Reagan’s Namibian Charade

On January 13th South Africa told the international conference convened in Geneva that it was “premature” to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, adopted in 1978. It declared that “acute distrust” and “lack of confidence” prevented the carrying out of the internationally accepted Western-sponsored plan that it had agreed to in principle in April 1978. The open truculence of the South African delegation and the unbridled attacks on SWAPO by South Africa’s political protege, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), reflected its final rejection of the international track of its two-track strategy. It appeared to have chosen the “internal solution” track.

While this rejection marked the culmination of three years of ever-increasing delays, stumbling blocks and objections which the South African government interposed to prevent UN-supervised elections in Namibia, the coming of the Reagan administration meant South Africa need not fear sanctions and that it might get the green light to install a Muzorewa-style puppet government in Namibia.

After Geneva, Sanctions or Appeasement?

Having invested its authority and responsibility in a Western plan that involved major concessions by the liberation movement, SWAPO, the United Nations faced a critical test of its own credibility. For four years, the African group at the UN had withheld asking for sanctions against South Africa in order to let the West play its diplomatic card, its persuasive talents and its influence in Pretoria. But in April, it decided that it must act, with the support of other Third World countries. On behalf of Mexico, Ambassador Munoz Ledo explained why the call for sanctions had broad support:

On the question of Namibia, practically everything has been said and practically everything has been tried... What prevails is a feeling of deep frustration... The United Nations can scarcely retreat before those who violate its resolutions and do harm to its principles. The Geneva meeting clearly established the limit beyond which any new offer or concession to the occupying power would be ineffective and a mockery of the international community.

The New American Game Plan

But going beyond those limits and making further concessions to South Africa is precisely what the Reagan administration is up to.

While recognizing that only the “international track” can end the war and settle finally the legal status of the territory, Reagan’s Africa expert, Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, warned last summer “it will fail unless or until Pretoria gains confidence that it can live with the outcome of a transition that it does not control unilaterally.” As Crocker said in Pretoria, “Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia.” Since the United States has chosen not to support sanctions or any other “stick,” it will by and large have to meet the terms South Africa sets for its withdrawal. In its eagerness to form a closer alliance with South Africa, the US has now put forth a plan geared to address South Africa’s concerns. In detail, the new plans looks like this:

1. Resolution 435 had called for UN-supervised and controlled elections for a constituent assembly that would write a constitution. Now the United States wants to provide a constitution for Namibia written by experts before any election. This would establish a basic political structure for Namibia which would protect Western and South African economic and military interests and take these decisions out of the hands of the Namibian people. Namibia’s resources,
now concentrated in the hands of white farmers and transnational corporations, would be guaranteed against nationalization or expropriation. The personal safety and security of whites would also be protected, although this issue is largely a bogus one. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma recently said in Salisbury, "We pledge here that we are prepared to give guarantees and safeguards to all white settlers in Namibia. No African in Namibia will rob a white man of his property. We welcome the settlers to live alongside us in Namibia."

Even more importantly, the constitution would, in Crocker's words, "reduce SWAPO's advantages"—meaning its overwhelming popularity—by mandating legislative representation for whites, ethnic groups and regions that would hamstring any electoral victory it might win. The constitution would also prohibit the presence of Soviet, Cuban or other foreign troops or South African liberation movements on Namibian soil. The West and South Africa would guarantee the constitution.

2. The US plan will offer further changes in Resolution 435 in order to reassure the South Africans. Since South Africa now objects to UN-commanded troops as "biased" in favor of SWAPO, it is proposing that the peacekeeping forces consist mainly of US, British and other western forces with perhaps a sprinkling from African countries friendly in South African eyes. These might be permanently stationed on the northern frontier to seal it. Election supervision would be similarly taken over by the West with just a sprinkling of UN personnel.

