Southern Africa REPORT

November 1995
Vol. 11 No. 1

Contents

Editorial:
Freeman, Cockburn & Co. ......................... 1

Canada and South Africa:
Less of the Same ................................. 3

The U.S. Front:
Newt-ering the Solidarity Movement .............. 8

Canadian Solidarity:
After Anti-Apartheid ............................ 10

Timeless Bombs:
The Mines of Mozambique ......................... 14
The Southern Africa Minefield .................... 19

Decentralization in South Africa:
How Democratic? .................................. 23

South Africa: Elite Sport is Winning ............... 27

More on Mozambique Now:
1. Not the Whole Story .......................... 30
2. Holes in the Story ............................. 32

SAR Collective
Margie Adam, Carolyn Bassett,
Christine Beckermann, Lois Browne, Marlea Clarke,
David Cooke, David Galbraith, Dave Hartman, Richard Pathak,
Joel Rosenbloom, John S. Saul, Lauren Swenarchuk,
Herb Vise, Joe Vise, Mary Vise

Cover design by Art Work
Cover photo by David Hartman

Subscriptions
Annual TCLSAC membership and Southern Africa Report subscription rates are as follows:

SUBSCRIPTION:
Individual (1 year) ............... $18.00
Institution ...................... $40.00

MEMBERSHIP: (includes subscription)
Regular ......................... $35.00
Unemployed ......................
Student ........................ $18.00
Senior ..........................
Sustainer ....................... over $100.00
Overseas add $10.00

Southern Africa REPORT
is produced 4 times a year by a volunteer collective of TCLSAC, the Toronto Committee for Links between Southern Africa & Canada
603-1/2 Parliament St.
Toronto, M4X 1P9
Tel. (416) 967-5562
Email tclsac@web.apc.org

Submissions, suggestions and help in production are welcome and invited.
ISSN 0820-5582
SAR is a member of the Canadian Magazine Publishers Association.
All rights reversed.
Freeman, Cockburn & Co.

A magazine like SAR stands or falls on the quality of its writers — and we must also rely on such writers' loyalty and shared commitment, rather than authors' fees, to keep the texts flowing. What could be more fitting, then, than to start our eleventh year of publication with an overview on the past ten years of Canadian policy-making towards southern Africa by Linda Freeman. For Freeman, as regular readers will know, has been our most reliable author, and perhaps our most widely read and cited one, over the first decade of SAR's existence. Each year she has provided us with an assessment — knowledgeable and well-documented, clear and acerbic — of official Canada's undertakings in the region.

Now, in this her tenth installment, she presents a magisterial overview of official Canada's record over the past decade, an historical survey that effectively debunks many of the myths that have begun to cluster around that record. But she also concludes on a soberingly contemporary note, underscoring the extent to which the orthodoxies of neo-conservative economics, so prevalent in other policy spheres, also give officialdom license for the most selfish possible reading of Canada's on-going interest in South Africa. Competitiveness, trade and investment, IMF rules: so Ottawa's litany goes, with any direct concern for the fate of the dispossessed in South Africa (or elsewhere, for that matter) increasingly downplayed.

Other key articles in the present issue speak further to the implications of this kind of finding. Please note, however, that Freeman's own work — of which SAR readers (and editors) have been the most immediate and grateful beneficiaries over the years — will soon take on the
additional weight and substance of an about-to-be published book (by the University of Toronto Press) entitled *Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years*. 

This is the good news: readers will want to keep their eyes open for this volume, a stocking stuffer if ever there was one (although such is the scope of Freeman’s undertaking that quite a big stocking will probably be required). The bad news? Freeman’s threat that her tenth annual contribution to these pages may well be her last — for she is poised to move on to other work (albeit work that remains southern Africa-focused). Do we hear a sigh of relief from Ottawa’s foreign-policy mandarins? Not so fast: don’t tell Freeman, but we plan to coax her out of retirement from time to time, precisely to continue her heretofore successful efforts to keep those mandarins a little more inclined to be!

Meanwhile, the tasks of southern Africa-related political work do continue in Canada, as Sue Sutton finds in her survey in this issue of what’s left of the erstwhile anti-apartheid movement in Canada. It’s true that the loss of the political focus that apartheid’s evil system provided has reduced the salience of South Africa in Canada, and the issues of equitable development and democratic empowerment that remain are less easy to get a head on for many Canadians. Moreover, as Jim Cason (another author familiar, over the years, to SAR readers) observes of the support movement in the United States, there are difficult dilemmas inherent in Africa-related political work in the present global context.

Cason notes, in particular, the irony of being forced to struggle for a better deal for Africa (in terms of aid, trade concessions, the availability of IMF/World Bank funds) within a global economic system that, left untransformed, offers little real long-term prospect for African development anyway. We hope to sustain and further deepen reflection on such vexing questions in forthcoming issues of SAR. Let us, for the moment, take comfort from the fact that there are support groups and NGOs in North America (Sutton’s article comes with a preliminary listing of such organizations in Canada) that continue both to critique their own government’s policies and to reach out to their counterparts — trade unions, women’s groups, community organizations, rural cooperatives, and the like — in southern Africa.

* * *

It seems safe to say that, in sustaining such efforts, there is no substitute for information about what is actually happening on the ground, in the region itself. So we’re pleased to enter our second decade by offering a range of articles, beyond our lead pieces, that provide novel and well-grounded insights on pressing issues that confront southern Africans. Moreover — speaking of authors! — we’re particularly honoured in this issue to have, alongside veteran Linda Freeman, a notable first-time SAR contributor: Canada’s leading singer-songwriter, Bruce Cockburn.

Cockburn writes with characteristic eloquence and at first hand (after a recent trip to Mozambique) about one of southern Africa’s most haunting problems, the ubiquitous presence of land-mines in the rural areas. As both Cockburn and, in a related article, Alex Vines testify, these are bombs — not time bombs so much as *timeless* bombs — that have been strewn recklessly across the path of development in countries like Angola and Mozambique, a deadly legacy of the region’s long agony of war. And they are primed, quite literally, to go off: again ... and again.

Other articles probe the current state of play in various spheres of South African policy-making — specifically, sports policy and local government (as analyzed by Douglas Booth and by David McDonald, respectively) — that are also proving to be mine-fields, albeit of a more figurative and immediately political kind. And there is even some good news, in the form of a response by Ken Wilson to an article in a previous issue on post-electoral Mozambique. In striking contrast to the tone and substance of that earlier article, Wilson suggests that there is much that should inspire us in some of the current developments in Mozambique. Could it be that the struggle really does continue, both in southern Africa and in North America? As we enter our second decade of publication we can only make one promise on that front: our writers will keep you posted.
Canada and South Africa: Less of the Same

BY LINDA FREEMAN
Linda Freeman is SAR's Ottawa correspondent; she has just completed a book on Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years.

As South Africa's government of national unity grapples with reconstruction, attention in Canada and the world has necessarily moved on from the long struggle to end apartheid. Relations have moved to a more "normal" footing since the days of diplomatic deep freeze and sanctions. Although plans for a visit by Mandela to Canada in October were cancelled for domestic reasons, he is expected in the winter of 1996, his first visit here as head of state of the new South Africa.

The prospect gives us a moment to reflect on the Canadian government's part in bringing apartheid to an end and to assess its involvement in the transition. Legend has it that Canadian Prime Ministers from Diefenbaker to Mulroney played a leading role in combatting apartheid. This common wisdom is shared by Canadians and South Africans alike, giving birth to "excellent relations" and fairly easy access for Canadian officials to South African Cabinet Ministers in the post-apartheid denouement.

Canada's mixed record
Yet, as the nine previous articles in Southern Africa Report have demonstrated, this memory is highly selective. The record was always more mixed and the contribution more nuanced than the official view would have us believe.

Although Diefenbaker did not side with the other white dominions in supporting apartheid South Africa's membership in the Commonwealth, he was a reluctant convert to the opposition, regretting to the end that some compromise, even a few token seats for non-whites in parliament, could not save the day. Ten years later, he strongly
supported the resumption of British arms sales to South Africa on Cold War grounds.

In retrospect, the Trudeau government also offered surprisingly little for black South Africans. As we have seen, this was the era where Western governments monotonously expressed their abhorrence of apartheid, while refusing to put significant economic or diplomatic pressure on the South African regime. This "having your cake and eating it too" policy became known as a policy of 'balance', giving something in theory to questions of social justice and human rights and a lot in practice to the Canadian corporate sector. A 1970 Canadian government White Paper on foreign policy formalized the contradiction, and it hardened into a formula for successive Liberal governments. We were, after all, living in a material world; South Africa was a Cold War ally; and other Western governments played ball with Pretoria.

Generally, Trudeau ignored the issue of apartheid, responding with impatience to those who urged a stronger policy. On the one occasion where South Africa fully occupied his attention, at the Commonwealth conference in Singapore in 1971, he slipped into the role of "helpful fixer." While agreement on a declaration of human rights helped prevent a mass exodus over British arms sales to South Africa, it was a weak compromise in a bleak era.

**Trudeau record undistinguished**

Trudeau's approach to South Africa was redolent with paradox: on the one hand, his interest in apartheid began early and lasted into his retirement. His liberal internationalist image encouraged African leaders to expect a great deal from him. Yet, with the exception of a few token reforms to halt the promotion of trade (but not trade itself) in 1977, the establishment of a toothless Code of Conduct for Canadian corporations based in South Africa and support for sporting sanctions and for the arms embargo, his government's record was undistinguished, considerably weaker than that of the Nordic countries. The operations of Canadian banks, investors and traders increased throughout this period with the full knowledge and approval of the Canadian state.

Moreover, it was on Trudeau's watch that a Canadian company, Space Research Corporation, sold South Africa the G5 gun, the most advanced artillery system in the world and the basis of South Africa's arms export industry. This rupture of arms sanctions strengthened apartheid at home and in South Africa's genocidal wars of destabilization in the region.

By contrast, Mulroney and his government did significantly better, adopting concrete economic sanctions in 1986 and maintaining them largely intact until Mandela requested their removal in September 1993. The sanctions were neither comprehensive nor mandatory and new initiatives were rare after 1986. However, they marked a clear abandonment of the previous approach and also of the Tories' general commitment towards free trade.

What made this policy even more remarkable was that it was adopted in the teeth of strong and growing opposition from Mulroney's own party, caucus, Cabinet and civil service, aided by the South African embassy in Ottawa. The private sector in Canada, especially the export community, disliked the restrictions from the start.

Sanctions also brought Mulroney into open confrontation with his staunchest allies: he challenged Thatcher personally and directly on a number of occasions within the Commonwealth and took Reagan to task bilaterally and within the G7. Thus, there is no question that Mulroney displayed a gut commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle which was both refreshing and new.

Partly the times were different. When Mulroney came to power in 1984, the conditions for change required a new response. The Vaal uprising signalled to the West that the apartheid regime was vulnerable, and Western banks and investment capital began their exodus. Generally, the international climate of opinion had begun to harden against white minority rule and Western governments began to adopt sanctions.

Yet, although Mulroney will be remembered for the strength of his government's policy on South Africa, its tenure was very brief - a matter of about two years - before it ground to a halt. Once the South African state and military had quelled the campaign to make South Africa ungovernable, banks, Western governments and the Canadian state went into neutral, refusing to sustain the momentum of the mid-1980s and adding little to their sanctions programme. Breaches of voluntary financial sanctions and the continuance of substantial two-way trade - not only exports (primarily of sulphur) but also imports (of dissolving wood pulp and ingredients for specialty steel) - began to call Canada's role into question and to diminish the importance of its expanded aid programmes.

**Mulroney's claims extravagant**

With Mulroney's attention diverted in the late 1980s to domestic issues (the question of free trade and the attempt to forge a new constitutional dispensation), he returned to Southern African matters primarily during Commonwealth meetings. To the end, he could bask in the praise of African leaders who generally chose not to notice how limited the policy had become. As the years went on, his claims for Canadian policy became more extravagant; the reality increasingly tawdry. The contradictions represented in the fading policy opened the possibility of major embarrassment.
The situation was saved at this juncture by the dramatic changes in South Africa which ushered in an end to apartheid. Following Mandela's release and the reforms introduced by de Klerk in 1990, the weight of opinion within the Canadian state and private sector changed to dispensing with sanctions, the sooner the better.

Yet, despite this consensus, the government stayed the course, and Canada was one of the last countries to lift sanctions. The difficulty lay in the prominent role which the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs had assumed as Chair of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. Although Canadian diplomats had proposed this Committee as a means to defuse the drive for additional sanctions, they could not break ranks later without a tremendous loss of face. Therefore, despite considerable impatience, the Tory government did the honourable thing; the state did not end sanctions until requested to do so in 1993.

Pro-sanctions forces within the state, aided by an uncritical and somewhat amnesiac press, have largely ignored the shortcomings in Mulroney's policy and have built a legend around its successes. In doing so, they have fallen prey to a self-congratulatory tradition in Canadian foreign policy – the vanity factor. They reiterate, against all the evidence, that "Canada led the way," that "Canada made a difference" and that Canadian policy on South Africa was "just right."

Yet a closer reading will show that, while the policy of the Mulroney period had its moments of distinction, it also had its weaknesses, compromises and ambiguities. The striking and somewhat sobering fact remains that the latter will drift into oblivion while the former will be remembered, complete with an invented past for the period stretching back through the dry gulch of the Trudeau years to the Diefenbaker era. Striking and sobering because similar patterns are recurring in a new and even harsher era.

