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Police informers led Goldstone to rightwing terror network

An extraordinary tale, two months ago, has resulted in a damning indictment of top members of South Africa's security forces, writes **David Beresford** in Johannesburg

THE investigation into allegations of senior South African police involvement in political violence began two months ago, when the Goldstone Commission was approached by an unidentified foreign diplomat, acting for a senior officer in the force.

A meeting was set up between Judge Richard Goldstone and the police informer — code-named "Q" — on February 13. He arrived in the company of two police majors. The story he told, as recounted in the Goldstone report last night, was an extraordinary one.

He claimed that since 1989, operations to destabilise South Africa through train massacres and township violence had been run by three of the most senior members of the police force: Lieutenant-General Basie Smit, now deputy commissioner; Major-General Krappies Engelbrecht, the head of police counter-intelligence; and Lieutenant-General Johan le Roux.

A key figure in this group was Colonel Eugene de Kock, head of a notorious police assassination squad which operated from a farm near Pretoria in the 1980s, called Vlakplaas.

Col De Kock was officially discharged from the police last year, with a golden handshake of 1.2 million rand (£240,000). In fact, he and other members of Vlakplaas continued to work for hit squads, with false identity documents provided by police headquarters.

The group under the three generals had also been involved until 18 months ago in the manufacture of home-made guns at two premises in the Transvaal. Three warrant officers in the police force oversaw the manufacturing operations.

The weapons, according to "Q", were delivered to three senior members of the Inkatha Freedom Party, including Themba Khoza, chairman of the Transvaal region.

In support of his story, "Q" gave Judge Goldstone details of false identities issued to five officers involved in the "Third Force" operations. To test the allegations, the judge's task force demanded files relating to the false names from the department of home affairs. It found there was a block in the department's central computer on three of the names. Further inquiries showed senior police officers were involved in issuing the false identity documents.

A few days after the first meeting with "Q", the two majors who had accompanied him told the judge that Gen Engelbrecht had ordered the destruction of all documents detailing Inkatha involvement with the police.

On February 18, the commissioner of police, General Johan van der Merwe, was informed of "the general nature" of the investigation. Two days later, President F. W. de Klerk, and the minister of justice and de-

fence, Kobie Coetzee, were also informed.

"The State President urged the chairman to proceed with the investigation as a matter of urgency, and both he and Minister Coetzee assured the chairman of their full co-operation and assistance," the report said. The following week, a former commissioner of the Canadian police and a chief superintendent from the Danish police were seconded to the commission to help with the inquiry.

On February 27, one of the two police majors told Judge Goldstone that Gen Engelbrecht had ordered members of the clandestine unit to obtain compromising information against the judge, to persuade him to drop the investigation.

On March 2, Judge Goldstone briefed Nelson Mandela on the inquiry.

The following day the Commission was given a written memorandum by "Q" which alleged that, among other things, "the project which led to the manufacture of guns was initiated by generals Basie Smit and Krappies Engelbrecht", with the support of Inkatha leaders, including Mr Khoza.

The project also involved "crash course training to Inkatha Freedom Party members in the use of weapons and hand grenades". Officers involved in the project included the former commissioner of the KwaZulu police, General Jac Buchner.

Weapons used, according to "Q", included arms from the notorious Koevoet police unit which played a leading part in the Namibian war. The weapons had been cleaned in acid, and their serial numbers removed, before being distributed to Inkatha. Subsequently, weapons received from Mozam-

bique were distributed to the Zulu organisation in a similar manner. Col De Kock also purchased firearms from a weapons company in Pretoria.

Gen Engelbrecht had "at all times been involved and a party to the projects", approving payments out of a secret fund.

In September 1990, Mr Khoza had been caught with some of the weapons in his possession at a road block. The police officers had paid his bail and legal fees and he managed to get off the charge when the magistrate accepted a fabricated story.

"Q" said that Col De Kock had also organised train violence in co-operation with an East Rand security branch officer, Willem Coetzee. They used turncoat members of the African National Congress, recruited to work with the police, and Inkatha members working in the security department of a South African bank, Absa.

The three generals named, and Col De Kock, deny the allegations against them.

While stressing that the people named "have not been found guilty of the allegations made against them", the commission said that, with the election less than six weeks away, it had no option but to publish the evidence it had.

"If those intent on further destabilisation succeed in aborting the election, an investigation afterwards would be a futile exercise."

It urged the government and other relevant authorities to "take all possible steps" against elements in the South African and KwaZulu police force who were likely to encourage political violence and intimidation in the run up to the election and immediately afterwards.

German neo-Nazis help to train Afrikaner right

FROM ROGER BOYES
IN BONN

A DISCLOSURE that German neo-Nazis have been helping to train extremist Afrikaners in South Africa has sparked fears about an international fraternity of radical rightwingers.

Three German, neo-Nazis were involved in a gun battle with South African police in Pretoria on Tuesday. One was killed; another, Stephan Rays, was arrested, a third escaped.

German television reporters have unearthed a mesh of contacts between German right-wing extremists — some of whom fought for Croatia in its war against the Serbs — and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement. News of the contacts comes amid disclosures of a conspiracy to supply arms to the Inkatha Freedom Party at the very highest levels of the South African police. The reports brought an outraged response from Cyril Ramaphosa, African National Congress secretary-general.

