Cold War Cripples Africa Policy

It is no secret that politics in this country is leaning right. Developments in US-Africa policy in the last few months show which way the wind is blowing.

In May, the US supported the French-Belgian “rescue” effort in Zaire and President Carter and his staff complained about Congressional restraints against covert activity in Africa.

In June and July, the Congress, under the prodding of Senator Jesse Helms, authorized the conditional lifting of the 13-year-old sanctions against Rhodesia and gave implicit recognition to the internal settlement. At the same time, Helms and his cohorts of the rising New Right have renewed their campaign against the frontline states that have assisted the Patriotic Front, especially Angola and Mozambique. Increased cold war rhetoric from the Administration and the desire, as aides have said, for their moderate Congressmen to “vote on something” (a reference to the Rhodesian sanctions amendment), rather than be labelled “soft on communism”, is heartening and hardening the forces of apartheid.

The need to vote on “something”, especially something that provides a “good, solid” image such as being “hard on communism”, is the posture a good many members of Congress have been anxious to take in this election year. Standing up to communism has provided them with a temporary shelter from the general malaise of the nation’s domestic situation. It has, by focusing on Africa, placed foreign policy in the role of surrogate, deflecting criticism directed at a dismal domestic performance on the part of the Congress and the Administration.

When the Republican Party indicated in early spring that President Carter’s inability to effectively oppose “terrorists” in southern Africa would be a key campaign issue, the President and other Administration spokesmen attempted to counter, as Senator Jackson put it, with “tough talk”.

President Carter’s vehement accusations against the Cubans in the recent Zaire crisis are proof of his attempt to intensify his rhetorical stance. His actions, and the lack of hard evidence on which they were based, showed a need to present a hard line. The President responded to a strategy which he did not understand and does not control. He met conservative reaction with reactionary rhetoric, and now that rhetoric is limiting his ability to be effective in southern Africa. The Helms initiative on lifting Rhodesian sanctions is the most striking example of that. At present, Mr. Carter, in an effort to rethink his strategy, has placed his foreign policy on the spot. It is a diversion orchestrated by Vance, Brzezinski and Young, at Africa’s expense.

Tough Talk

First among the Administration’s tough talkers is Zbigniew Brzezinski. His aristocratic, scholarly demeanor, his academic credentials and his approach to foreign policy make him quite palatable in conservative circles. His historical perspective may also be a source of endearment. Brzezinski is fond of viewing US-Soviet relations in Africa from a nineteenth century perspective. His point of reference is an 1898 Anglo-French affair known as the “Fashoda Incident”. At Fashoda, on the Upper Nile, the British forced the French to withdraw from a sphere of interest the French had previously claimed, all without a shot being fired.

On the basis of this model, Brzezinski sees an almost invariable confrontation between the US and the Soviets in Africa. According to Elizabeth Drew of The New Yorker, Brzezinski has the tendency to react viscerally to any form of
Soviet-Cuban activity—anywhere. This probably accounts for his statement on Meet the Press May 28, 1978:

"I have held the view, and I do hold the view, that Soviet-Cuban intrusion into African matters not only has the unfortunate effect of transforming difficult racial conflicts, of transforming the struggle for majority rule into also a very complicated and dangerous international conflict as well as an ideological conflict ... I do not believe that this kind of Soviet-Cuban involvement ought to be cost free [as it violates the] code of detente."

Two days later, Senator George McGovern issued a statement castigating Brzezinski for advancing a "foreign policy of crisis and confrontation". Ms. Drew reported that "in the view of some in government, there is the danger of a premature polarization of forces in Southern Africa. What Africans see as a liberation movement, this argument goes, we might view as an East-West struggle and help make it one." This seems to have escaped Mr. Brzezinski.

Enter the Diplomat

Part of the ability of the Carter foreign policy to attract so much attention is its split-personality; that is, the alleged conflict between Secretary of State Vance and Brzezinski. However, the two represent the same foreign policy. The point is that Vance simply articulates it more diplomatically. Vance may well be reflecting the liberal concepts of the Kennedy-Johnson years in which Vance began his service, which were openly stated at the time:

"We see Africa as probably the greatest field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the Communist bloc and the non-Communist world."


