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The Black American Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean

A FIRST YEAR'S ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

THE U.S. AND AFRICA: POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS



Ronald Reagan

The United States overall foreign policy towards the nations of Africa does very little to promote economic development in order to help alleviate the problems of unemployment, food import dependency and growing international indebtedness. On a continent with 21 of the 31 poorest countries in the world, military hardware is the smallest of needs. Yet the Reagan administration sought a 178% increase in total military aid for Africa with dramatic increases for two North African states, Morocco and Tunisia, while development aid falls by a small amount. Sub-Saharan African nations combined still receive less than one

quarter of the amount of aid that goes to Israel alone.

The Africa policy concentrates on improving links either through military aid with those countries deemed strategically important, or through economic aid emphasizing U.S. private sector involvement with those countries with western oriented economies. Those countries which are in neither category receive little or no U.S. attention.

In the major areas of conflict on the continent U.S. policy only contributes to further heighten existing tensions. Reagan's southern Africa policy is the centerpiece of the U.S. approach to African concerns and it is here that rests the key to American success or failure on the continent as a whole.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: The continuance of white minority rule in South Africa (through a system of constitutionally enshrined racism called *apartheid*) and the South African Government's illegal occupation of Namibia are the source of extreme regional tensions that have serious political and economic implications for the United States. Support for the liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa is the single-most unifying factor of intra-African relations and an issue that places the U.S. at odds with the African consensus. South Africa's role as the regional aggressor is further demonstrated by its attempts to destabilize its independent black ruled

neighbors through constant military assaults on Angola, manipulation of rail ties with Zimbabwe and sponsorship of anti-government insurgents in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola.

South Africa is unique among nations due to its repression of the overwhelming majority of its population on the basis of race. It is a country where 22 million blacks are denied every basic civil liberty and the white minority has set aside 87% of the land for itself and receives 70% of the national income. It is an authentic police state where 20% of the national budget is spent on the control and repression of the black majority. Clearly, South Africa's system represents the extreme antithesis of the values espoused by American democracy.

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration has only encouraged South African intransigence on the issue of power sharing by calling it a "friendly country" and treating it as an ally. While repression inside South Africa has increased considerably over the past year, the United States has continued to broaden its friendship with this regime by: defending it in the United Nations; violating the mandatory U.N. Arms Embargo; allowing South Africa to enlarge the size of its defense attache in the U.S. and increase the number of consulates in the U.S.; offering to renew nuclear cooperation with South Africa; training the South African Coast Guard; tolerating South African stalling tactics in the negotiations for Namibian independence; and, lifting trade sanctions against South Africa's military and police.

In the spring of last year, top U.S. officials informed their South African

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counterparts that domestic change within South Africa would not be a precondition for improved U.S./South African relations. The South Africans were further informed that the U.S. seeks to "move forward toward a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of western security interests," and to "work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world". The Reagan administration has termed its South Africa policy "Constructive Engagement" and has stated that it will refuse to choose between black and white in South Africa. But the available evidence already suggests that they have chosen the side of the whites. The administration continues to emphasize what it sees as the strategic importance of South Africa in terms of the sea lanes around the Cape and the military importance of access to the strategic minerals that South Africa produces. Both of these issues are placed in the context of a supposed "communist onslaught" against South Africa. Communism, in South African terms, is defined as anything opposed to white minority rule. The Reagan administration appears to have adopted this definition as well.

At the root of this "Constructive Engagement" diplomacy is the argument that South Africa will acquiesce on the Namibian independence plan as a result of this new friendship. The Reagan administration claims to have made great progress on the Namibian question while the war has claimed even more lives and caused greater destruction in the past year. Since the independence plan, embodied in U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, was adopted by all parties in 1978 the negotiations have hardly moved toward actual implementation and the Reagan administration has barely approached this matter. It has spent its first year in office addressing, almost exclusively, the concerns of the South Africans regarding special protection of white minority privileges in Namibia and the structure of the future independent state. The latter, of course, is an issue that only the people of Namibia have the right to determine. Throughout the U.S. shuttle diplomacy on Namibia, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) has always been the last to be conferred with.

Because Namibia is the focal point of the regional conflict and of African diplomatic concern, the U.S. reputation and influence throughout Africa is closely tied to this question. The U.S. must produce some actual progress on

Namibia or be viewed as having fallen into the strategy of the South Africans if not actively participating in that strategy. Already U.S. policy has benefited the South African regime in numerous substantive ways without Pretoria reciprocating with concessions on Namibia. In fact, South Africa has increased its military operations in that country and continues to try to legitimize its own client government there.

