After a resurgence of violence in April 1996, relative calm has returned to parts of the Liberian capital, Monrovia. The West African peacekeeping force, known as ECOMOG, has regained control over the city, and armed factions loyal to different warlords have been separated.

The United States contributed to this effort. Washington pledged an additional $30 million to ECOMOG and warned that the international community will isolate any faction which attempts to seize power by force.

However, the peace process is not back on track. International action has been insufficient to address the humanitarian crisis, to limit the power of the warlords, or to create a climate suitable for elections. Without a higher level of engagement by the United States in particular, renewed peace efforts will be vulnerable to violent and repeated collapse.

Six Years of War

Liberia was founded in the early 19th century by African Americans who returned to Africa as settlers. Their descendants, known as Americo-Liberians, dominated the country's government for more than 150 years. Ties with the United States were close, with high levels of aid and investment. In the 1960s and 1970s, Liberia received the highest per capita level of US aid of any country on the African continent.

In 1980 the settler-dominated government was overthrown. Many Liberians hoped for reform and a shift of power to the indigenous 95 percent of the population. But military leader Samuel Doe established a dictatorship and favored his own ethnic group.

The United States backed the Doe regime with a total of $402 million in aid between 1981 and 1985—more than during the entire previous century. At the time, Liberia was a key staging post for US covert operations against Libya. Washington's support for Doe continued in spite of well-documented human rights violations and a 1985 election marked by fraud and repression.

In late 1989, insurgents led by Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia from the Ivory Coast in a bid to topple the Doe regime. In the ensuing war, Taylor's forces, the remnants of Doe's army, and as many as five other armed factions inflicted numerous atrocities on the civilian population. Doe himself was killed by a rebel leader in September 1990.

Washington provided humanitarian aid—more than $425 million from 1990 through mid-1995—but did little more. Peace efforts were left to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with Nigeria playing a leading role.

ECOMOG arrived in late 1990, after the conflict was well under way. Its intervention has been flawed, but is generally credited with saving lives. West African governments meanwhile have supported continuing mediation efforts. The most recent is the Abuja accord of August 1995, which provided for an interim government involving all the warlords, and for the disarming and demobilization of their forces before elections, planned for this year.

The Abuja accord came after almost six years of war which killed as many as 150,000 out of a population of

Continued on page 2
Fragile Peace in Liberia

Continued from page 1

2.6 million. Some 800,000 people fled the country as refugees, and more than a million were displaced from their homes within the country.

Accord Breaks Down

Implementation of the Abuja agreement depended on either the goodwill of the warlords or decisive international support for their disarmament. Neither materialized. Liberian civilians were kept out of the process, and the predictable breakdown came in April when warlord Charles Taylor decided to launch an attack in Monrovia against a rival force. Both sides had by then infiltrated armed forces into the capital, previously a relatively safe haven from the conflict in the countryside.

The fighting forced the evacuation of humanitarian relief agencies. Their supplies were looted by the warlords, who used the relief goods for military ends. In mid-June, 13 international agencies said they would not reestablish full operations in Liberia until minimal security was assured.

Renewed fighting has recently broken out in several parts of the country. Despite the apparent stability of the capital, Liberians say that off the main streets there is no security. Basic services, such as electricity and running water, are not available, and food is scarce. During June over 1,500 bodies were recovered by health workers from shallow graves.

The primary responsibility for the war over the last six years—and for the latest violence in Monrovia—lies with the leaders of the Liberian armed factions, who have put their personal quests for power above Liberians’ desire for peace. The record of West African peacekeeping force, which brought some stability to parts of Liberia, has been mixed. Its failure to react when violence broke out in April contributed to the high level of destruction.

However, the international community shares the blame. The United States bears particular responsibility, given its 150 years of close ties with Liberia. The US failure to respond to the initial outbreak of war in 1989-1990 cost the lives of thousands of Liberians and close to $500 million in emergency aid.

When the latest peace agreement was signed, many observers warned that it was doomed to collapse without adequate international support for the disarmament and demobilization of the militias and for the peacekeeping efforts of ECOMOG. The failure to provide such support invited a costly humanitarian disaster and set the scene for the evacuation of US citizens and many other foreign residents in April.

Giving Peace a Chance

The majority of Liberians want peace. But the chances of achieving it are slim unless the capacity of the warlords to make war is curbed.

Liberian civil leaders and traditional rulers, meeting with ECOWAS leaders in mid-July, urged strong international sanctions against faction leaders to enforce compliance with peace agreements. They stressed that ECOMOG should be empowered and provided with logistical support to enforce peace by disarming combatants as a precondition to free elections.

