

OIL TANKERS TO SOUTH AFRICA 1980 - 1981  
\*\*\*\*\*

(Summary version)

EMBARGO: 6 a.m., June 17, 1982

**Shipping Research Bureau**  
**Amsterdam**

The pages which follow are the Summary of Principal Findings, some background information, the summary tables, the Contents, and the List of Tables of a 100-page report entitled:

OIL TANKERS TO SOUTH AFRICA 1980 - 1981  
\*\*\*\*\*

published by

The Shipping Research Bureau

Amsterdam

June 1982

The Shipping Research Bureau is a non-profit research organisation established in 1980 by the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos

Further information, and complete versions of the report, can be obtained from:

The Shipping Research Bureau  
P.O. Box 11898  
1001 GW Amsterdam  
The Netherlands

or

Bernard Rivers  
417 West 120th Street  
New York  
NY 10027

Phone: 020-251300  
Telex: 17125 COMSA NL

(212) 222-4924

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

1. The Shipping Research Bureau has identified a total of 256 ships over 25,000 tons deadweight <sup>1/</sup> that are capable of carrying crude oil cargoes and that called at South Africa between 1 January 1980 and 30 June 1981.

2. Through careful analysis of the 256 ships, and after writing to the companies and countries with which they are linked, the Shipping Research Bureau has selected 52 of them which it considers to be the "most likely" to have actually delivered cargoes of crude oil during their visits to South Africa. A further 29 of the ships are considered by the Bureau to have "possibly" made such deliveries.

3. If every one of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have made deliveries actually delivered a full cargo of crude oil to South Africa, then together they supplied over 10 million tons of crude oil, equivalent to about half of South Africa's estimated crude oil imports during the eighteen-month period under consideration.

4. The three oil companies (that is, companies owning the oil cargoes carried by ships but not necessarily owning or managing the ships themselves) which appear to be the most involved in the oil trade with South Africa, according to analysis of the 52 cases mentioned above, are Shell, Transworld Oil, and Vitol; all three of these companies are partly or wholly based in the Netherlands. Twenty-six out of the 52 ships were linked with one or other of these three companies.

5. The three shipping companies (that is, companies owning or managing ships, but not necessarily owning the oil cargoes the ships carry), which appear to be the most involved in the oil trade with South Africa, according to analysis of the 52 cases mentioned above, are A/S Havtor (based in Norway), A.P. Møller (based in Denmark), and Shell Tankers (based in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Over twenty out of the 52 ships were owned and managed by one or other of these three companies.

---

<sup>1/</sup> This report inevitably includes a number of technical terms. Appendix I to this report starts with definitions of the most important terms.

6. Twenty-one out of 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa were owned and managed by Norwegian companies and flew the Norwegian flag. Other countries whose ships were heavily involved are the United Kingdom and Denmark.

7. Ten out of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa sailed from Brunei. This is a semi-autonomous oil-exporting British colony which has not imposed an oil embargo against South Africa. A further 28 out of the 52 ships -- over half the total -- sailed to South Africa from the Arabian Gulf, an oil-exporting region in which all countries have proclaimed an oil embargo against South Africa; this suggests that the companies linked with most or all of these ships deliberately violated the wishes of these countries. The remaining 14 ships sailed directly to South Africa from oil-trans-shipping countries: 9 from the Netherlands and 5 from the Netherlands Antilles.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

(The text of this section is identical to the Introduction in the main report)

The oil embargo against South Africa

Probably no current world issue elicits a more universal reaction of anger and condemnation than does the South African policy of apartheid.

A policy of trade sanctions against South Africa represents the most practical action and is considered to be one of the few remaining peaceful means whereby the world community can simultaneously achieve two objectives: the imposition of economic pressure upon the South African Government; and an expression of solidarity with all South Africans and Namibians who suffer under and resist apartheid.

Of all the forms of trade embargo which could be imposed against South Africa beyond the mandatory arms embargo that was approved by the United Nations Security Council in 1977, there is little doubt that an oil embargo has the greatest potential for success. South Africa has no commercially viable oil deposits of its own, nor does it have sufficient stocks of oil to last more than a year or two; and its three oil-from-coal plants will not provide more than a third of the country's liquid fuel needs over the coming decade. Furthermore, the trade in oil is hard to disguise -- oil is carried in supertankers a third of a kilometre long, and a tanker delivery has to be made to South Africa roughly once every five days. Most important of all, the majority of the oil which is traded internationally is produced in the Third World countries which are united in their opposition to apartheid.

