formation several times, showing off his riding skills, DWakama halted and officially welcomed us to his headquarters. Foot soldiers were ordered to carry our gear, and the rest of us mounted the backs of motorcycles. For two-and-a-half hours I rode behind DWakama on a winding path through thick brush and forest. The base was a massive encampment, with concentric circles of troops, hidden under an expansive umbrella of trees.

After being deposited at our huts to clean up, we were assigned women "soldiers" who were responsible for attending to our domestic needs: drawing water, baths, cleaning the huts and washing clothes. Meeting Dhlakama late that same evening in the mud-and-thatch main hall, we saw he sported a new battle uniform which still showed the folds from its packaging and which we learned had arrived with our flight. DWakama, taking us all as Renamo sympathizers, spoke at length on how a conspiracy had made the world turn against Renamo. Charges of Renamo's responsibility for massacres were mere "propaganda," he insisted repeatedly.

The next morning, I met the only other woman in our assorted crew. Ellie Hein was the wife of Joseph the pilot, whom I now learned was named Rodney Hein when not on duty with Renamo. While Joseph a.k.a. Rodney worked tirelessly to transport supplies and men back and forth to Dhlakama's military camp, his wife Ellie was responsible for distributing goods among villagers in Renamo-held areas for both political and religious purposes. Ellie always wore a Sunday dress and carried a Bible close at hand.

During the next few days I spent with Ellie at Renamo's headquarters, she talked of more than a decade of evangelism among Renamo soldiers and among the villages over which Renamo exercised control, as well as in refugee camps in Malawi. Humanitarian assistance, she explained, gave the opportunity to evangelize refugees and villagers for Christ and to politicize them in favor of Renamo. This mission relied primarily on churches and religious organizations in the U.S. for support, she confided. Her biggest supporters in the United States were currently churches in North Carolina and Florida.99

She and Joseph helped bring in basic supplies for the Renamo camp, Ellie told me, like condensed milk, coffee, noodles, toothpaste and soap, as well as fuel for the generators. Ellie also showed me huge cardboard boxes of clothing and religious literature, brought in for a forthcoming rally. Ellie did not mention, but later conversations with Dhlakama and several of the South African advisors revealed, that the boxes on our flight had also contained expensive navigational and radio equipment, new military uniforms and boots, new AK-47s, motorcycle supplies and a brand new Renamo flag with a tag that read "Made in the USA. Remove before Display."

Eager to show a positive side of Renamo, the...
SABC crew agreed to accompany Ellie on her evangelizing mission to the village of Khanda, 40 km from the base. Dhlakama dispatched soldier-couriers to announce to the villagers that we were on our way, bringing boxes of clothing, food and other goods.

A large contingent of Renamo soldiers were loaded up with boxes of goods for Ellie to distribute. Along the way, we and the soldiers were fed as we took what few chickens or squash were available in each small village that we traveled through. At a few sites, there was not enough food to serve even the foreign visitors; the local villagers were listless and close to starvation. Yet every site boasted a well-supplied radio operator, who relayed a report on our progress to Renamo headquarters. We arrived at Khanda late in the day.

The next morning, we discovered that thousands of people had gathered not far from the village center, in anticipation of a religious service and the distribution of goods. All around us we saw people affected by the war: a man with no arm, a woman with no foot, small malnourished children sitting for lack of energy in the dust, ill-clad women holding naked infants crying with hunger in the folds of their arms. Few people were properly clothed. Some were fortunate to have secured burlap sacks or parachute material to wrap around them. The look of poverty, depredation and starvation was evident.

Ellie had planned to preach but when we arrived she was horrified to discover that the gathered worshipers belonged to a Zionist sect whom she regarded as heathens. Although she gave a short sermon, translated by a Renamo leader, the crowd was anxious for its own leaders to resume. Ellie quickly escorted us away to find another service, but that one turned out to be Catholic. The SABC camera crew, impatient for good footage, had Renamo stage a scene of “happy” villagers harvesting fields. A few villagers with implements were taken out into a sugarcane field and told to sing and chant.

Back at the village center, over 3,000 people were waiting for the promised distribution of clothing. First came a Renamo political rally, with the listless crowd responding to instructions to chant slogans: “Up with Renamo; Down with Frelimo”; “Up with Dhlakama; Down with [Mozambican President Joaquim] Chissano.” The rally continued through a sudden downpour of rain. When the clothes were finally brought out, there were not enough to go around. Although the soldiers had attempted to separate adherents of Ellie’s sect to receive priority, a riot ensued. Renamo soldiers then dispersed the crowd with warning shots and regathered up the clothes. Ellie explained that the clothes would have to be taken to individual churches associated with her missions, to be given to their members. The boxes of clothes were given for distribution to evangelists known to Ellie. We trekked back to Renamo headquarters the next morning.

In a gathering the last day before we left Gorongosa, Dhlakama on his motorcycle commanded another review of his troops. Then in a press conference filmed by the SABC crew, he gratefully acknowledged support from U.S. and other backers for his cause and introduced Renamo’s new constitutional draft to be presented in negotiations with the government. His answers at the press conference demonstrated he had little familiarity with its content. U.S. advisors had helped draft the document, he told me in a separate interview. He also noted that his communications equipment was essential to co-
ordinating both military and civilian operations.

On our last night in Gorongosa, Dhlakama hosted a late-night party at which his women "soldiers" were instructed to dress up in red gowns and sing praises to the Renamo leader. Dhlakama explained to us again that under Renamo the people were happy and said that he could not understand why the rest of the world was against him.