Pursuing such an objective by quiet diplomatic maneuvers does not exclude confrontation tactics; in fact they fit together quite well. In speeches made May 12th and June 9th, 1978, Vance indicated his quiet approach to the cold war. He stressed that while the US sought to avoid an East-West confrontation, there is an acknowledged need to head off Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa. And though Vance underlined US reluctance to supply arms to African clients (an old Kennedy-Johnson policy), he emphasized that African nations "threatened" by Soviet-Cuban presence have a legitimate need to possess the "ability to defend themselves."

In his speech on Africa to the Jaycees, June 20, 1978, Vance stated: "We can be neither right nor effective if we treat Africa simply as an arena for East-West competition. Our Africa policy has not changed. Its objectives remain forward looking and positive." (emphasis added). The effect of the June 20th speech was to assure the press and public that Vance, not Brzezinski, had the President's ear on Africa policy.

Andy Young on the Burner

The crucial character of Andrew Young's role in the Administration has been that he is the only man who can make US policy credible to Africans. Without Young, it is doubtful that the US would have gained African co-operation in the Zimbabwe and Namibia negotiations or formed a rapproche-ment with Nigeria. The development of an African approach by Young allows the exploitation of superficial considerations, even when they are overshadowed by a US exploitation of Soviet-Cuban presence that disregards African needs. The rhetoric of the US approach to Africa implies that "majority rule", "peaceful transition" and "stability" can only be achieved through western management of the situation. It is an attempt to place limits on the dimensions the struggle for self-determination can take.

As the Administration's "point man", Ambassador Young has made some masterful attempts at deflecting fire from domestic to foreign issues. Young has drawn attention by intrinsically balancing his "positive" and "negative" moves. The racist nature of the system demands that Young be a brilliant apologist for US Africa policy. On the other hand, that same system reserves the right to chastise him publicly if he tells the truth on other issues. The Carter Young-manipulation of this fact has been an exemplary tactic of their relationship. Young has been able to focus at times on his diplomatic coups and at other times on tactically calculated political faux pas, to use a phrase suggested by Mary McGrory. When the domestic heat has been too great, or criticism of a particular foreign policy issue been too intense, Andy Young and the Africa policy were ready to take their place on the burner.

The concerted efforts of Carter's three key foreign policy men represent a departure from the President's campaign promises to keep East-West confrontations at a minimum and to view African problems in their own context. What purpose does this departure serve? Why all the cold war rhetoric? It would seem that the Administration's emphasis on foreign policy, particularly those aspects that have the greatest cold war aura, is an attempt to divert attention from a devastated domestic policy. In the beginning, the Carter intention may very well have been the creation of a foreign policy so vigorous that it would buoy up the Administration through its domestic difficulties, as it did Nixon. However, now, it is not a buoying devise but a deflecting one; i.e., the Carter foreign policy is a defensive posture where the Nixon foreign policy was an offensive thrust. In an election year when both the Administration and Congress are faced with a floundering domestic policy, emphasis is being placed on foreign policy and its cold war potential, so that they might, to paraphrase Mr. Vance, control "the excessive swings in the public mood." Africa will therefore continue to be in the spotlight, perhaps to Africa's detriment.
Right Wing Scores
Points for Rhodesia

The Congressional friends of Ian Smith have almost pulled off another Byrd Amendment. Quietly, and with no advance warning, on June 28th, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced an amendment to the State Department Authorization bill to lift sanctions against Rhodesia for one year. His effort, which failed by a mere six votes, jolted the Administration, liberal Senators and the anti-apartheid lobby into a month of frenzied activity over Rhodesia.

Helms and other right-wingers maintained that the internal settlement was a truly democratic experiment in multi-racial government, embodying western values, which should be given a chance to work by the United States. The Patriotic Front guerillas, on the other hand, were characterized as Marxist terrorists, who killed innocent missionaries, women and children. They were described as wanting no part in any negotiations or elections (in spite of their stated policies to the contrary) but rather, determined to seize power solely “by the barrel of the gun.” In classically racist terms, conservatives, one after another, decried the violence of armed struggle while totally ignoring the 13 years of violence perpetrated against the African population by the illegal Smith regime, not to mention the violence of 70 years of British colonialism prior to Smith's unilateral declaration of independence.