In 1973, most oil-exporting countries agreed to embargo South Africa. This had little practical effect, however, because the then government of Iran, under the Shah, was willing to provide some ninety percent of South Africa's oil needs.

The situation changed significantly at the start of 1979, with the demise of the Shah and the decision by the new Iranian government to join the oil embargo. There is as yet no mandatory United Nations oil embargo against South Africa, because such a proposal, which would have to be passed by the Security Council, has been vetoed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. However, all members of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), plus most other countries exporting any significant amount of oil, now refuse to permit their crude oil to be sent to South Africa. The oil embargo against South Africa has also

(4)

been endorsed in several non-binding resolutions approved in the United Nations General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of the world's nations (see Appendix III). The only oil-exporting country known not to embargo South Africa is Brunei, a British colony in South East Asia with limited oil-production capacity. The United Kingdom says that in practice it does not export its North Sea oil to South Africa, though it has not imposed a legal oil embargo and it apparently has not officially requested oil companies not to sell British crude oil to South Africa. In the United Nations General Assembly, the United Kingdom has repeatedly voted against relevant resolutions on an oil embargo against South Africa. Norway has no legal oil embargo either, but it has officially requested oil companies not to sell Norwegian crude oil to South Africa. Norway did vote in favour of United Nations General Assembly resolutions on an oil embargo against South Africa. The largest oil producer which refuses to embargo South Africa is the United States of America, but this country exports very little crude oil.

Some countries have been particularly diligent in seeking to enforce the oil embargo. A noteworthy example is Nigeria, whose various actions include a refusal to deal with any tanker which has called at South Africa for any reason in recent months.

Unfortunately, despite these efforts, the oil embargo against South Africa is working far less well than it could be. Although many oil and shipping companies have made it clear that they are not prepared to take the risks involved in violating the embargo policies of the oil-exporting countries, a number of other oil and shipping companies have proved themselves willing to act as intermediaries in the secret supply to South Africa of some 15 million tons of oil annually, worth over \$3,000 million.

These intermediary companies, several of which are small and little known by the public, appear to be making profits in the millions or tens of millions of dollars in the course of their activities. Sometimes they use tankers which leave oil-exporting countries purportedly destined for Singapore, Europe, etc., and which then, after departure, are given new instructions to proceed to South Africa. On other occasions the oil is transported all the way to some oil trans-shipment port such as Rotterdam, where it is unloaded, held in storage, and then taken in another tanker to South Africa. Most oil-exporting countries whose oil is reaching South Africa appear to have little awareness of the existence or circumstances of these leakages.

It is worth noting that an unusual high proportion of ships involved in apparent oil deliveries to South Africa are scrapped, sunk, laid up, sold, and/or have their names changed not long after their one or more trips to South Africa. This suggests that the companies involved prefer

to use old ships for this trade, so that if the ships are subsequently blacklisted or impounded the consequences for the companies in question will not be too severe.

Improving the oil embargo; the role of the Shipping Research Bureau

The Shipping Research Bureau was set up in 1980 to provide assistance to the many governments and organizations which are seeking to render the oil embargo against South Africa more effective. The Bureau, which was established by two Netherlands-based organizations (the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos) operates principally by conducting in-depth research, and publishing reports, on the means whereby South Africa obtains its oil. This research is intended to enable those involved in enforcement of the embargo to be aware of some of the companies and ships, and some of the schemes of subterfuge, which appear to have played important roles in the violations of the embargo. The work of the Bureau has also been of assistance to some oil and shipping companies which do not wish to sell embargoed oil (or do not wish to provide shipping capacity) to oil companies which are involved in embargo violations.

In December 1980, the Shipping Research Bureau finished the research for its first major report <sup>1/</sup> which covered the period January 1979 to March 1980. The Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid sent advance copies of the report to the governments of various of the countries concerned, requesting them to undertake appropriate investigations and welcoming any relevant information or advice. Replies received by the Chairman were reproduced in UN-paper A/AC.115/L.538 and addenda.