In January 1994, almost three years after my trip, the Malawian army confiscated Hein's six-seater plane, as well as a seven-ton, American-registered cargo plane on which Hein served as copilot with an unnamed American pilot. The Malawi opposition paper, *The Monitor*, which reported the confiscation, interviewed Renamo members in refugee camps, who described Hein (an ex-Rhodesian) as "a very helpful American Reverend."
Throughout the height of Renamo's war in Mozambique during both the Reagan and Bush administrations, Renamo never joined the list of officially approved anticommunist insurgencies. Despite high-level advocacy by figures such as CIA Director William Casey, White House Communications Director Pat Buchanan, and National Security Council aide Constantine Menges, the State Department policy of wooing the Mozambican government prevailed. While conservatives strongly attacked the policy as a betrayal, it was President Samora Machel and his successor Joaquim Chissano who visited Washington, not Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama. In sharp contrast to the rising fortunes of Unita, which after a well-financed lobbying campaign in fall 1985 regained official covert assistance, Renamo denounced U.S. policy as President Machel was warmly received at the Reagan White House in September 1985.

The rapprochement between Mozambique and the United States, beginning in 1982, leading up to the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique and resulting by 1989 in Mozambique's becoming the largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa, is a familiar story. The debate in U.S. policy circles was between the right-wing, which wanted to support Renamo, and the moderates, who argued instead for constructive engagement with Mozambique as well as with South Africa. Less often noted is the glaring inconsistency between, on the one hand, the ringing denunciations of Renamo, which reached their height after the Homoine massacre and the Gersony report and, on the other, the virtual absence from policy of any efforts to stop material support to Renamo from South Africa or from other sources including U.S. private groups and individuals.

This gap in the policy debate was determined by the Cold War context and U.S. domestic politics and was apparent even in the first Rhodesian period of Renamo's war during the Carter administration. Many of the U.S. mercenaries serving in the Rhodesian armed forces in Rhodesia also participated in raids on Mozambique, although none played as central a role with Renamo as did Robert MacKenzie. The Rhodesian regime was illegally in rebellion against Great Britain, a close U.S. ally, and embargoed by UN Security Council sanctions. Extensive publicity surrounded the role of these mercenaries. Yet, despite calls for investigations into recruiting ads in *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, no charges were ever brought (see legal appendix for applicable legislation and its lapse into disuse in the twentieth century).

During the Carter administration, the U.S. had a diplomatic presence in Maputo and supplied small quantities of food aid to Mozambique, but it provided no support to compensate that nation for
economic losses and war damages suffered from compliance with UN sanctions against Rhodesia. President Machel's meeting with President Carter in 1978 and repeated Mozambican statements that the country was interested in Western investments never resulted in more than token contacts.

The Reagan administration's early tilt toward South Africa and the domination of Cold War politics intensified U.S.-Mozambique tensions in 1981. Even much of the diplomatic credit Mozambique gained for facilitating the Lancaster House agreement on Zimbabwe's independence was lost when U.S. diplomats stationed in Maputo were expelled after accusations of espionage in March 1981. U.S. food aid was cut off in reprisal. 102

It was quickly apparent, however, that Mozambique could not afford such a public affront to Washington. Although the Soviet Union sent warships on a symbolic visit to Maputo as a warning against direct South African attacks, it was unwilling and probably unable to provide military support for the massive counter-insurgency efforts that would have been necessary to contain South Africa's support for Renamo. By the time the Soviet Union vetoed Mozambican membership in Comecon in mid-1981, Mozambican envoys were actively exploring openings in Washington. In 1982, the Frelimo Central Committee approved a diplomatic offensive aimed at splitting Western support from South Africa.

In subsequent years, Mozambican diplomacy was consistently aimed at isolating Renamo by playing on divisions within the South African state and separating South Africa from its Western partners. The prize was to win support in Washington, the key both to international economic aid and to pressure on South Africa. U.S. Mozambique policy was influenced by Margaret Thatcher's friendly ties with the Mozambican government as well by Chester Crocker's constructive engagement policy, which saw Mozambique as wooable. U.S.-Mozambican relations began to improve in the second half of 1982. In January 1983, the State Department sent an important signal by publicly acknowledging South African sponsorship of Renamo. The U.S. played a key intermediary role in talks leading up to the Nkomati Accord of March 1984, which pledged Mozambique and South Africa to bar any support for armed action against the other.

Before Nkomati, eliminating South African support for Renamo was not on the U.S. agenda, because the Reagan administration viewed it as justified pressure on Mozambique to abandon its support for the African National Congress in South Africa. U.S. private support for Renamo was minimal and also not an issue. South African support continued after Nkomati, in violation of a U.S.-brokered agreement, and U.S. private support, as documented in previous sections of this report, became increasingly important. Yet, despite a public policy of continued support for the Mozambican government and condemnation of Renamo, squeezing these supply lines never became a serious option for U.S. policymakers.

The pattern of U.S. diplomacy was consistent. Successive concessions were urged on the Mozambican government, making use of the leverage that the promise or the reality of aid supplied. In dealing with South Africa and Renamo, however, U.S. diplomats pleaded lack of leverage. On April 27, 1988, at the UN Conference on Emergency Assistance to Mozambique, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roy Stacy made a powerful statement condemning both Renamo and its supporters:

For whatever misguided reasons Renamo has been waging a systematic and brutal war of terror against innocent Mozambican civilians through forced labor, starvation, physical abuse and wanton killing. Condemn as we all do, condemnation of these acts is not enough. What has emerged in Mozambique is one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II. The supporters of RENAMO, wherever they may be, cannot wash the blood from their hands unless all support for this inconscionable violence is stopped immediately.

There is no indication, however, that Stacy's superiors ever attempted to stop private U.S. aid or made serious attempts to stop the continuing
covert support from South Africa.

In the first year after the Nkomati Accord, the war continued and even escalated, with South African assistance. But Mozambique was cautious, as the U.S. advised, in its public criticism of South Africa. The State Department proposed a token $1 million in nonlethal military assistance to Mozambique in early 1985, but the measure was dropped after stiff opposition emerged from within the administration and from Congress. The Mozambican government, increasingly concerned, openly accused South Africa of violating the accord. When President Machel visited Washington in late 1985, he brought detailed documentation of South African violations of Nkomati, in documents captured at Renamo's Gorongosa headquarters.

