Fernando Moises, nine, was looking for firewood alone when he stepped on an anti-personnel landmine near Kuito, Angola, in 1995. His left leg blown off, Moises lay in his blood for two hours until he was found, rescued and carried by neighbors on foot seven kilometers to the hospital in Kuito where basic medical care provided by Medecins sans Frontieres saved his life.

Landmines Ban Gains Momentum Despite US Resistance

There are thousands of Fernandos throughout Southern Africa, and the numbers grow daily. Every 22 minutes—70 times each day—somewhere on the planet a human life is abruptly ended or permanently changed by the scourge of landmines. In recent months, the international campaign to ban these deadly weapons has made rapid progress, in spite of US government efforts to weaken a treaty which would outlaw the production, use, sale, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. The campaign gained additional moral authority on October 10th when it was named the winner of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. Within hours of this announcement, the Russian Government—previously unenthusiastic about the treaty—indicated that it would agree to a ban.

Landmines, booby-traps, and other unexploded ordnance remain active in the ground for decades, long after the wars that spawn them are over. In Africa, they are a deadly legacy of Cold War superpower confrontation and of the apartheid South African government's regional destabilization campaign. Today, mines continue to be low-cost weapons of choice for governments, insurgents, and mercenaries bent on destroying civilian economies.

Landmines restrict access to water and agricultural lands, disrupt transportation and commercial networks, interfere with medical and educational services, and displace households and communities. Rural people of color are the most vulnerable populations.

Africa is the most heavily mined continent in the world with an estimated 18 to 30 million mines in 18 countries. Seven of the 17 countries most severely affected by landmines are in Africa. Between nine and 20 million mines are believed to be hidden in Angola alone—more than one mine for every citizen. In Mozambique, where more than one million mines are thought to be buried, the National Mine Clearance Commission estimates that landmines claim at least 40 lives each month.

African nations have been in the forefront of the international drive to negotiate a comprehensive ban on landmines. In September, representatives of more than 100 nations gathered in Oslo, Norway, for the final treaty negotiations. US delegates made strenuous attempts to secure an exemption for US mines in Korea, to delay enforcement of a ban by up to 19 years, and to badger NATO allies into supporting US objections. In the end, the conference adopted language calling for a total global ban on the production, use, sale, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines. In addition, the treaty recognizes the urgent need of landmine survivors and mine-contaminated communities for international support for demining, rehabilitation, and sustainable development programs.
The treaty will be formally signed in Ottawa, Canada on December 2-4. From December 5, it will be housed at the United Nations and will remain open for further signatures. Once a government has signed, its endorsement must be ratified according to its own national laws. The treaty will enter into force once 40 nations have ratified it, a goal which organizers hope will be achieved before the year 2000. However, under existing international law (Article 18, Vienna Convention), states commit themselves to being bound by the spirit and intent of the treaty as soon as they sign.

What WE can do

1. Send a message to the White House!
President Clinton has said he supports a total ban "as soon as possible," but he has indicated that the US will not sign the current treaty. Contact key Administration officials to demand that the United States be represented in Ottawa in December 1997 to join with more than 100 other nations in signing this historic document.

   Call, fax or write to:
   President William Jefferson Clinton
   The White House
   Washington, DC 20500
   White House Hot Line: 202-456-1111
   Fax: 202-456-2461

   Mr. Samuel Berger
   National Security Advisor
   The White House
   Washington, D.C. 20500
   Fax: 202-456-2883

   Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
   Department of State
   Washington, D.C. 20520
   Fax: 202-647-6434

2. Send a message to Congress!
The United States has imposed a temporary ban on the export of US-produced antipersonnel landmines, thanks to the leadership of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT). This summer Sen. Leahy, Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and 58 other cosponsors introduced legislation, S. 896, that would prohibit the deployment of new antipersonnel landmines by the US government after January 1, 2000. The House version, H.R. 2459, was introduced in September by Representatives Lane Evans (D-IL) and Jack Quinn (R-NY) and quickly acquired 182 more cosponsors.

   Write to your Senators and your Representative. Encourage them to cosponsor the current legislation and to ask their colleagues to do so as well. Urge them to press President Clinton to sign the Ottawa Treaty.