The activities of the Special Committee against Apartheid, and the publication of the report in March 1981, had considerable impact. In addition to various press stories around the world, the results included the following:

- (a) The Government of Indonesia stated -- in connection with a tanker revealed by the report as having sailed from Indonesia to South Africa -- that because the company which had purchased the oil carried by the tanker had refused, after release of the report, to state where the oil had been discharged, the government was circulating the company's name and that of the broker to all oil companies operating in Indonesia and prohibiting them from doing business in the country.

---

<sup>1/</sup> Oil Tankers to South Africa; Amsterdam, March 1981.

(b) The Government of Libya stated that it had decided "to bar .... from entering Libyan ports and to include ... in the blacklist" a tanker which the report revealed had called at a South African port for less than one day while en route from Libya to Japan, even though it had delivered no oil during its stop in South Africa.

(c) It was announced in Liberia that as a consequence of the Bureau's report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had proposed to the Liberian Governing Council that tankers sailing to South Africa under the Liberian flag should lose their Liberian registration.

In addition to the above, the research consultant to the Shipping Research Bureau was invited by the Organization of African Unity to participate in a week-long closed meeting of the OAU Sanctions Committee, chaired by the Zambian Foreign Minister. The consultant provided testimony regarding the Shipping Research Bureau report, and some important proposals for rendering the oil embargo more effective were approved by the Committee and later endorsed by OAU Heads of State.

The OAUPEC Resolution

In an independent and significant development, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC) passed a resolution (26/5) on May 6th, 1981 in which it recommended i.a.:

- (i) that OAPEC governments oblige companies purchasing crude oil to ensure: (A) that they do not send the oil to South Africa; (B) that the oil is delivered in its entirety to the final party specified in the contract of sale; (C) that this party does not itself permit re-exportation of the oil to South Africa.
- (ii) that OAPEC governments oblige companies purchasing crude oil to obtain and show documentary proof that the cargo is delivered to the port specified in the contract of sale.
- (iii) that OAPEC governments penalise oil and shipping companies that violate the above policies, by refusing -- on a temporary or long-term basis -- to supply them with further oil.

(For the full text of the OAPEC-recommendations: see Appendix III.)

(7)

Actions in Western countries

In certain Western countries, support for the oil embargo is gaining momentum:

-- Parliamentarians from 8 West-European countries and the European Parliament met in Brussels in January 1981 to discuss the oil embargo. They proposed changes in legislation and pledged active support in their countries concerning the implementation of an oil embargo against South Africa.

-- At the United Nations/Organization of African Unity "Conference on Sanctions against South Africa" (Paris, May 1981), the government of Norway proposed a conference of all oil producing countries to discuss improvements in the implementation of the oil embargo. It is now planned that this conference will take place under the auspices of the United Nations, and that it will involve not only oil producing countries, but also countries in which shipping companies that transport oil are based.

-- In June 1980, the Netherlands' Parliament passed by a considerable majority a resolution declaring that the Netherlands should join the oil embargo that was already voluntarily imposed against South Africa by most oil-exporting countries, and that this should be done even if other West-European countries would not act similarly. The then Netherlands Government refused to implement this resolution, and nearly fell in the ensuing vote of no confidence. But a year later a new Dutch Government included the introduction of such an embargo in its declaration of agreed policy. By that time, research by the Shipping Research Bureau had made it clear that a full prohibition of any Dutch involvement in oil supplies to South Africa (including activities of overseas subsidiaries of Dutch companies, and including the prohibition of Dutch involvement in deliveries of oil originating outside the Netherlands) would have considerable impact and would therefore be much more than the symbolic political gesture that some had suggested it would be.

-- The Governments of Norway and Denmark, and to a lesser extent that of the United Kingdom, have indicated that South Africa is not an acceptable destination for crude oil produced in their own territories.

-- In January 1981, a newspaper in Norway revealed that the Norwegian tanker Jane Stove was on its way to South Africa with a cargo of crude

oil, originating in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, in violation of the Norwegian Government's policy against such shipments. After pressure from the Norwegian Government, the ship was stopped just before it reached South Africa. (The visit to South Africa by the Jane Stove referred to in case 36 in Table A of this report refers to a different, earlier, incident.)