Despite clear evidence that Mozambique had implemented Nkomati in good faith while South Africa had not, U.S. talking points on objectives for the visit made no reference to putting increased pressure on Renamo. In the words of a memorandum prepared for the Secretary of Defense before his meeting with President Machel:

"State's objectives for the Machel visit are:

• improve the Frelimo government image in conservative congressional eyes;
• encourage continued adherence to the U.S.-brokered Nkomati Accord with South Africa;
• encourage Frelimo to negotiate power-sharing with Renamo;
• seek Frelimo cooperation in achieving an Angola/Namibia settlement;
• achieve a renewed CIA liaison presence;
• press Frelimo towards serious economic reform and greater cooperation with the IMF and World Bank
• moderate Mozambique's anti-U.S. votes in the United Nations."103

The memo was annotated with a handwritten note from a Defense Department aide: "The administration needs to review the whole issue. I'm not sure that the President isn't getting sold a bill of goods with this guy." Another annotation read: "I agree, we need to review our Mozambique policy."

Within the debate in those terms, pressure on Renamo's external backers was ruled out from the start. Even if the State Department had been willing to confront Pretoria over continued supplies to Renamo, it lacked the detailed information needed to do so. "Despite our requests, it somehow was never possible for US intelligence to document Renamo's barbaric modus operandi or the pattern of continuing South African support," noted Chester Crocker in his memoirs.104 The U.S. intelligence agencies, instead, painted a picture that was systematically biased toward Renamo.

South African officials were well aware of the disarray in Washington on Mozambique policy and had little incentive to respond when State Department officials mildly suggested that Pretoria might do more to curb support for Renamo. Concern for Mozambique was third at best on the State Department's southern Africa agenda, after the escalating crisis in South Africa and the high-profile Angola/Namibia front. Mozambique had no leverage in Washington apart from goodwill, which was subject to the fickle fortunes of lobbying.

The same political context and truncated range of policy options excluding the issue of external support for Renamo persisted after 1985. During the critical period from 1987 to 1989 in particular, the war in Mozambique continued unchecked; supplies from South Africa to Renamo continued and, as documented above, the private support network for Renamo from the U.S. through Malawi became more significant.

The policy debate in Washington did not address these issues, however. There was no discussion of the U.S. obligation to Mozambique to secure enforcement of the Nkomati Accord by South Africa. Instead the State Department's policy was under attack from the right-wing within Congress and within the administration. The campaign reached its height when career diplomat Melissa Wells was nominated to serve as the new ambassador to Mozambique. Senator Jesse Helms held up the confirmation, with the support of aspiring presidential candidate Senator Rob-
ert Dole, during an unprecedented ten-month confirmation struggle. Congressman Dan Burton took the lead in the House of Representatives in demanding a review of U.S. policy toward Mozambique. Meeting with Burton in late May, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger agreed that "clearly we should have a full NSC [National Security Council] examination to see if it is not now time to, if not give up on FRELIMO, then at least help RENAMO to some extent."¹⁰⁵

A State Department policy paper on Mozambique, issued in the midst of Wells' confirmation battle, was defensive, focusing on the success of Washington's efforts in turning Mozambique toward the West. Although the paper mentioned "credible reports of Renamo atrocities against the civilian population" and South African supplies of "high-priority items that Renamo is unable to acquire on its own," there was no mention of any U.S. interest in reducing military supplies to Renamo.¹⁰⁶

With the changing climate of opinion after the Homoïne massacre in July 1987, Melissa Wells was confirmed as ambassador in September. Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano visited Washington in October 1987, which helped to hold the line against a U.S. shift to support of Renamo. But again there was no progress in getting the U.S. to target South African support for Renamo. Not even the Gersony report's evidence of Renamo's atrocities served to bring Washington to a more proactive policy in favor of peace. The operative objectives remained wooing Mozambique with aid while promoting concessions toward Renamo and further liberalization of the Mozambican economy. Curbing Renamo's supply lines was conspicuously uninteresting to U.S. officials.

The pattern of U.S. policy remained consistent through the prolonged period of prenegotiations and negotiations from 1989 through 1992. Although U.S. officials recognized that the flow of supplies to Renamo continued, and several times commented publicly to that effect, they always characterized the evidence as insufficient to justify action. As Kenya became involved in training Renamo troops and supplying arms through Malawi, Washington claimed it was unable to confirm detailed allegations by the Mozambican government and in press reports. A Renamo attack on the border town of Ressano Garcia in April 1989, in which South African soldiers on the other side of the border cooperated, was characterized by diplomats in Maputo as a "smoking gun" demonstrating South African military involvement. Back in Washington, however, not even the Mozambique desk officer at the State Department thought it particularly interesting.¹⁰⁷

Visiting Washington again in early 1990, President Chissano committed himself to direct talks with Renamo, and President Bush committed his administration to active diplomatic support for the peace process. In keeping that pledge, U.S. diplomats expressed support for the general posture of the Mozambican government and frustration at Renamo's delaying tactics. But just as had their predecessors under Reagan, they rejected any suggestion that the U.S. should put pressure on Renamo through its supply lines. Toward the end of the Bush administration, aid to Kenya and Malawi was suspended as a result of congressional pressure and the rising pro-democracy movements in the two countries. Still, no linkage was made of these actions to the issue of Renamo's support. As late as 1991, the administration was still proposing military aid for both Kenya and Malawi.