The German links have not made a serious impact on South African politics, but the Germans are alarmed: the far right, thwarted at the polls, seems to be developing into an

■ The German extreme right, thwarted at the polls at home, are extending their international contacts and are working with British and American groups

export product. There has been an international dimension to the rise of neo-Nazi groups in Germany. Much of the racist material distributed in Germany was printed in the United States. British mailing addresses are offered for those Germans who want to buy videos of Hitler rallies. In the past few months the neo-Nazi networking has taken on a

different note. First, the steep ascent of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the Russian ultranationalist, has given far-right organisers the idea that they have a sacred international mission. Mr Zhirinovskiy is in contact with Gerhard Frey, the millionaire publisher who runs the far-right German People's Union (DVU). Secondly, many German neo-Nazis have been returning to Germany from the Balkans having gained combat experience. They are now anxious to trade on their skills, either as mercenaries or as right-wing missionaries abroad. Apart from South Africa, Russia and Ukraine are regarded as interesting new fields of action.

Far-right parties were expecting to make gains in the local council elections this weekend in Schleswig-Holstein, but the general trend seems to be away from parties such as the Republicans.



Ramaphosa: expressed outrage over plot

Arms row threatens deputy police chief

David Beresford
In Johannesburg

A LEGAL battle has developed behind the scenes in South Africa over whether the second most senior policeman, General Basie Smit, should be named in connection with arms smuggling deals involving the Inkatha Freedom Party.

The arms scandal threatens to erupt amid high political drama in KwaZulu. A scheduled meeting in the Zulu capital of Ulundi today between the African National Congress leader, Nelson Mandela, and the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, was called off last night. The ANC claimed there was a plot to assassinate Mr Mandela.

The Goldstone commission of inquiry into political violence continued secret hearings yesterday on the police weapons scandal. Gen Smit is believed to have brought in his own defence lawyers.

President F. W. de Klerk told the Guardian yesterday that if the allegations were true: "It

will bring forth a situation which will be fairly serious."

Mr De Klerk dismissed as a "flight of fantasy" allegations this week by the Transkei leader, General Bantu Holomisa, that he had tried to discourage Judge Goldstone from making his findings public, by warning it could precipitate a rightwing coup.

"My request is that the investigation must be carried out in the quickest possible time," Mr De Klerk said.

Gen Smit, the senior deputy commissioner of police, was head of the security branch at the time of its involvement in the Inkathagate scandal. There was some surprise when he survived a 1992 purge of top police commanders by the De Klerk government.

The cancellation of the Ulundi meeting was announced last night in an open letter to the Inkatha leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, from the ANC chairman, Thabo Mbeki. It said the ANC had received "firm reports that an attempt will be made on our president's life should he visit Ulundi".

President De Klerk yesterday made a historic but low-key campaign tour of Soweto, the country's largest township.

Lunching in a local park with black National Party officials, he said: "Go and tell the people that this election is not about liberation. The National Party has already liberated South Africa. This election is about the future."

Meanwhile, the white extremist leader, General Constand Viljoen, has explained his break with the Afrikaner Volksfront in a leaked fax to his political confidants.

The former commander of the South Africa Defence Force explained that differences had arisen within the Volksfront on whether "the time had come for us to use our military power to gain what we would not attain on the political front".

Gen Viljoen yesterday emerged as the top candidate on the list for his newly formed Freedom Front. The list included prominent members of the Conservative Party — which is boycotting the election — and farmers' leaders.

John Carlin counts the cost of the Third Force's secret war on the ANC

INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY
20 MARCH 1994

De Klerk's blind eye to slaughter

THOUSANDS of black South Africans would still be alive today if President FW de Klerk had responded with a will to the mountains of evidence put before him over the years supporting allegations that a "Third Force" within the state was orchestrating township violence.

That is the scale of the political neglect and the human tragedy that emerges from the finding of Judge Richard Goldstone, released on Friday, that Colonel Eugene de Kock, of the security police, assisted by three police generals, hatched a plot in 1989 to arm and train Inkatha loyalists to kill ANC supporters.

Since Inkatha, with the backing of the South African police, unleashed a wave of violence on the Johannesburg townships in mid-1990, four months after Nelson Mandela's release, some 7,000 have died in the area.

Then there is Natal, Zulu country, where the Inkatha-police axis precipitated a small civil war in 1986, which still rages

and has claimed a similar number of victims.

The violence has been the greatest obstacle to political reform since Mr de Klerk began formal negotiations with the ANC in May 1990.

After the 1992 massacre at Boipatong, when Inkatha, assisted by the police, slaughtered 42 innocent men, women and babies, the ANC called off all talks with the government and left South Africa on the brink of anarchy. Even today, with elections less than six weeks away, Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi continues to threaten war. Democracy, stability and prosperity all remain in the balance because "the Zulu nation", he says, will fight to prevent the elections from denying him the power that he acquired under apartheid.

"The Zulu nation", code for the Inkatha mafia and humble folk fooled or terrorised into supporting him, has been exposed as the criminal instrument of a larger, more sinister

mafia working within the white state. The majority of the Zulu people have known for a long time what Mr de Klerk, government officials and most of the South African media failed, with their apartheid blinkers, either to see or to want to see. Which is why, as the polls show, most Zulus support the ANC.

Judge Goldstone's document reveals that Colonel de Kock, of the police counter-intelligence unit, C10, paid Inkatha's Transvaal chairman, Themba Khoza, an informer's wages and supplied him with a vehicle to distribute AK-47s, grenades and other weapons among his hostel-based terror squads. De Kock used his police network to obtain the guns, which came from Namibia and Mozambique. Inkatha paid him for the guns.

Khoza was originally recruited by a C10 officer. C10 paid his legal costs after he was arrested in September 1990 by honest policemen, in possession of a bootful of weapons moments after a massacre of 48 ANC supporters in Sebokeng. A magistrate acquitted him of unlawful possession of firearms.