At present the negotiations are right where they were when Reagan came into office. SWAPO and the frontline states have rejected the Western Contact Group's latest proposal for the election process for a constituent assembly and have called for another Geneva meeting between South Africa and SWAPO. The proposal involved a complicated one person, one vote counted twice formula that would support South Africa's aims of keeping Namibians divided along ethnic lines and increase the white minority's influence there.

THE WESTERN SAHARA: The current armed conflict in the Western Sahara began in 1975 when Spain withdrew its colonial occupation and granted administrative authority over the territory to Morocco and Mauritania. Soon thereafter thousands of Moroccan troops along with a Mauritanian force invaded and occupied the Western Sahara. Also during that year the International Court of Justice at the Hague ruled that neither nation could claim territorial sovereignty over the mineral-rich territory, and that the question of the self-determination of the peoples of the Western Sahara was unresolved. Following the invasion, 50-80% of the Saharawi people were forced to flee to Algeria where they now live in refugee camps.

While Moroccan troops in the Western Sahara exceed 50,000 and the Monarchy spends \$3 million a day on the war effort, the POLISARIO Front (the national liberation movement of the territory) with only between 15-30,000 armed troops has waged an increasingly successful war for self-determination. In 1978, Mauritania, after a change of government, relinquished all claims to the territory and withdrew its forces.

Although a 1960 agreement with Morocco limits the use of American weapons to the defense of the Kingdom of Morocco itself not including the Western Sahara, there are numerous films, photographs and eyewitness accounts that confirm that Morocco is

using American arms in the Western Sahara. In addition there are numerous captured or destroyed U.S. weapons and vehicles in POLISARIO hands in the territory.

Despite these violations, the Reagan administration is continuing to supply Morocco with an assortment of U.S. weaponry and military training, and has even dropped the language in the aid agreements that encouraged a negotiated settlement indicating a shift away from the position of neutrality that the U.S. has taken since the conflict began. The administration has, over the past year, sent a significant number of high-level military teams to Morocco to discuss upgrading U.S. military backing for the King. In return King Hassan II has granted the U.S. military transit rights in Morocco. In his foreign aid request for Fiscal Year 1983, President Reagan has asked for a \$100 million increase in military assistance to Morocco from the \$30 million already provided. Included in this aid is a counter-insurgency training program that could have the effect of directly involving American military personnel in Morocco's war effort.

This policy of the Reagan administration negates the Saharan people's right to self-determination and undermines United Nations, O.A.U. and other individual countries efforts to bring about a negotiated resolution of the conflict. The U.S. has also been accused of provoking a polarization of O.A.U. member states over this issue at the 38th O.A.U. Council of Ministers meeting in February and encouraging the walk-outs that occurred over the admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as the 51st O.A.U. member. The dispute within the O.A.U. could threaten to disrupt the Organization's Head of States Summit in early August to be held in Libya, and some member states have argued that the U.S. is seeking such a disruption.

THE HORN OF AFRICA: The current U.S. interest in the Horn of Africa results from its strategic location relative to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean sea lanes. The Reagan administration has gained access to military facilities in both Somalia and Kenya and has stepped up military aid to those countries as well as the Sudan. This approach is based on a U.S. desire to be able to project greater military force into the Persian Gulf area as part of the Rapid Deployment force. It is also seen as an alternative to facilities in

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THE U.S. AND AFRICA: ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In recent years sub-Saharan Africa has assumed a position of greater economic and strategic importance in the viewpoint of US policymakers and businessmen. As the US matures industrially, access to strategic mineral/energy resources and new export markets becomes a high priority. Africa, a virtual treasure trove of minerals, promises to be an important supplier as the US grows more dependent on imported raw materials.

Outside of South Africa, the US economic presence in Black Africa has been limited for a variety of reasons: political instability, low purchasing power, poor infrastructure, and closer African ties to European powers. For example, US trade with sub-Saharan Africa in 1978 accounts for only 2.3% of total exports and 5.4% of total imports. The deficit is primarily due to oil imports from Nigeria. Direct US investments in Africa are also small, amounting to about \$4 billion of which \$1.8 billion is in South Africa. For comparative purposes, this figure is roughly 5% of US investments in Latin America. Most of the capital is concentrated in extractive industries—copper, iron, and uranium mining, rubber, and oil.

Commercial relations: Despite the relatively unimpressive US-Africa trade volume and value, the Reagan administration has actively sought to increase exports and investments in Africa. The Administration strongly believes that private enterprise expansion and dynamism is the key to economic growth and development.

Accordingly, Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, led a delegation of US officials and businessmen to four pro-western, market oriented African countries (Cameroon, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Morocco) this past January. The group met with African counterparts and appraised business opportunities and the investment climate. At the time agribusiness investments in Nigeria seemed most promising. However, with the oil glut in more recent months, Nigeria has sustained sizeable revenue losses and has restricted imports as a precautionary measure. These actions may dampen US business enthusiasm.