With no official interest in curbing other governments' support for Renamo, U.S. private support for that organization was also a nonissue. In November 1987, after publicity concerning meetings of U.S. officials with Renamo, the State Department provided contingency talking points for U.S. representatives to respond to press inquiries.¹⁰⁸ The points, later repeated in guidance for a U.S. military envoy's visit to Mozambique in January 1988, included the following question and answer:

Q: Why do you allow Americans to help Renamo and let Renamo keep an office in Washington?
A: Our constitution encourages free debate and protects the rights of those who live in our country to do as they please within the law.¹⁰⁹
TO:        Ambassador George A. Trail, III
           Ambassador Melissa F. Wells, Malawi
           Assistant Secretary Henry Cohen
FROM:      Dennis C. Jett, Charge' d'Affaires
SUBJECT:   The Gory Details - Part III

Our intrepid travelers came through Lilongwe again on May 26-27. The group this time was composed of Bob MacKenzie, soldier of fortune and Executive Director of Freedom Incorporated; Sybil Cline, Bob’s friend and Steph Halper’s ex and Ray Cline’s daughter; and Nickolas de la Casa, the former RENAMO prisoner. The following are some impressions of their trip which they shared with me. While clearly biased observers who favor RENAMO, I don’t get the impression that they are so enamored of the group that they would significantly distort the factual portions of their story. They had critical as well as positive things to say about RENAMO.

Dhlakama contacted Bob in April and asked him to come from Seattle for a chat. 1

Bob cleared the trip with his boss Larry Abraham, Chairman of Freedom, Inc., who I would guess also picked up the tab. See the attached newsletter which Bob gave me.

Nickolas was invited to return to his old haunts (he was held for 18 months) by Dhlakama. Since he is an independent TV producer doing a documentary on various guerrilla groups around the world, he wanted to return and shoot some more footage. He is doing a 15-minute video on RENAMO. He said he would send me a copy when it is done in July in care of the Malawi desk at the Department.

They spent three and a half weeks inside Mozambique, including walking to Gorongosa and back. They estimated they covered about 300 miles all on foot on trails through the bush. They said they were led on a circuitous route but never saw any indication of a FAM presence. They were impressed with RENAMO’s military strength and organization and described the troops as well equipped, well disciplined and with high morale. All three believe that RENAMO

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There was, however, no indication of any active efforts to investigate whether any of those U.S. residents known to be involved went beyond advocacy to violations of law. Given the high profile of “counter-terrorist” rhetoric in Washington in the 1980s, such an investigation would have been a logical step had the political context allowed. The first direct official contact between Renamo and State Department officials, in fact, appears to have been in the context of Renamo’s kidnapping of foreign hostages, a classic “terrorist” tactic.

As early as 1982, the Defense Intelligence Agency had noted in a situation report that [Renamo] “insurgents have been abducting foreign residents in what appears to be a persistent effort to undermine the confidence of foreign governments... and will quite likely continue to take additional hostages.” The kidnapping of an American nurse, Kindra Bryan, in May 1987, gave Renamo an opportunity to establish official contact with the U.S. government. Mozambique desk officer Greg Fergin met with Renamo representative Luis Serapiao in June, after which a rescue mission was arranged by Tom Schaaf of the Mozambique Information Office and Robert MacKenzie. Subsequent press guidance explained that “U.S. policy is not to deal with Renamo, except when we thought it could lead to resolution of a specific humanitarian problem, as the release of hostages.”

This contact, with accompanying press coverage including articles by MacKenzie in Soldier of Fortune and other material cited in the main body of this report, meant that U.S. officials — from 1987 at least — were well aware of the principal figures involved in private U.S. support for Renamo and of the provision of militarily relevant supplies. That no legal or other substantive action was taken to discourage these activities or to investigate them in further detail was not primarily the result of lack of information, but rather that of a political and policy environment that provided no incentive to take such action.

This is illustrated by a report on one of MacKenzie’s 1989 trips, entitled “Gory Details,” by U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Malawi Dennis Jett (in 1993, Jett was appointed U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique). Only the third part of this three-part memorandum has been released. It reports on Jett’s conversation with MacKenzie and his companions after their return from Mozambique, focuses on information and opinions about Renamo gathered from them, and gives no hint that Jett had any instructions to question or inquire into their own support activities for Renamo (See page 1 of memorandum, in box, page 37).

On the second page of his report, Jett noted that “Bob acknowledged that his trip was a long trek just to listen to Dhlakama’s exposition which was short on specifics but said this was the only purpose for the trip.” He added that they had met “Father Pagliara, the Italian priest captured in the attack on Inhassunge, on his way out and talked to him. He supposedly said his three colleagues were killed when they left their residence, hid in some trees, were seen by Renamo and fired upon.”

As mentioned in the first section of this report, there is still no reliable estimate of what proportion of military support for Renamo, channeled through Malawi, came from U.S. private networks, as contrasted with South African agents, ivory smugglers, and others. But there is no doubt that the former route was the major supply source for Renamo headquarters and for much of northern Mozambique in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. If there was any significant effort by U.S. intelligence to target resources to collect information on this route, with the aim of reducing outside support to Renamo, it was singularly ineffective. It makes more sense to conclude that the effort was never made, just as Chester Crocker noted that little effort was made to document the pattern of continuing South African support.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

1. No effective U.S. government mechanism exists for monitoring and evaluating possibly abusive intervention in conflict situations by outside parties, including private U.S. groups and individuals.

During the Cold War, U.S. government monitoring of and response to third-party intervention in foreign conflicts was subordinated to national security issues and foreign policy objectives. This was also often the case with evaluation of human rights abuses by internal parties to conflict. The legislative requirement for annual human rights reports has provided a mechanism, if not yet consistently implemented, for providing more comprehensive reports on the internal human rights situation in countries around the world. However, there is no comparable mechanism requiring comprehensive objective reporting on third-party intervention.