The stages in the preparation of this report

This report now being released is the second major report to be published by the Shipping Research Bureau; it covers the period January 1980 to June 1981. Because of the three-month overlap between this report and the first report, a few cases are mentioned in both reports.

The initial gathering of data for this report which, occupied nearly a year of research, was completed in late 1981. By that stage, the Shipping Research Bureau had identified 256 ships capable of carrying crude oil which had called at South Africa during the period (1980 and the first half of 1981) to be covered by this report. Because of the secrecy surrounding this issue, complete information was not available regarding which of these ships actually delivered crude oil when they called at South Africa. But the available evidence made it clear that many of the visits were much more likely than others to have involved deliveries.

Accordingly, in early 1982 the Bureau wrote to 130 companies which had been identified as owning, managing or chartering the more suspicious of these ships, and/or apparently owning oil carried by these ships. The companies in question were asked whether the ships in question had delivered crude oil to South Africa. Replies were received from, or on behalf of, over three quarters of the companies written to. Some of the replies were very detailed; others were rather less forthcoming. The replies were all taken into consideration in the preparation of this report.

Through the good offices of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, the Shipping Research Bureau also contacted the governments of over 50 countries in which the above-mentioned companies are based, and from which the ships had sailed to South Africa. The governments were requested to inform the Bureau, via the United Nations, of any inaccuracies in the data which the Bureau provided regarding these cases. Again, the replies received were all taken into consideration in the preparation of this report.

Further analyses of all these cases were conducted until the finalisation of the draft of this report in mid-May 1982.

Copies of this report are being sent to the governments of all countries named in the Index, and to all companies which responded fully to the Bureau's query.

In certain cases discussed in this report a ship sailed to South Africa after calling at a sequence of countries within a single oil-exporting or oil trans-shipping area. In a number of such cases it could not be determined which of these countries were the ones in which the tanker had actually been loaded with oil. Thus rather than naming all those countries, this report simply names the region from which the ship sailed to South Africa. The unpublished details regarding each of these cases, together with copies of this report, are being sent to the governments of the relevant countries, so that they may initiate any investigations and actions deemed to be necessary. All of this additional information is also being submitted to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of the Organization of African Unity, in order to assist these two committees in their continuing efforts to improve the effectiveness of the oil embargo against South Africa.

Table 1

Initial breakdown of the ships capable of carrying crude oil which have been identified as having called at South Africa between January 1980 and June 1981

<p>Total number of ships over 25,000 tons deadweight which are capable of carrying crude oil cargoes and which have been identified as having called at South Africa between 1 January 1980 and 30 June 1981:</p>	<p>256</p>
<p>Of which: Number which are considered by the Shipping Research Bureau to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil cargoes during their visits to South Africa: (For details, see Tables 2 to 5 and A to D)</p>	<p>52</p>
<p>Number which, in the opinion of the Shipping Research Bureau, "possibly" delivered crude oil cargoes during their visits to South Africa: (For details, see Table A)</p>	<p>29</p>
<p>Number regarding which the Shipping Research Bureau either has positive evidence that they did not deliver crude oil cargoes during their visits to South Africa, or has insufficient evidence to warrant their inclusion in either of the above two categories: (For details, see Table E.)</p>	<p>175</p>

Table 2

The oil companies which apparently owned the presumed oil cargo on board each of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa

- (Notes: 1) This is a summary version of Table B in Appendix I.
- 2) All but one of the companies named below were approached by the Shipping Research Bureau regarding the various cases with which they are apparently linked. Their responses are summarized in the footnotes to Table A in Appendix I.)

<u>Oil Company</u>	<u>Principal country or countries in which this oil company is based</u>	<u>Number of ships ("most likely" to have delivered crude oil to S. Africa) for which this company apparently owned the presumed oil cargo during the voyage to South Africa</u>
Shell	Netherlands/ United Kingdom	10
Transworld oil	Bermuda/ Netherlands	10
Vitol	Netherlands	6
British Petroleum (BP)	United Kingdom	2
Kaiser Corp.	Bahamas/U.S.A.	1
Petromed	Italy	1
-----	-----	-----
Unknown companies	Unknown countries	22
<u>Total:</u>		52

The shipping companies which were the managers, apparent beneficial owners, and charterers of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered

crude oil to South Africa

- (Notes: 1) This is a summary of Table C in Appendix I.  
 2) All but one of the companies named below were approached by the Shipping Research Bureau regarding the various cases with which they are apparently linked. Their responses are summarized in the footnotes to Table A in Appendix I.  
 3) The numbers in the right hand column total more than 52, because sometimes more than one company is linked with a particular ship. For instance, one company may be the owner, and another company may be the manager.)