3. Send a message to your neighbors!
Launch solidarity actions in your hometown. Sample city and county council resolutions supporting the ban are available from:

   Northern Arizona Peace & Justice Network
   Attn.: Bud Day
   8555 Silver Spur
   Flagstaff, AZ 86004
   Phone: 520-527-1283 Fax: 520-523-6777
   E-mail: warren.day@nau.edu

   Join the US campaign to receive background materials and information on petition drives and upcoming events related to the treaty signing, implementation, and monitoring processes:

   The US Campaign to Ban Landmines
   Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
   2001 S Street, NW #740
   Washington, D.C. 20009
   1-800-853-9292 Fax: 202-483-9312
   E-mail: banminesusa@vva.org
   Web: http://www.vva.org/landmine/uscbl.htm

Landmines claim at least 40 lives each month in Mozambique.
As Nigeria's military dictatorship pursues an increasingly ruthless campaign against human rights, pro-democracy, and environmental activists, the United States continues to dither, lending implicit approval to General Abacha's reign of terror.

Although Nigeria has been receiving less media attention recently, repression continues unabated. Federal troops occupying the oil-rich Niger Delta have stepped up their attacks on local communities protesting the destruction of their lands. Twenty Ogoni activists are still being held under intolerable conditions on the same charges for which the regime executed human rights and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight colleagues in November 1995. At the end of September, police raided a conference on democracy, arresting 71 participants. More than 20 journalists have been detained in the past month for covering Gen. Abacha's reported illness, and a government crackdown on news vendors has already caused one death.

Neither the White House nor Congress is yet ready to challenge the Nigerian military's strongarm tactics, in spite of a professed US commitment to democracy and human rights. In November 1995, following Saro-Wiwa's execution, the United States and other countries adopted limited sanctions against Nigeria. The White House banned arms sales to the Nigerian military, cut off direct flights to Nigeria, opposed new loans to the Nigerian government, and restricted US visas for Nigerian officials.

Since then, the United States has failed to address the deteriorating political situation in Nigeria. In June, Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ) reintroduced the Nigerian Democracy Act (H.R. 1786) on which the last Congress took no action. The bill would codify existing sanctions, adding a freeze on US assets held by Nigerian government officials and a ban on new US investment in Nigeria. To date, it has attracted 37 cosponsors, but it still has fewer cosponsors than in 1996. No corresponding measure has been introduced in the Senate—a further sign that Nigeria remains at the bottom of the Congressional agenda.

The State Department has been equally sluggish. This summer, the agency initiated a comprehensive review of US policy toward Nigeria. As of late October, however, State Department officials would say only that the review was still in progress.

Pro-democracy groups fear that the United States will adopt a "wait-and-see" policy with respect to the elections Gen. Abacha plans to orchestrate by October 1, 1998. Inaction would imply US acceptance of Abacha's bogus transition plan, ignoring the military's stage management of the electoral process and the draconian security measures that preclude the possibility of free and fair elections.

At the end of September, armed security personnel broke up a farewell party for outgoing US Ambassador Walter Carrington organized by pro-democracy groups. While the State Department made only a belated and feeble response to this act of aggression, some members of Congress were outraged. Congressional Black Caucus Chair Maxine Waters (D-CA) and 74 cosponsors introduced H.Res. 260, condemning the armed assault on Ambassador Carrington and calling on the US government to implement additional (but unspecified) sanctions against the Abacha regime.

However, neither the State Department nor Congress have seriously considered the one initiative that would most effectively undermine the Nigerian regime's confidence: an embargo on Nigerian oil. The Nigerian dictatorship derives roughly 90 per cent of its export earnings from oil sales, and the United States is the regime's biggest single customer.

While oil drilling and refinement have caused extensive environmental destruction in the oil fields of the Niger River delta, the Ogoni people and other ethnic minorities who inhabit the region realize little benefit from the exploitation of their lands. Instead, oil revenues enrich Nigeria's ruling elite, prompting the military to tighten its grip on power. Shell, Mobil, Chevron, and other transnational oil companies have joined the Nigerian government in waging an expensive public relations battle to stave off oil sanctions.