The Liberian leaders also demanded that the international community impose sanctions on the export of Liberian natural resources by the warlords. “On no account should there be elections without first complete disarmament, encampment and integration of these combatants into the society,” stated the chair of the...
Angola Makes Uneven Progress

Angola continues to make slow and uneven progress in its effort to end 22 years of civil war and establish a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. This would bring together members of the present Angolan government and the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA).

In March 1996, the Washington Office on Africa, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA, the successor to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement), and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (KZA) issued a joint position paper on Angola. The statement reflected insights from recent visits to Angola by William Minter, the Senior Research Fellow at WOA's affiliate, the Africa Policy Information Center, and Ben Jackson, the Director of ACTSA. It identified potential obstacles to a durable peace in Angola and called on all parties to intensify efforts to ensure the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the peace plan agreed upon by the Angolan government and UNITA in November 1994.

Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol is being monitored by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), and the UN Secretary-General has appointed a Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, to facilitate the peace process. On June 27, 1996, the Secretary-General reported to the UN Security Council on recent developments in Angola. Excerpts from the report's concluding observations appear below.

The complete text of the Secretary-General's report is available on APC computer networks in the conference unica news. The March 1996 WOA-ACTSA-KZA statement is available on the WOA/APC Web site (see page 2). A printed copy may be obtained by writing to the Washington Office on Africa. Please include a self-addressed stamped envelope.

Excerpts from the UN Secretary-General's report on UNAVEM III

"During the last two months, the pace of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has improved somewhat. The promulgation of the Amnesty Law, the completion of the quartering of the rapidly growing police, the partial withdrawal of FAA [Angolan Armed Forces] to barracks, some progress in the quartering of UNITA troops, and a small beginning to the incorporation of UNITA military personnel into FAA, are all positive factors. ...

Continuing delays in the quartering of UNITA troops, the high number of desertions from the quartering areas, the unsatisfactory quality and quantity of weapons and ammunition handed over, the failure to quarter UNITA police personnel and the incomplete withdrawal of FAA from forward positions all require urgent corrective action if the peace process is to retain credibility.

The picture is no more reassuring on the political front. The parties have yet to take a number of steps towards the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. Most of the UNITA Members of Parliament have not taken their seats in the National Assembly. Officials designated by UNITA have not yet joined the State administration at the national, provincial and local levels. It is also essential that the question of the post of Vice-President to be occupied by UNITA should be expeditiously resolved. ...

If the peace process is to succeed, the parties, especially UNITA, must show greater readiness to implement, in good time, the commitments they have entered into. ...

The demobilization and socio-economic reintegration of former combatants is another essential precondition for lasting peace in Angola. National institutions are expected to take a leading role but significant external assistance will also be required. So far, the donor community has been cautious in committing resources to this process. Of $42 million required for the first year of demobilization and social reintegration, only $10 million has been received to date. Now that initial steps have been taken to form the integrated armed forces, demobilization is becoming a major concern. Without strong donor support, the results which have been achieved so far could be undermined.

The rapid rehabilitation of war-torn communities throughout Angola is another critical condition for the restoration of peace. Donors made important pledges at the Round Table Conference in Brussels in September 1995 to fund high-priority projects to restore the economic viability of Angolan communities and prepare them to reabsorb the large number of former soldiers, displaced persons and refugees. ...

UNAVEM III has become the Organization's largest peacekeeping operation. Its continued involvement, particularly at this stage of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, remains essential. I recommend, therefore, that its mandate be extended for three months, until 11 October 1996. ..."
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Select Legislation Relating to Africa

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION
(See chart on opposite page for other country-specific legislation which has been inactive since the last update.)

LIBERIA
S.Res. 248
Sponsor: Sen. Feingold (D-WI)
Introduced: 04/18/96
Cosponsors: 7
Calls for a cease-fire and recommitment to the Abuja peace process. Urges the US administration to identify funds that could be used to support additional non-Nigerian West African peacekeepers; and consider the provision of excess defense articles for the logistical support of non-Nigerian West African peacekeeping forces; use its influence with other nations and with interests in Liberia to solicit further support for West African peacekeeping forces; and lead United Nations efforts to activate a Commission to implement sanctions against those parties violating the UN arms embargo on Liberia.

STATUS: Pending in Foreign Relations Committee.