The case study of Mozambique presented in this report illustrates this point. Renamo atrocities were well publicized and acknowledged as massive and systematic abuses of human rights. The insurgent group had no acknowledged official support from the U.S. The U.S. enjoyed, after 1984, constructive relationships with the government under attack. Material aid to Renamo's military campaign undercut stated U.S. policy objectives and perpetuated massive human rights abuses. Yet the issue of response to third-party intervention, including private U.S. groups and individuals, was never addressed.

In the post–Cold War era as well, it is likely that such intervention will be adequately investigated and the issue of appropriate response addressed only in cases where the country or group victimized is a prominent U.S. ally with an effective lobby and political support in Washington. It is also likely that the opportunities for intervention in troubled and obscure conflict situations will grow enormously in many areas of the world. There is a need, therefore, for less arbitrary and more impartial guidelines for monitoring cases lacking politically powerful advocates.

2. No effective legal remedy exists in U.S. courts or international law for parties injured by such intervention. (See Appendix)

The Neutrality Act, the most plausibly relevant criminal statute, has rarely been enforced in the twentieth century. Its precise contours, dictated by eighteenth-century concerns, hamper its application to private twentieth-century interventions. While an energetic government prosecutor may find peripheral statutes under which to prosecute some offenders, there is as yet no effective civil remedy that can be pursued by injured parties or their advocates in the U.S.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Any proposed remedies to address third-party intervention should avoid the danger of creating or justifying mechanisms that might infringe on the civil liberties of U.S. citizens and groups to comment on, advocate, and provide support for causes with which they identify for humanitarian, political, or other reasons.

Caution is appropriate in establishing administrative measures or legislative remedies to address the intervention of U.S. citizens or groups in foreign conflicts. Nevertheless, it is essential that thought be given to establishing some mechanisms of accountability. Powerful countries can protect themselves against foreign intervention in support of domestic terrorism or insurrection, but vulnerable populations have no such protection when those supporting the abuses against them are citizens of powerful countries.

2. Human rights groups, scholars, and activists should give attention to developing mechanisms for collecting and presenting data on both public and private foreign intervention in conflicts involving possible human rights abuses.

The task of developing relatively impartial and objective mechanisms for reporting on human rights abuses is still incomplete. The need to address third-party intervention in foreign conflicts adds to the complexity of human rights monitoring. The new post-Cold War climate provides the opportunity to develop more adequate reporting mechanisms that can win respect, if not full consensus, from a wide variety of parties. There is a need to explore creatively the gap between human rights reports and compilations such as those by arms control agencies, which are focused more narrowly on such subjects as arms transfers. But much more effort is needed, both in conceptualizing such studies and producing studies applicable to one or more cases.

3. The U.S. Congress should consider mandating systematic reports from the Department of State or from an independent body on the role of external intervention in influencing human rights abuses and on respect for the laws of war in conflict situations.

There is an urgent need for more systematic mechanisms for evaluating the effects of external intervention, whether multilateral, bilateral (including U.S.) or private, which may contribute to human rights abuses in conflict situations. While no reporting mechanism can hope to solve this issue, it may provide greater transparency and a chance for holding external actors as well as internal parties to greater accountability.

4. Legal scholars should address the inadequacy of existing mechanisms for redress by parties injured in foreign conflicts as a result of actions by U.S. private parties, seeking remedies that may address this issue without infringing on the free speech and advocacy rights of U.S. citizens and residents.

Such efforts should address both the option of making better use of existing laws and the possible need for new legislative action.
INTRODUCTION

No accessible, effective legal mechanism exists to hold private actors accountable in U.S. courts for intervention in foreign conflicts. Several criminal statutes, enacted early in U.S. history, prohibit using U.S. territory to recruit combatants or organize military expeditions against nations with whom the country is at peace. After 125 years of active enforcement, the past 75 years have seen only few, selective prosecutions. Private attempts over the last 10 years to force prosecutions for obvious violations have failed. Those cases have now clearly established that the executive branch of government has essentially unreviewable discretion over whether to prosecute violators. Individuals are also generally required by the criminal laws to register with the executive branch before acting within the country at the direction of foreign governments, political parties, or other foreign entities and engaging in political activity, soliciting funds, or propagandizing on their behalf. Still, U.S. citizens are generally free under those laws to go abroad individually and participate in foreign conflicts.

In theory, victims of war crimes outside the country may recover civil damages from U.S. actors who inflict or substantially contribute to their injuries. The difficulties of proving events abroad during civil conflicts, and the complex logistics of collecting damages in transnational litigation have prevented any such recovery so far.

Relevant laws and related cases are briefly reviewed below.

CRIMINAL STATUTES

The Neutrality Act, first enacted in 1794, is the federal statute whose spirit seems most offended by private war-making. The core provision of the Act prohibits anyone within the U.S. from organizing, funding, or taking part in a military expedition or enterprise organized in the U.S. and carried out against a state with whom the U.S. is at peace.1 Other provisions prohibit a citizen from accepting a commission within the country from any foreign body to serve in war against any foreign body with whom the U.S. is at peace;2 or enlisting or recruiting anyone within the U.S. to serve in a foreign army, unless one is a citizen of a country

at war with a country with which the U.S. is at war, and one is enlisting fellow citizens of that foreign state. A related provision makes it a crime for two or more people to agree to injure specific property abroad belonging to a foreign government with whom the U.S. is at peace when one party commits an act in the U.S. to achieve that end.

The origins of the Act help explain its contours and the history of its enforcement. In 1794, the newly formed federal government had a small standing navy, visions of a large maritime trade, and a consequent need to avoid entanglement in the foreign conflicts of European nations. It also needed to assert its foreign affairs authority over the newly united states. During the war that broke out between France and England in 1793, the Washington administration sought legislation to curb the activity of the French minister to the U.S. The minister had authorized the arming of private U.S. ships, commissioned the captains, and begun organizing citizens of the western states to take part in an invasion of adjacent Spanish territory. The Washington administration apparently believed that, under international law, the U.S. would be responsible for these activities occurring within its jurisdiction unless it acted to prohibit them. Thus, the resulting legislation focused less on controlling the activities of Americans abroad than on preventing Americans from being mobilized at home into foreign wars.