Liberals recycle trade cliches

This time around, the Liberals are, if anything, even more hard-nosed (and certainly more up front) about the interest of trade and commercialization uberre alles, and particularly over questions of democracy and human rights, than when they defended Canadian business interests in apartheid South Africa. It is a good thing that apartheid ended before the Tories lost patience and the Liberals came back to power.

Consider, for example, the way Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet now recycles the same tired cliches about countries such as China, Myanmar and Indonesia, that were formerly used by Liberals on South Africa. Irrespective of whether a country is a dictatorship or what its record is on human rights, Ouellet told a Vancouver audience in May 1995, the best way to promote democratic development is through trade promotion. "Isolation is not conducive to helping the populations of repressive regimes ... (but) foreign trade, which creates progress in the economy, is the best way of spreading ... (democracy) to the population." Thus, as the Liberal government's statement on foreign policy (Canada in the World) made clear, the brutality of an assortment of regimes will be no impediment to the promotion of economic relations with Canada. Constructive engagement has been given a second spring, with all its hypocrisies and selfishness.

But at least in South Africa, the end of apartheid and the transition to a government of national unity have put the linkage between economic relations, democracy and human rights to the side for the time being. The central themes of the new relationship have become trade and investment, assistance and quiet diplomatic support. South Africa's readmittance to the Commonwealth in May 1994 has provided a central focus for co-operation, particularly on efforts to ease the crisis in Nigeria. On larger international issues like nuclear non-proliferation, Canadian diplomats have become trusted colleagues, encouraging South Africans from the new government to speak out. The Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa has visited South Africa several times, the most recently following a tour of the region in September.

At the same time, Canadian assistance has increased (by 44% in the 1990s), though it has settled at a fairly modest level with annual disbursements of about $20 million. Since May 1994, South Africa has become eligible for bilateral assistance but the $5 million special fund to support NGO programmes in South Africa was axed in the February 1995 budget cuts along with development education work.

For the next three years, CIDA's programme in South Africa will be focused on technical assistance for constitutional development, for civil servants at all levels of government, for administrators in the education sector, for the black private sector and for NGOs and civics. Of particular interest is the programme which twins provinces in Canada and South Africa, providing orientation and advice to South African provincial leaders visiting Canadian provincial governments – Jacob Zuma of Natal in Ontario, Manne Dipico, Premier of the Northern Cape, in New Brunswick and Terror (Patrick) Lekota, Premier of the Orange Free State in Saskatchewan.

Without question, however, the central interest continues to be support for the Canadian private sector with Minister for International Trade Roy MacLaren declaring his "personal conviction" in its vital importance in developing relations.
Trade with South Africa jumps

The initial response in the trade sector has been extremely positive. Two-way trade (at over $545 million) in 1994 was almost double the annual average of the sanctions years, and the prediction of the chairman of the South African/Canadian Chamber of Commerce is that it will double again in the 1990s. Exports increased by 44%, and although almost half consist of primary commodities – forest products, metals and minerals and agriculture – there is some diversification into non-traditional markets for telecommunications equipment, information technologies and instrumentation. However, the big surge came in imports – up by almost 120% in 1994 as Canadian companies stocked up on strategic minerals. This trend has continued in 1995 with two-way trade for the first six months surpassing annual totals during the sanctions era.

However, investment is an entirely different matter. Canadian interest has been modest, mostly from small- and medium-sized companies with annual sales of about $50 million: Newbridge Microsystems is developing computer networks and Cott Corporation makes colas and soft drinks from concentrates imported from Canada. Diversey Corporation, a subsidiary of Molson, bought a South African chemical company, primarily as a base for operations in the region.

Earlier in the 1990s, Dundee Bancorp purchased a 25% interest in a small gold mining company in South Africa and Lardel Holdings co-operated with Thebe Investment Corp. to develop a regional airline. Quebec Iron and Titanium, one of the die-hard Canadian corporations that stayed on through the apartheid era, has stirred up a national protest of greens in its intention to strip mine ecologically fragile sand dunes on the northern Coast of Natal.

Canadian consultants have won a number of important contracts, notably SNC-Lavalin in the Alusaf project to build the largest aluminum smelter in the world and SR Telecom to provide microwave communications systems for South Africa's national telephone company. Other Canadian companies provide technical support to the mining sector.
However, the general reaction of foreign capital, including Canadian capital, is cautious, holding a watching brief; money is not flooding into the new South Africa. Reservations continue about the heavy monopoly factor, the relative backwardness of technology, and the problems of adopting a highly protected economy and uncompetitive industry to the global marketplace. The South African economy is only just emerging from a profound recession and negative or low growth rates. Canadian investors do not like the power of South African trade unions. On the political side, uncertainty has accompanied Mangosuthu Buthelezi's erratic campaign to stay aloft politically and the continuing high level of violence.

Generally, the South African government is caught between its belief in the paramount importance of strong economic growth and its commitment to redress the inequalities of the apartheid era. Lacking immediate infusions of private capital from domestic or foreign sources, it has turned to international financial institutions and bilateral donors.

Yet, such sources of support quickly identified their preference for neo-classical solutions to South Africa's economic and social problems, discouraging even mildly social democratic reforms. Almost immediately the South African administration faced a Faustian bargain: accepting policies at odds with its goal of redistribution or being starved of desperately needed capital. The drift to the right in discourse and policy in South Africa suggests that, in the short term at any rate, the administration has been forced to choose World Bank/IMF policy advice.

Canadian assistance carries conditions

Thus the relationship between South Africa and the West, including Canada, has entered a new and complex phase. In the last decade, both Conservative and Liberal governments have insisted on conditionality, requiring recipients of Canadian assistance to limit public sector involvement in their economies and to focus instead on increasing their competitive ability in the global market place.

Despite the distortions of the apartheid legacy, the attitude towards South Africa is no different. In 1991, the head of the Southern Africa Task Force stated publicly that the government supported early IMF planning missions in South Africa, so that the new government would “get things right” from the start. The Canadian state has entered fully in the drive to open South Africa to global forces and to promote the interests of the private sector. One former Canadian High Commissioner to South Africa spoke glowingly about the prospects “across the board” for Canadian exports opened up by trade liberalization. The consensus accepting the “rightness” of neo-classical policies has become the mantra of the 1990s.

Once again, as in the early years of the battle over apartheid, the concerns of the dispossessed in South Africa will be promoted in Canada primarily by old allies in civil society, remote from the corridors of power – churches, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and academies. For many in these circles, market driven solutions are unlikely to produce sustainable growth in the medium and long term and will certainly not address the needs of the poor.

The standard insistence on trade liberalization, for example, may mean that highly protected inefficient industries of the South African past may disappear, but along with them will go significant industrial capacity and an important segment of the labour force. Should South Africa's rate of unemployment increase significantly from current estimates of about 50%, the prospects for political upheaval are intensified. In this view, mass expectations will remain unfulfilled and loyalties put to a severe test. If experience elsewhere is any guide, the approach is a recipe for political instability.

As Carleton University Professor Manfred Bienefeld suggested to a parliamentary sub-committee in Canada: “Competition is like medicine. It is very good for you in the right doses at the right time; it will kill you if you take too much of it.”

Given the constellation of forces in the Chrétien government, the drift to the right and recent experience of restructuring in Canada itself, however, such views will have little purchase. Many NGOs in Canada, like their partners in South Africa, have been marginalized and cut back in the era of fiscal restraint. In the current conjuncture of neo-conservative fundamentalism, it will be even more difficult to advance the interests of South Africa's dispossessed than it was to encourage serious action against apartheid in the past.

The recolonization through structural adjustment programmes elsewhere in Africa are a fait accompli. Although it is early days, the inability of South Africa's current government to work out alternative visions or to begin to deliver the goods to its constituency bodes ill for the near future. At the least, it suggests that the contradictions in its approach will come into focus sooner rather than later.

So rather than slip into self-serving rhetoric about the current role of Canadians in South Africa - through aid, diplomacy or "mutually beneficial" trade and investment - let us remember the lesson of the apartheid era. When the going gets even tougher in South Africa, as it is likely to do, let us at least have the integrity to recognize that, in our government's largely uncritical insistence on neo-classical solutions, we play a role in South Africa's difficulties.
The U.S. Front: Newt-ering the Solidarity Movement

BY JIM CASON


The conservative assault on U.S. foreign aid to Africa has provoked some difficult debates in this country as Africa groups and their supporters struggle to fight for aid while at the same time demanding radical changes in the composition, structure and goals of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A few activists are simply arguing good riddance, but given the pleas from Africa for continuing Western assistance, most U.S.-based Africa support groups joined the push for protecting aid to Africa.

The question in Washington this year is not whether U.S. aid to Africa will be cut, but by how much - in October Congress was still debating cuts of from 16 per cent to 34 per cent. "I have a hard time justifying expenditures in most of the African countries," said the Republican chairman of the subcommittee in charge of foreign aid in the Senate, Kentucky's Mitch McConnell. "I know they have enormous problems, but I have a hard time finding an American national interest."

Other conservative critics like Senator Jesse Helms argue that $10 billion in aid to Africa over the last thirty years has done little to solve Africa's problems, or prevent conflicts like Somalia, Rwanda or Liberia. (He doesn't, however, take the next step and point out that the aid in some of these cases may have actually exacerbated the conflicts.)

In the context of these arguments, many Africa groups in the U.S. have been wary of criticizing foreign assistance for fear of seeding the movement for cuts. Within the government the rightward tilt has all but eliminated whatever room existed to press for a more development focused aid program. Gone is even the rhetoric of sustainable development. This year the focus of aid policy discussions has been much more practical (and some would argue more true to actual policy). Justifications for aid are based on short-term economic interests and the argument for some improvement of third world conditions now to preempt the need for more dramatic human intervention later.

"Aid to Africa is not welfare. It is an investment in other people for one's own self interest," argued USAID administrator Brian Atwood earlier this year. "Africa is today what the Latin American and Asian markets were a generation ago. It is the last great developing market. Latin America is the fastest growing market for US goods, a new middle class market of 350 million people .... In 1993, sub-Saharan African imports $63 billion worth of goods from the rest of the world. America's share of this market is 10 per cent, but it has been growing. African imports have risen by around seven per cent a year for the past decade. At this rate, the African market would amount to $480 billion by the year 2025. These figures represent millions of jobs. They reflect precisely what happens when the markets of developing countries grow."

This argument that aid to Africa opens up markets for U.S. investment and goods is also used to justify continuing contributions to the IMF and the World Bank. In fact U.S. officials note that the U.S. contributions to the World Bank and the IMF are small compared to the markets that those international financial institutions open up for U.S. products or even the purchases that these organizations make from the U.S.

Despite these arguments Republicans in Congress have cut the U.S. contribution to the World Bank's soft loan affiliate, the International Development Association, to $775 million, a figure nearly 40 per cent smaller than the contribution last year.

So why not welcome the Republican budget cutters and elect the leader of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich honorary chair of the "50 Years is Enough" campaign against the World Bank? Well in part because of appeals from Africa. Nearly half of the money IDA lends out each year goes to Africa and when African ambassadors in Washington got wind of the cuts they began a furious lobbying campaign, writing and visiting with members of Congress and pressing their allies in major Africa organizations to do the same. A group of African NGOs also issued a statement earlier this year declaring that although the IDA needs to be reformed, they wanted the money to continue flowing.

In fact, most of the major African organizations in this country argue for more but better aid to Africa and almost all of them have been pushing for more money to the World Bank's IDA. These groups have spent the last year mobilizing grassroots
groups to lobby Congress not to cut aid. Several organizations, most prominently the Christian group Bread for the World and the organization Development GAP, have developed sharp critiques of these programs that are part of their campaigns, but a lot of the lobbying is simply Don’t cut aid to Africa!

By now, of course, the failings of U.S. aid in Africa are well documented. But the public face of lobbying on this issue is often reduced to arguing that while aid isn’t perfect, it is necessary and, by the way, can you please call your congressional representative today? This is a reality I discovered first hand on several occasions this spring.

Speaking at a public forum on foreign aid this June in Pennsylvania, all three of us on the podium urged the audience to write Washington and press for more aid to Africa. The evening began with a short video that raised some of the critical problems with foreign aid. I then made several specific criticisms of the way foreign aid is misused before launching into a plea for citizens to call Congress to press for more foreign aid, something that ten years ago would have got me thrown out of the Southern Africa Magazine collective. The other two people on the panel did not mention any criticisms of the program.

Once several students from Africa responded to the panel by raising questions about aid in relationship to debt, I reverted back to a more critical (and more comfortable) stance and a fight ensued between the critics and several recently returned peace corp volunteers. But the truth is that in short public interventions on this issue, trying to persuade an audience to make one quick call to lobby Washington not to cut aid to Africa, there isn’t much room for detailed critical analysis.

It’s not that people in the U.S. are unaware of the critique. It is just that in the face of the Republican assault on aid overall the debate about foreign aid has been reduced to either cutting all development aid to the Third World (because of course, “strategic” aid to allies such as Israel and Egypt is not being cut) or making sure the aid advances specific short-term political and economic interests.

And this lobbying paid off to an extent. Analysts here had expected even deeper cuts in the Africa aid budget and it is even possible that, despite threats from the Republicans, the main vehicle for U.S. funding in Africa, the Development Fund for Africa, will be maintained. But what exactly are we saving?