Khoza, who is in his late thirties, became rapidly perceived as the incarnation of evil in the eyes of ANC officials in the Johannesburg townships, after the dead started piling up in Soweto, Kagiso, Katlehong, Alexandra and Thokoza in August and September 1990. He would always appear on the scene within minutes of a massacre or a rampaging raid by Inkatha hostel-dwellers.

The reason why in many of the townships the violence has ebbed in the past 18 months is that the hostel-dwellers have come to realise that Khoza and his lieutenants - two others of whom were mentioned in the Goldstone document - have been manipulating their fears,

leading them into "wars" nobody in the townships wanted.

Judge Goldstone unearthed *prima facie* evidence, besides, that under the command of the deputy commissioner of the South African police, General Basie Smit, and the chief of counter-intelligence, General "Krappies" Englebrecht, De Kock deployed black policemen and Inkatha members to carry out the notorious train killings. Between August 1990 and August 1992, more than 300 black commuters were gunned down or stabbed to death on their way to or from work.

De Kock also organised crash courses in the use of guns and grenades for Inkatha men, often drawn from the East Rand townships where the violence raged long after it had died down elsewhere in the Johannesburg area. In the past year, 1,800 people have died in the East Rand. Similar collusion has been going on in Natal since the mid-1980s when the state security apparatus identified Inkatha as the perfect surrogate to wage war against ANC Zulus. The relationship worked because of the harmonious confluence of political interests. It was a case of "my enemy's enemy is my friend".

Of course, the ANC hit back. Nelson Mandela's supporters are guilty of an untold number of atrocities, too. But it is undeniable that, had Inkatha and its police friends not started the violence, thousands of victims would still be alive.

Mr de Klerk may now either pay the price at the polls for his supine lack of concern for black life, or benefit from having done something, however late. The door is open for him to send in his "honest cops". Either way, Chief Buthelezi's days on the political stage are numbered.

Conspirators talked of 'taking us out'

ONCE met Colonel Eugene de Kock, the mastermind behind South Africa's township wars. He bought me breakfast at a small café in Pretoria on the ground floor of the police headquarters building.

That was in November 1991. I was working on a joint Independent-BBC project investigating the "Third Force". I had been witnessing the slaughter in the black townships for more than a year and had become convinced that elements in the security forces were orchestrating the Inkatha terrorists behind the scenes.

The evidence, as we discovered, abounded. Proof was another thing - especially as 90 per cent of the dozen or so serving and retired members of the police and army undercover services we spoke to would not go on the record.

I organised a meeting with De Kock through a shady friend of his. I wanted to see him because we had been told by some of his former colleagues - in the security police and Military Intelligence, which often worked closely together - that "Gene" was still up to his old tricks.

Under the PW Botha regime, he had served in the brutal "Koevoet" unit in the Namibian war, and upon his return home had set about several murders of ANC officials.

A large man with thick black-framed glasses and a slight stutter, he told me that he was in the business of intercepting smuggled weapons. My belief that he was smuggling

them himself was confirmed by other sources then - and now by Judge Goldstone's report.

De Kock featured prominently in the documentary we made for Assignment, "War on Peace", as did another of his co-conspirators mentioned in the judge's report, General Jac Buchner, who was chief of the security police in Natal from 1987 to 1989, then became chief of the KwaZulu police, directly under Chief Buthelezi.

We revealed how the police were supplying guns to Inkatha for the assassination of ANC supporters, and linked the same hidden conspirators - including Themba Khoza - to the train killings.

At the end of 1992, we also revealed in the *Independent* how De Kock had conspired with Ulster loyalists to kill a police defector, Dirk Coetzee, on the streets of London.

I have since discovered that De Kock and his people bugged my home and that he had read lengthy transcripts of our conversations. I have also discovered that, in their panic at how close we were getting to the truth of their activities, they discussed "taking us out".

It was with some distress, but little surprise, that I learnt several months back that De Kock had received a 1.2m rand (£240,000) pay-out for his silence a year ago upon his official retirement from the police force. Judge Goldstone confirmed this on Friday, and then added that the "packet" had been approved by the South African cabinet.

Chronic source in township gather in attack national economy of assassinating ANC leader in 'Third Force' massacre

Mandela rails at 'corrupt government'

Death plot points to 'Third Force'

SA judge begins inquiry into 'Third Force' violence

Army 'involved in township train massacre'

Telling contribution: the story unfolds in the *Independent*

Senior police set up the massacre which nearly derailed South Africa's talks, reports Phillip van Niekerk in Johannesburg

IT HAS long been rumoured that a 'Third Force' existed in South Africa — a shadowy conspiracy by elements within the police and Inkatha violently to disrupt the country's transition to democracy. South Africans' worst fears were confirmed this weekend in a report by the Goldstone Commission. What the commission did not reveal was that the terror squads very nearly succeeded.

The *Observer* has learnt from African National Congress sources and others that among the many operations a secret unit of the South African police conducted with their paid Inkatha collaborators, was the infamous Boipatong massacre on 17 June, 1992, in which 41 people died.

The incident prompted the ANC to break off constitutional negotiations with the government. Talks were not fully back on track until last March, after nine acrimonious months that almost cost South Africa its political settlement.

The ANC was furious about security force involvement in the massacre, apparent even then. Its claims were dismissed by the government. Investigations were held; residents of the hostel from which the attack was launched are still on trial.

But what lay behind the massacre — who planned and executed it and for whom — was, like so many of the acts of mass violence in South Africa since 1990, never explained. Nor was there an attempt to look at the political roots of the criminal activity.