By its terms, the Act also buttressed the exclusive authority reserved to Congress by the Constitution to declare war. For that reason, early decisions under the Act made clear that it applied equally to the executive branch and to private citizens.

Courts throughout the nineteenth century and in a handful of twentieth-century prosecutions construed the statute broadly. Thus, courts upheld convictions for conspiring to violate the Act in which the defendants had a general intent to organize a hostile expedition and had committed any overt act in the U.S. to effect that end. In one 1917 case, the court upheld indictments under the Act, charging that the defendants had met together, conceived plans for arranging arms imports to India, received money in the U.S., and traveled abroad to arrange the imports. The alleged purpose of the plan was to foment rebellion in India that would require Britain to commit troops that otherwise would be available for the war against Germany. The court found that this arms import scheme constituted a military enterprise carried on from the U.S. Similarly, in another case that year, the court upheld the indictments of members of a spy ring organized in the U.S. whose members traveled to Britain to report on British shipping for Germany.

While vigorously enforced throughout the nineteenth century, the statute largely fell into disuse after 1917 due to a variety of trends. These included the secure consolidation of foreign affairs powers; both at the federal level and in the executive branch the exponential growth of the U.S. armed forces; the frequency of "undeclared" wars in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere; and the increased use of paramilitary and covert action by the executive branch. Despite incidents such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the only reported convictions in the last sixty years concern three apparently modest attempts to overthrow the government of Haiti.

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4 18 U.S.C. § 956. Other provisions focus on preventing anyone within the U.S. from inter alia arming, augmenting the arms, or delivering any armed vessel to a nation at war with a nation with whom the U.S. is at peace. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 961–67.
One recurrent recent question has been whether military expeditions by private actors supported by some executive branch officials are prosecutable under the Act. Several cases in the 1980s addressed efforts by U.S. citizens and internationals within the country to organize, direct, fund, and train combatants in the U.S. for an undeclared war against the government of Nicaragua — the “contra” war. Each litigation failed to hold any of the private actors or executive branch officials accountable.

In one set of court decisions, despite early success in the lower court, the higher court found that private citizens could not force the U.S. attorney general to investigate credible and specific reports of Neutrality Act violations — the first step toward appointing a special prosecutor. Nor could private citizens or foreign victims sue directly for violations of the Act for either money damages or for a court order to stop the activity. The one reported government prosecution under the Act, for shipping weapons, failed. The court held that the U.S. was not “at peace” with Nicaragua, as required by the statute. The court based its holding on the frequency of undeclared wars in the latter half-century and the ceaseless activity of the executive branch against the government of Nicaragua from 1981 through 1986, despite congressional legislation forbidding spending to support groups fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 generally requires anyone acting as a representative, under the control, or at the specific request of a foreign government, political party, or other foreign entity to register with the attorney general before engaging in political activity, acting as publicity counsel, or soliciting or disbursing funds for the foreign principal. The Act is intended “to label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinterested source.” The Act requires periodic reporting on activities for the foreign principal. It also requires that the agent keep prescribed books of account available for government inspection. In theory, the Act does not interfere with or restrict the agent’s activities.

Of course, other laws regulate many activities that may be undertaken by private actors to support armed struggle abroad. These include, for example, the import and export of arms, correspondence with foreign governments, and travel.

**CIVIL DAMAGE REMEDIES**

Generally, injured individuals may sue those at fault for damages in U.S. courts. Accordingly, some victims of military actions abroad have sued persons in the U.S. who participated in the offending military enterprise. However, courts have been reluctant to undertake the task of discovering and judging actions undertaken during civil conflicts abroad. In one case arising out of U.S. private support for the Nicaraguan contras, U.S. nationals harmed in Costa Rica by a bombing allegedly linked to the U.S. support network brought a civil action.

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15 The Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953, makes it a crime *inter alia* for private actors to carry on “correspondence or intercourse” with any foreign government with the intent to defeat the measures of the United States. Passed in 1799, there has apparently been only one indictment and no prosecutions under the Act, though it is sometimes discussed when citizens or congressional members visit foreign governments with whom the administration has hostile relations. The only court to consider the statute at any length strongly hinted that it was unconstitutionally vague and should be rewritten. *Waldron v. British Petroleum*, 231 F. Supp. 72, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
tort suit against defendants in the U.S. The legal theory was in part that the defendants conspired to violate the Neutrality Act. The case failed when the victims could not prove that the person who planted the bomb had any links to the U.S. support network. The court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs for bringing the case.

Several aliens, tortured abroad during civil conflicts, have won court judgments against either the torturer or someone with command responsibility for the torture, where either was currently residing in the U.S. The Alien Tort Act of 1789 allows an alien to sue another alien in U.S. courts for a tort "in violation of the law of nations." Yet, at least until very recently, it was generally accepted that the "law of nations" imposed obligations only on nations. Therefore, one could violate that law only if one was acting under color of state authority. Because the statute applies only to aliens and only to government agents, it is not a vehicle for holding private U.S. actors accountable for their conduct. Also, none of the prevailing plaintiffs have yet succeeded in collecting any judgment from their persecutors.

One case may illustrate the only legal remedy available against private actors based in the U.S. for their actions in a foreign civil conflict. In Linder v. Portocarrero, the family of a noncombatant American engineer tortured and killed in Nicaragua by contras sued the paramilitary commanders who had allegedly ordered the killing from Miami. The court dismissed numerous claims based directly on violations of international law. Yet the court is allowing the case to proceed on "a claim under Florida tort liability" for conduct "that violates the fundamental norms of the customary laws of war." The plaintiffs are currently seeking to depose the only defendant still alive, who is now in Nicaragua.