More often than not U.S. development aid to Africa is part of the problem, not part of the solution. It is undeniably the fact that U.S. humanitarian assistance has kept tens of thousands from starving, supported electoral monitoring programs and helped provide shelter and medical aid to refugees. Yet as Joe Hanlon and others have documented, the U.S. programs have also often led to more dependence and debt than development.

The easy answer, and perhaps the correct one, is simply to say good riddance and not worry about foreign aid. Western aid flows to Africa are declining anyway and for progressives perhaps it is best to begin looking at other types of relationships. Yet, in truth, foreign aid is still a major mechanism for advancing the U.S. neo-liberal agenda in Africa. The $600 million U.S. assistance program to South Africa, in fact, proves this point.

The U.S. assistance agenda is designed primarily to support the voices in South Africa advocating a free market agenda. Close to half of the money is devoted exclusively to promoting “market-based models” and much of the rest is devoted indirectly to this purpose. And USAID is not shy about proclaiming this purpose. In reviewing U.S. grant-making in the period up to September 1994, the Agency congratulated itself on keeping the ANC on the correct path: “A USAID-funded international economics conference and supported research are credited to have led the GNU (Government of National Unity) leadership to endorse pragmatic economic policies and a fiscally conservative approach to the RDP, contrary to the prior expectations that an ANC-dominated government would opt for more statist solutions and fiscally unsustainable social programs.”

The report probably overstates the influence of the U.S., but its bluntness nicely illustrates the dangers inherent in too uncritical an advocacy of foreign aid. And at the same time it demonstrates the importance of beginning to develop in the U.S. a capability to influence, or at least publicly critique, the program.

Oxfam America, Development GAP, Bread for the World and others have begun to articulate alternative aid policies that generally emphasize sustainable development, consultation and equity issues. The Africa Policy Information Center and The Africa Fund are both developing more detailed critiques of the U.S. aid program in South Africa. The question will be how to begin to bring some of this discussion out of Washington and into places where local constituencies can hear them.

Bread for the World has had some success in organizing local programs around the country that include critical comments from African leaders. Another hopeful sign is a city council resolution being offered by The Africa Fund. This resolution, which has been passed in Seattle, Washington and several other places, notes that aid to the poor is being cut in Africa and in the United States and calls for more assistance in both places. It’s not a particularly sophisticated analysis but it is a beginning, and perhaps an important beginning to a new style of campaigning that looks at the consequences of development policies in Africa and the U.S.
Canadian Solidarity: 
After Anti-Apartheid

BY SUE SUTTON

Sue Sutton, prepared this report for SAR on behalf of the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (ICCAF).

The height of the anti-apartheid movement in Canada saw passionate public engagement, focused on a highly identifiable and straightforward evil. The institutionalized racism of the South African regime was an easy rallying cry for fundraisers, donors, and solidarity groups.

But as many Canadians who laboured in the struggle against apartheid quickly point out, its abolition is the tip of the iceberg. Black South Africans may be able to vote now, but the vast majority still live under the conditions that obtained prior to the elections. What has happened to all that activist energy since the collapse of apartheid and the elections last spring?

In Canada, some organizations have moved on to address the new challenges in South Africa, while others have folded. Some have undergone considerable changes, either devoting less energy to South Africa or broadening their focus to include all of southern Africa. Most are engaged, alone or in partnership with other Canadian groups, in the critical issues of gender, housing, agriculture, and the rebuilding of civil society.

Broadly speaking, agencies which came into being with apartheid as their sole focus have either disappeared or turned their attention to the parallel issue of racism within Canada. The anti-apartheid groups which proliferated on Canadian campuses, with a heavy focus on disinvestment and benefitting from the considerable energy of youth, are gone. A number of Canadian universities are linking with South African universities and conducting student exchanges, but there are few, if any, campus groups still absorbed with South Africa.

The same holds true for many of the provincial committees and coalitions against racism and apartheid, which are either addressing issues closer to home, such as the Aryan Nations in Alberta, or have disbanded altogether.

Ongoing efforts in Canada have not been helped by the changes in Canadian government policy. Virtually all groups which are still engaged have been damaged by cuts in Canadian government funding—some of them severely—and hard choices are being made. The recent slashing of CIDA’s Public Participation Program and drastic cuts to other development education programmes have hurt or killed at least ninety development education and advocacy groups. The vast majority of such organizations outside the Montreal-Ottawa-Toronto axis have been eliminated, denying communities across the country real access to information.

The Canadian government’s focus has clearly changed, from indirect support for South African NGOs through Canadian groups, to direct government to government support. The South Africa Educational Trust Fund, the Defense and Aid Fund, Canada-South Africa Cooperation, and the South Africa Special Fund are all gone. While there’s a certain logic to this, given that the new South African government is largely composed of former NGO partners, Canadian organizations are concerned that this severe cut in funding to South African NGOs will harm efforts to rebuild the NGO sector there.

The government is also encouraging increased involvement through private enterprise, such as former Minister of Foreign Affairs Joe Clark’s efforts to encourage private investment. It appears to be a hands-off approach. For example, the government has refused to promote the Business Code of Ethics proposed by the South African Council of Churches (SACC). According to Bill Davis, Coordinator of the Task Force on Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR), Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Andre Ouellet said in a letter that Canada saw no role for itself in helping to set standards for ethical investment in South Africa.

South African groups are seeing funding from other sources dry up as well. The European community has all but abandoned many of its former partners. The funding for the Committee for South-South Relations has dropped from 800,000 rand to less than 300,000, and the Committee will probably fold. The South African Council of Churches (SACC) has been decimated by cuts from international partners, and has been further affected by structural changes which will see the national body divided and decentralized.

Of course, there is money available for South Africa—from the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed, Dennis Howlett of 10 Days for World Development worries that South Africa is in danger of taking on too many
loans from the IFI’s. The World Bank is offering massive loans directed at land, agriculture and housing, but these loans are highly conditional. There is concern that the IMF and the World Bank are skewering the government’s Reconstruction and Development Plan, and that the results will benefit middle income groups, but not the majority of the country’s poor. The World Bank, for example, is discouraging communal farming, while the IMF says the government needs to “dampen” wage increases, which Howlett likens to economic apartheid.

Canadians have lost much of their partner base in South Africa itself. Most of the individuals who were most heavily engaged in the anti-apartheid movement are among the best qualified to help run the country, having learned valuable leadership skills over their years underground. Not surprisingly, they have been quickly snapped up by both government and private enterprise.

While this is of tremendous benefit to the fledgling government, it has also meant the loss of skills for the churches and NGOs which are so important as a counterfoil to government power. While some Canadians who have been involved for many years in South Africa are reluctant to state it on the record, access to power and money, after people have spent years underground, can be seductive. Some are bound to succumb. There is therefore a serious interest in supporting those in South African unions, NGOs and other advocacy groups who are strongly for true democracy there.

There is therefore a serious interest in maintaining a true democracy that is manifest in unions, NGOs, and other advocacy groups. New elections loom, and with them voter registration and the need to educate and inform newly empowered South Africans. While South Africa probably has the strongest civil society in sub-Saharan Africa, there is still much work to be done in the areas of democracy, elections, and the restructuring of civil society in light of the recent changes.

But even if apartheid is gone, basic human rights remain a very real concern. The Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (ICCAF), which for many years was a locus for much of the churches’ anti-apartheid work, has shifted its focus from liberation politics to human rights. As part of a more general interest in developments across the continent in the human rights sphere, ICCAF monitors the human rights record of the new South African government, especially its activities in the area of socio-economic development. Briefs are submitted annually to the Canadian government, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and the Organization for Africa Unity.

In addition to the monumental task of rebuilding an effective civil society within South Africa, there are immediate practical concerns around housing and land reform, women’s issues, and the arms industry which are engaging Canadians.

Housing for the close to eight million black South Africans living in townships is of critical importance. The ANC pledge to create one million new housing units by the turn of the century has been set back somewhat by the death of Housing Minister Joe Slovo, and to date only a fraction of that number has been built. Some Canadian groups, particularly unions and cooperatives, are assisting with this urgent problem.

Others, such as OXFAM, are devoting considerable energy to gender issues, particularly in the areas of income equity, violence against women, family health, and rural and agricultural development.

The massive arms industry is also of concern, as is the related rise in crime due in part to the availability of weapons from the various regional wars. Within the arms industry itself there is a large faction amongst middle-management and workers advocating conversion to non-military goods production, for example, fibreglass and carbon technology to make bridge trusses, water pipes, and different kinds of vehicles; these ideas are being blocked by senior management.

These are complex issues – far more complex than the monumental but straightforward task of eliminating official apartheid. The loss of media attention, which has moved on to other hot spots, has not helped.

Apart from occasional progress reports, South Africa is suffering from the same lack of attention as any other African country: if it’s not going up in flames, it’s not a story. Ongoing issues of development, the building of a civil society, social justice: these are complex issues that don’t easily translate into sound bites, and they are not subjects in which the mainstream media excel. Given the loss of development education groups, the news media is where the vast majority of the public gets its information. Thus ICCAF, for example, is beginning to address this particular problem with its media monitoring project, which
hopes to pinpoint deficiencies and also provide the media with a broader base of sources and accurate information.

On a positive note, if the work of Canadians concerned about South Africa has been harmed by funding cuts, media abandonment, and the attendant increased difficulty in engaging the energies of the general public, for those who remain involved in the issue, their passion appears undiminished.

List of Canadian Organizations

While attempts were made to contact as many organizations as possible, some proved difficult to track down. The following is a preliminary list. We would welcome hearing from any groups we've missed.

ALBERTA YOUTH ANIMATION PROJECT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA (AYAPSA): continues the work it began 1989, including presentations and workshops with youth, the “Cry Freedom” newsletter, hosting speakers and visitors from South Africa, skills training for youth involved in solidarity work, and development of linkages with partners, including youth tours to Southern Africa. Contact: Lynn Caldwell, (403)277-8718

ALTERNATIVES: formed about a year ago in Montreal, and includes the Centre for Information and Documentation for Mozambique & South Africa (CIDMAA). CIDMAA was chiefly a resource centre for community organisations, trade unions & churches concerned with South Africa; they continue to support development projects in South Africa and the region, funding projects by local organisations involved in civics, community radio & newspapers. Contacts: Stephane Corriveau, Pierre Beaudet, (514)822-6000

ANGELICAN CHURCH: continues to work with partners on issues of tolerance, reconciliation, racism, gender, and reconstruction and development. Contact: Charlotte Maxwell, (416)924-9192

ARUSHA: continues to operate as a learner centre and develop anti-racist education programs; co-operating with CUSO and OXFAM. Contact: Rosemary Browne, (403)270-3200

ASSOCIATION OF CANADIAN COMMUNITY COLLEGES: working with Community Outreach Through Institutional Linkages (COTIL) on outreach and adult education programs; also with PRO-TEC, helping youth in disadvantaged areas; both programs focus on upgrading skills in science and technology. Contact: (613)746-2222

BRITISH COLUMBIA TEACHER'S FEDERATION: working with the South African Democratic Teacher's Union (SADTU), organizing & developing a membership and financial base, and funding training programs. Contact: Larry Kuehn, (604)871-2283

CALGARY COMMITTEE AGAINST RACISM: has disbanded South African subgroup; most participants have gone on to other areas, particularly native issues & local opposition to the Aryan nations. Contact: Don Dale, (403)888-3249

november 1995 Southern Africa REPORT
solidarity

CANADIAN COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION: has a three-year project providing technical assistance and credit union specialists to the Savings and Credit Co-op League of South Africa; helping develop credit unions across the country, particularly in the townships, and helping to develop links between the co-op and agricultural sectors. Contact: Rick Weger, (613)238-6711

CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS: has been working with COSATU and NACTU & SA service organisations, and continues to support educational projects, as well as OXFAM's summer and winter schools, as well as exchange programs. Contact: Paul Purrit, (613)521-3400

COOPERATION CANADA MOZAMBIQUE (CCAMO), a coalition of 20 Canadian NGOs, church groups, labour unions' humanity funds and solidarity groups, has been working collectively since 1988 to support community groups and popular organizations in Nampula, Mozambique. CCAMO has provided technical assistance and training to local groups that provide adult education, support to family sector farming, small income generating activities and credit facilities for women. With the arrival of peace, CCAMO-supported groups are beginning to move into previously contested areas where the landmine problems are more acute. Currently, CCAMO is exploring ways to support programmes to develop de-mining expertise in Nampula province. Contact: Michael O'Connor, (613)562-3830

CONFEDERATION DES SYNDICATS NATIONAUX (CSN): from the mid-80s until last year was involved with COSATU and member unions in educational activities, summer schools, health & safety, and organising. To date, partners in South Africa have not renewed their demands, and CSN is therefore uncertain of any future involvement. Contact: Peter Bakvis, (514)598-2273

CUSO: working chiefly on land, housing and literacy projects with South African NGOs and various Canadian partners. Contact: John Van Mossel, (613)829-7445

DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE: working with the National Land Committee; with the National Language Program, which is looking at reference based on language and linguistics programs; and with a network of advice centres in Orange Free State, concerned with ensuring that citizens know their rights and how to get access to the services to which they are entitled. Contact: Trevor Cook, (514)257-8711