At the Agency for International Development (AID), a new office promoting US investments and private sector expansion named the Bureau for

Private Enterprise (BPE), was opened in July of 1981. BPE has selected ten relatively more advanced, western-oriented Third World economies for initial focus of which three are African: Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Teams of specialists and business representatives have been sent out to reconnoiter the target countries and conduct feasibility studies. To date no reports have been made public.

In a show of noteworthy independence, the Export-Import Bank, an issuer of trade credits and guarantees, in spring of 1981 extended an \$85 million guarantee for oil exploration in Angola at the same time the State Department was pursuing repeal of the Clark Amendment, a Congressionally imposed ban on covert US military and para-military aid to anti-government forces in Angola.

In assessment, the Reagan administration can be given good marks for making high level overtures to Black Africa, but the free enterprise moralizing and the unwillingness to consider reform of the international economy is discomfiting to most African leaders and Third World intellectuals. Africa for the most part is bedeviled by declining terms of trade. Its traditional agricultural exports simply cannot keep pace with the high costs of manufactured imports. Trade deficits occur reducing the incentive of indigeous producers, causing foreign exchange shortages, and stymieing the governments' development plans. Whereas agricultural markets are more nearly competitive, extractive and manufacturing markets are less so, subject more to control by a few dominant corporations based in the West. Thus one of the main reasons Africa remains weak and dependent is because of this problem of unequal exchange. Through United Nations channels the less developed countries of the world repeatedly seek to initiate commodity price stabilization schemes and impose a code of ethics on multinational corporations as a corrective of the flaws in the international economy. Previous administrations have been ill disposed to these initiatives; the present one is even more recalcitrant.

The most visible impact of the reaffirmed free enterprise creed to date has been an expansion of the US presence in South Africa and more oil exploration in several black independent countries. In February 1982, the Commerce

Department relaxed export restrictions on sales to the South African military and police. Now US manufacturers can sell "non-lethal" goods and computers to these groups. The clear signal is that the US government encourages economic involvement in South Africa even though it implies support of apartheid. For the first time in several years, the US had a positive trade balance with South Africa in 1981.

Bilateral Assistance: Throughout the 70's, US assistance to Black Africa came to 10% of all donor contributions, both bilateral and multilateral, a small amount indeed. Because of the fragile economic state of Africa, as a region it has been receiving an increasingly larger share of AID's budget. In 1981, for the first time in three years, the Congress passed an authorization and an appropriation bill for foreign assistance. A strange confluence of Administration pressure on Republicans, liberal Democrats, lobby groups, and institutional prestige, allowed passage.

The emphasis of the \$11.9 billion aid program is on military security as opposed to development assistance. The Reagan team unabashly wants to strengthen the military capability of friendly and/or conveniently allied countries. In Africa the focus of US aid is on six countries: Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Morocco. Critical and leftist countries found themselves greatly reduced or totally eliminated such as Benin, a tiny West African country, and Mozambique, a war demolished country that is vital to land locked black independent countries in the area as a transportation hub. Of the six major aid recipients only two, Zimbabwe and Liberia, are not of express military value. Zimbabwe is seen as an interesting case in racial conciliation and hopefully a model for South Africa to follow. Liberia, since its founding as a modern state by freed American slaves, has always been close to the US. Now that Liberia is in dire economic straits, the US feels a special responsibility to keep the country solvent and out of the hands of a hostile regime. It is also the center for U.S. communications in Africa and a base for the CIA on the continent.

In evaluation, while the Administration should be credited for its successful Congressional lobbying and targeting most of the development aid to increasing agricultural production, it wrongly places too much emphasis on

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U.S./CARIBBEAN: POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS

Under the Reagan administration the nations of the Caribbean have received renewed attention from the United States in an effort to address what is perceived as expanding communist influence and to further develop U.S. economic advantages in the region.

The major vehicle for this effort is President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The CBI begins with an artificial and unsound definition of the region as the "Caribbean Basin" which adds the countries of the Central American isthmus to the basic configuration of the Caribbean area. This, in part, reveals the true political nature of what is being touted as an economic recovery program.

The Caribbean policy moves from the premise that the turmoil and instability in the region results from external communist interference. This reasoning is unfounded. The main cause of unrest in this area is the critical mass of poverty and social injustice which are the products of rigid, exploitative institutions and processes. The administration's reflexive anti-communism would have the American public believe that were it not for the Soviet Union there would be no indigenous movements against repressive and exploitative governments or practices in any part of the world.