CONCLUSION

No accessible, effective legal mechanism exists to hold private actors accountable for their role in foreign conflicts. Aggressive enforcement of the Neutrality Act by the executive branch would circumscribe some activities by U.S. citizens within this country. However, the contours of the Act reflect eighteenth-century concerns. Little of the activity described in the attached case study would violate the Act because U.S. citizens were not mobilized from the U.S. for a military expedition against the Mozambican government.

Theoretically, victims of war crimes abroad can hold U.S. perpetrators accountable under state common law. The logistical difficulties of such suits and the reluctance of courts to judge actions undertaken during civil conflicts abroad have prevented any such recovery so far.

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18 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992).
1. Thus, the comprehensive 1992 Africa Watch report on Mozambique, *Conspicuous Destruction* (New York: Africa Watch, 1992), recommended bringing to trial “those members of the armed forces, on both sides, who are primarily responsible for gross abuses of human rights during the war” (p. 199). An Africa Watch report later that year opposed a general amnesty in South Africa (*South Africa: Accounting for the Past*, October 23, 1992). Yet, because inquiries into the past would almost certainly threaten many whose cooperation is deemed necessary to preserve peace, the chances of legal action along such lines now or in the future are very low.

2. See particularly the issues raised by Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal in *Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment* (London: African Rights, May 1993) and other reports.


4. Witness the extensive debate in the press on the effect of various international measures, including the arms embargo, construction of roads, and delivery of food, on the military balance in the former Yugoslavia.


10. Reporters who interviewed the injured and other residents also concluded that there was no doubt Renamo was responsible. See, among others, Larry Olmstead (*Detroit Free Press*, August 3, 1987) and John Battersby (*NYT*, July 25, 1987).


16. Payment of salaries in cash to Dhlakama and other Renamo officials and soldiers was recounted in an interview in Johannesburg in May 1991 with Roland Hunter, who acted as a courier for South African Military Intelligence in paying the money.

17. *Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction*, p. 2.

18. See, for documentation, William Minter, *The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-Participants* (Washington, 1989), as well as the more extensive discussion in Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, Chapter 7 and other research cited there, including Christian Geffray, *La Cause des Armes* (Paris: Karthala, 1990), Chapter 4 ("La Base"). Several documented exceptions reveal by contrast the general pattern. Thus, Ken Wilson notes an incident in 1984, in which Renamo soldiers successfully refused their commander's order to continue with executions of a group of Jehovah's Witnesses after "only ten" had been killed. See K. B. Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, p. 534.

19. Wilson, "Cults of Violence," p. 531. This conclusion is particularly striking because Wilson's research was done primarily in Zambezia province, an area in which, as he notes, Renamo's use of violence was much more limited and selective than in southern Mozambique.

20. The documents, dated December 1983 through September 1984, included a diary of the secretary to Renamo President Dhlakama, with details of supply drops such as a series in August 1984 of 26 tons "in the drop zone to the east of Inhaminga." For detailed discussion of the documents and subsequent supply patterns see Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, Chapter 7.

21. Eddie Koch in *Weekly Mail*, October 9-15, 1992. Koch's report implicates the SADF in supplying the base of Ngungwe in Maputo province. And other reports refer to the continued involvement of members of 5 Recce in Phalaborwa. The official status of this support (i.e., whether this support was officially authorized or simply initiated at lower levels off-the-record) is still undocumented.

22. *Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction*, pp. 51-52.

23. Ibid., p. 52.

24. This brochure and other materials cited from the conference, which took place in Las Vegas on September 12-16, 1990, were collected at the conference by researcher Kathi Austin.

25. All quotes from transcript of tape of MacKenzie lecture.


27. All quotes from transcript of tape of lecture.


35. Cole, p. 413-422.
36. This and subsequent references are to Thomas Schaaf Jr. unless otherwise specified.
37. Personal testimony by Schaaf's landlady and his colleague Buster Holmes, both in Mutare. Interviews in May 1991. Holmes showed pictures of Schaaf in uniform to researcher Kathi Austin.
40. Christ for the Nations, Shekinah Ministries, and the Rhema Church were three of the most prominent among many small fundamentalist or charismatic Christian groups operating in southern Africa. Many of these groups have links to, and use materials from, other better-known groups such as Jimmy Swaggart Ministries and Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network. To outsiders, all these groups may sound alike, but only some of them have actively engaged in political as well as religious right-wing causes. See Steve Askin, "Mission to Renamo: The Militarisation of the Religious Right," pp. 106-116 in Journal of Theology for Southern Africa (December, 1989); Paul Gifford, The Religious Right in Southern Africa (Harare: Baobab Books, 1988), especially pp. 46-83.
43. MacKenzie speech at Soldier of Fortune conference in 1990; confirmed in informal interviews on several other occasions.
44. For the most detailed treatments to date of these links, see Anders Nilsson, Unmasking the Bandits: Europe's Involvement with Apartheid's Tool of Terror (London: ECASAMA, 1990), and pp. 32-72 in Alex Vines, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique (London: James Currey, 1991).
45. Interview with South African journalist specializing in covert military operations, September 1990.
47. See SOF, February 1986 and March 1986. In a Washington Times article on February 5, 1985, Wheeler charged that “the chief of the Mozambican air force is a North Vietnamese, Maj. Gen. Hama Thai.” Although anyone who has met the Mozambican general, later chief of staff of the Mozambican army, would recognize that his skin color makes him an unlikely Asian, the charge was later taken up and repeated by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who also served on the board of Cline's U.S. Global Strategy Council.
48. The name was changed in 1987 to Mozambique Research Center.
55. Ibid., p. 39.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. See also the analysis in Minter, Apartheid's Contras.
60. Pear and Brooke, “Rightists in U.S. Aid Mozambique Rebels,” NYT.