INTER-CHURCH COALITION ON AFRICA (ICCAF): Southern African Working Group (which included a major focus on South Africa) has been replaced with the Human Rights Working Group. South Africa remains one of the groups eight countries of focus, with special attention paid to civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights; gender and land issues are also monitored. ICCA's initiative to South Africa Update, which provides news and analysis of human rights-related issues and responses to those issues by church partners in South Africa. Contact: Gary Kenny, (416)927-1124

INTER-PARES: has worked with partner organisations around SADCC issues; continues to be active in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia, and Tanzania but has little to do with South Africa. Contact: Lise Latroumille, (613)568-8191

THE MICAH INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN ALBERTA: continues to work on third world educational issues, with a focus on Africa. Was almost entirely funded through the PPP; is looking at new ways to continue its work with limited funding, including the KENYA CONNECTION, a fair trade group launched by Joy Duncan in Calgary to bring African crafts to Alberta, which is looking at expanding into southern Africa. A portion of the profits are being used to fund cooperative efforts such as market gardens and the digging of wells. Contact: Caroline Brown, (403)262-5111

OXFAM: Gender and Development Programme currently supports over a dozen women's organisations, addressing violence against women and income equity, mobilising rural women to take economic and political control of their lives. Funds for staffing office costs, communications systems, research and networking are provided for women's groups. Funding is also being provided for information sharing, exchanges, and internships between women's groups in South Africa, other Southern African countries, and Canada; projects for 1994-95 are bringing Canadian and South African groups fighting violence against women in both countries. OX­FAM is also working on development and training for urban community-based organisations, and issues around civil society, democracy and elections. Contacts: Lola Fabowale, Jim McKinnon, (613)237-5236

PREBYSHERIAN CHURCH: has a staff member in Johannesburg working on land re-allocation; also working with partners in Lesotho on visitor exchanges and assistance with nursery schools, and in association with the Presbyterian World Service and the Sharpeville Women's Association on their community centre, focusing on job retraining and skills such as sewing and trading. Contact: Rick Pee, (416)441-1111

ROOFTOPS: international development arm of the Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada, with strong assistance from CUSO; is helping South African partners like the Housing Department of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and UMZAMO in the conversion of single-sex hostels to family accommodation for migrant labourers in mining areas. Also working with Planact, a planning and urban policy group, and the National Housing Forum, to establish sustainable housing policies and deal with housing, financing, state subsidies, and land allocations. Contact: Barry Pinsky, (416)366-1445

TASK FORCE ON CHURCHES AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (TCCR), addressing the corporate agenda in other areas and now has little to do with SA. Supported the SACC proposal for a "Code of Business Ethics," largely ignored by the Canadian government, out of concern that South Africa would be under intense pressure to set lower standards and cut corners. Contact: Bill Davis, (416)923-1758

TEN DAYS FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT: has no active campaign related to South Africa; continues to focus on economic justice, mobilizing the churches to advocacy, popular education approaches, and policy issues; maintains e-mail contact with organisations in South Africa. Contact: Dennis Howlett, (416)222-8391

TORONTO COMMITTEE FOR LINKS BETWEEN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND CANADA (TCLSAC) is entering its 11th year publishing Southern Africa Report magazine and continues its work in the South-South-North Network. An index of the first ten years of SAR will be available shortly. TCLSAC is a founding member of Counterpoint: the Resource Centre for Global Analysis through which the library of the Southern Africa Resource Centre is maintained. Contact: (416)967-5562

UNITED CHURCH: continues to support its partners, particularly the SACC and related sub-groups, in justice work, issues relating to women and youth, Reconstruction & Rehabilitation, environmental groups, academic and trade unions, publications, and the training of new leadership to replace those lost to government and private enterprise. Contact: Omega Bula, (416)231-5931

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA (Humanities Fund): working on health & safety issues, pension funds, and workplace reorganisation, and with the English Literacy Project and its publication, Active Voice, which deals with human rights, democracy, civil society, and voter education. Also working with the International Labour Resources and Information Group (ILRIG) on regional integration themes, as well as the Center for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE), providing training around race & gender issues, and developing a curriculum for trade unions and community groups. CACE has links with George Brown College, COADY Institute, and Ontario District of Steelworkers. Contact: Judith Marshall, (416)487-1571

YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION (YWCA): maintains relationships with regional YWCA; looking for funding for anti-violence activities. Contact: (416)593-9866
Timeless Bombs

There's a wealth of amputation waiting in the ground
But no one can remember where they put them down

Bruce Cockburn, "The Mines of Mozambique"

Canadian singer/songwriter Bruce Cockburn and Mozambican singer Chude Mondlane recently toured Canada under the sponsorship of a broad coalition of Canadian NGOs (led by COCAM and Mozambique's Instituto Eduardo Mondlane). The object: to speak about the invisible threat to the dynamics of peace process in Mozambique that landmines - a particularly grisly legacy of three decades of war in that country - represent.

Cockburn previously toured Mozambique in 1988, at the height of South African-backed war of destabilization there. Chude Mondlane's father, Eduardo Mondlane, was the first leader of the Mozambican liberation movement, FRELIMO, and was assassinated by the Portuguese colonialists in 1969. Together, Cockburn and Mondlane spent two weeks learning about the devastating human impact of landmines. They visited hospitals, landmine removal sites, rural communities affected by landmines and groups working with survivors.

whose weapons were these,
who buried my future

Chude Mondlane, "A Song for Mozambique"

In their meetings both spoke (and sang) eloquently of the horrors they had witnessed. Thus Mondlane brought the tragedy home by recounting the story of a little girl, much the same age as her own daughter, who was blown up by a landmine in an area not identified as a mine field. All that remained of the child was her red dress. Not just the death but the fact that there was no opportunity to bury the dead had clearly shaken Mondlane. Will Mozambicans be able to "return to the Blues and Greens and the Joy that was ours as Mozambicans?" she asked.

Cockburn also spoke movingly of his experience in Mozambique, even singing a song that he had just composed in response to what he had observed there. We are grateful to Bruce for his permission to publish both an edited version of the text of the speech he gave, as well as the lyrics of the song he has written. For Mozambicans, Cockburn emphasized, demining is possible, albeit extremely difficult and formidably expensive. But his basic message was simpler: the only long-term solution to the landmines problem is a total ban on their use.

Ban landmines. This is the goal of a coalition of Canadian NGOs, grouped together as Mines Action Canada (170 Bond St., Ottawa, ON K1R 7W1); this group calls on the Canadian government to push internationally for such a ban and to stop producing the Canadian landmine, the "Elsie." Advocacy of a world-wide ban is also the principal message of a recent report from Human Rights Watch that Alex Vines - who himself works in the UK with that organization - brings to the attention of SAR readers in a second article published here. Vines' article has the added virtue of locating the problem of landmines within its wider southern African regional context (not least by referring to Angola where the landmine problem is even graver than in Mozambique). He thus provides a valuable pendant to Bruce Cockburn's account.

The Mines of Mozambique

BY BRUCE COCKBURN

The road from Quelimane to Nampula winds prettily between lines of mango and cashew trees planted by the old colonial masters to draw people to where their activities could be monitored. It takes a long time to do the drive. The road rolls and heaves like a rough sea. A lot of rainy seasons have come and gone without anyone working on its repair. During the long years of war much of the countryside was emptied of people. Those who remained in RENAMO-controlled zones were put to work, not maintaining the road, but cutting shallow trenches in rows across the paved portions in order to slow vehicular traffic to where it would be vulnerable to ambush. Even though, since the peace accord was signed in October '92, scrap metal dealers have been busy, you can still see the twisted remains of convoyed trucks here and there along the roadside.

The war

While scavengers sort out the physical detritus of war, Mozambicans in general are trying to sort out its psychic debris.

What was the true course of the war? There was virtually no communication between people caught on opposing sides - and it's only now that one can grasp the real shape of recent history.

When I was in Mozambique in 1988, there was no evidence that RENAMO had a political platform or anything like legitimacy. They were simply "the Bandits." And they had acquired a reputation for atrociously brutal tactics with respect to forced recruitment and the treatment of prisoners. So it
came as quite a surprise to me, and I think to others, when they emerged from the elections with something like 40% of the vote. There was plenty of evidence in 1988 to support the former characterization of RENAMO, evidence which still abounds. I talked with the nurse in charge of a rural health post at Luala, in Zambezia province, who was blind in one eye because RENAMO soldiers had driven a pin into it.

Nevertheless, that picture didn’t tell the whole story. In its attempt to replace colonial structures with a Marxist social order, FRELIMO had gone out of its way to humiliate and render powerless the traditional village leaders who had previously been supported by the Portuguese as a means of controlling the population. This, among other things, alienated large numbers of people. RENAMO turned this alienation to its own advantage by presenting itself as the friend of the traditional leaders. It seems, too, that peasant communities, when threatened by the war itself, had to choose between fleeing toward RENAMO or toward FRELIMO bases, and their choice then led to a similar choice at election time. There was an understandable feeling of exhaustion with war and the sense that if RENAMO didn’t do well, the fighting would continue. Angola is currently providing an example of that scenario.

What next?

So where are we now? After 500 years of colonialism and 25 years of war, we have democracy in a country which for the most part does not value or even recognize any community larger than the village. Even at that level you don’t see the acknowledgement of interdependence among people that you find in some other places. To what extent this is a mentality spawned by the war is not clear, but there’s no doubt that the “Sauve qui peut” concept is what prevails.

We have a government with virtually no funds – which has, in the years leading up to the peace and those since, been compelled to restructure the country’s economy at the behest of the World Bank and friends, opening the way for unfettered capitalism. We can now witness the spectacle of drastically underpaid teachers finding it necessary to charge students for the release of their marks; of thousands of demobilized soldiers without work or other support falling back on banditry to survive, who sometimes rent their weaponry from underpaid police who themselves frequently resort to mugging passers-by to augment their wages. (About this I can speak with great authority, having been held up by two cops outside my hotel in Maputo).
All this in contrast to a feeding frenzy on the part of international business and its local agents. There are oil companies, mining companies, logging companies, Japanese trawlers, entrepreneurs of all sorts, many of them Portuguese and South African. The irony is inescapable. Even the HIV virus, kept at bay by Mozambique's relative isolation during the war, is appearing as a colonizer.

Economic restructuring, to be fair, created an incentive to produce, and this has led to an improved situation for some people. It has also, though, provided massive incentives for corruption. There are consumer goods in the country, but the minimum wage is about $17 per month—not enough to buy a 50 lb. bag of flour. The cost of importing such goods is whatever you can negotiate with the nearest crooked customs official. Social spending is gone—sound familiar? Yes, but the effects in a place like Mozambique are beyond our worst nightmares. The central hospital in Nampula City used to be decent, if poorly supplied. Now it's a cesspool of misery. The mentally ill wander the hallways stinking of urine and raving. The walls are filthy. People who can, bring their own brightly pat-

terned cloth rather than put themselves in contact with the hospital bedding. The gurney used to transport patients who can't walk is an old blood-stained stretcher rigged with wheels. Fecal-smelling wards are crammed with people, most of whom seem to be in for treatment of infections acquired while undergoing operations at this very institution.

If you need an IV, you have to pay. If you need blood, you have to buy it. If you need medicine, your family has to comb the pharmacies in town because all the drugs have been sold off long since by the hospital staff. The closest thing to a bright spot in the whole scene is a cop who's there because he shot himself in the foot while chasing a "suspect." He complains because his superiors haven't come to visit.

The government can't raise salaries for fear of losing the support of the World Bank. So you have people producing in a modest way, but no money to buy anything and no means of carrying produce to market.

A country destroyed

The field against which this is happening is one of near total destruction of transportation, schools and stores in the wake of war, drought, and, in the north, a disastrous hurricane last year.

The war killed all the cattle, drove away or killed the wildlife, destroyed nearly all the trucks, wrecked rail lines, left all but the major cities in ruins—left rural access roads and fields polluted with landmines. With respect to this latter, Mozambique is typical of many Third World countries which...
have been the scene of wars, especially civil wars, in recent years. Over the past two decades the presence of anti-personnel mines in such places has come to constitute a major epidemic. The UN estimates that there are around two million mines in Mozambique. Although people involved in the process of removing them feel that number is a little high, there are plenty to go around. There are plenty of dead and maimed Mozambicans—10,000 dead from mines during the war, and at least 500 in the last two years. These numbers don't include the injured, or the deaths occurring in remote areas that largely go unreported. The injured are generally disabled, becoming a burden to their families and to what health care resources do exist. They are likely to swell further the numbers of urban beggars, contributing to the instability of society; they can look forward to a very poor quality of life. Victims of mine accidents are most likely to be civilians, rural people who depend on a degree of physical fitness for their survival.

The one-armed, badly scarred and blinded kid whose sister leads him around to beg from the foreigners at the riverfront cafe in Quelimane is representative: he hit a mine with his mattock while working his family's machamba, or garden plot—well after hostilities had ended. When you talk to the technician in charge of the prosthetics workshop supported by the French NGO Handicap International, he tells you that probably 60% of his customers are mine victims. The workshop is part of an orthopaedic clinic where patients come for consultation and fitting of artificial limbs, as well as physiotherapy aimed at helping them adjust to their prostheses. In one room they are navigating between parallel bars, getting used to walking without their Canadianas. Their what? Canadianas. These are the short metal crutches that are braced against the forearm. Nobody knows why they're called that, but we get a laugh from the bystanders when we explain that where we come from, women are Canadianas.