Continued on page 5
Select Legislation Relating to Africa

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION

KENYA
H.Con.Res. 130
Sponsor: Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-FL)
Date: 7/29/97
Cosponsors: 4
Urges: the Government of Kenya to take steps to avoid more violence in the future; rapid progress toward conducting free and fair elections; the cessation of violence in Kenya; the US Government and the international community to continue to exert pressure on the Government of Kenya to ensure a lasting transition to democracy. Calls for the creation of a unified pro-democracy movement to work for constitutional, statutory, and administrative reforms.

Status: 10/9/97 — Marked-up by International Relations Committee.

NIGERIA
H.R. 1786
Date: 6/4/97
Cosponsors: 37
A bill to impose sanctions against Nigeria, and for other purposes. See article, page 3.

Status: 6/4/97 — Referred to the Committees on International Relations, Banking and Financial Services, Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Judiciary.

Sponsor: Rep. Waters (D-CA)
Date: 10/6/97
Cosponsors: 74
Condemns the Nigerian dictatorship for its abuse of United States Ambassador Walter Carrington. See article, page 3.

Status: 10/6/97 — Referred to the International Relations Committee.

SIERRA LEONE
H.Con.Res. 99
Sponsor: Rep. Houghton (R-NY)
Date: 6/16/97
Cosponsors: 13
Expresses concern over recent events in the Republic of Sierra Leone in the wake of the military coup d'état of that country’s first democratically elected president.

Status: 7/22/97 — Measure passed House, 418-1.
10/24/97 — Reported out of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Pending in Senate for concurrent vote.

SOUTH AFRICA
H.Con.Res. 89
Sponsor: Rep. Furse (D-OR)
Date: 5/22/97
Cosponsors: 106
Expresses the sense of Congress that the 2004 Summer Olympic Games be held in Cape Town, South Africa.

Status: 5/22/97 — Referred to the International Relations Committee.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (formerly Zaire)
H.Res. 115
Sponsor: Rep. Royce (R-CA)
Date: 4/16/97
Cosponsors: 13
A resolution concerning the promotion of peace, stability, and democracy in Zaire.

Status: 4/17/97 — Measure passed House, as amended.

GENERAL LEGISLATION RELATING TO AFRICA

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
H.R. 1253
Sponsor: Rep. C. Smith (R-NJ)
Date: 4/9/97
Cosponsors: 0
A bill to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for the fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes.

Status: 4/10/97 — Forwarded by Subcommittee to International Relations Committee (amended).

H.R. 2159
Sponsor: Rep. Callahan (R-AL)
Date: 7/14/97
Cosponsors: 0
A bill making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1998, and for other purposes.

9/5/97 — Measure passed Senate in lieu of S. 955. Currently awaiting action by conference committee.

COMMERCE
H.R. 1432
Sponsor: Rep. Crane (R-IL)
Date: 4/24/97
Cosponsors: 49
African Growth and Opportunity Act. For provisions, see article, page 7.


S. 778
Sponsor: Sen. Lugar (R-IN)
Date: 5/21/97
Cosponsors: 3
Identical to H.R. 1432, as introduced. See article page 7.

Status: 5/21/97 — Referred to the Committee on Finance.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
H.R. 1486
Sponsor: Rep. Gilman (R-NY)
Date: 4/29/97
Cosponsors: 0
A bill to consolidate international affairs agencies, to reform foreign assistance programs, to authorize appropriations for foreign assistance programs and for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes.

Status: 5/9/97 — Reported to House (amended) by Committee on International Relations.

S. 903
Sponsor: Sen. Helms (R-NC)
Date: 6/13/97
Cosponsors: 0
An original bill to consolidate the foreign affairs agencies of the United States, to authorize appropriations for the Depart-
ment of State for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and to provide for reform of the United Nations, and for other purposes.  
**Status:** 6/17/97 — Senate passed companion measure H.R. 1757 in lieu of this measure by vote of 90-5. Pending in conference committee.

