

## THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA

110 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002  
PHONE (202) 546-7961  
FAX (202) 546-1545

### ANGOLA POLICY FRAMEWORK

The war raging in Angola since late 1992 is one of the world's most serious and most neglected humanitarian crises. As many as 1,000 are dying each day, agricultural production is paralyzed in many areas by ongoing combat, and thousands of displaced people are pouring into government-held urban areas. Diplomatic hopes for a renewed cease-fire have been repeatedly disappointed. The international community has deplored Unita's resort to war and called on all parties to continue negotiations, finally imposing a mandatory arms and oil embargo against Unita. But the slow international response has failed to bring effective pressures to bear to restore peace. Despite what former United Nations Representative Margaret Anstee called "a conspiracy of silence by the international media," it is urgent to mobilize support for active implementation of effective policies.

#### *Premises:*

1. Any lasting solution to the conflict in Angola must build on the May 1991 Peace Accord and the legitimacy of the elections carried out under its terms in September 1992. Whatever adjustments may be necessary to achieve future settlements, they must be designed to reinforce the trust that millions of Angolans put in these guarantees of peace and democracy, rather than to entrench the cynicism aroused by the violation of these agreements by force. Respect for the democratic verdict in Angola is a test case for South Africa, Mozambique and indeed the entire continent. And it is a measure of the credibility of the U.S. and UN commitments to the democratic initiatives they endorse.
2. While no party can escape blame for incidents reinforcing mistrust, primary responsibility for the relapse of Angola into vicious warfare lies with the leadership of Unita, which systematically evaded the Peace Accord's provisions to disarm and demobilize and used its military advantage to reignite war after refusing to accept election results regarded as generally free and fair by international monitors. The United Nations and the three countries designated as observers (the United States, Russia and Portugal) failed to expose and to react in a timely fashion to these violations of the Peace Accord.
3. There can be no purely military solution to the conflict. Total military victory by one side or the other is neither possible nor desirable. All parties should resist the tendency towards attitudes of intransigence or ethnic hostility, and should take measures to end human rights abuses by their security forces. Despite repeated frustrations, negotiations must continue.

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4. At the same time, experience to date leads to serious doubts about the good faith of the Unita leadership in negotiations. Without constraints on Unita's military power, or other concrete demonstrations of good faith, appeals for talks and new opportunities for talks are likely to be empty charades. Unless international resolutions are accompanied by practical efforts to curb Unita's warmaking capacity, they will continue to be seen as empty gestures to be ignored in favor of the ebb-and-flow of the battlefield.

5. The United States, with South Africa a principal sponsor over the years of Unita's military capacity, holds a special responsibility to take serious action to restrain its former client, rather than to walk away blaming the destruction it helped foster on the Angolan parties.

#### *Recommendations for U.S. Policy*

**1. The U.S. government should take the lead in implementing the mandatory United Nations embargo on the supply of arms, fuel and other war-related material to Unita.**

Unita's military capacity, while dependent in part on stockpiles and captured arms, also relies on resupply through Zaire and by air from South Africa. These supplies are funded partially via sales of diamonds by Unita. The arms and oil embargo approved by the United Nations Security Council in September must be implemented urgently. It is an essential prerequisite for any credible policy of negotiations and a guarantee for implementation of any new settlement that is reached. To be effective, it requires, at minimum:

- allocation of intelligence resources to identify states, companies and individuals involved in delivery of supplies to Unita;
- pressure on Zaire and on diamond merchants involved in purchasing diamonds originating from Unita-controlled areas of Angola;
- technical assistance to Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe in identifying overflights of supply planes between South Africa and Angola;
- insistence on full cooperation by the South African authorities in preventing flights, including those from the nominally independent homeland of Bophuthatswana.

Like all embargoes, such measures could not be 100% effective. But it is critical that symbolism be followed up with practical measures which will force the Unita leadership to take the alternative of good-faith negotiation more seriously.

**2. The U.S. government should reiterate, at high levels, its warnings to Unita not to attack U.S. and other oil installations in Cabinda and off-shore at Soyo. It should also make clear that it will not recognize the legitimacy of Unita's acquisition of territory by force, nor recognize any government that might be established on that basis.**

While such statements have been made on several occasions by U.S. representatives, Unita may continue to doubt U.S. commitment unless new statements are accompanied by evidence of stepped-up

contingency planning for protection of these installations. The United States should also initiate or expand sharing of intelligence data relevant for defense with the Angolan government.

**3. The U.S. government should express its willingness to support a greatly expanded United Nations presence in the case of a renewed settlement.**

All parties are agreed on the necessity of such an expanded presence, the lack of which is generally agreed to have been one of the failures in 1992. As specified in the points agreed at the Abidjan talks of May 1993, it is necessary to ensure genuine disarmament, full demobilization of partisan military forces, a policy of no reprisals and completion of the second round of presidential elections. A clear declaration by the U.S. pledging necessary resources would be an incentive to a renewed settlement.