Landmines

Landmines come in many shapes and sizes, but they can be loosely divided into "anti-tank" and "anti-personnel." Anti-personnel mines can be further differentiated as "blast" and "fragmentation." Blast mines, as the name implies, work by simply blowing off parts of the body. Fragmentation mines work like a big grenade, sending shrapnel over a wide radius. There are various methods of triggering explosions, the most common being foot pressure, or a trip wire.

Anti-tank mines are designed to blow the track off of 60-ton armoured vehicles and generally require a substantial weight to set them off. The front wheel of a jeep will do it—or a road construction vehicle—and there won't be much left afterward. Fortunately, anti-tank mines are present only in small numbers in Mozambique. The real obstacle to development is the anti-
personnel mines, and the perception of them. It's worth pointing out here that unlike other weapons, mines are activated by the victim. Nobody is aiming them. Classically, mines are used by soldiers to deny access to an area — e.g. to create a defensive perimeter around a base or town, or to prevent ambushes by laying them along the shoulders of a road. This application is one seen commonly in Mozambique.

During the war of independence, the Portuguese laid mines in this way. In the late 70's, the Rhodesian forces mined the border areas of Mozambique to deter guerilla incursions. FRELIMO laid strings of mines around towns, hydro lines, military bases and key industrial sites. Private companies mined their own operations as well. The Canada Dry mineral water bottling plant at Namaacha near the border with Swaziland, is surrounded by four different rings of anti-personnel mines. For all that, RENAMO still was able to capture and destroy the plant.

Classically, too, records are kept of the location and number of mines, and the minefields are marked with signs and/or strands of wire. In practice, very little documentation survives. Wire and sign posts are removed by people in need of building materials and years later nobody remembers where the mines are.

When you're the guerrillas, you don't have large installations to defend, so your use of mines is different. And you don't keep records at all. RENAMO proved itself very effective at using its South African-supplied ones as a terror weapon. Put a couple on the trail where you might expect the enemy to walk, but maybe lay some near the local health post or in the schoolyard, or maybe don't lay any, but say you did. RENAMO used a lot of forced labour. In one case, a primary school teacher was put to work for several days carrying boxes of mines from one of their camps to an area where they were to be laid. He told his acquaintances what he was doing, and the word spread that the area was now unsafe. After the war, it turned out that he was only carrying crates of rocks — that it was all a trick. It served the purpose though — area denial — and I wonder if anyone's farming that land even now? When you've seen what these things do, you're not inclined to take chances.

Problem is, when you're a subsistence farmer, you have to farm or starve. So what do you do? You learn to live with the threat. You start to mythologize it. If your child decides to play with a fragmentation mine and is suddenly reduced to a few bloody scraps of clothing, it's because somebody's offended the ancestors. It's not because someone in Russia or Italy or China or the US manufactured a lethal device and sold it for five bucks so your low budget armies could put it in your field. It isn't obvious to you that the manufacturers' government will give its taxpayers' money to the UN, so that the UN can hire that same manufacturers' expertise to remove the thing for a thousand dollars.

A total ban?

A lot of effort is going into mine awareness training in Mozambique. It was hard for me to judge whether or not it's working. A good deal of effort and expense is going into de-mining operations, not all of them of the kind just referred to. The UN has a major program in place in the south of the country, training former soldiers from both sides in the location and destruction of mines.

A couple of NGO's are also working in other regions. Halo Trust, a British group and the first NGO to have de-mining as its express purpose, is at work in Zambezia province, one of the worst infested areas. Norwegian People's Aid has a similar program in Tete province using trained dogs to sniff out mines where the soil is too high in iron for metal detectors to be effective.

There is a reasonable hope that the problem of mines in Mozambique can be solved — because of the relatively small numbers and because in many cases they can be worked around. Even though the things can remain deadly for as much as 50 years, given the money and the will to keep on clearing, and to build alternative roads to those that are most heavily mined, we can eventually expect to ease the situation to the point where life can be something like normal.

This may be true of Mozambique, where the war is over and no new mines are being laid. It's not so true elsewhere. A year ago Mozambique was averaging two mine accidents weekly. At the same time, Angola was suffering 25 per day. In Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and a host of other places, there is no short-term solution.

There is, however, a long-term one. Only one. Anti-personnel mines must be placed in the same special category under international law as chemical weapons. They have to be banned.

Mozambique is facing a frightening array of difficulties. Who will rein in the police? Where will transportation come from? Can the country remain sovereign in the face of so much international economic involvement? How do you move a nation from a nearly pre-industrial state into the age of the microchip without being buried by the avalanche of change?

In some respects, this is a country that is still at the tourniquet stage of recovery. It must be kept from bleeding to death long enough for it to get on its feet. It's hard to know where to start to address the situation. One point might be this: I asked an activist for the disabled, himself crippled by a mine, what message he would like carried to the outside world. His response — tell them to stop blowing us up!
The Southern Africa Minefield

BY ALEX VINES

Alex Vines works with Human Rights Watch in London.

For over 30 years landmines have claimed civilian victims in southern Africa. In 1961, in northern Angola, a landmine took its first life. By 1995 all countries in southern Africa have had landmine incidents, with the exception of Lesotho, and every country in the region maintains stock-piles of such weapons.

Indeed, a new report by Human Rights Watch, entitled "Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa"\(^1\), estimates that southern Africa has some twenty million mines in its soil and that these mines have claimed over 250,000 victims since 1961. Angola is the most affected country in the region, with well over eight million mines in its soil (only Afghanistan is more heavily mined). Angola also has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it has many thousands of amputees, possibly 70,000, the great majority of them injured by landmines. Yet despite international clearance efforts in Angola, landmines have continued to be planted by both UNITA and government forces. But the problem is well known throughout the region. Moreover, by 1995, landmines were also being used in criminal acts in Mozambique, and were available in Namibia and Zambia for exchange of food or second-hand clothing; they can be bought individually on the black-market in South Africa, for example, for as little as an old pair of shoes!

The trade

The Human Rights Watch report documents the way in which anti-personnel landmines came to feature prominently in the colonial and post-colonial wars that have plagued much of southern Africa for the last three decades. During this period many millions of landmines have been imported into southern Africa (62 different types from some 17 countries) while others have been manufactured there (in South Africa, Zimbabwe and, possibly, Namibia).

Thus, South Africa's mines have been found in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe and have been exported further

---

\(^1\) Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa, to be published this month by Human Rights Watch/Arms Project. For further information contact: Steve Goose, Program Director, Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1522 K St., N.W., #910, Washington DC 20005-1202 USA, Tel: (202) 371-6592, Fax: (202) 371-0124, E-mail: hrwatchdc@igc.apc.org; or Alex Vines, Human Rights Watch, 33 Islington High St., London N1 9LH UK, Tel: (171) 713 1995, Fax: (171) 713 1800, E-mail: hrwatchuk@gn.apc.org
afield: to Cambodia, Rwanda and possibly Somalia. Zimbabwe's mines have been used in Namibia and Mozambique. But the trail can often be complex: stocks of landmines captured by the South African military in its invasions of southern Angola in the 1970s and 1980s were also used to supply insurgent forces in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, for example. In covert aid the U.S. supplied U.S.-manufactured landmines to UNITA rebels up to 1991 while the Malawian military received U.S. manufactured mines as part of a military co-operation agreement. More recently, in 1993-1994, UNITA rebels in Angola have purchased weapons, including landmines, on the open market, in contravention of U.N. sanctions. Or take the stocks of French landmines cleared in Algeria after independence. Some of them were merely sold to the Mozambican government in the 1970s. Yet now, in Mozambique, government and Renamo clearance of mines of varied provenance has again not resulted consistently in their destruction: they have been preserved for re-use or sale!

The mines themselves
Unlike many other weapons, landmines are blind weapons that cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of an old woman gathering firewood. Casualty rates due to landmines show that they recognize no cease-fire and, long after the cease-fire has stopped, they can maim or kill the children and grandchildren of the soldiers who laid them.

Two characteristics distinguish landmines from other weapons and cause them to be particularly insidious. First, they are delayed-action weapons. They are meant not for immediate effect, but rather are primed, concealed, and lie dormant until triggered. In theory, mines can be directed at legitimate targets. However, because of the time lag between when mines are laid and when they explode, mines frequently and indiscriminately strike civilians instead.

The life of landmines is long. A middle-age man who planted a landmine in northern Angola in 1965 recently returned thirty years later. The mine was still operational and could have killed or maimed at any time over the last thirty years. In many cases, those responsible for laying the mines have long since died, or moved, making locating them more difficult. The on-going threat created by live landmines can prevent civilians from living in their homes and using their fields, and can seriously threaten the ability of an entire country to re-build long after the war has ended.

A second distinguishing feature of landmine use is the particularly egregious nature of mine injuries. The majority of landmine explosions that do not cause death result in traumatic medical effects: "The result" writes the British Medical Journal, "for the individual is not one but, typically, a series of painful operations, often followed by a life at the margins of a society heavily dependent on manual labour."

Mine clearance
Mine clearance cannot effectively deal with the crisis; it is generally too little, too late. Moreover, when undertaken at all, most efforts are badly funded and poorly coordinated. Only some US$45 million has been invested in mine clear-
ance in southern Africa since May 1991, resulting in less than 400,000 mines being cleared, the majority of these from large defensive minefields in southern Angola.

Nor are such clearance efforts without controversy. In Mozambique, U.N. mine clearance efforts became victim to inter-agency competition for control over funds and consequent bureaucratic delays. They were also thrown into disrepute when a US$7.5 humanitarian contract for clearance of priority roads went to a consortium of British weapons manufacturer, Royal Ordnance, Lonrho de Moçambique and Mechem of South Africa, a part of Denel Ltd., the export wing of state arms manufacturer, Armscor. Both Royal Ordnance and Mechem are companies which have produced landmines, or their components in the past, some of which in all likelihood are to be found in Mozambique. Awarding mine manufacturers with clearance contracts, known as “double-dipping,” is opposed by Human Rights Watch. (Mechem in mid-1995 received a further multimillion dollar UN contract for clearance of priority roads in Angola.)

Moreover, even if de-mining were given top priority, it would not be a solution. Mines are being laid worldwide far faster than they are being removed. The U.N. estimates that there are 84-100 million mines still uncleared around the world. By the end of the century there could be between 100 and 130 million. Clearance rates are far slower. In 1994 U.N. programmes cleared an estimated 84,000 mines in total, about 34 times slower than the rate of laying them. Moreover while the average mine costs between US$10 and $20, the average direct and indirect costs of removal range from US$300 to $1,000 a mine – a ratio frightening in its implications for a region with roughly 20 million uncleared mines and new ones still being planted, especially in Angola. Even if new technology and economies of scale brought mine removal costs down by a factor of ten, the cost of mine clearance would still be so prohibitive that clearance alone could not readily abate the crisis.

**International protocols?**

The Landmines Protocol, an international treaty intended to diminish landmine use against civilians, has also proved utterly ineffective in stemming the crisis. This Protocol is part of the 1980 U.N. Inhumane Weapons Convention (and is currently under international review). 50 states have ratified it as it stands but even though southern Africa is one of the most mine-affected regions in the world only South Africa is in the region that has ratified it.

Moreover, although the original Landmines Protocol does contain provisions to curb certain kinds of use, it has many failings, not least the fact that, generally, its provisions do not apply to internal conflicts in which the vast majority of mines, as has been the case in southern Africa, are used. Moreover, it lacks any real enforcement mechanisms, an extremely serious problem given the fact that the Protocol’s limited rules are rarely followed: armies both regularly use mines deliberately against non-combatants and fail to take even minimal precautions to safeguard against collateral harm to civilians.

Take, for example, the case of Zimbabwe. That country inherited a lengthy border minefield, which the Rhodesians boasted was the second largest man-made barrier in the world, second only to the Great Wall of China. Over a million anti-personnel mines were laid in this minefield. Although the early minefields were constructed in conventional manner, demarcated on both sides by security fencing on which was prominently displayed warning signs, by 1977 the Rhodesians stopped demarcating the minefield on the hostile side and stopped maintaining them. As a result mine laying became uncontrolled and unrecorded and booby trapping flourished. This was in direct contravention of the Landmines Protocol. Yet these minefields remain lethal today, often claiming new victims. Clearance of the border minefields will be dangerous, costly and time consuming.

To those unfamiliar with the consequences, mines may not initially evoke the nightmarish visions of warfare conducted, for example, with chemical or biological weapons, traditionally thought of as weapons of mass destruction. However, in their inability to distinguish civilian and military targets, the numerous deaths and egregious injuries they cause, and their terrible potential for massive long-term devastation, landmines are not very different. Indeed, in some ways landmines are worse than chemical weapons, which at least rapidly dissipate.

**A total ban?**

Yet the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological and toxin weapons were banned by international treaty in 1972 as “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Now, mounting evidence of the destruction caused by anti-personnel landmines has led many groups to call for a similar total ban on anti-personnel landmines, such a ban – on the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of such mines – being preferable to the existing, and largely ineffective, restrictions contained in the Landmine Protocol.

The experience of recent decades in southern Africa has been that if combatants have access to landmines, they will use them in abundance, typically with complete disregard for the Protocol. Thus, since 1961, in every war in the region every group has used landmines indiscriminately. A complete ban would be easier to monitor and enforce than intricate regulations on use which will always engender debate as to whether a particular use is per-
missible or not. Indeed, given the magnitude of the crisis, the only way to affect use is to attach to landmines the same stigma attached to chemical and biological weapons. In short, the stigma must be attached not to particular, debatable uses of the weapon but to the weapon itself.