**H.R. 1757**  
**Sponsor:** Rep. Gilman (R-NY)  
**Date:** 6/3/97  
**Cosponsor:** 1  
A bill to consolidate international affairs agencies, to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, and for other purposes.  
**Status:** 6/11/97 — Measure passed House (amended). 6/17/97 — Measure passed Senate in lieu of S. 903 (amended). Pending in conference committee

**PEACE AND MILITARY ISSUES**  
**S. 1067**  
**Sponsor:** Sen. Kerry (D-MA)  
**Date:** 7/24/97  
**Cosponsors:** 12  
A bill to prohibit United States military assistance and arms transfers to foreign governments that are undemocratic, do not adequately protect human rights, are engaged in acts of armed aggression, or are not fully participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.  
**Status:** 7/24/97 — Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

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**Priority Legislation Awaiting Action Prior to Recess**

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<th>Bill</th>
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<td>H.R. 1432 / S. 778</td>
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<td>Foreign Relations Appropriations Act, FY 1998</td>
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**H. Amdt. 171 (Amends: H.R. 1757)**  
**Sponsor:** Rep. McKinney (D-GA)  
**Date:** 6/10/97  
An amendment to require the President to submit to Congress a list of countries that he wishes to make eligible for United States arms exports and to specify which countries are undemocratic or which abuse human rights.  
**Status:** 6/10/97 — Amendment agreed to by voice vote.  
**S. 896**  
**Sponsor:** Sen. Leahy (D-VT)  
**Date:** 6/12/97  
**Cosponsors:** 59  
A bill to restrict the use of funds for new deployments of antipersonnel land mines, and for other purposes.  
**Status:** 6/12/97 — Referred to Armed Services Committee. See cover article.  
**H.R. 2459**  
**Sponsor:** Rep. Evans (D-IL)  
**Date:** 9/11/97  
**Cosponsors:** 183  
A bill to restrict the use of funds for new deployments of anti-personnel land mines, and for other purposes.  
**Status:** 9/11/97 — Referred to the Committees on National Security and International Relations. See cover article.  

For the text and current status of all legislation listed, see the Library of Congress legislative web site, THOMAS: http://thomas.loc.gov. Note, however, that the bill text typically does not include amendments adopted in committee.

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**US Policy Vacuum**

> Continued from page 3

Meanwhile, Nigerian pro-democracy activists in the United States and around the world are joining forces with environmental, human rights, and Africa advocates to initiate people’s sanctions. Borrowing tactics from the anti-apartheid movement, church, labor, student, and community groups have launched an international boycott of Shell and have convinced several US city and county governments to restrict their investments in and purchasing from firms that do business in Nigeria. In solidarity with imprisoned Nigerian labor leaders, the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM) recently launched a global campaign to track Nigerian oil shipments and to stop the oil from being unloaded in foreign ports.

For further information, see the Africa Policy Information Center Country Profile on Nigeria and other Nigeria documents archived on the WOA/APIC web site, www.africapolicy.org.

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**NEW from the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC):**

**The Reconstruction of Africa: Faith and Freedom for a Conflicted Continent**

by Ngoy Daniel Mulundo-Nyanga

This new assessment of the churches’ role in African political life links Africa’s struggle for democratic freedoms with the churches’ ministry of reconciliation and conflict resolution. Mulundo-Nyanga, a former WOA intern, is currently the Executive Secretary for International Affairs of the AACC. 156 pp. Paperback. 1997. ISBN: 9966-886-26-5.

Copies of this book are available for $15 each (plus $2.50 postage and handling) from:

*Africa Office*  
National Council of Churches  
475 Riverside Drive, Room 612  
New York, NY 10115
Summit Leaders Fail to Address Key Issues

On June 20–22, the leaders of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States gathered in Denver for their annual economic summit. Prior to the summit, the US-Africa Trade Policy Working Group, a coalition of secular and faith-based nongovernmental organizations, issued a statement calling for broad consultation with Africans to identify effective strategies for reducing poverty and facilitating sustainable development. The statement, published in the last edition of WNA (Summer 1997), is available, with other critiques, on the Web at www.africapolicy.org. The summit's concluding communiqué proposes a “Partnership for Development” in Africa, but the initiatives envisioned fall far short of the need. The following are brief notes on the actions to which the leaders agreed:

Poverty reduction

Action: The leaders agreed to adopt “a results-oriented approach to development policy, with the particular goal of combating extreme poverty.”
Assessment: The goal is admirable, but progress will be difficult to measure. The Eight should regularly evaluate the impact their efforts have on poverty in Africa. The commitment to poverty reduction must become a priority in all initiatives, including trade and investment, not just aid.