Taking heart from his near victory on June 28th, Helms, together with Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R-CA) and other conservatives, launched an ambitious lobbying effort to lift sanctions for six months, going so far as to bring Bishop Abel Muzorewa to Washington to personally visit with Senators in the hopes of convincing them to “give democracy a chance” in Rhodesia. Seven African members of the internal settlement government wrote and called long-distance from Salisbury to key Senators. It was an ironic alliance—the black Bishop, a former advocate of sanctions, and Helms, an ardent opponent of the civil rights movement in the south and a long-time backer of white rule in Rhodesia.

Clearly taken by surprise by Helms’ initial show of strength, the Administration and Senate liberals, led by Africa Subcommittee Chairman Dick Clark (D-IA), launched a counterattack. They stressed that lifting sanctions would cause greater insurrection on the part of Ian Smith, and thereby intensify the war. They also emphasized that such a move would eliminate any further chance for the US to play the role of “honest broker” in attempting to convene an all-parties conference, thus effectively ruling out any hope of a negotiated end to the Rhodesian conflict.

Carter’s Policy in Trouble

In a briefing for Senate staffers called by the White House, Tony Lake, chief policy planner for the State Department, faced hostile questioning which turned the session into a failure. This incident demonstrated why Carter’s Rhodesian policy is in trouble. As soon as the internal settlement was signed in March, right-wing politicians and organizations like the American Conservative Union began mobilizing support for Ian Smith and his black partners. Resolutions were proposed in the House and Senate, urging the President to accept the Salisbury agreement. The Carter Administration, on the other hand, remained virtually silent. British and American diplomats continued to try to split the Patriotic Front and get ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo to join the agreement. When evidence mounted that the war was not de-escalating, that racial discrimination was not ending, and that the black participants in the agreement were losing support, the Administration still did not condemn it. The US could have seriously pressured Smith to give up power by cutting off his supply of oil from US subsidiaries in South Africa. It could have helped explain to the American people that the settlement was a recipe for continued white political control and privilege for at least a decade, and therefore could not be supported in the name of democracy. Not having taken a firm position against the internal agreement, the Administration could not now make a convincing argument as to why Congress shouldn’t lift sanctions to aid the transitional government.

As time drew near for Helms’ second legislative attack, an amendment to the International Security Assistance bill, a head count by the liberals showed about 51 votes against the conservative forces. Frightened by the prospects of losing, both President Carter and Vice President Mondale urged Senate leaders to support retention of sanctions.

The Case/Javits Compromise

In the meantime, Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) and Senator Clifford Case (R-NJ), the lame-duck ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, co-authored a compromise amendment. It allowed the lifting of sanctions if the President determined that: a) the Government of Rhodesia had committed itself to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference, and b) a government had been installed chosen by free and fair elections with international observation. Case and Javits stated in their “Dear Colleague” letter that “...
approach not only protects the executive and diplomatic negotiating authority of the President but also makes clear to all sides that the United States is not opposed to the internal settlement as such and has no adverse feeling to the black leaders who have joined in the internal settlement."

The Case/Javits language was the perfect political compromise. For the liberals who wanted no change in policy but who feared a showdown with Helms, the compromise seemed to give the President sufficient grounds to keep sanctions. For the moderates who didn't want to be associated with a racist, right-wing effort but who wished to separate themselves from the Administration's position, Case/Javits was acceptable, as well.

When the Case/Javits amendment was introduced on July 26th, liberals heralded the successful US role in the newly-announced Namibia settlement and argued that the chances of a similar success in Rhodesia would be enhanced by the passage of the compromise. Javits said that his amendment corrected the "tilt" toward the guerrillas. Bishop Muzorewa watched the entire proceedings from the gallery, seated next to Kenneth Towsey, long-time Director of the Smith regime's Rhodesia Information Office in Washington. When the vote came, Case/Javits was accepted by a substantial margin of 59 to 36.