The present policy of siding with the status quo regardless of the despotic records of some "friendly governments", and attempting to subvert nascent, leftist oriented regimes is simply counterproductive. It is a policy which mortgages the U.S. to unstable governments and alienates itself from the forces of progressive change in these countries. It further forces the young non-capitalist governments into a closer embrace with the Soviet Union and reaffirms America's imperialistic image.

The U.S., over the past 1½ years, has substantially stepped up its efforts to isolate Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua from the other states in the region by seeking to impose its political views on all countries that want U.S. aid or simply wish to avoid American hostility. Cuba is the most populous island nation in the area with 9.5 million people and has an impressive record in health care delivery, housing construction and public education; problematic areas for most other Caribbean countries. Its exclusion

from the CBI underlines the overly manipulative nature of the program, and has been criticized by Mexico, one of the proposed participants in the aid program.

Over the past twenty years, little progress has been made toward resolving the fundamental issues which separate the United States and Cuba. Some attempts at normalization of relations between the two countries were made during the Ford and Carter administrations, but the Reagan administration has completely reversed this trend. It has recently imposed restrictions on Americans wishing to visit Cuba, increased military maneuvers in the area, restricted the entry of Cuban publications to the U.S., and is in the process of setting up a radio station in Florida designed to broadcast anti-Cuban propaganda to the island. The administration also continues to ignore the numerous conciliatory overtures by Cuban officials toward opening up discussions on normalization.

Grenada has also been the object of American government belligerence. The administration has engaged in what can be termed the "economic sabotage" of the government there. In the spring of last year, the U.S. tried to dissuade several European countries from contributing funds to the construction of an international airport in Grenada, crucial to that country's tourist industry. The U.S. also tried to exclude Grenada from a \$4 million grant to the entire region in a clear violation of the Caribbean Development Bank charter. The administration has on several occasions refused requests by Grenada's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for discussions on the two countries relations. In the administration's view Grenada is simply another Cuba and must not be allowed to succeed in its present course of development for fear that its accomplishments might influence other nations in the region to pursue alternative paths of development.

The revelation of plans for covert activities to destabilize the government of Nicaragua is another clear indication of the lengths to which this administration is willing to go in order to politically dominate the course of events in the region.

The administration's policy objective of creating a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union in various parts of the world translates, in the

Caribbean, into an effort to ostracize Cuba and extract support from the other nations for the U.S. military involvement in El Salvador. It is a policy which uses token economic rewards for supporters, bullying tactics against those who would remain neutral and the threat of subversion against opponents.

President Reagan is seeking the right to use military bases in Honduras and Columbia, and is considering Haiti and Jamaica as well. This type of "gunboat diplomacy" will only create an arms escalation in the region and increase instability undermining any overall efforts at regional economic development and cooperation. The recent "Ocean Venture '82" military maneuvers around the Puerto Rican Island of Vieques, which were intended to simulate an invasion and blockade of Cuba, cost more for the few days they lasted than the entire aid program in the CBI for the 16 Eastern Caribbean Islands.

A few staunchly pro-American governments may benefit in some limited and short term manner from the Reagan policy by taking an anti-Cuban posture and supporting American private sector involvement in their countries. This is likely to cause greater divisions among states in the Caribbean which seems to be precisely what the U.S. is hoping for, with Cuba and countries friendly to Cuba being in the minority.

The new government in Jamaica provides the best illustration of a Reagan policy beneficiary. After years of official Washington indifference or chill toward Jamaica's problems, the Reagan administration has chosen that Island to be the showpiece of the CBI and an example of economic recovery under western-oriented principles. Consequently, the requests for economic and military aid to Jamaica were raised well above the levels of other Caribbean nations and with U.S. help Jamaica received a favorable decision on increased financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a release from the stringent conditions that crippled the previous government there.

The ideological preconditions and the broad discretion involved in who will be named "beneficiary countries" in Reagan's Caribbean/Central America policy will serve as levers to divide

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U.S./CARIBBEAN: ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The US has long been the dominant economic actor in the Caribbean, as a large investor and major trading partner of virtually all Caribbean countries. The archipelago ranging from the Bahamas to Trinidad and the four mainland states (Belize, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana) with large black populations and strong historical ties to the islands have been shocked by spiralling energy prices, depressed export markets, and high interest rates. High unemployment and limited economic opportunities breeds discontent and pressures national leaderships to find some relief.

Commercial Relations: The US has direct investments that amount to about \$9 billion as of 1980 in the area and the presence grows by an estimated \$400 million per year. Much of the investment is in bauxite mining and petroleum. A sizeable portion is also in transshipment activities centered in the Bahamas. The US imports mostly agricultural products from the region: sugar, bananas, coffee and spices. The US, on the other hand, exports a wide range of manufactured goods and accessories. The degree of dependency on external powers in the Caribbean is high. The economies, because of colonial legacies, relative poor resource endowments, and insularity, face serious barriers to development. These inherent weaknesses coupled with high population growth rates makes for a grim future.