Debt relief

Action: A separate economic communiqué, reiterated support for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, indicated that the Paris Club of creditor governments would participate more fully in the initiative, and called for the extinguishing of bilateral concessional debt.
Assessment: The leaders did not provide additional resources for debt relief, accelerate the timetable for debt relief, adopt higher targets for total bilateral debt reduction, or modify the economic reforms which debtor nations must implement to be eligible for debt relief. These reforms have often meant lower living standards for poor households as a result of cuts in social investment, elimination of food price subsidies, currency devaluation, etc. Debt relief conditionality must not thwart efforts to reduce poverty.

Aid

Action: The communiqué, acknowledged a continued need for development assistance, but made no commitment to increasing aid to Africa.
Assessment: A target figure for aid, expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, would have encouraged the least generous donor nations (such as the United States) to increase their investment in human development. Alarmingly, the leaders linked development assistance to recipients' success in carrying out “necessary broad-based reforms.” Making assistance conditional on the adoption of specific economic policies promotes external, not local, control of national development agendas.

Agriculture and food security

Action: The communiqué completely ignored African agricultural development and mentioned food security only as a potential target for aid.
Assessment: The Eight neglected an important opportunity to set targets for full implementation of the Marrakesh Decision which aims to mitigate the detrimental effects of the Uruguay Round on food security.

Trade and investment

Action: The leaders committed to opening their markets more fully to African products, but endorsed the idea of making market access contingent on economic liberalization.
Assessment: African nations continue to operate at a disadvantage in the global market. Compelling them to abandon economic protection on the same schedule as powerful nations will perpetuate their disadvantaged status.

Conflict resolution

Action: The Eight pledged to support African peacebuilding initiatives and to work through the United Nations to strengthen these efforts. The communiqué included a commitment to a global ban on antipersonnel landmines.
Assessment: The leaders did not report significant progress toward the fulfillment of a similar commitment made last year in Lyon. The Eight failed to offer an unambiguous endorsement of the Ottawa process, which is working toward a December 1997 treaty banning landmines.
US Trade Initiatives Offer Few Benefits for Most Africans

US policymakers have devoted increased attention to Africa trade initiatives during the past year, but the proposed initiatives offer few concrete benefits to ordinary people across the continent.

Legislators began to take more notice of US trade relationships with Africa in late 1994 during the debate over the adoption of the Uruguay Round amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (see WNA 22:1, Summer 1996). Concerned that the new trade regime would further marginalize African nations, Congress required the Administration to prepare an annual trade and development strategy for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The Office of the US Trade Representative published the first such strategy in February 1996 and revised it in February 1997.

Dissatisfied with the Administration's lack of creativity, a bipartisan group of Representatives began to develop their own package. In April 1997, House Trade Subcommittee Chair Phil Crane (R-IL), Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA), and Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) introduced the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (H.R. 1432). To date, the bill has attracted 47 additional cosponsors, including more than half of the Congressional Black Caucus. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) introduced companion legislation (S. 778) in the Senate.

The legislation has four main components, all of which would be available only to sub-Saharan African nations that are pursuing specific economic reforms. First, it would set up annual meetings at which the US Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce and their counterparts from participating African nations would discuss trade and investment relations. The corresponding Heads of State would also meet biannually.

Second, it would expand access to US markets for certain African countries. The bill would eliminate US quotas on the import of African textiles (currently applied only to Kenya and Mauritius). It would also extend the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program for eligible countries. GSP offers import tariff concessions to developing nations, making their goods more competitive in US markets. H.R. 1432 would renew the program for eligible sub-Saharan nations until 2007 and would expand the list of imported goods for which concessions are available.