MAURITANIA
H.Con.Res. 142
Sponsor: Rep. Bereuter (R-NE)
Introduced: 02/01/96
Cosponsors: 9
Calls upon the Government of Mauritania to: respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, prosecute slave owners to the fullest extent of the country's anti-slavery law, and educate individuals being held as slaves on their legal rights; abolish discriminatory practices and integrate black Mauritians into the economic and social mainstream; investigate and prosecute officials responsible for the extrajudicial killings and mass expulsions of black Mauritians during the late 1980s and early 1990s; and allow all refugees to return to Mauritania and restore their full rights.

STATUS: Passed House (as amended) on 07/29/96. Pending in Senate.

NIGERIA
S.1419
Sponsor: Sen. Kassebaum (R-KS)
Introduced: 11/17/95
Cosponsors: 22
Imposes limited economic sanctions against Nigeria to promote democracy and human rights. Prohibits assistance to Nigerian government; loans; air transportation between Nigeria and US; sale of defense articles or services or issue of licenses for same; visas for Nigerian leadership and their families; EXIM, OPIC, or TDA financing or activities for Nigeria; new investments. Freezes assets of Nigerian leadership; suspends Nigeria from international sporting events; reprioritizes foreign assistance resources and funding for democracy-building and rule of law assistance through NGOs in Nigeria; requests cooperation of other nations and UN in imposing sanctions to promote democracy and human rights. Permits President to waive sanctions if they jeopardize US national interests. Requires President's certification to Congress that Nigerian government has become civilian and democratic as a prerequisite to termination of sanctions. Encourages President to seek multilateral oil embargo; UN arms embargo; UN Human Rights Commission resolution condemning Nigerian government; and additional measures if substantial progress not made within three months of enactment of Act. These include support for an international oil and arms embargo, a unilateral oil embargo, and a ban on export of any refined petroleum to Nigeria.

STATUS: Hearings held in Africa Subcommittee on 05/15/96.

SUDAN
H.R. 3766
Introduced: 07/09/96
Cosponsors: 24
Prohibits economic or military assistance or arms transfers to the Government of Sudan until appropriate action is taken to eliminate chattel slavery in Sudan.

STATUS: Referred to Africa Subcommittee and Domestic and International Monetary Policy Subcommittee.

ZAIRE
H.Res. 399
Introduced: 03/29/96
Cosponsors: 19
Expresses support for Zairian nongovernmental organizations seeking to promote the protection of fundamental human rights and the transition to democracy; encourages all Zairian political parties to include representatives of civil society in every stage of the electoral process; condemns the Zairian military's continuing violation of human rights and intimidation of local civil society groups; urges the President to: renew indefinitely current sanctions on Zaire, support an extension of the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on Zaire, press President Mobutu to halt the use of Zairian territory for military incursions into Rwanda or for training and arming Hutu extremists living in Eastern Zaire, and assist the United Nations Arms Investigators to remove intimidators from the refugee camps; recommends that the United States reinforce international pressure on President Mobutu, his family, and his associates.

STATUS: Pending in Africa Subcommittee.
Legislation Needing Our Immediate Attention:

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<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Action Needed</th>
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<tr>
<td>S. 1419 / H.R. 2697</td>
<td>Nigerian sanctions Calls and letters to President Clinton and Members of Congress encouraging legislative action and seeking stronger measures, especially an oil embargo, to promote human rights and democracy in Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.Res. 399</td>
<td>Zaire Calls and letters to Members of the House to urge cosponsorship and increased attention to Zaire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Legislation on Which No New Action Has Occurred:

No new action has occurred on the following legislation since the Legislative Update in the Winter 1995-1996 issue of Washington Notes on Africa. However, some items may have acquired additional cosponsors. Previous cosponsor tallies appear in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
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<tr>
<td>S. 121</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Sen. Feingold (D-WI)</td>
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<td>Passed Senate; awaiting House action</td>
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<td>H.Con.Res. 93</td>
<td>Cameroons</td>
<td>Rep. Engel (D-NY)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>Pending in Africa Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.R. 2697</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Rep. D. Payne (D-NJ)</td>
<td>93 (59)</td>
<td>Pending in Foreign Relations Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 940</td>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>Sen. Leahy (D-VT)</td>
<td>45 (45)</td>
<td>Pending in Internat. Rel. &amp; Nat. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.R. 1876</td>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>Rep. Evans (D-IL)</td>
<td>65 (61)</td>
<td>Pending in Judiciary Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1058</td>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>Sen. Wellstone (DFI-MN)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GENERAL LEGISLATION RELATING TO AFRICA

(See chart above for other general legislation which has been inactive since the last update.)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

H.R. 3540
Sponsor: Rep. Callahan (R-AL)
Introduced: 05/29/96
Cosponsors: 0
House version provides $11.9 billion total foreign assistance for FY97. Just as in the FY96 bill, no funds were specifically allocated to the Development Fund for Africa (DFA). However, the House Appropriations Committee adopted language indicating that the proportion of foreign assistance money spent on Africa should match the proportion of funds designated for Africa in the President's request (approximately 40%). House bill offers stronger support for the African Development Foundation ($11.5 million).