Bilateral Assistance: The Caribbean over the years has been a largely neglected area. US attention tends to be episodic. Whenever a leftist government emerges or Cuba makes a bold move, American policymakers respond. Levels of foreign-assistance closely follows perceptions of threats to US interests. In times of relative tranquility, the aid is negligible; in times of crisis the aid levels increase for friendly governments and virtually disappears for critical or leftist ones. In 1982, the Reagan administration is playing out the same themes once again. The proximity of the area to the US, stirs intense fears about growing communist influence.

In the Caribbean proper, the Reagan administration has been particularly encouraged by the election of conservative Edward Seaga as Prime Minister of Jamaica. Under the leftist Manley regime, US assistance dropped to \$2.6

million in 1980. Now that Seaga's Jamaica is to be the "capitalist showcase of development", aid increased to \$69.5 million in 1982 and the request for 1983 is at \$92 million. Groups of private US businessmen have also been focusing on Jamaica as the most promising spot for expansion in the Caribbean.

In the Eastern Caribbean, home to ten mini-states several of which are still possessions of European powers, most of the US development assistance is channelled through a regional account. Contributions to the Caribbean Development Bank are also made through this account. With the passage of a foreign aid authorization bill for 1982 and 1983, the amount of assistance has been able to rise. In 1981 the US provided \$27 million under a stop-gap funding measure, but in 1982 the aid level rose to \$50 million and in 1983 the requested amount is \$61 million. As more of the islands become independent, the need for concessional assistance will grow dramatically as colonial grants dissipate and more ambitious social development plans are pursued.

Multilateral Assistance: In response to pleads for a Mini-Marshall plan for the Caribbean and rapidly deteriorating conditions in Central America, the Reagan administration unveiled a multilateral, cooperative economic plan designed to spur economic recovery in the Basin. The US aims to combine duty free entry for Caribbean products (except for textiles and apparel), a tax credit for American investors, and \$350 million in emergency assistance to help with pressing balance of payments problems. The other donors: Canada, Mexico, Columbia, and Venezuela also agreed to increase concessional aid to the target countries. The Reagan plan or the Caribbean Basin Initiative was submitted to Congress on March 17, 1982.

The Initiative received strong support from the business sector and the Central American governments who stand to benefit the most. Of the \$350 million in emergency aid, \$233 million is to go to three Central American republics while \$10 million goes to sixteen Eastern Caribbean countries. In the Caribbean, the big recipients are Jamaica with \$50 million and the Dominican Republic with \$40, two very pro-American countries. The free trade aspect, which was the best portion of

the bill, has already been substantially altered in markup by the House Ways and Means subcommittee on Trade. In response to pressure from labor groups and import-sensitive industries, exemptions have been granted to leather goods, all footwear, luggage, and automobile parts. These industries are all very promising ones in the Basin because of low labor costs. The opportunity for the Caribbean to develop its manufacturing capability has been stymied. The area will continue to be dependent on the exports of a few agricultural products whose prices fluctuate violently.

Beyond the questionable distribution of the emergency assistance, the plan can be criticized for not attacking the infrastructural impediments to growth, the many political pre-conditions set for inclusion that will prove divisive, and the exaggerated faith in US investors. The \$350 million is far from adequate in relieving the current account deficits that approximate \$4 billion for the region in 1982 let alone the needs for electrical generation, airport and harbor facilities and the like. The automatic exclusion of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada and evidence of "self help efforts" in order to be named a "beneficiary country" undermines the touted multilateral nature of the program. It seems obvious that the thinly veiled bilateral levers will be used to reward friendly countries and isolate or discipline overly independent leaderships. Lastly, the 10% tax credit for US investors in the area is an indiscriminate instrument that will create revenue losses for the US Treasury with little assurance that either substantially more investments will be induced in the area or that the investments would be of a labor-intensive nature. Unemployment in the Caribbean ranges from 20-40%; job creation is a critical need. An improved version would tie the amount of credits to progressively larger numbers of indigeneous employees.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative, unambitious in size and scope is not a bold departure from previous American policies toward the region. It is yet another plan, concerned not with aiding and improving the lives of the majority in the region, but with maintaining American control and dominance. The political will needed to commit sizeable outlays of resources necessary for balanced development is lacking.