Third, it would set up two new funds to provide capital for investment in business development and infrastructure. The program would be administered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) which would capitalize the funds by guaranteeing loans raised from private sector sources. A total of $150 million is expected to be made available for business investment, with an additional $500 million raised for infrastructure investment.

Fourth, the bill requires the President to draft a plan for the creation of one or more US-Sub-Saharan Africa free trade zones.

In June, on the eve of the Denver Summit of the Eight industrialized powers, President Clinton announced his own "Economic Partnership with Africa," the provisions of which are virtually identical to those of H.R. 1432. The primary difference between the two packages is that the White House plan identifies three "tiers" of participation that link benefits to progress in implementing economic reforms. GSP concessions would remain one of the "basic" benefits available to all sub-Saharan countries, regardless of their economic policies.

Africa advocates welcomed policymakers' recognition of the need to engage African nations on a coherent and pro-active basis—instead of the old, ad hoc approach that rendered the continent invisible except in moments of crisis. They also applauded the revision of draft Congressional proposals—which initially portrayed trade and aid as competing strategies—to emphasize the importance of development assistance and debt relief to sustainable development. At the same time, however, US and African nongovernmental organizations have expressed serious reservations about specific aspects of the initiatives.

Continued on next page
Many of the concerns revolve around the eligibility requirements which countries must meet in order to take advantage of the new programs. The International Relations Committee recently added language to H.R. 1432 that would prevent participation by countries that consistently violate internationally recognized human rights, but the primary requirement in both the Congressional and Administration proposals is a demonstrated commitment to economic reform. The terms of that commitment are more explicit in the legislation. The bill restricts benefits to countries that have "established, or [are] making continual progress toward establishing, a market-based economy." It then lists more than a dozen specific areas in which participants will be expected to adopt "appropriate" policies: protection of property and intellectual property rights, deregulation of markets, privatization of state-owned enterprises, reduction of corporate taxes and tariffs, removal of price controls and subsidies, elimination of nontariff trade barriers, etc.

These criteria constitute an unacceptably rigid prescription for reform. Market deregulation does not automatically benefit most households. To the contrary, indiscriminate deregulation can have devastating consequences for vulnerable populations. Market liberalization should not be an end in itself, but should be pursued selectively as part of a package of reforms designed to promote sustainable development—especially the reduction of poverty and hunger—in environmentally responsible ways. Furthermore, conditioning increased trade and investment on compliance with these demands contradicts US commitments to the promotion of democracy and accountable government.

Although the legislation (like the White House plan) acknowledges the importance of continued development assistance programs and the urgent need for substantial debt relief, it makes no additional funding available for these programs. Instead, it earmarks funds for trade and investment programs most likely to be of immediate benefit to comparatively prosperous groups—not only successful individuals within nations, but also affluent nations within the region. Of the new initiatives funded by this bill, the $500 million infrastructure fund stands the best chance of improving services available to poor households. However, the bill lacks any mechanism to ensure that new infrastructure serves a broad cross-section of the population, and OPIC is unlikely to make accessibility a top priority in project assessment.

Neither the Administration nor the Congressional proposals give African grassroots organizations a meaningful voice in policy planning and implementation. The initiatives miss opportunities to encourage the emergence of inclusive, participatory, and accountable political institutions with the capacity and autonomy to respond to local conditions. While the Act calls for African non-governmental organizations and business leaders to meet in parallel with the Economic Forum, it provides no formal channel of communication among these bodies. Similarly, no provision is made for grassroots representatives to serve on the panels which are to be created to advise OPIC and the Export-Import Bank on the deployment of funds for investment.

Many critics are convinced that, in its current form, the bill could impede equitable and sustainable development in Africa. However, final action on the legislation is unlikely this year. Africa advocates should continue to urge Congress members to find constructive ways of modifying the bill. At the same time, both Congress and the White House need to be reminded that unrestrained markets are not a recipe for mutually beneficial US-African relations.

For critiques of these initiatives from African perspectives, see the articles from *African Agenda* and *EcoNews Africa* distributed electronically in September 1997 and archived on our Web site, [www.africapolicy.org](http://www.africapolicy.org).