**4. The U.S. government should continue and expand active support of UN and other efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to Angola. It should also immediately initiate programs of development aid in conjunction with the Angolan government and non-governmental organizations, in those areas of the country where security considerations permit. Plans for both private and public-sector economic cooperation, through trade and investment, should not be held hostage by the war.**

It is urgent that obstacles to the delivery of aid to war-affected zones be removed. Additional resources should be allocated to city residents immediately, including large numbers of persons displaced by the war, as well as others in areas where security does not impede assistance. There is urgent need for medical and other services as well as food aid.

While any comprehensive program of development or economic cooperation must await abatement of conflict, there is significant scope for programs aimed at relatively secure areas, particularly the coastal cities as well as Lubango and the surrounding agricultural area in Huíla province. In particular, the U.S. should play an active role in assisting the nascent Angolan non-governmental organization sector, and should consider support for health, education, informal sector development and other programs in accessible urban areas.

**5. The U.S. government should stress to both parties the urgent imperative for respect for the laws of war, particularly concerning attacks on civilians, kidnapping, summary executions, and lack of respect for humanitarian relief operations.**

While responsibility for renewed conflict and attacks on civilians lies primarily with Unita, both sides have been guilty of serious human rights abuses in the course of the fighting. Both the Angolan parties and the international community have the responsibility for establishing mechanisms for investigating, exposing and ending such practices.

**6. The U.S. government should recognize that stability in Angola depends on completion of the democratic transitions under way in Zaire and South Africa, and urgently address itself to the obstacles threatening those transitions.**

While activities in Angola set a bad precedent for Zaire, South Africa and Mozambique, delays in installing democratic institutions in those countries in turn promote continued conflict in Angola. U.S. policy on Angola must be accompanied by effective action to promote the departure from power of Mobutu in Zaire, and to ensure that violence and other obstacles do not block the transition to elected democratic institutions in South Africa. A policy of complacency toward threats of violence by those threatened by democracy will enhance the prospects of escalating region-wide conflict in southern Africa in the future.

## ANGOLA POLICY FRAMEWORK ENDORSEMENTS

**Africa Faith & Justice Network**  
Maura Browne

**The African-American Institute**  
Vivian Lowery Derryck

**American Committee on Africa &  
The Africa Fund**  
Jennifer Davis, Executive Director

**American Baptist Churches USA**

**Association of Concerned Africa Scholars**  
David Wiley, Co-Chair

**Bread for the World**  
David Beckmann, President

**Center of Concern**

**Church of the Brethren Washington Office**  
Timothy A. McElwee

**Community Action International Alliance**  
Joan Heckscher

**Episcopal Church**  
Betty Coats  
Advocacy, Witness and Justice Ministry

**Interfaith/Impact for Justice & Peace**  
James Bell, Executive Director

**Disciples of Christ/United Church of Christ**  
Rev. Dan Hoffman  
Joint Ministry in Africa Office

Erich Mathias  
Joint Ministry in Africa Office

**Maryknoll Fathers & Brothers**  
Justice & Peace Office  
Terrance Miller, Associate for Africa & the  
Middle East

**Maryknoll Sisters**  
Sister Janice McLaughlin, Communications  
Coordinator

Sister Maria Zeballos, Africa Coordinator

**Missionaries of Africa**  
Father Richard Humphrey

**Mozambique Solidarity Office**  
Prexy Nesbitt

**National Association for the Advancement of  
Colored People (NAACP)**  
Rev. Dr. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr.

**Africa Office of the  
National Council of Churches**  
Willis Logan, Director

**National Rainbow Coalition**  
Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, President

**Presbyterian Church (USA)**  
Jon Chapman, Area Representative  
Southern Africa Program

**Progressive National Baptist Convention**  
Rev. Archie LeMone  
Home Mission Board

**Society of African Missions**  
Stephen G. Price, Ph.D.  
Justice & Peace Office

**Southern Africa Action Network**

**TransAfrica**  
Randall Robinson, Executive Director

**United Church of Christ**  
Office for Church in Society  
Maelinda Turner

**United Methodist Church**  
Thom White Wolf Fassett, General Secretary  
of the General Board of Church & Society

Rev. Thomas Logsdon  
Africa/Europe/Middle East Region  
General Board of Global Ministries  
United Methodist Church

**U.S. Catholic Conference**  
Bob Dumas  
Office of International Justice & Peace

**U.S./South Africa Sister Community Project**  
Anne M. Poirier, National Coordinator

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**Washington Office on Africa**  
Imani Countess, Executive Director

**Washington Office on Africa**  
Jean Sindab  
Advisory Board

**Women Strike for Peace**  
Edith Villastrigo

#### CANADA

**Centre d'Information et de Documentation  
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Pierre Beaudet, Executive Director

#### SOUTH AFRICA

**Foundation for Contemporary Research**  
Edgar Pieterse, Director

**Peace Action**  
Monica Green, Executive Director

**Planact**

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**Catholic Institute for International Relations**  
Ian Linden, General Secretary

**Christian Aid**