House Vote Reflects Conservative Mood

Energies then shifted to the House, where the mood proved to be even more conservative and partisan than in the Senate. In efforts orchestrated largely along party lines, Clement Zablocki (D-WI), Chairman of the International Relations Committee, introduced the Case/Javits language on August 2nd. Paul Findley (R-IL), the second ranking Republican on the International Relations Committee who had consistently supported sanctions in the past, proposed an immediate lifting of sanctions, provided that the President could reimpose them if Rhodesia refused to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference or failed to schedule an early date for free elections.

Findley's amendment failed, 176-229. But a similar amendment offered by a long-established anti-Communist Democrat, Richard Ichord of Missouri, succeeded, 229-180. Ichord's amendment, passed with little debate, called for sanctions to be lifted January 1, 1979, "unless the President shall determine that a government has not been installed, chosen by free elections in which all political groups have been allowed to participate freely."

The House/Senate conference committee accepted the essence of the Case/Javits language on August 10th. Both houses are expected to endorse this version:

The Politics Behind the Vote

Why did Carter substantially lose the sanctions fight? Firstly, the Administration had reinforced the anti-communism on which the right-wing based its support for the internal settlement and attack on the Patriotic Front. Carter and Brzezinski continually sounded the theme of standing up to communists in Africa when the US sent in logistical support to quell the revolt in Shaba province in May, and blamed the fighting on Cuba. After this response to the relatively moderate National Front for the Liberation of the Congo in a passing uprising in Zaire, the Administration was in no position to defend negotiating with the Patriotic Front on the future of Zimbabwe, where a liberation struggle, supported by socialist countries, has been in progress for a decade.

Secondly, a large number of members of Congress see the Patriotic Front as terrorists. This attitude is continually reinforced by the one-sided and distorted media coverage of such things as the missionary killings in eastern Rhodesia, and misrepresentations of statements by Patriotic Front leaders.

Thirdly, a major theme in the Congressional action on sanctions was anti-Administration sentiment. In this election year, the right wing sees Rhodesia as an issue on which the President is vulnerable. Identifying Carter's policy as pro-terrorist, pro-Marxist and anti-democratic makes for good political capital for the fall campaigns.

In this political atmosphere, the legislation adopted on sanctions will put Carter on the spot in December. The organized right will press him to determine that the elections held earlier that month under the internal settlement have been "free and fair." Their ammunition is the simplistic argument which prevailed in Congress that any elections are, by definition, democratic and acceptable to the United States.

But the elections are for a Parliament which, according to the internal settlement, is powerless to change a constitution that enforces white privileges. This cannot be considered a suitable transition from colonialism to independence at this time in history. In addition, conditions in Rhodesia preclude holding free elections: the majority of the countryside is enveloped in war, over 500,000 Africans are penned up in "protected villages," and over 100,000 Zimbabweans are refugees. If US policy is to ever support genuine majority rule in southern Africa, the Carter administration must finally admit that the internal settlement is a transparently bogus agreement and push for truly meaningful change in Rhodesia.

Namibia Settlement Closer to Reality

After more than fifteen months of arduous negotiations, the Western diplomatic team on Namibia led by Ambassador Donald McHenry finally seems to have pulled off a triumph—at least for the moment.

On July 27th, the Western nations secured a UN Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative to insure "free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations" and to report his recommendations for implementing the Western proposal. At the same time, the Council passed another resolution declaring that the "territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the re-integration of Walvis Bay into its territory."

Reservations on Both Sides

The South African reaction was a predictable public fury against an alleged Western double-cross on the Walvis Bay issue, and an implied threat to reconsider the whole deal.

If South Africa was keeping its options open, SWAPO was too. At a press conference held at the UN on July 31st, President Sam Nujoma stressed that SWAPO had not accepted the
Western proposals but rather "accepted to work within the framework of the proposal, taking our reservations into account." He said that the armed struggle would continue until all repressive laws had been repealed, South African troops had been confined to bases and all SWAPO political prisoners had been released. One key point which he stressed was the importance of the UN special representative taking control of the transitional government rather than merely observing a South African-run administration. The South African administrator, Mr. Martinus Steyn, could not be trusted:

In spite of the distrust that such statements reflect on both sides, there seems to be a consensus that some sort of understanding, however tentative and fragile, has been reached.