U.S.-REFUGEE POLICY

US refugee admissions policy over the years has been marked by gross inconsistencies in the application of legal standards and the treatment of asylum petitioners. Too often political expediency and racial prejudice seems to overshadow the individual merits in asylum adjudication. Whereas East Europeans, Indochinese, and Cubans are routinely admitted, Haitians and Ethiopians fleeing equal, if not worse, conditions are rarely granted asylum. Within the last months the inequities have become even more blatant. Thousands of Salvadoreans have been deported although a civil war rages in their country. They have not been informed of their rights to apply for asylum or granted "voluntary departure status", a legal limbo state. Polish nationals in this country, on the other hand, have been extended the special status since the December 5, 1981 military crackdown in their country.

The Reagan administration has moved decisively to accentuate the abominable situation. In efforts to secure the borders of the country and deter future waves of immigrants/refugees, the Administration has detained asylum seekers believed to undeserving e.g. 2,100 Haitians and 800 Salvadoreans, interdicted Haitian vessels, and sponsored legislation that would severely reduce the due process guarantees of asylum petitioners such as the right to counsel, to judicial appeal etc. All these measures while efficacious violate international obligations and long accepted standards of fairness. The US seems willing to accept Indochinese, many of whom are self professed economic migrants, out of guilt and as a show of support to refugee burdened allies in the area. East Europeans and Cubans seem to be welcomed not so much on individual merit, (for a fair number are high status, privileged persons) but for propaganda purposes. Racial considerations also seem to enter the equation. Whereas Africa has half the world's refugee population, the ceiling for African refugees is 3,000 for fiscal year 1982 and European processing of Africans refugee claims have been stopped. In contrast, 30,000 East Europeans will be accepted, if though in years pass this generous ceiling has not been met. While Central America disintegrates and Haitians valiantly brave open seas to escape their miserable land, the Administration requests a refugee ceiling

of 3,000 for all of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The most patent case of double talk and suspect motivations seems to be the actions taken against resident Ethiopians. In October 1981, the Immigration and Naturalization Service mailed notices to 2,000 Ethiopians revoking their voluntary departure status as a class. The temporary status was extended to all stateside Ethiopians after the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and an ensuing period of great unrest. Now the State Department believes that the situation in that country has "stabilized". UN Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick, Amnesty International, and the State Department Bureau for Human Rights report otherwise. Thirty-five to forty thousand persons are detained on political grounds; disappearances occur; three secessionist struggles are on-going; press censorship and martial law persist. Ethiopians are faced with the choice of applying individually for voluntary departure status or asylum or leaving the country. Acceptance rates for asylum have dropped from 70% to 40% in the last year. The Administration suspects that Ethiopians within the last two years have been abusing the system; attempting to stay in this country as long as possible in order to qualify for permanent resident status. Whatever the intentions, fear and uncertainty are rampant in the Ethiopian emigre community. Many fearing that they are being used as pawns in a US ploy to gain influence with moderate members of the Marxist military junta in Ethiopia are contemplating going underground. If the new immigration reform bill is passed with a provision for sanctions for those who knowingly hire aliens, undocumented Ethiopians will be terribly disadvantaged.

Concern about refugee asylum and illegal immigration has grown so that the respective chairpersons of the Senate and House Judiciary subcommittees on Immigration, Alan Simpson and Romano Mazzoli, countered the Administration's omnibus reform bill by introducing their own. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill calls for the establishment of a six member immigration appeal board, training of administrative law judges to hear asylum cases, and provide a fair amount of due process protection such as right to counsel, opening hearings, and a public record. The Administration realizing that its

own bill would not go far with its strong tilt toward expeditious processing, has offered tentative support for the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. In a Senate subcommittee markup of the bill, the Administration was successful in gutting the notion of an independent immigration board. The Attorney General would appoint the members of the board and help write operating standards. Also Senior Executive personnel and not specially trained administrative law judges would hear asylum cases. The weaknesses of the bill—lack of judicial review in cases of pattern discrimination and summary exclusion at the borders—were not addressed.

In the final evaluation, reform of the immigration and refugee laws are long overdue. Outmoded procedures hamper the system, leading to unwieldy delays and suffering. More alarmingly, crass political and racial factors enter into the decision-making process when fair dispositions and genuine attempts to meet human needs for security and safety should be foremost in mind. The unmitigated insensitivity of the Administration in immigration/asylum matters is palpable and shameful.

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the region's states according to U.S. strategic interests at a time when greater regional unity and economic cooperation are required to alleviate the region's problems. If the administration believes that this policy promotes the type of American leadership in the Caribbean that those states would like to see then they clearly do not understand the realities faced, nor the aspirations held by the people and their governments in the Caribbean.

From supporting the repressive regime in Haiti to escalating the civil war in El Salvador, the Reagan policy is one which emphasizes a military approach to the region's problems. Presently the U.S. has military advisors in Haiti, Costa Rico, Honduras and of course El Salvador, and is seeking to send some to Guatemala as well. The tone of Reagan's denunciations of Cuba and the stepping up of American military presence in the region seem more reminiscent of the United State's "interventionist" past rather than the development of a new policy. It is the 1980's version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine.

RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S.-AFRICA: POLITICAL

1. The administration's development of a coherent and realistic southern Africa policy must avoid a blinding preoccupation with what the Soviets are doing and respond forthrightly to clear African priorities. American interests are best served by placing the United States on the right side of the growing challenge to the *apartheid* regime in South Africa. The U.S. should adopt a policy of escalating economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa in order to press for an immediate settlement of the Namibia conflict and to begin and hasten the process of real political change within South Africa. Contrary to administration claims, the U.S. has immense leverage with South Africa that it has thus far refused to use. Only the application of sanctions will prevent the U.S. from strengthening South Africa's repressive capacities and military capabilities, prolonging the struggle and causing greater human suffering and loss of life.

The U.S. concern about Cuban troops in Angola can best be addressed by making more strident efforts to bring about Namibia's independence and supporting international calls for an end to South African assaults on Angola. In addition, the administration should favorably consider Angolan overtures for normalization of ties with the U.S. thereby helping Angola decrease its dependence on the eastern bloc, and supporting the sizeable American private sector presence happily involved in the Angolan economy.

3. The U.S. should transfer the monies intended for arms sales credits and port and airfield expansion in Somalia to agricultural development programs and refugee assistance in order to genuinely address the instability in that country. The administration should also seek to help Ethiopia and Somalia move toward a negotiated settlement to that conflict.

4. The U.S. should withhold all military aid from Morocco because of its violations of the 1960 agreement and the Arms Export Control Act. Other types of aid should be tied to efforts toward a negotiated settlement to the Western Sahara conflict.

5. Military aid to Zaire should be cut off because of the massive government corruption that soaks up all forms of international aid for the personal gain of individuals in the government. Also, human rights violations and growing disaffection within the army point to a level of repression that is causing the likelihood of internal upheaval threatening U.S. interests there.

U.S.-AFRICA: ECONOMIC

1. Reduce military assistance levels and increase economic development levels. The US should increase foreign assistance contributions to 1% of GNP as promised from the present level of .27% and focus the largest portion on Africa, the continent with the gravest needs.

2. The Reagan Administration should actively embrace the basic human needs strategy of development instead of retrenching and focusing wholly on private sector participation and technology transfers. Without accommodating vital needs for health care, education, vocational training and infrastructure development, productivity will not rise and material benefits of increasing capitalist penetration will gravitate only to a select few, exacerbating existing inequalities. The common people of the Third World have to participate in the planning and formulation of development projects. "Progress" can not be simply imposed from the outside; the common people have to gain control of their destinies.

3. The US administration should make a serious effort to assist regional integration, especially the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC). In this effort substantial assistance should be extended to Mozambique, an alternative transportation outlet for the land locked black independent states in the area. As long as South Africa is white ruled and determined to subvert its neighbors, the vast economic potential of the surrounding black nations will never be realized given the heavy dependence on South Africa.

4. The US should engage in dialogue toward the restructuring of the international economy. Prescriptions against the rapacious activities of multinational corporations are needed as well as commodity price

stabilization schemes and a lowering of trade barriers in the West to Third World manufactures.

U.S.-CARIBBEAN: POLITICAL

1. The U.S. should begin discussions (without pre-conditions) with Cuba in an effort to move toward the normalization of ties with that country. Such a policy would be welcomed by every nation in the region and would do more toward creating stability than any CBI could ever achieve.

2. The U.S. should also move to improve relations with Grenada perhaps by beginning with talks in the manner that Washington is now approaching relations with Nicaragua.

3. The administration should adopt a policy that accepts ideological pluralism in the region and abandons the current confrontational approach that creates the pretext for American intervention in the Caribbean. The funds spent on increased military maneuvers should be shifted to development aid or aid for balance of payment deficits.

4. The U.S. should forego seeking military bases in countries in the Caribbean and pursue a policy that helps establish a U.S.-Caribbean community that includes all of the nations in the region and is based on economic and diplomatic cooperation.

5. The U.S. should limit its ties with the regime in Haiti and restrict aid until such time as the human rights conditions in that country improve allowing for the repatriation of Haitians in the U.S. who wish to return to contribute to their country's development.

US-CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC

1. The US Congress should reduce the amount of aid to El Salvador and make it contingent on the undertaking of good-faith negotiations with the opposition. The differential should be redirected to the Eastern Caribbean nations.

2. The Congress should explicitly tie the tax credit to employment generation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).

3. Nicaragua and Grenada should be included in CBI and a dialogue with Cuba initiated, with normalization and mutual constraints on aggressive actions in mind.