62. Ibid., p. 193.


64. Ibid.


70. Letter to Freedom Inc. members from Larry Abraham, undated, 1989.


73. *Insider Report*, in its August issue, exulted that "Frelimo’s lies are now exposed. Before this media breakthrough, everyone shunned Renamo. Now all this is changing, thanks to their effort, masterminded by Tom Schaaf and aided by FI [Freedom Inc.]." For the critical reader, the reports differed significantly in the credibility they gave to Renamo claims, with Spencer Reiss appearing the most nuanced and John Battersby the most gullible. However, all agreed in downplaying continued South African involvement.


75. Ibid.


78. Thus on the one hand, the board of the U.S. Global Strategy Council included prominent former officials such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, and Donald Rumsfeld. Among its research directors was Dr. Yonah Alexander, a prominent expert on “terrorism” and co-author of a number of works with USGSC chairman Ray Cline. Among the voluminous literature on broader right-wing connections with more extreme groups, see particularly Russ Bellant, *The Coors Connection* (Boston: South End Press, 1991); Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), and sources cited therein.


80. Ibid., p. 195.

81. From a four-page announcement of Mozambique Business Association, accompanied by a one-page press release.


85. One specific accusation, as yet unconfirmed, is that the International Freedom Foundation worked with South Africa’s military intelligence and MacKenzie’s former SAS colleague Garth Barrett on a shipment of two C-130’s of arms and ammunition to Renamo through Malawi, on September 12 and 14, 1991. The Mozambican government officially presented a claim to this effect to the South African government in 1992, but the South Africans responded that the shipments were for the Malawi army (*Southscan*, November 6, 1992).

86. Registration Statement under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, July 24, 1991.

87. Section 8, for example, provided that “Every government budget enacted by the Congress must provide for revenues equal or greater than expenditures. Expenditures shall never exceed 10 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.” Section 10 mandated “the privatization of all government business enterprises, land, or other assets superfluous to the exercise of sovereignty and traditional government operations within one year of the adoption of the Constitution.” Section 11 called for creation of a tribunal to restore prop-

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erty to "persons whose possessions are found to have been stolen, plundered, or despoiled by Frelimo Marxist thieves."

88. See earlier references in note 37, as well as Kathi Austin's account of her trip with Rodney and Ellie Hein, below.


90. See particularly Askin, 1989, p. 113–115.

91. Askin, 1989, p. 114. Testimony from leaders of the Christian Council of Mozambique, who told visiting National Council of Churches (U.S.) researcher Ruth Brandon Minter in 1987 that Hammond had visited them in Maputo in 1985, showed evangelistic films in Maputo without hindrance, and then returned to South Africa to say that religion was totally suppressed in Mozambique. (Ruth Brandon Minter, Mozambique: Treading Water While Crying Help, manuscript prepared for the National Council of Churches, May 1987).


93. The documents were captured in April 1991 and consist of old files left in this subsidiary base. See reference to documents in Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, p. 52. Photocopies of original documents obtained for research on this publication. Most of the documents are radio messages from 1988, with a scattering of other reports and correspondence from 1986 and 1987 as well. Many messages include both an English and a Portuguese version.


96. See Vines, pp. 59–60. Mozambican officials reported in August 1990, based on information from prisoners, that 300 Renamo troops trained in Kenya were infiltrated into Mozambique from Malawi into Tete province (Mozambique Information Agency, August 8, 1990).


98. The same gathering is also referred to in an interview by Steve Askin with Ian Grey, dated July 4, 1988, and in as yet unpublished oral histories from Zambézia province by K. B. Wilson.

99. The churches supporting the Heins specifically named in public sources, however, were Christ for the Nations, in Dallas, Texas; Don Normand Ministries, in Melrose, Florida; and the End-Time Handmaidens, in Jasper, Arkansas. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries and Pat Robertson also provided television time favorable to Renamo, and were suspected of supplying material support under the guise of aid for refugees.

100. For the best short summary of this, see Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, pp. 179–198. See also Crocker's account in High Noon in Southern Africa, and the analytical study in Minter, Apartheid's Contras, Chapter 6.


102. Mozambican intelligence officials had been monitoring the espionage activities of personnel in the U.S. embassy, who seemed interested primarily in collecting data on the Mozambican military, on Zimbabwean and South African liberation movements, and on the personal habits and movements of President Machel. The sudden expulsions were a reaction to South Africa's raid in January 1981, in which South African
commandos killed 13 African National Congress members in a suburb of Maputo. The raid followed by days a well-publicized speech by U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig condemning “rampant international terrorism.” The Mozambican government suspected that U.S. intelligence sharing with South Africa played a hand in preparations for the attack. See Abel Mutemba, *Operarao 6º Aniversário* (Maputo: Notícias, 1982).


107. Personal communication from a Western diplomat who raised the issue in Washington after inquiries from their embassy in Maputo.

108. See WP, November 10, 1987, “Carlucci and the Mozambicans: A Tale of Two Viewpoints.” The article referred to a meeting at the National Security Council with Frank Carlucci, attended by Tom Schaaf, then registered as Renamo’s Washington representative, accompanied by a group of other right-wing activists. The cable noted that “Mr. Carlucci was dismayed at this inclusion. We do not consider that this constituted a recognition of Renamo.” Also referred to in the cable, but not in the WP article, were the 1986 meeting of White House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan with Renamo, “in his personal capacity without the knowledge of authorization of the State Department,” and State Department contacts in connection with “the release of hostages.”


113. According to statements by the Capuchin religious order to the Mozambique Information Agency, two Italian missionaries were killed in the Renamo attack in Zambêzia province on March 27, 1989. The body of a third was found buried in a shallow grave about 20 kilometers from the mission.


115. See the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, submitted by the Department of State to the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, as well as the parallel annual volume, often critical of omissions in the official reports, prepared by Human Rights Watch.

116. One example of such a linkage is the January 1994 report on *Arming Rwanda,* by the Human Rights Watch Arms Project.
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