Still, it is not really possible to create universal revulsion against landmines without a simultaneous ban on production, stockpiling, and transfer. As noted, southern African experience has shown that if combatants have ready access to landmines, they will use them. Only a squeeze on supply can affect use. Not that a ban on production and export will drive all suppliers from the field. But if only a much smaller number of producers is left standing, it will be easier to treat them as international pariahs. Then mines might come to be seen not as the relatively cheap commodity they are today, but as a weapon for which a premium would have to be charged. Of course, we cannot know how far the number of producers and exporters would have to drop in order to cause an increase in the unit cost of landmines, or how much the cost of landmines would have to be raised in order to affect combatant behaviour and reduce landmine use. But the combination of a flat ban, international stigmatization of users and suppliers, and the possibility that censure or sanctions against producers does make the proposal for a complete prohibition more promising than simply proposing further modest, and likely unenforceable, restrictions on use.

**South African leadership**

Fortunately, the South African government has taken a leadership role in Africa on the landmines issue. In July 1994 the new majority led government upheld a moratorium on the export of landmines. The government subsequently acceded to the 1980 U.N. Weapons Convention in May 1995, which was ratified by parliament in August. Meanwhile, the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), the U.N. and a number of governments, including those of Belgium, Norway and Sweden, have already indicated their support for a total ban on landmines. The Human Rights Watch report now suggests that southern Africa states (Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa itself) should also follow this example (for other recommendations of the Human Rights Watch report, see box).

This is, in fact, what many of the citizens of these countries also seek. In Mozambique, a petition campaign in 1994 obtained, within a few months, over 100,000 signatures for a ban. But consider also the view of Afonso Lumbala, a 32 year old farmer from Caxito in Angola who has first-hand experience of landmines: he stepped on one in April 1995. “All soldiers lay these mines. They don’t care about us, the people. We suffer for them. They never warn us about mines, we find out by losing our limbs. We want them to clear the mine mess and leave us alone. The leaders and their soldiers are responsible for this. So are the people who make these evil weapons.”

---

**Key Recommendations of the Report**

Only South Africa has acceded to the convention and declared a commitment not to export or transfer landmines. Given that over the last thirty years in southern Africa anti-personnel landmines have been shown to present a serious and long-term threat to civilians far in excess of any short-term military advantage that may be gained, Human Rights Watch calls on the governments of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe to:

- support an international ban on landmines, and destroy stockpiles.
- push for Protocol II of the 1980 U.N. Weapons Convention to be amended to prohibit the use, development, production, stockpiling or transfer of anti-personnel mines. There should also be mechanisms for verification and penalties for abuse of the terms of the Protocol.
- South Africa, Zimbabwe and possibly Namibia have a domestic capacity to manufacture anti-personnel mines. Human Rights Watch urges these states to guarantee that no further production is taking place and permit regular independent monitoring of their production facilities.
- the Angolan government and opposition UNITA leadership stop their forces planting new mines and assist more enthusiastically national mine clearance initiatives.

Human Rights Watch calls on the U.N. to:

- not continue to reward mine-producing companies with humanitarian clearance contracts. Mechem, a producer of landmines and the subsidiary of South African state arms manufacturing company, Denel Ltd., should be encouraged to privatize and specialize only in mine clearance before it receives any additional contracts. Mechem should allow regular independent inspection of its facilities to verify that it does not continue to produce components for landmine or engage in research for a future production of anti-personnel mines.
- ensure that companies working for them do not subcontract to organizations or enterprises that might engage in production or active training in landmine warfare.
Decentralization in South Africa: How Democratic?

BY DAVID MCDONALD

David McDonald is finishing a doctoral thesis at the University of Toronto on local government and environmental politics in South Africa.

The battle for a new South Africa will be fought at the local level . . .
We are only at the beginning of this process of change.

Thabo Mbeki,
Deputy Vice-President,
Government of National Unity,
June 1995

Negotiations for new, non-racial local governments in South Africa may pale in comparison to the drama and excitement of events leading up to last year’s federal and provincial elections, but the results are no less important. It is at the local level that the injustices of apartheid have been most keenly felt, and local governments are expected to play a major role in addressing these inequalities.

But it also at the local level that resistance to change is strongest. Affluent South Africans are anxious to protect the material gains they made under apartheid and local government is seen as the last bastion of support for their suburban lifestyle.

In Cape Town, local government negotiations have brought about a distribution of powers that perpetuates a highly skewed and highly fragmented allocation of municipal resources. White Capetonians (and a certain percentage of middle class “coloureds”) will continue to live in luxury while the costs of urban upgrading are off-loaded onto the urban poor through privatization and “self-help” schemes.

The restructuring process in Cape Town has placed substantial

Self-help project in Orange Farm Squatter camp near Johannesburg
limits on the ability of local government to affect real change in a “new” South Africa.

The importance of local government

Guidelines for local government restructuring are laid out in the Local Government Transition Act of 1993, the essence of which is that racially divided cities and towns must be amalgamated into single, non-racial, democratically elected local governments.

Schedule Two of the Act makes local governments responsible for ensuring that all South Africans have access to basic services like water, electricity, transport, and health care. With at least 12 million people in the country without clean drinking water and over 21 million people without adequate sanitation (i.e., toilets and refuse removal), local governments will play a critical role in poverty alleviation. Local governments are also expected, along with community organizations, unions, and businesses, to identify and manage reconstruction and development priorities. Local RDP Forums will be set up in every town and city, and RDP funds will only go to those areas that have demonstrated a good working relationship between the community and local government officials.

Little wonder then that Jay Naidoo, until recently the ANC Minister in charge of the Reconstruction and Development Programme...

1 Local governments will not have to finance all of these projects on their own, but a rationalization of white and black municipalities and a reprioritization of local government spending is expected to represent a substantial amount of financial and human resources.
(RDP), has referred to local government as the "hands and feet of the RDP."

Decentralization

These decentralization efforts represent a long-standing commitment on the part of the ANC and its allies to democratize decision making in South Africa. The ANC argues that local government is the "level of representative democracy closest to the people" and the most accountable. Involving civil society in the decision-making process is expected to strengthen support for RDP-related projects and to help avoid costly mistakes.

But calls for decentralization by the democratic movement have also been tempered by the desire for a certain degree of centralization—especially in large cities like Johannesburg and Cape Town. It has long been argued that the amalgamation of racially defined townships and suburbs must be accompanied by mechanisms that allow for a more efficient and more equitable distribution of municipal resources, and a strong metropolitan government is deemed absolutely essential for this purpose.

Accordingly, the Local Government Transition Act grants Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs) the power to exact metropolitan-wide tax levies, to rationalize human and capital resources in the metropolitan area as a whole, and to ensure that bulk services like sewage plants and waste disposal are made available to everyone in the city. More local services (e.g. street cleaning, refuse collection, parking tickets) were made the responsibility of metropolitan substructures.

Local government negotiations in Cape Town

Before local government negotiations began in Cape Town, the metropolitan area was divided into a patchwork of 26 municipalities, 69 decision-making units, and no central metropolitan authority. None of these municipalities had jurisdiction over another and except for policing activities very little communication took place between different local bodies. Services such as urban planning, public transport, and the dumping of toxic wastes were conducted with no central coordination and with enormous inefficiencies.

Needless to say, the service disparities between African, coloured and white areas of the city are enormous—a situation that local government restructuring is intended to address. But rather than creating a strong metropolitan government able to rationalize services in Cape Town, the negotiation process has created a relatively weak metropolitan council and strong substructures.

The first blow to a strong metropolitan authority was the exclusion from the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) of a number of important satellite towns. The municipalities of Paarl, Stellenbosch, and Franschhoek—home to many of the intellectual and financial elites of Afrikanerdom—managed to bargain their way out of a metropolitan Cape Town and the associated responsibilities of upgrading the sprawling squatter camps and townships that fall within the CMC.

Representatives from these fringe municipalities argued that their towns were not sufficiently urbanized and not economically reliant on Cape Town proper, and their inclusion in the metropolitan area would bring about a loss of cultural and financial "autonomy." One business owner went so far as to say that the wine industry, which makes up a significant part of the fringe area's economy, "was self-contained and had greater links with France and Australia than Cape Town!"

Opponents of this position claimed that these satellite towns did fit the criteria for inclusion in a metropolitan area and that they are economically dependent on the CMC. Only a large metropolitan authority, it was argued, would be capable of financing urban upgrading in the townships and effectively managing urban growth. Loss of autonomy was not considered a problem because "effective democratic participation in government is dependent in the main on the system of representation and on the strength of civil society, not on the area of jurisdiction of an authority."

The Local Government Demarcation Board responsible for making the final decision on metropolitan boundaries decided to exclude these satellite towns, despite the Board's own admission that these "fringe municipalities apparently spent lavish sums of public money on consultants to prepare arguments against inclusion in the metropolitan area while virtually no assistance was given by these bodies to the respective non-statutory groups who differed from them." The Board also gave little consideration to the argument (put forward by a representative of the World Bank, among others) that splitting what was clearly a single metropolitan area into two would lead to capital flight from the city to the fringe, further weakening the ability of the CMC to address the enormous backlog of services.

The second major blow to a strong metropolitan authority came with the granting of metropolitan duties, and the right to "retain maximum control over local decision-making and implementation" of these duties, to the metropolitan substructures. This devolution of power will make it much easier for councillors from the wealthier parts of the city to resist a restructuring of municipal assets and service systems.

The Cape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum (CMNF) Agreement also stipulates that the responsibility of a given substructure to provide services to "disadvantaged areas" won't "impose inordinate increases
in any of its taxes and charges" to rate payers - yet again relieving affluent Capetonians from the burden of urban upgrading.

Metropolitan councils retain the de jure right to collect tax levies and administer bulk services for the city as a whole, but the wording of the CMNF Agreement will make it very difficult in practice for a metropolitan authority to tell substructures what to do. Furthermore, apartheid bureaucrats still control the technical and managerial systems required to run a complex network of service facilities and they are much more likely to listen to white politicians than to listen to representatives from the townships.

To make matters worse, the provincial government, which is controlled by the National Party in the Western Cape, has been manipulating both the composition and the rulings of important local government decision-making bodies. The provincial Minister of Local Government, Peter Marais, a long-time apartheid crony from the ex-House of Delegates, replaced members of the Provincial Committee on Local Government with National Party supporters in order to reverse a decision of the Demarcation Board.

Marais insisted that the (Afrikaner-dominated) northern suburbs in the Tygerburg substructure were unable to support urban upgrading in Cape Town so he unilaterally drew up substructure boundaries that attached all of the major African townships and squatter camps to the southern suburbs. Not surprisingly, residents in this (English-dominated) Central substructure were up in arms over these proposals with local papers predicting massive rates increases if the National Party plan went ahead.

The ANC and other non-statutory bodies were also upset with the plans because it weakened yet again the ability to transfer resources within the metropolitan area. The national government (with support from several national NP Members of Parliament) threatened to declare the provincial government’s moves “unconstitutional.”

Marais backed down on his original proposal but then submitted an equally objectionable plan to twin the Tygerburg substructure with the townships of iKapa and the Central substructure with the township of Khayelitsha - a proposition that the leader of the ANC for the Western Cape called “economic and geographical nonsense.” The controversy eventually had to go to Constitutional Court and has delayed local government elections in Cape Town until at least April of 1996 (a full year and a half behind the original election plans).

A number of commentators have suggested that the episode was political gerrymandering on the part of the National Party to limit the number of African voters on the election lists in Tygerburg; others have suggested it was old-fashioned racism. But the incident also reveals the stark economic interests at play in local government restructuring.

Whatever the motives behind the demarcation debates may be, the heavy decentralization of power in the Cape Metropolitan Area seriously erodes the ability of a metropolitan authority to distribute municipal wealth and assets more evenly and flies in the face of the spirit of the Local Government Transition Act.

Conclusion

This is not to say that all is bad in local government restructuring. Non-racial local government will be an immeasurable improvement on the local apartheid state and there are important political, economic, and social gains to be made. What is being emphasized here is the financial and managerial squeeze that has been placed on a metropolitan authority in Cape Town and the limitations this places on the ability of the CMC to perform its intended duties.

One result would appear to be the privatization of municipal services. A lack of state funds at the local level, coupled with a fiscally conservative macroeconomic policy at the federal level, means that private sector financing will be the only funding option available for the enormous service expansion that is required.

In a June 1995 Report to Parliament, Jay Naidoo announced that of the anticipated 60 billion Rand needed for urban infrastructure over the next ten years, only a fraction of this will come from the state. The “major source of funding” will be the private sector, either by “loans repaid through the tax base, or direct private sector investment in local government services.” Although it is too early to tell which services would be privatized, it is clear that privatization will be a major feature of urban renewal schemes in the country.

This is not the place for a lengthy discussion on the relative merits and demerits of privatization in South Africa. However, it can be said that privatizing services at a time when local government resources and powers are still so unevenly distributed threatens to reinforce the racially defined class character of the city and to balkanize even further a highly fragmented service delivery system. Black Capetonians will be forced to pay market-oriented prices for sub-standard services while whites in the suburbs continue to enjoy publicly financed facilities on par with the best in North America.