ANC sources, for example, have confirmed that three members of the KwaZulu homeland Cabinet — who are not mentioned in Judge Richard Goldstone's report — were named by the commission's informants as having knowledge of the death squads. They include the Justice Minister, C. J. Mterwa, and Interior Minister Steven Sithebe.

Inkatha Transvaal leaders Themba Khoza — exposed by *The Observer* two weeks ago as being implicated in the Nqutu massacre in Natal — and Victor Ndlovu were named by the commission as paid police agents recruited to foment violence.

Among the commission's bizarre findings were that senior policemen were involved in a 'horrible network' of murder and violence in black communities, subverted justice and were involved in gun-running for profit and blackmail. Most chilling is the central inference that they were involved in a grand conspiracy to destabilise South Africa.

Goldstone released the report because the election on 26-28 April was so close. 'If those intent on further destabilisation succeed in aborting the election, an investigation afterwards would be a futile exercise,' his report, released on Friday, said.

The Boipatong massacre occurred weeks after talks between the government and the ANC deadlocked. The ANC had just launched a mass action campaign for democracy. The timing — as in many of the acts of terror — was suspicious. On the night of 17 June, Zulu supporters of Inkatha from the KwaMadala hostel, rampaged through

Boipatong and the neighbouring Slovo squatter camp, hacking, stabbing and shooting residents. Among the dead were a nine-month-old baby, a child of four, and 24 women, one pregnant.

Ordinary people — the victims — knew from the start who had caused the massacre. It came after a year of entreaties to political authorities to do something about the KwaMadala hostel, which was suspected of being an armed Inkatha military camp supported by police.

After the massacre, residents refused to make statements to the police because they were convinced they were involved. Several witnesses claimed they saw white men in balaclavas during the attack. The tapes from the police central control room that day were tampered with and spoiled, according to British experts. Khoza visited the hostel the next day to promise hostel dwellers legal assistance.

Boipatong sparked a debate within the ANC over how to treat President F. W. de Klerk. Some believed there was no purpose in talking to the government while it was involved in destabilising the ANC. The negotiators argued that the country was fragile and that the ANC should not lose its cool. Once in power, it could start to deal with the security forces, rather than leave it to an unwilling and unable De Klerk.

It is clear now from Goldstone's report that those who advocated the more militant line were unwittingly playing into the hands of the Third Force, which was seeking to prompt just such a reaction to sabotage the talks.

Goldstone's report is based largely on the evidence of a senior police officer identified as 'Q', who would only testify in the presence of two police majors. He said the unit was headed by General Basie Smit, the deputy commissioner of the South African police, and General Krappies Engelbrecht, head of police counter-intelligence.

The revelations pose serious questions about higher-level government involvement. The perception by ordinary black people is that such a sophisticated and extensive operation could not have been conducted by officials alone.

De Klerk this weekend acted quickly to limit the damage, setting up an international task force to investigate the 'strong prima facie' evidence in the report. He suspended all the implicated officers. Further action, he said, would follow consultation with the Transitional Executive Council, the multi-party body overseeing government until the election.

De Klerk's attempts at defending his government's record, saying that 'at no stage did we have evidence of an organised entity within the security forces that could be described as a Third Force', were unconvincing.

Over the years, the National Party has refused to countenance the Third Force theory. Instead, it blamed the ANC for most of violence.

There is no proof that De Klerk had any knowledge of the criminal activity within his security forces, but the stark fact is that he failed to weed out rogue elements when it was clear to people all over the country what was happening. It was pointed out to him by, among others, ANC president Nelson Mandela.

De Klerk's presidency is now tainted by his timidity and blindness. Rather than being honoured as a reformer and co-founder of the new South Africa, he is now likely to be remembered as the head of a government harbouring mass murderers. It comes at the worst possible moment for his election bid to win black votes.

The ANC, only seven weeks from its likely takeover of power, has been remarkably cautious, and praised those officers involved in breaking the cell. ANC sources say the organisation is scared the revelations could further a rebellion among disgruntled men in the security forces, whose ruthlessness and capacity to foment violence is detailed in the judge's report.

An equal tough dilemma confronts the ANC over the report's findings on Natal province, which includes the KwaZulu homeland, where Inkatha has made no attempt to conceal its preparations for war. Tension in the region worsened last week as the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, proclaimed sovereignty over the province, opening the way for a potentially violent secession.

The chances of a free election in Natal are virtually nil, particularly as the homeland has its own police force. *The Observer* revealed two weeks ago how this force covered up the Nqutu massacre last November. In a preliminary report, Goldstone said there was 'prima facie' evidence that the massacre was not investigated with any diligence and that two senior officers who testified to the commission were dishonest witnesses.

Goldstone recommended that De Klerk 'take all possible steps to neutralise elements in the South African police and KwaZulu police which may be likely to cause or encourage criminal acts of violence and intimidation'.

Yet the same timidity that prevented De Klerk from acting against his own security forces — action which might have saved the lives of thousands — was again revealed at the President's press conference on Friday night.

He defended his decision not to arrest people, such as Khoza and Ndlovu, who are implicated in violence and who continue to threaten it, because 'we have a civilised legal system in this country'. Given their experiences with the legal system, families of the victims of Boipatong and numerous other murders at the hands of the Third Force could be forgiven for disagreeing.

Fear of death in South Africa

CHURCH WORKERS in rural Natal say that if they speak the truth about the Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party's violence they, their families or their congregations, risk execution, according to a despatch from Southern African Church News.

"To say the right thing to the wrong person might lead to an instant beating, even death," said one Zulu church field worker.