Senate version provides $12.2 billion total foreign assistance for FY97 and reestablishes the DFA (without specific funding commitment). Senate allocations for the International Development Association of the World Bank ($700 million), and debt reduction programs ($27 million) are greater than the House version.


IMMIGRATION

H.R. 2202
Sponsor: Rep. L. Smith (R-TX)
Introduced: 08/04/95
Cosponsors: 130
Amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the US by increasing border patrol and investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures, by improving the verification system for eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States.

STATUS: Referred to International Relations Committee and National Security Committee.
Africa Trade Policy Gains Congressional Attention

In an atmosphere of growing hostility to foreign assistance, Congress is devoting new attention to trade and investment initiatives in Africa. Recent proposals have the potential to generate economic opportunities for Africa and expand US ties with the continent. However, they may also threaten Africa's future if they divert funds from sustainable development efforts. In recent hearings before the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Washington Office on Africa called on Congress to ensure that trade and investment measures complement and reinforce continued development assistance programs.

Trade relations have attracted increasing attention since 1994, when Congress considered the agreements which emerged from the "Uruguay Round" of negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT is the multilateral treaty which regulates international commerce. Critics of the Uruguay agreements warn that poor countries will be less able to take advantage of the new trading opportunities expected to result from the negotiations.

In acknowledgment of these concerns, Congress required the President to prepare and implement a comprehensive trade and development policy for sub-Saharan Africa and to report annually on its progress. The first report, issued by the US Trade Representative's office in February 1996, received a mixed reaction from members of Congress and non-governmental organizations.

The report contained several provisions designed to promote communication and coordination among Executive agencies involved in Africa-related programs. It also recognized the need to strengthen Africa's regional economic networks and to make capital and financial services more readily accessible to marginalized groups, especially women and rural communities.

As a whole, however, the report revealed a disappointing lack of creativity. It consisted largely of a reiteration of existing programs. It offered an uncritical endorsement of structural adjustment programs, and failed to address the pivotal issue of Africa's debt.

Members of the House of Representatives responded by forming a bipartisan Africa Trade and Investment Caucus (ATIC). In June, Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA), one of the Caucus' co-chairs, outlined proposals for new Africa trade and investment initiatives.

McDermott called for:

- the formation of a US-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum, which would bring together US and African government officials at the ministerial/cabinet level to discuss economic policy;
- the creation of a US-Africa Free Trade Area by the year 2020; and
- the establishment of a $300 million equity fund to leverage investment in African businesses. The equity fund would be privately managed, but would be set up with public money, much of which would be diverted from existing US Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in Africa.

These proposals are expected to be introduced in legislative form when Congress reconvenes in September. Given the current congressional enthusiasm for cutting foreign assistance, the package is likely to receive a favorable reception in both the House and Senate. Indeed, "Trade not Aid" is becoming an increasingly common refrain in Washington.

WOA and other supporters of development approaches that emphasize economic justice and sustainability have consistently opposed reductions in foreign assistance programs, pointing out that the US already ranks last...
among all industrialized countries in the percentage of its Gross National Product which is committed to aid. At the same time, they have called upon USAID to focus more of its resources on reducing economic inequality and ensuring that the recipients of assistance have greater control over the identification of development priorities.

In testimony to the August 1 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Trade, WOA emphasized the following points:

1. Trade and aid policies should be seen as complementary, rather than as mutually exclusive options. The effectiveness of both will also be significantly affected by the adequacy of measures to diminish the indebtedness of African states. The issue of what policies are most effective in promoting sustainable development that can benefit the majority of Africa’s people is complex. There are no magic formulas to ensure success. US policy must integrate a range of components—including substantial reduction of African debt—without portraying sustainable development and private sector approaches as contradictory alternatives.

2. Aid should not be viewed as “charity” or “welfare,” nor restricted to humanitarian relief. Aid is more properly seen as a counterpart to government support and subsidies for private sector initiatives. It should represent public investment in sustainable development to produce long-term benefits for both “donor” and “recipient” countries. Short-sighted and indiscriminate cuts in aid programs not only endanger human lives today, but also seriously diminish the chances for future economic growth in Africa and other regions—growth which could benefit the United States, too.