Table 3

<u>Shipping company</u>	<u>Principal country or countries in which this shipping company is based</u>	<u>Number of ships ("most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa) for which this shipping company acted as manager, apparent beneficial owner, or charterer during the voyage to South Africa</u>
A/S Havtor	Norway	8
A.P. Möller	Denmark	7
Shell (Tankers)	Netherlands/U.K.	6
Sanko	Japan	5
Odd Godager and Co.	Norway	4
H.E. Hansen-Tangen	Norway	3
Maritime Overseas Corp.	United Kingdom	3
North American Ship Agencies	United States	3
Sig. Bergesen	Norway	2
Cast, Eurocanadian	Canada/Switzerland	2
Denholm Ship Management	United Kingdom	2
Leif Høegh and Co.	Norway	2
Schlüssel Reederei	F.R. Germany	2
World Wide Shipping Group	Hong Kong	2
Aegeus Shipping Co.	Greece	1
Allied Shipping International	Greece	1
Arkon Shipping Agencies	United States	1
A.F. Klaveness and Co.	Norway	1
Konkar Maritime Enterprises	Greece	1
Nav. Letasa	Spain	1
M.P. Nomikos	Greece (?)	1
Nippon Yusen Kaisha	Japan	1
Palm Shipping	United States	1
Helmer Staubo	Norway	1
Tschudi and Eitzen	Norway	1
Utah International	United States	1
Wallem Shipmanagement	Hong Kong	1
Unknown ship-owners	unknown countries	6

The countries in which are based companies that are linked with the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa, and the countries whose flags were used by these ships at the times in question

(Notes: 1) This is a summary version of Table D in Appendix I.

2) The numbers in the first, second and fourth column in the table total more than 52 for two reasons. First, sometimes, two or more companies, based in different countries, are linked with a particular ship. Second, some companies are based in two countries, and are thus shown under both countries as explained in the footnotes below.

3) Whenever both the oil company and one or more of the shipping companies linked with a particular ship are based in the same country, and/or when such companies are based in the same country as the country whose flag the ship flies, the number in the last column is less than the total of numbers in the three previous columns.)

Table 4

Country	Number of ships ("most likely to have delivered crude oil to S. Africa) which are linked with this country by means of:			
	Oil company apparently owning the ship's oil cargo	Shipping company acting as manager, registered owner, apparent beneficial owner, or charterer of the ship	Flag	Any of these
Netherlands	26*	6*	1	26
Norway	0	22	21	22
United Kingdom	12*	11*	2	16
Bermuda	10*	2	0	12
Liberia	0	9	7	9
Denmark	0	7	7	7
Netherlands Antilles	0	7	7	7
United States	1*	6	0	6
Japan	0	5	3	5
F.R. Germany	0	2	0	3
Greece	0	3	3	3
Hong Kong	0	3	0	3
Canada	0	2*	0	2
Switzerland	0	2*	0	2
Bahamas	1*	0	0	1
Italy	1	0	0	1
Panama	0	1	0	1
Spain	0	1	1	1
Not known	22	6	0	24

\* Shell is shown under both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Transworld is shown under both Bermuda and the Netherlands. Cast, Eurocanadian Shipholdings is shown under both Canada and Switzerland. Kaiser Corp. is shown under both the Bahamas and the United States of America.