This fear seems justified, claims SACN. Attacks on clergy and church workers by armed hit squads have resulted in deaths and serious injuries. Where Inkatha suspects have been caught, collusion between the South African Police, KwaZulu police and Inkatha has usually resulted in destruction of evidence or other cover-up methods, it says.

Some prominent clergy have moved their families out of black townships because they fear they will be targets of anti-democratic violence.

"Buthelezi parades his devotion to Anglicanism openly, signing letters to clergy as 'yours in Christ'. Archbishop Desmond Tutu has had three meetings with the Chief to urge him to stop the violence and allow the democratic process to go forward. Church leaders in Natal wrote Buthelezi in December urging him to participate in the democratic process. The Chief's reply was unhelpful," says SACN.

If Inkatha do not take part in the elections in April, any black person who votes will automatically be assumed to be pro-ANC and a target for retribution. If election results are announced without Inkatha, open warfare against ANC villages is feared.

The Anglican Bishop of Natal, Michael Nuttal, has asked Christians around the world to pray for an end to the violence and for participation of all parties in the elections. Unless the situation changes drastically "we are facing an extremely difficult and violent period," he says.

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Fiasco in 'Bop' clears way for SA elections

THE COLLAPSE of the Freedom Alliance, the unholy marriage of the black and white right, has shattered the greatest obstacle to peace in South Africa and, while more violence can be expected, has cleared the way for all races to vote in the country's first democratic elections next month.

A short, sharp military showdown exposed the bluster behind the far right's threats of civil war and delivered, in less than 24 hours, the outcome the government and the African National Congress (ANC) had sought during months of painstaking negotiations.

On 12 October last year the Afrikaner Volksfront coalition, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party and the government of Bophuthatswana, formalised a union held together by a seemingly strong bond: their common fear of democracy.

Their combined support amounted, at best, to 10 per cent of the population but they had the firepower, they snarled, to stop the April elections. Unable to gauge the exact nature of the threat, the ANC and the government bent over backwards to accommodate their demands while simultaneously, in discussion after discussion, trying to divide them.

What South Africa's two main political parties now know, to their immense relief, is that when it comes to the crunch the South African Defence Force can be expected to defend the new order against — another happy discovery — the paper tigers of the far right.

It all started going wrong for the apartheid die-hards when, in response to a request from what remained of the Bophu-

White extremists and Inkatha are in disarray, writes

John Carlin in Johannesburg

thatswana government, General Constand Viljoen dispatched his motley Boer army to Mmabatho, the homeland capital. It was a decision so politically misguided, with such suicidally catastrophic consequences, that by Friday night the Volksfront had split in two and Lucas Mangope, the embattled leader of Bophuthatswana, was staring political oblivion in the face.

General Viljoen, explaining his decision on Saturday to break away from the Volksfront and register for the elections in the name of the Freedom Front, blamed the "Bop" fiasco on Eugene Terre-Blanche's rabble, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB). Had they not joined the fray with the rest of the Boer "commandos", he said, there would never have been such murder, mayhem and, in the end, the worst humiliation since the Boer war.

This was disingenuous. It was he who gave the order for the *volk* to embark on their midnight ride in the full knowledge that the AWB was as integral a part of the Volksfront as his other, purportedly more disciplined, troops. The general, who Nelson Mandela describes as a gentleman, has always felt uncomfortable in the presence of Mr Terre-Blanche. But, de-

spite the promptings of, among others, his appalled wife, he stuck by them.

To imagine that when he issued the call to war the AWB would fail to respond, their *raison d'être* having always rested on the fantasy that one day they would rise up in arms to claim their "volkstaat", indicates how far removed from reality General Viljoen is. Responsibility for the killings in Mmabatho is not something he can shrug off.

Just how many deaths will result from Chief Buthelezi's continued refusal to participate in the elections is the question that remains to be answered. He failed to meet the final deadline for electoral registration and, barring some last-minute acrobatics by the strained Independent Electoral Commission, the door is open for the ANC to sweep the board in the Zulu province of Natal and the homeland that lies within its borders, KwaZulu. Alternatively, Inkatha will set about their customary bloody tactics in a bid to stop people from voting.

But there is another possibility. Chief Buthelezi, remarking on events in Bophuthatswana on Friday, said he had glimpsed "the nightmare" that lay in store for South Africa. He might, in truth, have been giving expression to more immediate fears.

For the moment Chief Buthelezi has the lid on things. But his real nightmare, many suspect, is that one day in the not too distant future the South African Defence Force will drive into KwaZulu and that the residents of his capital, Ulundi, will welcome them with as much celebration as the residents of Mmabatho.

THERE was one country less in the world yesterday after Lucas Mangope was deposed as President of Bophuthatswana. Control of the homeland, a sovereign territory under the old apartheid rules, passed to the South African authorities.

The ambassador of the only country which recognised Bophuthatswana's independence, South Africa's Tjaard van der Walt, promptly took charge of the territory's administration. Mr Mangope, who with Pretoria's blessing had ruled Bophuthatswana as a one-party republic since 1977, was not arrested but, according to an official state-

JOHN CARLIN
in Johannesburg

ment, would be "secured" by the South African Defence Force for his own safety.

Reports from Mmabatho, until Saturday the homeland "capital", said soldiers and civil servants loyal to Mr Mangope were fleeing for fear of retribution from an otherwise jubilant local population. The policeman who killed two members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) on Friday is to be charged. The statement was issued by

the South African government and the multi-party Transitional Executive Council (TEC) after a joint delegation had visited Mr Mangope at 9pm on Saturday to tell him his reign was over. The delegation was headed by South Africa's Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, and included a senior ANC official on the council, "Mac" Maharaj, and General Georg Meiring, the chief of the South African Defence Force. "Citizens of South Africa, and all those resident in Bophuthatswana, can now engage in free political activity and participate without let or hindrance in the forthcoming elections," the statement said.