3. Private sector trade and investment is a necessary component of any sustainable development strategy, and government subsidies to facilitate the acceleration of such private sector activities are amply justified. However, private sector trade and investment is not a substitute for adequate and sustainable levels of aid. The diverse experiences of East and Southeast Asian countries show that taking advantage of market opportunities requires not only liberalization and export orientation, but also massive investments in state capacity and human resource development.

4. Funds should not be transferred from existing programs without a prior evaluation comparing the effectiveness of these funds in their current deployment with the projected effects of their redeployment. Some existing US programs have demonstrated success in stimulating private sector growth, trade, and investment, often in highly creative ways. In contrast, the mixed record of the ten enterprise funds created for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union emphasizes the need for adequate planning.

5. Any new initiatives will require careful consideration and a full elaboration of details prior to implementation. This planning process should include extensive consultation with African states, representatives of African civil society, multilateral agencies, and expert advisors.

6. To achieve long-term success, bilateral trade initiatives must dramatically enhance African access to US markets. This includes not only the extension of preferential terms of trade to African nations, but also the encouragement of investment in both the physical and social infrastructure which undergird sustainable development. US policy should promote emerging African industries in a manner which does not invite worker exploitation or environmental destruction.

7. Eligibility for participation in any new trade or investment program should be established on the basis of transparent conditions relevant to the programs themselves, and not exclusively conditioned on participation in larger schemes. For example, once the scope of a particular investment fund is determined by its charter, applications for financing should be open to projects in any sub-Saharan African country, perhaps with preference to projects which demonstrate regional rather than single-country impact.

For a copy of WOA’s full 11 page statement, please write to us, enclosing a self-addressed, stamped envelope. Excerpts of the US Trade Representative’s report and WOA’s response are available on our Web site (see page 2).
Liberian Bar Association, Frederick Cherue.

At a meeting on August 17, factional leaders and ECOWAS officials agreed on a new disarmament plan, adopted a revised timetable for elections (now scheduled for May 1997), and named Ruth Perry to chair Liberia's transitional Council of State. Perry, a former Liberian Senator, replaces Prof. Wilton Sankawulo. Her appointment raises hopes for a strong leadership, though it remains to be seen how much authority she will have in practice.

In sum, three basic steps are needed if Liberian civilians are to have a chance to rebuild their society. The United States must support these measures with diplomatic pressure and financial resources.

1. The international peacekeeping force already on the ground must be maintained and upgraded. West African states must continue to play a central role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, regardless of the shortcomings of their past involvement and doubts about the future. (ECOWAS leadership is shifting, as Ghana's President Jerry Rawlings ended his term as chair in late July. His successor is General Sani Abacha, head of the Nigerian military regime.)

   However, West African states do not have the diplomatic clout, the credibility, or the logistical resources to do the job entirely on their own. The ECOMOG force needs adequate logistical support. Its efforts also need to be supplemented by consistent backup and monitoring from the wider international community, including an expanded United Nations peacekeeping presence which can balance the West African role.

2. The peace process must be linked to plans for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants. Continued participation by faction leaders in the political process should be contingent on their cooperation with disarmament, as specified in the Abuja peace agreement.

   The warlords likely will only comply with such demands if action is taken to block the flow of arms. This includes strong and effective pressure on neighboring countries, particularly Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, to restrict the supplies of arms to the factions.

   Disarmament will not be possible without simultaneous planning for demobilization. Successful reintegration of former combatants into civilian life in turn depends on the creation of economic opportunities within the civilian economy. Such a comprehensive plan will be costly, but it is more practical—and, in the long term, less expensive—than responding to repeated humanitarian emergencies.

3. Steps must be taken to guarantee a more active role in the transition for the vast majority of unarmed Liberians and Liberian civic institutions. The peace process must not be held hostage by any of the armed faction leaders. Unless new measures are taken to protect and encourage civilian political activity, the peace process will be again be doomed to fail.

   One option might be the convening of a broad national conference with international sponsorship and support.

What You Can Do

Write to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Urge that the United States become more actively engaged in the search for peace in Liberia.

Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Council
Washington, DC 20500
Fax: (202) 456-2883

Secretary Warren Christopher
US Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
Fax: (202) 647-6434

Stay informed! For updates on the situation in Liberia, contact Ezekiel Pajibo, Africa Faith and Justice Network, 401 Michigan Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20017. Tel. (202) 832-3412. Fax (202) 832-9051. E-mail: afjn@igc.apc.org.