Obstacles to Implementation

The implementation of the agreement, however, faces formidable obstacles which Secretary Waldheim's representative, Commissioner Martti Ahtisaari, must remove:

1. Voter registration. Since June 26th, the South African administrator, Judge Steyn, has been registering voters under a decree he himself made, which provides that a voter must have been born in the territory or have four years of continuous residence in it and be over 18. Walvis Bay residents are excluded and so, more importantly, are guerrillas, exiles and refugees. High church officials cabled Commissioner Ahtisaari that "the majority of voters who have been registered so far ... have not done so freely," but under employer duress and criminal decrees that forbid criticism of the registration law.

2. Election date. The South African government and the Turnhalle group allied to it want elections before the rainy season starts in October so that they can capitalize on their headstart in political organizing. But pressing ahead with elections quickly would not give long-repressed SWAPO forces opportunity for free and unimpeded political organization and campaigning.

3. Political prisoners and banished persons. While the West was negotiating its deal, the South African Administrator General continued and escalated detention and imprisonment of SWAPO leadership in the country. On July 14th, two days after the alleged "settlement", he ordered the Anglican vicar general and his wife, and a superior of a Catholic order to leave Namibia for reasons not specified. They followed dozens of others who had been exiled for revealing South African torture and brutalities. Church leaders told UN Commissioner Ahtisaari that the Administrator General had gone on a "spree of imprisonment and banishment inside Namibia."

The resolution of these difficulties will clearly tax the diplomatic skills of Commissioner Ahtisaari, who is known to favor a non-confrontational, low-key approach. The most difficult question of all, however, is one which the Western Five's proposal slides over in silence and ambiguity. If there is disagreement between the UN administrator, no procedure is established for resolving such disputes. While Commissioner Ahtisaari is charged with seeing that the electoral process is administered fairly and freely, the day-to-day knowledge of the country and its administration is in the hands of the ruthless South African regime. So the question SWAPO wants answered is "Who will really be in charge?"

South Africa also has an ace in the hole in Walvis Bay. While the UN has warned South Africa not to use Walvis to obstruct the independence of Namibia, it is clear that South Africa can use the port as a base for troops and as a bottleneck to hold up Namibian trade in the event that a Namibian government after independence proves to be troublesome.

In spite of these problems, the general mood when Commissioner Ahtisaari arrived with his staff of 50 was described as "festive", as 10,000 demonstrators from various political groups, including SWAPO, greeted him at the Windhoek airport. The Lutheran, Catholic, Anglican and African Methodist Episcopal churches said: "It is with great joy and thanksgiving that we welcome you in Namibia as an answer to prayer. Your presence here represents the fulfillment of hopes cherished by many Namibian people for a generation."

Factors that Made Agreement Possible

While the progress achieved so far could come apart, it is a remarkable achievement all the same — a show of dexterity and persistence in an Administration which has so far scored few foreign policy victories.

One reason for the progress lies in the success of the team led by Ambassador McHenry in getting Angolan co-operation. In May, the CIA and National Security Council floated the idea in Washington of renewing substantial CIA covert support for UNITA. With this threat hanging over the MPLA government, Angola and Zaire have taken significant steps toward
rapprochement. The West appears to have agreed to see that Zaire stops support for FNLA and UNITA in return for Angola restraining and disarming Mobutu's enemies within its borders. At the same time, the presence of a UN peace-keeping force in Namibia could serve to seal off further South African help to UNITA forces in Angola. If a reduction in the level of internal conflict can be achieved, Angola could then reduce the number of Cuban troops, calming Western fears about continuing Cuban and Soviet influence.