It was Mr Mangope's refusal to provide guarantees of free political activity, despite his belated decision to take part in the elections, that led the government and the ANC to deliver the *coup de grâce* to the deluded dictator. A warning that fires remain to be extinguished in other parts of South Africa was provided yesterday morning when hundreds of Inkatha supporters occupied a stadium outside Durban and prevented an ANC rally from taking place. Four people died.

Adding fuel to that fire, Inkatha's leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who failed to meet Friday's deadline for electoral registration, said that he would deploy trained "self-protection units" in areas affected by violence. "No matter how many of us you kill," he said, addressing himself to the ANC, "you cannot kill our resolve. We will fight to the last man."

Bophuthatswana taken off the map



Fiasco clears way, page 9

Defections crack South Africa's anti-poll front

Chris McGreal in Mmabatho

THE Freedom Alliance of black and white conservatives opposed to South Africa's first multiracial elections is disintegrating. Yesterday Pretoria overthrew the leader of the Bophuthatswana black homeland, Lucas Mangope, while a prominent white right-winger led a breakaway of Afrikaner nationalists to rejoin the election process.

The developments have left the Inkatha leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi as the only prominent politician actively opposing the vote.

Rowan Cronje, who suffered a double blow as the Freedom Alliance's chairman and President Mangope's deputy, said elements of the alliance would keep up the struggle but admitted it had suffered a setback.

"It's not necessarily the end. It seems to put new resolve in some but clearly things took a very sudden change," he said.

After days of violent unrest and a collapse of authority, the South African government forced Mr Mangope from power in the early hours of yesterday. The foreign minister, Pik Botha, said South Africa no longer recognised Mr Mangope as president and Pretoria's ambassador, Tjaart van der Walt, would administer the homeland on behalf of the government and the Transitional Executive Council, probably until next month's elections.

"The political government of Bophuthatswana is non-existent. It is no longer recognised by South Africa. That specifi-

cally applies to Mr Mangope and the cabinet ministers," he said. Asked how Mr Mangope reacted, Mr van der Walt said: "I can't say he's accepted it, but he noticed."

Mr Mangope was overthrown after protests against his refusal to allow Bophuthatswana to join the elections turned violent with extensive looting and killings. South African troops were sent in to the homeland on Friday. Although Mr Mangope then agreed to join the vote, he failed to offer sufficient guarantees of free political activity.

Mr Mangope was visited by Mr Botha, Mr van der Walt and an ANC official, Mac Maharaj, in the middle of Friday night. They tried to persuade him to resign, but failed.

"For weeks I've been trying to persuade him to take part in the elections. When that didn't work, last night I tried to persuade him to resign with dignity. And that didn't work," Mr van der Walt said.

A statement said Mr Mangope had been "secured" by troops but Pretoria denied he was under arrest.

A few hours earlier, General Constand Viljoen resigned from the leadership of the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), which has led the campaign for an Afrikaner homeland, after entering his Freedom Front in the April 26-28 election. Seven Conservative Party MPs backed the general, though their party has rejected the vote.

Gen Viljoen also attacked the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), saying it had undermined the common cause

through indiscipline such as its failed attempt to take over the Bophuthatswana capital. At least 10 people died in clashes, including four white right-wingers. The AWB described the general as a Judas goat in league with the South African government and communist ANC.

None the less, the loss of Mr Mangope and Gen Viljoen has probably shattered the Freedom Alliance. The general's defection will bleed support and the loss of Bophuthatswana has cost the AVF territory it had hoped to include in an Afrikaner homeland, or *vo/ksstaat*.

But hopes of a peaceful election remain distant amid Chief Buthelezi's continuing intransigence. Last night, Inkatha and ANC supporters clashed at a stadium near Durban leaving at least three people dead.

The attacks on unarmed blacks by the AWB and other whites in the area did not do as much damage as being herded without resistance from Mmabatho by the Bophuthatswana army and South African forces.

'He re-cocked, took aim and fired. I saw her eyes rolling as she died'

MONEY was unavailable in downtown Mmabatho on Friday. With 5,000 white Right-wingers apparently in control of the capital, there seemed enough of a window of calm for me to make the 50-mile dash to Zeerust to pick up some cash and get back before the next phase of the Bophuthatswana drama unfurled.

What I didn't know then was that the homeland's defence force had mutinied against its political boss, President Lucas Mangope, leaving the so-called white liberators of the capital *de facto* hostages to angry locals fed up with their discredited president and his white allies.

Nothing had prepared me for the horror of the next hour.

As I turned the yellow VW Golf into the main highway from the airport towards South Africa proper, I found myself in the middle of a 30-vehicle column of heavily-armed AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) men who were firing randomly at blacks as they passed.

Being driven out of town by troops of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force had left the AWB's mood much like that of a swarm of angry, humiliated hornets: after all, they thought they had come to Bophuthatswana to support the BDF in propping up Mangope.

With hindsight, it's clear the AWB were reacting like injured animals trying to scabble back credibility as they were hounded out of town by blacks. Sensing that something was going to



On a routine trip to a bank photographer Graeme Williams watched in disbelief as an AWB gunman killed a black woman — for the fun of it

explode, I slotted the Golf into the middle of the AWB convoy. Black people were cowering at the roadside and in houses as the passing AWB men fired on them.