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U.S./Africa: Political
(cont'd from page 2)

Europe for supporting Israel in a potential regional conflict and as a means of countering the Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia. Seen in the context of the ongoing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, which affects other nations in the region, Reagan's policy toward the Horn of Africa will only fuel existing hostilities and increase the instability of the region.

The conflict in the Horn is founded primarily on Somalia's irrendentist claims to parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. Tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, which fought a war in 1977-1978, remain extremely high. As a result of the war and continuing conflict, close to 2 million refugees have left the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and created the world's largest refugee problem in Somalia. Relations between Somalia and Kenya are also tense and Kenya has voiced strong objections to the U.S. military aid to Somalia. As a result of Somali territorial ambitions Kenya and Ethiopia, despite their ideological differences, maintain a defense agreement and a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

The U.S./Somalia military agreements are fraught with liabilities without providing any significant assets. This relationship may only encourage Somali territorial ambitions toward Ethiopia and Kenya which, particularly in the case of Ethiopia, could draw the U.S. into a conflict of global dimensions. The relationship has already unfavorably identified the U.S. as the prime backer of a government that most African nations view as the aggressor in the region and it is feared that U.S. arms will be used against Ethiopia in the Ogaden.

In November and December of last year, the administration spent millions of dollars on military maneuvers in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia. The maneuvers, called "Operation Bright Star", were viewed with great alarm by most African nations that are opposed to the increasingly militaristic U.S. policy toward the continent and that do not wish to be pawns in a east/west confrontation. American use of military facilities in Somalia and Kenya can only widen any regional crisis and pull these countries into conflicts that are neither of their making nor in their interest. The current U.S. policy only subordinates the African priorities and basic needs to larger U.S. global objectives which are the basis for this policy.

U.S./Africa: Economic
(cont'd from page 3)

military assistance. The dramatic 178% increase in military assistance while total economic assistance to Africa only rose 14% seems questionable given the fact that Africa is the poorest continent.

Multilateral Assistance: Early on the Administration made clear its preference for bilateral as opposed to multilateral programs. The first indication of this bias came in a memo by Budget Director, David Stockman, leaked to the public in January of 1981, calling for a drastic reduction in contributions to multilateral institutions because these bodies often encouraged state intervention, used funds inefficiently, and precluded the US from taking credit or exerting leverage in pursuit of short term self-interest.

In the Congressional requests that followed, the International Development Association replenishment was scaled down to four instead of three years, with the first years being relatively small pay ins. This affiliate of the World Bank provides concessional loans to the poorest countries. African countries with the exception of Ivory Coast and Nigeria are heavy borrowers from this "soft loan window".

In a speech before the Annual World Bank meeting President Reagan emphasized that larger US contributions to international organizations should not be expected. The President recommended that Third World nations look to the "magic of the marketplace" for salvation. Later in January 1982, the Treasury Department released a report which awkwardly tried to substantiate the reasons for diminished multilateral development banks, entitled *United States Participation in Multilateral Development Banks in the 1980's*. While the body of the report found that the banks served the US commercial and political interest quite well and effected neoclassical economic reforms more readily than bilateral aid institutions because of greater prestige and credibility in Third World countries, the Treasury authors recommended harsh measures that would weaken the banks in years to come.

In evaluation, the Reagan Administration misunderstands the important role the multilateral institutions play in promoting US political and economic influence in the third world and providing humanitarian assistance. By overly emphasizing Soviet threats the US continues to miss opportunities to lay a sound foundation for economic development.

Recommendations
(cont'd from page 7)

4. The capabilities and resources of the Caribbean Development Bank should be bolstered so as to allow the Bank to extend its lending and improve its operational efficiency.
5. The US administration should drastically increase trade adjustment assistance and develop an employee retraining voucher system as a prelude to reducing trade barriers to Third World manufacturers.

US-REFUGEE POLICY

1. The Administration and/or Congress should grant amnesty to the unjustly detained Haitians. While asylum seekers of different national origin are routinely released pending adjudication, 2,100 Haitians have been incarcerated. Given the long back log of asylum claims, it seems both humanitarian and pragmatic to release these persons.
2. The refugee processing system should be depoliticized as much as possible by either establishing an immigration court or an independent immigration review board, developing fair and standard procedures for adjudicating claims, and by recruiting and training more personnel.
3. The refugee ceilings for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean should be dramatically increased while that for Eastern Europe reduced. Disruptions and unrest are more likely in the Third World than in Eastern bloc countries.
4. Ethiopians and Salvadoreans should be granted extended voluntary departure status as a class just as Polish nationals are until conditions in their respective homelands improve dramatically.
5. The domestic resettlement aid for refugees should be distributed fairly to all groups including the Haitians, who have been overlooked in the past.

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