Aside from the pressure Angola and the front-line states led by Tanzanian President Nyerere could exert, SWAPO may well have had reasons of its own for concluding that the settlement could work to its advantage. Its judgement is that in any fair election SWAPO would win a clear majority, a view shared, incidentally, by the South African Financial Mail. At the same time, the Western powers were probably anxious to hasten the political process so that moderate forces could be put in place with sufficient power to prevent a further radicalization which would threaten Western interests. An early election might end with no single party having a majority and thus ensure that moderate middle parties such as the Namibia National Front would hold the key block which would determine the nature of the constitution and government Namibia would have.

The next hurdle for the Western proposals will come when Commissioner Ahtisaari reports to UN headquarters around August 23rd. The meeting of the Security Council which follows will provide a test of whether a plan that all parties can live with is possible.

Rescue Mission in Zaire

Now that the headlines have shifted to other topics, we are all too apt to forget that the American intervention in Zaire this year was more costly than last year's - in dollars, in delusions and in possible consequences. The US role in the intervention mainly took the form of airlifting supplies and troops for a "rescue" operation.

Was it Humanitarian?

The western news services portrayed the US-backed mission as primarily a rescue of European civilians from Cuban-trained African forces bent on slaughter and terror. Yet if humanitarianism was the reason, why did the West choose to ignore the warning of General Mbumba of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo that an attempt to retake Kolwezi by force would endanger lives? Why was no advantage taken of his offer to release the European population from the captured city? One may also ask why, after all European civilians had been evacuated from Kolwezi, foreign troops stayed on in Shaba province, interrogating and intimidating the African population. It was in fact only after the main force of Shaba rebels had withdrawn from Kolwezi, that the real killings began, notwithstanding early news accounts that the rebels were hunting Europeans. And it was only much later that it was reported that more than 700 black Zaireans had lost their lives in the melee that ensued. The number of whites killed is now thought to have been 136, not the several hundred originally reported.

Underlying Economic Rivalries

If any one doubted that European economic greed and intense political competition underlay the "humanitarian" rescue and the subsequent security arrangements, it could be learned from the public squabbles of France and Belgium. France accused Belgium of pulling out of Kolwezi early, thereby endangering the lives of both European civilians and French Foreign Legionnaires. The Belgian Foreign Minister accused France of seeking to win economic privileges held by Belgian companies and replace Belgium as the predominant outside influence in this former Belgian colony. By aggressively seizing Kolwezi with air-dropped Foreign Legionnaires, France was clearly trying to create an image of boldness and enlarge its role in Zaire's future mineral extraction. France made no secret of the fact that its mission was not solely humanitarian, but rather that it intended to return security to the area.

\[image\] French Foreign Legionnaires intimidated Africans in Shaba.
The United States attempted to justify its own intervention by insisting on the Cuban role in aiding and abetting the Katangans' rebellion, even in the absence of conclusive, publicly-available proof. Fidel Castro told the head of the American mission in Havana, Lyle Lane, that he had known of the Katangans' intention to continue last year's uprising but was unable to stop it. But his statement was ignored by State Department officials as a "lie".

American officials should know history better than they let on. Revolutions against neo-colonialism are not exported. They flow from the hope of a people to be free from rule by dictatorships which govern on behalf of foreign interests. Whatever the role of the Cubans was, it was certainly Zaireans who revolted and foreigners who quelled their uprising. It was repression, not revolution, which was exported.

Can the Leopard change his Spots?

Meanwhile the myth that Mobutu has turned over a new leaf is being created. On June 21st, the West got "tough" with Mobutu. The press reported that Mobutu had been told he wouldn't get $50 million in food, medical aid and security supporting assistance unless he managed the economy better, improved his relations with Angola, curbed corruption and improved his human rights accord. On August 16th, the United States professed to see big improvements in Zaire, and released $26 million in food and security assistance. But the alleged improvement seems mostly to have come from moves made by Angolan President Neto to discourage Katangan forces from re-entering Zaire. Yet Mobutu got the reward, not Neto or Angola. The evidence for improvements in human rights, in ending corruption or in economic management was entirely lacking.