Then there came the sound of intensified gunfire, including the rat-tat-tat of heavy automatic weapons, and AWB vehicles up ahead began scattering left, right and centre. At this point, I did not realise that summary executions had begun.

My attention was on a lone, 45-ish AWB man, wearing the swastika-like emblem of the movement, who had stepped from his vehicle and was aiming through the telescopic sight of a heavy-calibre hunting rifle at a black woman running towards her front door.

His first bullet missed. He re-cocked, took deliberate aim and shot her. I saw her eyes rolling as she died. He was very pleased with himself. Instinctively, I had begun to photograph it all.

Suddenly I was surrounded by AWB men armed with pump-action shotguns and automatic

rifles. They were screaming abuse at me for taking the photographs. I threw my camera in the car and promised not to take any more pictures.

But, as I threw the camera, an AWB man elbowed me in the face. I staggered into a nearby bush and three guys started grabbing cameras from my car and throwing them into their *bakkies* (pick-up trucks).

One pushed a shotgun in my face and ripped film and my wallet from my pockets. He smashed me in the face four or five times. The AWB men then rushed off in their vehicles as I staggered back to the car to retrieve my one surviving camera to film the dead woman being taken to hospital or the morgue.

Further down the road, I then stumbled on the scene of the heavy firing I had heard earlier. Three AWB men lay dead, riddled with bullets, next to their blue Mercedes. Two had been executed minutes earlier with shots through the head by a black BDF officer.

As I again shot photos of the grizzly scene, a white officer of the Bophuthatswana Police screamed at me: "F*** off with your camera or else you'll be shot too."

The time had come to hightail it out of there. Having witnessed white brutality and seen the consequences of black revenge, I felt a sense of horror and despair for all of us South Africans at the savage, indiscriminate violence that might yet lie ahead.



4. WORKING WITH RURAL SOUTH AFRICANS


CLC operations rest on an intimate working relationship with target rural communities. Communities working with the CLC understand that they make decisions and look to the CLC for assistance and training rather than direction. Rural paralegal committees are elected to oversee the establishment and administration of paralegal offices in their communities. In turn, rural paralegal committees advertise for, interview and select paralegals for training.

Selecting paralegals from within communities is a critical component in the CLC programme. Too often programmes train and install "foreign" workers in communities. Too often unskilled community workers not intimately versed with local problems are insensitive to the dynamics and developmental needs of rural communities. CLC paralegals are indigenous to their communities and intimately familiar with the history, problems and needs of their communities. Hiring local paralegals ensures that skilled workers are more likely to remain in their communities than would paralegals moving from urban or peri-urban areas.


Through their paralegal committees, rural communities identify problematic areas of law. The CLC uses these local needs assessments to determine its paralegal, paralegal committee and community training programmes. Paralegals administer client cases and together, with their committees and CLC staff, conduct community education workshops. CLC training programmes are not limited exclusively to law but include socio-economic issues and alternative dispute resolution methods, buttressed with training in the local language(s).

The CLC approach is based on workable empowerment principles, untainted by the exaggerated idealism of contemporary politics. The CLC holistic and innovative approach to legal issues within the broader local, regional and national social context and extensive training network allow for development which germinates in, grows out of and spreads through the community. Communities identify their own interests and develop local resources to serve their legal and development needs. This methodology lends itself to developing long-term self-reliance and sustainability.

EXTENT OF CLC OPERATIONS UKWENABA KWEZIZINDA ZE CLC



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KWAZULU NATAL FORUM ON EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

The KwaZulu Natal Forum on Education for Democracy (Durban and Coastal) brings together nearly 40 organisations dedicated to creating a climate of tolerance conducive to free and fair elections, ensuring informed participation by all South Africans and strengthening popular commitment to a democratic future.

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This bulletin is produced by the KwaZulu Natal Forum. If you wish to receive a copy or to contribute an item, please contact Deborah Ewing, on the numbers above.

Dossier on unsafe areas launched

A register of 'no-go' areas, identifying places in KwaZulu Natal where voter education is proving difficult or impossible, is being drawn up by the Forum's training commission.

Reports from partners trying to conduct voter education in areas where there is political conflict or uncertainty reveal that people trying to obtain or disseminate information in advance of the election are facing many obstacles - and dangers. Several individuals involved in education and peace work, of differing political affiliation, claim they have had to pull out of such activities due to direct threats and because of fear for their families.

Information received will be used to help those involved in voter education and monitoring to develop a strategy for safely reaching communities in areas of conflict. It will also support the efforts of the Independent Electoral Commission to seek assurances of free activity from political and other leadership.

Community based organisations and monitoring and observer missions are asked to contact the Forum urgently to pass on information that will contribute to this register.

Reports should include the following information:

- * areas where violence or related tension is making free movement/activity impossible
- * incidents of voter educators/monitors have been actively prevented from entering or carrying out their work
- * areas where voter educators and others are refusing to enter for fear of being obstructed or attacked
- * incidents of intimidation or obstruction of voter educators
- * instances where voter education programmes have been cancelled or invitations withdrawn due to the political climate
- * bans or restrictions on voter education in certain areas or sectors.

Details of dates, locations, sectors and role players will be very useful but anything that may expose individuals, organisations or communities to further intimidation can of course be withheld.

Every effort will be made to handle the information sensitively and constructively

and sources will remain confidential.

Please phone Deborah Ewing on 031 307 5693 if you can contribute to this project.

One partner organisation has already reported widespread interference with its voter education work in KwaZulu.

"The situation in almost all areas is not conducive for voter education", says the Community Law Centre.