Affluent Capetonians will not be able to escape the costs of urban upgrading entirely, of course, but they will be able to resist efforts to alter their lifestyles in any significant way. As one ANC activist said recently “white South Africans feel that they have given up the country, and they are unwilling to give up [power in] their own backyard.”
South Africa: Elite Sport is Winning

BY DOUGLAS BOOTH
Douglas Booth teaches history in the School of Physical Education at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He returned earlier this year from a research trip to South Africa.

"The scenes were surely unmatched by anything we have seen in our history," wrote columnist Mondi Makhanya describing the aftermath of South Africa's victory at the 1995 Rugby World Cup: "[President] Nelson Mandela hugged [team captain] Francois Pienaar at Ellis Park [stadium], and black and white South Africans rejoiced together in city streets around the country." "While the emotion and joy that accompanied the inauguration of President Mandela ostensibly marked the end of white domination and the beginning of black rule," Makhanya added, "the past week's [rugby] celebrations are supposed to have represented the unified nation's triumph over a foreign foe. It was therefore an occasion for all to celebrate."

Indeed, there is much to celebrate in the new South Africa, including reforms in sport. But any analysis and evaluation of the sports situation must look beyond smiling throngs and a gleeful President in a Springbok jersey and cap. A useful starting point in this task is John Saul's distinction between structural reform and social reform.

Structural reform means community empowerment. In a sports context this involves the provision of sports facilities, the development of sporting skills and the enhancement of sporting opportunities among the disadvantaged. It also requires a critical political context which links sport to other social practices. Through this process the structural reform of sport extends into empowerment in areas such as health, education, employment, transport and community representation. By contrast, the social reform of sport means redressing isolated grievances. In South Africa this refers mostly to the deracialization of elite privileges in sport.

Sadly, one finds little evidence of structural reform in South African sport. While some former anti-apartheid activists use sport to empower local communities, the majority view it as a convenient route to self-enrichment or, at best, as a symbol of racial reconciliation. Few care about developing sport in disadvantaged communities.

The so-called unity talks sowed the seeds of the current problems in South African sport. The unity talks, which took place between 1990 and 1994, consisted of negotiations between officials of the nonracial movement and establishment sport. The objectives were to unite the two blocs and put in place sports development programs in the townships. Negotiations achieved neither.

South African sport was a battleground in the 1980s. The nonracial movement's boycott strate-
gies left the country's sportspeople isolated, with rebel tours the sole source of international competition. Rebel sport ground to a halt in 1990. The year before, a small group of non-racial sportspeople formed the National Sports Congress (NSC) which organized mass demonstrations against the rebel English cricket tour led by Mike Gatting. That tour collapsed after three weeks and the NSC used its victory to force establishment sport to enter negotiations.

Unity talks were prerequisites for South Africa's readmission to international sport. International federations, such as the International Olympic Committee, would only readmit sports governed by one national controlling association. The collapse of the Gatting tour appeared to hand the reins of sport to the NSC; this was not so. The NSC lacked the resources to negotiate with, or even monitor, every establishment sport. Of the more than 120 sports in South Africa, only some two dozen entered serious negotiations. And in every case tension and conflict racked those negotiations.

NSC and establishment officials arrived at the negotiating table with completely different agendas. The NSC wanted to deracialize and democratize sport; it wanted to create united non-racial administrative structures that would empower disadvantaged communities. Preservation of the status quo preoccupied establishment sport; it feared loss of authority and dilution of privileges. One rugby official reflected the suspicions and sentiments of the entire establishment when he said, "we will not be bullied into surrendering all we have built up through the years."

The NSC confronted numerous internal problems. Lack of resources forced it to recruit the incompetent and the opportunistic. Many NSC officials lacked the skills necessary for tough negotiation. Few had training in sports management or administration. Most lacked the energy, ruthlessness, and moral resolve to tackle equity and justice issues. For many recruits, the NSC was a fortuitous avenue to self-enrichment in an uncertain, rapidly changing environment.

Unity was mostly a sham. Typically it consisted of a black ceremonial head and a sprinkling of black personalities among a core of white administrators who refused to change their uniforms and banners. Not surprisingly, many of South Africa's new sports associations, supposedly united in tough negotiations, were exceedingly fragile. Rugby officials convened a Crisis Committee in October 1992 to prevent unity from collapsing. In March 1993, the NSC appointed a retired supreme court judge to investigate political turmoil in athletics. This was 13 months after athletics had supposedly united. In August 1993 the International Amateur Athletics Federation cited disunity as the reason for refusing Athletics South Africa full membership.

Interference from the African National Congress (ANC) and international sports federations compounded the NSC's problems. The ANC and international sport disenfranchised the NSC and pushed it into compromise. The ANC identified international sport as a way to reassure whites about their future lifestyles under a black government. Nelson Mandela played a decisive role in cricket's return to international competition. He telephoned Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley and asked the West Indies to support South Africa's application to rejoin the International Cricket Council.

With the repeal of apartheid legislation in mid-1991, international sports administrators claimed that the boycott had worked: sport had triumphed over racism. But they paid scant attention to the details of unity talks; many readmitted South African affiliates simply because they had deracialized their constitutions.

Tensions between the NSC and establishment sport erupted into open conflict in 1992. Several incidents, including the playing of Die Stem, the apartheid anthem, before a rugby test between New Zealand and South Africa, and concerns about the lack of development, forced NSC officials to concede the obvious. Founder member Arnold Stofle admitted that the NSC had lifted the boycott too soon. "We made the fundamental mistake of believing that whites are ready for change" he said. Muleki George, the president of the NSC declared, "we have been taken for a ride. Certain people were never interested in unity. They were more interested in international competition."

The NSC and the ANC considered reimposing the boycott. But they quickly learned that you cannot turn an international boycott on and off like a tap. Sponsors, local and international sports administrators, and foreign governments rejected a new boycott and the ANC backtracked. It realised that a boycott would drain resources and undermine its strategy of social reform through reconciliation.

Notwithstanding the failure of unity talks, a "consensus" between the non-racial sports movement and establishment sport began to emerge in 1993. South Africa's bid for the 2004 Olympic Games marks the turning point. The bid engendered a new understanding among anti-apartheid and establishment officials about the social benefits of sport.

Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg all investigated hosting an Olympic Games shortly after political negotiations began. By 1992 they were preparing bids for consideration by the newly united National Olympic Committee of South Africa (NOCSA). The process drew together interests within the NSC and establishment sport and together they spun a fabric of hegemonic consent around the benefits deriving from the Games.
As is their want, consultants employed by the respective cities produced favourable economic scenarios for the potential host cities. Transnational consultant Ove Arup calculated that the economic impact of an Olympic Games in Cape Town would be R44 billion and 70,000 jobs. Supporters touted the Games as a social panacea. Harry Naidu, an executive member of the NSC and chairman of the Durban bid committee, promoted the Olympics as a solution to high crime, to the lack of housing, to unemployment, and to diminishing living standards. But more important, the bidding process introduced a new generation of sports officials to a new, and very comfortable, lifestyle. NOCSA, for example, sent a 100 strong delegation to assess the three cities vying for its nomination for the 2004 bid. The delegation received red carpet treatment in each city. Durban chauffeured delegates in Rolls Royces, entertained them on harbour cruises, and wined and dined them at the luxurious Point Yacht Club. A single weekend presentation cost Durban’s sponsors R750,000. Let us put this figure in perspective. The annual pension for old aged Africans in 1992 was R2,750. Such pensions typically support the recipients, their children and their children’s children: R750,000, thrown away on one weekend, would have clothed and fed over 1,500 people for a year!

The 10 May 1994 ushered in a new political order in South Africa with the ANC inaugurated as the senior partner in the government of national unity. A black-led government changed the dynamics of relationships in sport in two important ways. First, some former establishment figures joined the NSC to secure jobs in the new order. Even committed apartheid ideologues now had to speak the language of non-racialism, development and reconciliation. While it is highly unlikely that they believe their own utterances, the crucial point is that public audiences no longer hear reactionary invective.

Second, the new political order killed off all left-opposition in sport. The non-racial South African Council on Sport (SACOS), formed in 1973 as the sports wing of the liberation movement, split in 1989 after heated debates over strategy. Activists in favour of negotiations with establishment sport and political alignment with the ANC quit SACOS and launched an alternative non-racial association—the NSC. SACOS initially entered negotiations with establishment sport and the NSC in 1990, but withdrew after international associations prematurely readmitted South Africa. SACOS underwent a revitalization in 1992. Former defectors, discontented and disillusioned with united sport, rejoined SACOS, forming new affiliates in cricket, rugby, squash, table tennis and tennis. Unfortunately, SACOS did not nurture the regeneration. Ordinary members either began to subscribe to the NSC as a revolutionary force that would structurally reform sport, or they acknowledged the reality of the new order. Significant numbers also abandoned sport completely, taking with them their critical faculties and administrative skills. Ultimately, however, the 1994 election was SACOS’s death knell. For most black sportspersons the election ushered in the democracy for which they had fought.

SACOS is now disbanding. Its leaders want remaining members to join united sport and influence the channelling of funds into true development in disadvantaged communities. But the potential to use sport to empower disadvantaged communities appears minimal. South Africa’s limited resource base means that the government faces difficult choices. Over five million South Africans live in shanty settlements; ten million live in dwellings without electricity; a phenomenal 40 per cent of working age South Africans are unemployed. One doubts whether playing sport is a high priority.

Given the sad history of South Africa, the deracialization of sport and its partial democratization are remarkable achievements. Yet one finds precious little evidence of structural reform. In particular, the critical political context has evaporated. In its place we have a new hegemony.

Two aspects of this hegemony require elaboration. First, crisis plagues South African sport. United sport is driven by competing agendas between elite performance and grassroots development, and by rivalry between the Department of Sport, the NSC, and NOCSA. For example, personal antipathies, ambitions, and a gravy train mentality kept Cape Town’s Olympic bid in turmoil for more than a year after the city received NOCSA’s nomination in early 1994. There is wide dissatisfaction about selection on merit, lily-white representative teams, and the slow pace of development. But, and this is the second point, united sport coheres as one when challenged. It has proved exceedingly adept at silencing alternative viewpoints. United sport swiftly trounces all criticism, whether from inside or out. Ngconde Balfour, a former SACOS official, a founding member of the NSC, and co-chairman of the Cape Town Olympic bid committee, laments that “people who question the new order are quickly isolated.” “Some of the things that are happening,” he says, “make you sick but there is nothing you can do. The top guys will shoot you down and take you to task if you challenge anyone or anything.”

Paradoxically, the real winner here is the traditional establishment—the very group that reaped the facilities and resources in the old order. Its only serious concession has been to share its privileges with a new, deracialized, elite. Of course, concessions are the essence of social reform which explains why so much of South Africa’s past remains firmly in place.
More on Mozambique Now:

1. Not the Whole Story

BY KEN WILSON

Ken Wilson is the Ford Foundation’s programme officer responsible for Mozambique, on leave from the Refugee Studies Programme in Oxford. He has been researching war, peace and development in rural Mozambique since 1989.

In your May 1995 issue you provide space to a “special correspondent” based in Maputo to argue that the new Frelimo government is failing post-election Mozambique. Your correspondent describes in a generally accurate way how and why Frelimo has successfully out-maneuvered Renamo so as to retain almost all political power despite the fact that Renamo won in five of the ten provinces. S/he then argues that this means in practice “a rerun of much of the same kind of arrogance of power that has tended to mark Frelimo in the past.” The article points to the government’s failures to resist a chaotic implementation of neoliberal economic policies promoted by the World Bank/IMF, to end continuing corruption, and to stem an upsurge of criminality in Maputo.

But this picture is not adequate. For a start it fails to acknowledge how limited is the space for Frelimo or any other Mozambican government to act quickly on such fronts. With the economy still 80% dependent on aid, and the country’s debt 4 or 5 times its GDP, and with the IMF, the World Bank and certain bilateral lenders generally as narrow-minded and demanding as ever, Mozambique simply has no choice on basic financial policies. It can only struggle around the edges for the present.

And in truth some serious effort is being made on this count, for example efforts by the new Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Dr. Oldimiro Baloi, to address the real needs of the new Mozambican private sector. Nor are corruption and the abuse of authority by petty officials things that can simply be stopped by decree or by some one-off campaign. They are deeply rooted in centuries of every-day practice. Even a decade of puritanical socialism made less of a mark on corruption than is usually acknowledged, and the subsequent decade of all-out war has been marked by unprecedented chaos even by Mozambican standards. Corruption can only be addressed when the state can pay salaries; when massive incremental reforms destroy the present byzantine regulatory bureaucracy; and when ordinary people believe they have rights and there really are institutions in place to support their struggles to realize them.

In relation to crime, it may indeed be the case that Minister of Interior Manuel Antonio has hardly kept his foot out of his mouth when dealing with the press, and that in a country where the police have never had a tradition of upholding law rather than order he and the government have no real idea as to how to make the police useful. But it is hardly surprising that there is an upsurge in crime in a city, pushing three million in population, where abject misery sits alongside (mostly foreign) opulence, where tens of thousands of demobilized people still have access to weapons, and where Johannesburg crime rings are but a stone’s throw away.

In short a government still only a few months old can hardly be held accountable for the legacies of history.