Now the West is trying to reclaim Zaire by managing it directly as a colony. Since the army is little more than an unpaid gang that has to live by thieving, basic security (for European interests) is being handled primarily by troops from Morocco and Senegal, two client states closely tied to France and the United States. Once again the United States has supplied C-141s to airlift Moroccan troops and the brand-new jeeps, Mercedes trucks and weapons they insisted on as a pay-off. With Zaire's foreign debt over $2.6 billion, the economy in a shambles and with a third of its foreign exchange being siphoned off by Mobutu and his cronies, the International Monetary Fund has appointed a director of the Bank of Zaire to carry out currency reforms and a financial austerity program. Other key ministries will be co-managed by Western experts.

But as the Wall Street Journal reported on August 1st, the Zaire government frustrated seven World Bank experts sent in the last three years to straighten out its finances, and all but one has gone home. Meanwhile, only 1.2 million of the country's 25 million people are steadily employed. Even the university-educated are close to starvation. Yet the West sees no alternative to Mobutu, hated though he is by now. "The alternative is civil war, chaos or tribal warfare" a European diplomat told the Journal.

Notwithstanding the Zaire-Angola border agreement, the inhabitants of Shaba province expect that the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo will return again in months. While a coup against Mobutu is unlikely because he has eliminated leadership rivals by exile, execution or prison, it cannot be entirely ruled out. The European technicians and experts dread a general uprising that cannot be suppressed.

Meanwhile, Mobutu is said to be "euphoric". The rescue act is a perennial favorite with him. It leaves him laughing all the way to the bank.

President Nyerere Speaks on Intervention in Africa

There is a great furor in the West about so-called Soviet penetration of Africa. But Cuban and Soviet forces are in only two countries — Angola and Ethiopia — and they are there for understandable reasons at the request of the two respective governments.

The danger to Africa does not come just from nations in the Eastern block. Current developments show that the greater immediate danger to Africa's freedom comes from nations in the Western block.

Until Africa, at the O.A.U., has made such a decision, there can be no Pan-African Security force which will uphold the freedom of Africa. It is the height of arrogance for anyone else to talk of establishing a Pan-African force to defend Africa. It is quite obvious, moreover, that those who have put forward this idea, and those who seek to initiate such force, are not interested in the freedom of Africa. They are interested in the domination of Africa.

When the USSR sent its troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, Tanzania was one of the many countries which protested. Is it expected that we should not protest when Western powers send their troops into an African country? Western "rescue operations" almost always seem to result in the death of a lot of innocent people and the rescue of a government.

But that is apparently not regarded in Europe as interference in African affairs. Instead, the same country which initiated the military expedition then calls a meeting to discuss, they say, the freedom of Africa.

There should be no mistake. Whatever the official agenda, Western diplomats meeting in Paris and Brussels are not discussing the freedom of Africa. They are discussing the continued use of Africa, by Western powers.

The West should not invent an excuse to bring the East-West conflict into Africa. For if they succeed in doing that, Africa will suffer, and African freedom will suffer, but it may also turn out to be very expensive for those who chose Africa as another site for East-West confrontation.

The above comments are excerpted from a major speech by President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania delivered to the diplomatic corps on June 9, 1978. The full text is available from the Washington Office on Africa for 20 cents each for 1-10; 15 cents each for 11-50; 7 cents each for over 50 copies (including postage).
House Looks at Investment in South Africa

A House Committee is holding extensive hearings on a bill that would regulate US investments in South Africa. HR 12463, introduced by Rep Stephen Solarz of New York, would prohibit new investment and bank loans to South Africa except the substantial category of reinvestment of profits. In addition, it would require companies already there to follow fair employment practices in order to qualify for US tax credits. Export-Import Bank privileges, government contracts and export licenses for South Africa.

Not surprisingly, the bill has caused considerable controversy, even though it doesn't come close to advocating total corporate withdrawal. Four major US corporations with investments in South Africa testified against the bill, arguing that their voluntary endorsement of the “Sullivan code” is sufficient.

Several witnesses and Subcommittee Chairman Charles Diggs think the legislation should go further. Diggs has proposed alternative legislation (HR 13273) which would end new investment, including reinvestment of profits, and wouldn’t deal at all with the issue of employment practices. Solarz’ fair employment section could actually prove meaningless. Even if passed, it provides a presidential waiver of any section which conflicts with South African law.