CONTENTS (Page numbers apply to the full version of the report)

	<u>page</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1
The oil embargo against South Africa	1
Improving the oil embargo; the role of the Shipping Research Bureau	3
The OAPEC Resolution	4
Actions in Western countries	5
The stages in the preparation of this report	6
Acknowledgements	8
1: <u>SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS</u>	9
2: <u>FINDINGS</u>	11
2.1. The number of ships capable of carrying crude oil cargoes which called at South Africa	11
2.2. The number of ships which are considered to be the most likely to have delivered crude oil to South Africa	13
2.3. The approximate quantity of oil involved	15
2.4. The companies owning the oil on those ships which are considered to be the "most likely" to have supplied South Africa	15
2.5. The identities of the companies owning or managing the ships	17
2.6. The nationalities of the oil and shipping companies involved	17
2.7. The countries and regions from which the ships sailed to South Africa	21
3: <u>SOME BACKGROUND DETAILS REGARDING THE COMPANIES APPARENTLY MOST DEEPLY INVOLVED IN OIL SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA</u>	23
3.1. A/S Havtor	23
3.2. Transworld Oil	23
3.3. Shell	25
3.4. Vitol	27
3.5. Oil supplies to South Africa and coal concessions	28
3.6. Hansen-Tangen	28
4: <u>THE ROLE OF TRANS-SHIPMENT PORTS IN OIL SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA</u>	29
4.1. How trans-shipment ports can be used to disguise the origin of crude oil	29
4.2. An Example: Rotterdam	29

5: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 33

5.1. Actions by oil-exporting countries 33

5.2. Actions by oil-trans-shipping countries 34

5.3. Actions by countries in which oil and shipping companies  
are based 34

5.4. Actions by companies 35

5.5. Other actions 36

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: THE PRINCIPAL WORKING TABLES 37

    An explanation of technical terms 38

    Table A 41

    Table B 58

    Table C 60

    Table D 64

    Table E 69

APPENDIX II: SOME EXAMPLES OF THE WAY SHIPS, KNOWN TO HAVE CALLED  
AT SOUTH AFRICA, HAVE BEEN SELECTED AS TO THE  
LIKELIHOOD OF ACTUAL OIL DELIVERY 73

APPENDIX III: RESOLUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS REGARDING  
AN OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA 79

    1. The United Nations General Assembly resolutions  
    on an oil embargo against South Africa, and  
    the voting record 79

    2. The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of  
    the Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC)  
    on the strengthening of the oil embargo  
    against the South African régime 85

APPENDIX IV: BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING THE SHIPPING  
RESEARCH BUREAU AND ITS FOUNDING ORGANISATIONS 89

APPENDIX V: BIBLIOGRAPHY 93

INDEX TO COMPANIES 95

INDEX TO COUNTRIES AND AREAS 97

MAP 98

	<u>page</u>
Table 1: Initial breakdown of the ships capable of carrying crude oil which have been identified as having called at South Africa between January 1980 and June 1981	14
Table 2: The oil companies which apparently owned the presumed oil cargo on board each of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa	16
Table 3: The shipping companies which were the managers, apparent beneficial owners, and charterers of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa	18
Table 4: The countries in which are based those companies that are linked with the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa, and the countries whose flags were used by these ships at the times in question	19
Table 5: The countries or regions which were visited immediately prior to sailing to South Africa by the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa	21
Table 6: Ships that departed from Rotterdam, loaded with crude oil, and that are considered likely to have delivered crude oil to South Africa; January 1980 - June 1981	30
Table 7: Approximate distance (in nautical miles) between the main area mentioned in Table A	99
Table 8: The main detours (in nautical miles) made by ships as indicated in Table A	99

APPENDIX I

Table A: The ships which called at South Africa between January 1980 and June 1981, and which, in the opinion of the Shipping Research Bureau, may have delivered crude oil cargoes during their visits to South Africa	41
Table B: The oil companies which apparently owned the presumed oil cargo on board each of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa	58
Table C: The shipping companies which were the managers, apparent beneficial owners, and charterers of the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa	60
Table D: The countries in which are based those companies that are linked with the 52 ships considered to be the "most likely" to have delivered crude oil to South Africa, and the countries whose flags were used by these ships at the times in question	64
Table E: The 175 ships which called at South Africa between January 1980 and June 1981 and which are understood to be capable of carrying crude oil cargoes, but regarding which the Shipping Research Bureau either: (a) has evidence that they did not deliver crude oil cargoes during these visits to South Africa; or (b) has insufficient evidence to warrant a suggestion that they may have done so	69