But the main reason I am responding to the article is because I believe it misses a number of exciting, positive initiatives that are unfolding in Mozambique, especially with regard to rural development. Your correspondent mentions the local elections only because they are becoming the focus of the next political struggle between Renamo and Frelimo. Yet what is really exciting about these elections is that they usher in the most sincere and radical experiment in decentralization yet attempted in Africa, one in which all power at the district level will be accountable to the local electorate. Gone will be the centrally appointed District Administrator – the single most durable feature of colonialism in Africa for rural communities – and each of the ministries will finally be brought to account for its policies and programmes, these to be drawn up by the municipal councils.

Furthermore, under decentralization, all land and natural resources will be allocated at district level. As a result, a massive reversal of the chaos which has seen an area equivalent to half of Mozambique allocated to private sector interests – mostly foreign – in just five years is on the cards. Of course the whole programme is fraught with challenges both political and economic, national and local, and may yet fail entirely – in no small part because certain donors are so committed to accelerating the process that local municipalities may be elected before they have the framework and capacity to undertake their functions.

Indeed, it does seem a shame that some key donor officials in Mozambique, people without accountability to a Mozambican electorate or more than a casual acquaintance with the realities of the rural areas and hence the logistic challenges involved, are in such a strong position to influence the process.
cess. Of course these officials believe that government attempts to stagger implementation reflect a fear of local Renamo victories, rather than a realistic assessment of the implementation difficulties, an argument bought in its entirety by your correspondent. Doubtless, political factors are now important for Frelimo, but the government formulated the policy of decentralization even prior to the 1992 peace agreement, when the visionary innovator Dr. Aguiar Mazula ran the Ministry of State Administration.

Thus it is only recently that the matter has become important to major donors and unfortunately mainly as another arena to continue what they consider the unfinished business of the transition — the need for some form of “power sharing” with Renamo. For many such donors, then, it is local elections and not effective decentralization that is at issue. For, as one donor representative recently intimated, local elections will legitimate the implementation of programmes by NGOs from his country through local administrations.

In addition to the policy of decentralization, and just as important, there has been a remarkable re-think of the rather high-handed “modernization” paradigm that underlay both colonial Portuguese and post-independence thinking on rural development. Appropriately enough, given that becoming “modern” in Mozambique has always been linked to concepts of “assimilation” (either to becoming Portuguese or to becoming the “new socialist man”), this debate has been led in part by the Minister of Culture, Dr. Matheus Katupha. And it has also been linked in subtle ways to debates about ethnicity and urban domination of the countryside, about the alienation inherent in various notions of “development,” and about the nature of the arts in Mozambique.

Consideration of such matters came to a head in the special 1993 Congress on Culture, one curiously ignored by western analysts but often said by Mozambicans to have been one of the most important events since independence. In tackling these issues Frelimo’s new intellectuals have been accused of pandering to Renamo, or of merely seeking to out-maneuver Renamo on the terrain of “tradition” and “regionalism.” But while there has, of course, been some political expediency involved, these issues have been under discussion (and under discussion, it might be added, by many of the same people who are engaged with them today) since the final years of Samora Machel’s presidency. For the fact is that Renamo had identified a fundamental flaw in Frelimo’s ideas about Mozambican political culture — the party’s lack of a sympathetic grounding in the complexities of rural existence — even though this was a flaw that Renamo alone was not equipped to address adequately.

Particularly important here is the fact that, beyond the formal political arena, this re-thinking of the approach to be adopted towards Mozambican rural dwellers is sweeping through the government departments responsible for rural development. Whether in fisheries or forestry, in wildlife or livestock husbandry, or in other agricultural pursuits, today’s Mozambican technocrat is throwing out the formal models of transforming “tribes of subsistence farmers into citizens” through top down technologies and social engineering, recognizing that, indeed, there never were “tribes” or “subsistence farmers” in any meaningful sense, and acknowledging that rural Mozambicans will not become true citizens unless they have the right to engage with development on their own terms, being served rather than dominated by state structures and non-governmental organizations.

Most government departments are therefore exploring in practice how to enter partnerships with rural people that recognize the latter’s existing knowledge and practices, as well as the potential present in their own institutions to achieve “development” if they are given half an opportunity. True, there is at times some naivety inherent in this new thinking — there always has been a tendency amongst the Mozambican elite to counter the modernization model with a certain rural romanticism — but, on balance, the speed and seriousness of this conceptual change is leading to positive developments on the ground in several areas of Mozambique, and cannot help but bode well, more generally, for the future.

Of course, much of this rural revolution is not so readily noticed in Maputo itself — which is the main reason why the government is hastening the pace of decentralization across this vast and little integrated country! The new government is also demonstrating a serious concern to face up squarely to other of the country’s huge problems, including those created by its having been force-marched into the embrace of neo-liberal economics without the institutions necessary to protect existing rights. A case in point is the recent creation of a Land Commission, designed to address, at last, the increasingly hot issue of land alienation, and to work out a whole new framework that can secure peasant rights, facilitate honest and appropriate private sector investment, and create a reasonably transparent and implementable system for administering land claims.

Finally, it is important to note that the 1990 constitution, and a 1991 law of free association, have ushered in a new era of “civil society” in Mozambique. Whereas across Africa civic institutions have often been trapped between donor dependence on the one hand and meddling governments on the other and have had next to no links with ordinary people, Mozambique’s civic associations — all of which are membership-based — are already starting to demonstrate a genuine
socio-political accountability. Moreover, most of the active associations are led by women and are assertively committed to issues of social justice and to the very real representation of marginal people. There is still a long way to go, of course, in the establishment of locally-based institutions across the rural areas, and in their gaining of financial and management strength, but the prospects are also encouraging.

The rise of civic institutions already impacts on the political scene—described so unfairly as being quite dismal by your correspondent. One of the reasons why Mozambique now has the highest proportion of women members of parliament in the world, and why there are now four women ministers and vice-ministers (and why there are now four women ministers and vice-ministers among the leading public figures in Mozambique), is precisely because of their emerging strength in civic society. The national assembly—which is already demonstrating itself to be no rubber stamp—already has, in consequence, a special working group on gender issues. Furthermore, two of the brilliant new governors—that in Nampula mentioned by your correspondent, and Dr. Virgilio Perrão, the new Governor of Tete—were not political hacks prior to their appointments but the heads of their regional associations. Given the thrust of the article, it is a shame that your correspondent did not even mention the campaign of the Nampula governor both to check the abuse of state power in the province and to counter continued attempts by some government officials to manipulate or abuse local Renamo officials or Renamo-supporting communities.

In short, committed scholars should remain interested in and engaged with Frelimo and Mozambique and take seriously the new attempts to nurture rural development. I for one am excited by the freshness and honesty of much of the new thinking in that country. And despite the fact that Mozambique’s weakness means rural people will continue to be messed about by a hostile global economic climate and by a fickle international aid bureaucracy, I believe, nevertheless, that they will continue to make the massive strides towards improving their livelihoods that have already begun since the 1992 peace agreement.

Make no mistake: this is not a clarion call for more of the kind of naive and total commitment to Frelimo, with uncomfortable truths swept under the carpet, that was all too prevalent in the past. Nor is it an attempt to say that Renamo is a political irrelevance, which it is not. Indeed I welcomed the critical freshness of your correspondent in spurning such mythologies. I only reply because for me the article is not the whole story.

2. Holes in the Story

BY PAUL FAUVET

Paul Fauvet is a Mozambique based journalist.

28 June 1995

In your May 1995 issue, your special correspondent in Maputo devoted two lengthy paragraphs to the Presidential Forum for the Opposition. I regret to tell you that there is no such thing.

Your correspondent seems to have confused two completely different forums. One is the long mooted “Extra-parliamentary Opposition Forum” which a dozen minor opposition parties set up at a meeting in May in the southern city of Inhambane.

The second is President Joaquim Chissano’s “Presidential Consultative Forum.” During last year’s election campaign, Chissano promised to set up this body to advise him on matters of national importance. People invited to sit on

...
of MPs called for one (i.e., whenever Renamo wanted): it was persuaded this was a non-starter and dropped the idea.

There is no sign that Frelimo is having the difficulty in maintaining cohesion among its MPs that your correspondent claims. Of course, there are disagreements inside the Frelimo parliamentary group and, of course, not everyone was in favour of the decision to propose former Attorney-General Eduardo Mulembue for the job of Speaker. But the majority backed Mulembue, and in a vote, no Frelimo MP was going to desert Mulembue given that the only alternative on offer was Renamo's Raul Domingos, a man who a few weeks earlier was threatening not to accept the results of the general election.

Your correspondent insults the integrity and intelligence of Mozambican MPs when he claims that Frelimo wanted open voting in order to "ensure voting discipline." The suggestion is that MPs only express their true feelings in a secret ballot, but will sheepishly follow the party line when a vote is taken by a show of hands.

But open voting is the norm in parliaments all over the world for the excellent reason that the electorate have a right to know how its representatives are casting their votes.

As Frelimo MP Sergio Vieira warned: "Secrecy tends to be the enemy of democracy."

Frelimo was elected on a detailed program of government that all Frelimo MPs pledged to defend. Without open voting, it will be impossible to know whether they are all honouring that pledge. Of course, issues will arise that are not covered by the program. There will always be unforeseen situations where MPs have to make their minds up and some, in all conscience, may find it impossible to accept the decisions of the majority of Frelimo MPs. Fine. They can and will vote against. But their electorate has the right to see this and to hear an explanation.

As regards the local elections, your correspondent is quite wrong to say that the government has indicated they might be postponed (a story that is being assiduously spread in Maputo by the U.S. embassy). On the contrary, Prime Minister Pascual Mocumbi has repeatedly stressed his intention to respect the law establishing municipal districts which calls for elections in 1996.

The key issue is not whether but where the elections will be held - in some of the country or all of it? Renamo wants nationwide local elections while the government wants them initially only in those districts that can generate a significant local tax base (which means the provincial capitals and a few other relatively prosperous areas.)

Logically Renamo should be delighted at the government position, since this would allow it to concentrate on winning control of several key cities - Beira, Quelimane, Chimoio, Nacala and possibly Tete and Nampula - instead of dispersing its meagre resources over the entire country.
WHAT CAN BE DONE...

Canadians can encourage our Government to take more leadership. As a start, the Government could declare a unilateral moratorium on the production, sale and trade in antipersonnel landmines, setting an example for the world. Request our Government to increase funding support for landmine clearance, local training and assistance to victims of landmines and their families. Several MPs from various parties have already taken a strong interest in the issue.

Letters can be sent to:
• The Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister,
• The Honourable David Collenette, Minister of Defence,
• The Honourable André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
• Your local Member of Parliament.

Long Term

The eradication of mines and the support to countries emerging from conflict are long term concerns. A global ban on antipersonnel mines will not happen immediately. Until there is a ban, innocent people will continue to be killed or maimed. Cooperative efforts by groups and individuals around the world will one day wipe this scourge from the earth. Now is the time to start. For information contact Mines Action Canada, 170 Booth Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1R 7W1, (613) 233-1983 (phone) or (613) 233-9028, (fax) cppceli@web.apc.org (email).

COOPERATION CANADA - MOZAMBIQUE (COCAMO), a coalition of 20 Canadian NGOs, Church groups, labour union humanity funds and solidarity groups has been working since 1988 to support community groups and popular organisation in Nampula, Mozambique.

With funding from members and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), COCAMO has provided technical assistance and training to local groups that provide adult education, support to family sector farming, small income generating activities and credit facilities for women.

Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, some COCAMO partners began to work in previously contested areas where the landmine problems were more prevalent. COCAMO is exploring ways to support the development of de-mining expertise in Mozambique.

For information on Mozambique and how to get involved in addressing the long term development issues contact:

COOPERATION CANADA - MOZAMBIQUE
1 rue Nicholas St., Suite 510, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 7B7
(613) 562-3930 (phone) (613) 241-5302 (fax)
email: cocamo@web.apc.org

COCAMO Members

Adventist Development and Relief Agency  •  Anglican Church of Canada
Canadian Cooperative Association  •  Canadian Feed the Children  •  Canadian Hunger Foundation
Canadian Lutheran World Relief  •  CARE Canada  •  Carrefour Tiers-Monde
CIDMMA  •  Christian Children's Fund of Canada  •  COSU  •  Canadian Catholic Organisation for Development and Peace  •  Oxfam-Canada  •  Presbyterian World Service & Development
Save the Children Fund of British Columbia  •  Steelworkers Humanity Fund  •  TLCSac
USC CANADA  •  United Church of Canada  •  World Vision Canada

MINE FACTS

By the time the Government of Mozambique and Renamo signed a peace agreement ending fifteen years of war, an estimated 2 million land mines had been planted. A landmine costs as little as $3 to produce. Safely removing one costs between $300 and $1,000. De-mining is further complicated in Mozambique because records and maps indicating the location of mines are very sketchy.

Landmines do not deteriorate, if anything they become more unstable with age. Once planted, they remain active until detonated or defused, long after the war is over. Food production and resumption of normal life are severely affected by antipersonnel landmines.

Until recently, some of the same companies that have manufactured and sold landmines have also been awarded even more lucrative contracts to remove them.

Typical of the victims are Sofia Fumo, 12 years old, and her 11 year old sister, Maria. Sofia set off a mine when she jumped down from a fence she had been climbing in a field outside Maputo. Sofia instantly lost both legs and several fingers on one hand, but survived. Maria, close by when the landmine detonated, suffered extensive damage to both legs which had to be amputated. She later died.

"COOPERATION CANADA - MOZAMBIQUE"

"COCAMO"

"WHAT CAN BE DONE..."

"LONG TERM"