The CLC has experienced threats to staff, cancellation of workshops, the banning of voter education and related literature and a level of violence in some areas that has left trainee voter educators too scared to venture out.

Due to concerns about the safety of voter educators who are attempting to reach communities in difficult areas, the Forum training commission has agreed to ask UNQMSA and EMPISA international observers to attend workshops where problems are anticipated.

Healthy result

Anyone worried that the IEC is a 'toothless dog' should note its successful intervention this week in a controversy over voter education in hospitals.

Last week, the Natal Provincial Administration health authorities banned voter education on their premises, on the grounds it was perceived by some staff as being too political and could, therefore, destabilise hospitals.

Workshops already arranged were hastily cancelled and hospitals were instructed that no election-related materials must be displayed on site.

However, within days of the matter being exposed and referred to the IEC, by the KwaZulu Natal Forum, a meeting was set up and the decision was reversed. Groups who have had hospital workshops cancelled due to the ban can now rearrange them.

Naming names

Concerned that voters could be confused by the appearance on the ballot paper of a new party called the African Moderate Congress, the Forum has called on the IEC to disallow its registration.

The IEC has the power to refuse an application for registration if the name, abbreviation or symbol of a political party resembles that of an existing party so closely as to deceive or confuse voters.

The ANC has objected to the AMC's registration on these grounds and as the voter education coordinating body for KwaZulu Natal, the Forum has written independently expressing anxiety that in the current climate of uncertainty, voters will be further confused by seeing the AMC listed directly above the ANC on the ballot paper.

Moving challenge

Transport, for people, ballot papers and boxes, during the election period, is a security issue being raised by communities and voter educators.

The question of secure transport of ballot boxes to central places for vote counting - which will take several days - is being raised with the IEC by the Forum.

The IEC has already announced provisions for security of ballot papers which will be flown into the country under stringent security after 17 April, transported to warehouses under surveillance and in the presence of party officials, and transferred to secure locations near the voting stations.

Specific concerns among voters about safe access to and from the polls will only be clarified when the proposed sites of voting stations are made public later this month.

Sounds familiar?

Talking constitution is starting to be a turn-off for listeners to HPN Stereo's voter education spots. The SABC reports that several complaints are being received every day in response to the mock 'phone-in' broadcasts answering questions about the interim constitution.

"Too long, too patronising, too irritating, too often", is the refrain.

You telling me or you asking me?

'Think positively', urge Zululand churches

In an attempt to build bridges between communities locked in conflict over the issue of participation in the election, the Zululand Churches Electoral Education Project has publicly endorsed the strategy adopted by the IFP and other parties in not committing themselves to go to the polls.

"While it is not appropriate for us to comment on the substance of the arguments about the integrity of the transitional constitution, the formally stated strategy adopted by these parties is valid and legitimate", stressed the project in a statement published last week.

Voter educators in northern Natal had earlier complained that the churches in the area were 'paralysed' by the continuing political tensions.

By recognising the rights of individuals, groups or parties to campaign against, as well as for, an election, the churches project hopes to be able to move forward on broad democracy education in areas where voter education has been seen as pro-ANC by virtue of being pro-election.

It aims to address the alienation felt by dissenting parties who have been presented as 'wreckers', in order to assist "in developing popular understanding of what freedom and fairness could be as a sign of the bonds of solidarity between all people".

To do this, it sees it as vital to regard divergent political views "when freely and actively in contest" in a positive light.

"We invite other Christian-based projects and organisations concerned with bridge building to refrain from intruding into the political domain with vocabulary that...casts dissenting parties in fundamentally negative terms", says the statement.

It further calls on all people to contribute to a society governed by the rule of law and "to persuade and never to coerce".

In its new code of conduct, the Zululand churches project undertakes to place special emphasis on reaching rural people and helping to interrupt the "cycles of fear and uncertainty pervasive in the region".

Let us eavesdrop

Potential voters, and non voters, have been asking voter educators awkward questions for weeks.

Such diverse dilemmas as whether a woman should vote according to her own views when she is supposed to obey her husband, or whether it will be safe to vote in an area where the *Inkosi* supports a boycott have been aired at workshops all over the region.

In order that the advice and information given to small groups can be shared with the widest number of people, radio stations participating in the DEBI (Democratic Education Broadcast Initiative) want to broadcast short dialogues on electoral concerns scripted from voter education meetings.


If your organisation has documented question and answer sessions on topics that have received little publicity, DEBI would be glad to receive samples.

If you are running voter education and can consider allowing some activities to be recorded, or consenting participants to be interviewed, please contact DEBI through Ricky Ndlovu on 304 3563, or Deborah Ewing on 307 5693.

Thought for the day

'A sense of humour is the last truly democratic weapon in the hands of each person.'


Walter Dill Scott, in 1920's Democracy in South Africa.



They will take this ballot paper and go to a voting booth where no-one can see what they are doing. There they will make a **X** next to the party or organization they support, fold the ballot paper in half and post it into a sealed box where no-one can read it.

BALLOT PAPER

(Make a cross next to the party or organisation of your choice)

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS	ANC		
AFRIKANER-VOLKSUNIE	AVU		
BOPHUTHATSWANA NATIONAL PARTY	BNP		
AZANIAN PEOPLE'S ORGANISATION	AZAPO		
CONSERVATIVE PARTY	CP		
DEMOCRATIC PARTY	DP		
DIKWANKWETLA PARTY	QWAQWA		
INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY	IFP		
NATIONAL PARTY	NP		
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY	NPP		
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS	PAC		



This is a sample and not an official ballot paper.