Church, student and civil rights groups welcomed the closer look at US government support of corporate involvement in South Africa which hearings on the bill provided, but no action is expected on the legislation this year.

The Carter Administration has come out vehemently against even the moderate Solarz bill. Witnesses from the Departments of State, Commerce and Treasury painted what Rep Cavanaugh of Nebraska called “an economic chamber of horrors” if the legislation were enacted. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Fred Bergsten said the bill would be “contrary to the national interest,” would be difficult to enforce, and “could trigger retaliation against important US economic interests.”

No New Aid Restrictions Likely

The House narrowly defeated new conservative efforts this year to further restrict US aid programs to Angola and Mozambique. The foreign aid appropriations bill has become an annual occasion for right-wing attacks on the front-line states which support the Patriotic Front and SWAPO liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia. But this year, the attack ended up being largely rhetorical.

This spring it became clear that the prohibition on direct aid to Mozambique and Angola enacted last year would be retained. Most bilateral aid to Angola is prohibited anyway, since the US still has not recognized the MPLA-led government.

Conservatives in the House sought to extend the prohibition on aid to include US participation in multilateral programs this summer. But here they met strong resistance from the Administration and such diverse groups as the Chamber of Commerce and the human rights lobby.

Conservative Representatives began by trying to ban indirect aid to three countries in Indochina plus Uganda, but were narrowly defeated by 203 to 198. After this failure, a similar amendment on Mozambique and Angola was rejected by voice vote. The Senate is likely to accept the House action.

Zambia will get the largest amount of the $60 million foreign aid authorized for southern Africa this year—$20 million in loans to purchase US commodities. $10 million will be earmarked in Congress’ report for humanitarian aid and scholarship programs for Zimbabwean refugees. The overall southern Africa program would appear to be reduced considerably from the $115 million level authorized last year. But much of that money has not yet been expended. So the cut is more apparent than real, and it does not represent any reduction of US interest in southern Africa. AID is currently preparing a five-year projection of aid to the region to present to Congress in January.

Eximbank Campaign Update

As so often happens on Capitol Hill, action by the Senate on the Export-Import Bank bill and South Africa has been postponed, and postponed, all summer. The bill, S. 3077, is tentatively slated to reach the Senate floor around the second week of September. Congressional action will have to be completed that month, since the current authorization for the Eximbank’s operation runs out September 30th.

Some Senate liberals are hesitant to offer an amendment on the floor that would end or restrict Eximbank financing to South Africa. One staffer explained simply that the mood of the Senate on southern Africa is “grim”, as demonstrated by the July debate on Rhodesian sanctions. It is therefore not clear whether liberals will propose an amendment for the full Senate to vote on, or will wait until the Conference Committee with the House to raise the South Africa issue again.

With a strong lobbying effort, the Conference Committee could well accept the compromise language passed in the House, since it was adopted there by a 100-vote margin. The House-passed language prohibits Eximbank financing to the South African government and its agencies, and to private purchasers which haven’t endorsed and “proceeded to implement” fair employment practices in their plants in South Africa.

The wide margin of the House vote was due in large part to the momentum built up by lots of lobbying from constituents on this issue. Letters to Washington and phone calls to Senators’ and Representatives’ local offices need to be stepped up again before the Senate floor action and the Conference Committee meeting if we are to retain even the House compromise version. Senators should be asked to vote for the House-passed language. Representatives should be urged to insist in conference that their amendment be included in the final bill.

Although members of the Conference Committee have not yet been named, they are likely to include the following people who should be contacted:

From the Senate: Senators Proxmire (Wisc.), Stevenson (111.), Williams (N.J.), Cranston (Ca.), Reigle (Mich.), Brooke (Mass.), and Heinz (Pa.).

From the House: Representatives Reuss (Wisc.), Neal (N.C.), AuCoin (Oregon), Tsongas (Mass.), Cavanaugh (Neb.), Stanton (Ohio), and Fenwick (N.J.).