3. The United States would require more precise guarantees from Angola that Cuban forces would leave its territory when South African forces leave Namibia. It would threaten to or actually aid Jonas Savimbi's UNITA dissident movement now fighting the MPLA government in southern Angola. It would play on divisions in the MPLA to promote a "reconciliation" coalition government that would be oriented toward the West and capitalist development.

4. In order to induce South Africa to accept this highly favorable package of amendments, the US would offer South Africa "carrots" instead of "sticks": improved bilateral relations, easing of export restrictions, better consular facilities, full exchange of defense attaches and moving ahead on nuclear relations. If the Namibia issue were resolved, South Africa would be assisted by the US in gaining recognition as a legitimate regional power. As Crocker told the South Africans in April:

As long as the Namibia issue persists, we cannot reach a situation where US can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security network.

The Rationale Behind the Irrational

Sanctions against South Africa have never been popular with the conservative political forces which elected Reagan and the majority of the Congress. Sanctions would interfere with US trade and with investments in South Africa at a time when competition for markets, cheap and manageable labor and a government friendly to free-market profits is getting keener every day. United Nations sanctions are a particular anathema because they cannot be altered without the consent of the USSR and China, major potential adversaries to the US and advocates of Third World interests. Carter had a hard time with conservatives in supporting sanctions against Rhodesia. For Reagan, it would be contrary to his perception of South Africa as a friendly ally and to long-standing conservative doctrine.

As elsewhere in the world, in southern Africa the United States uses the mythology of Cuban and Soviet "adventurism" to justify its own support for military power projection to protect its "turf." Secretary Haig and Dr. Crocker maintain that the MPLA government is a Moscow puppet maintained in power solely by the military strength of the Cubans. Haig told the Senators at his confirmation hearings that the Cubans were "mercenaries" and that he favored "sanctions" against Angola. The US is one of the few countries in the world that refuses to grant recognition to Angola. In addition to this stick, the administration has called for the repeal of the Clark Amendment, which forbids US military or paramilitary aid to any party in Angola. While recognizing that UNITA cannot gain a military victory, the Reaganites believe, implausibly, that a stronger UNITA would result in a coalition government. More probably, the US believes that continuing civil war in Angola ties up Cuban and Soviet forces, creates popular dissatisfaction with a socialist government which cannot deliver on its economic promises and makes support for SWAPO's operations much more costly.

If Reagan believes sanctions are out and the pressure which the liberation movements generate is unacceptable because it could lead to Soviet or Cuban influences, then he justifies the assumption that only the whites can bring about "constructive change." But while South Africa is seen as the key, it has been in a testy mood ever since Zimbabwe's election last year.

The victory of Mugabe shocked South Africa, which had given all-out financial and political support to Muzorewa. Both the South African government and its creation, the DTA, shrank back from their earlier pledges for elections, to which they had agreed in the belief that they would win. Defense Minister Malan made it very clear to Dr. Crocker in April that the South African government "can't accept prospects of a SWAPO victory, which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from any elections which left SWAPO in a dominant position." The head of the DTA, Dirk Mudge, had made his position embarrassingly clear at Geneva: "We are for free elections—if we know we shall win them."

Consultation American Style

If the United States intended for African states to be persuaded by its new approach, its methods, not to speak of the substance of its proposals, surely smacked of the arrogance and insensitivity that had contributed to Kissinger's
Africa Reacts

If the American intention was to win the hearts and minds of Africans to a solution that South Africa would support, the new policy was a totally bankrupt failure. From Nairobi, the Christian Science Monitor reported that at the late June meeting of the Organization of African Unity, criticism and bad feelings against the United States ran like a persistent thread through private conversations, interviews, statements and formal resolutions. Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations B. Akparode Clark explained:

*These attitudes result from American actions. It is inexplicable that the US should declare South Africa a natural ally and to move from there to prevent implementation of the UN plan for Namibia.*

At its close, the OAU summit meeting passed unanimously a resolution accusing the Reagan administration of collusion with Pretoria in an attempt to block efforts to end South African rule in Namibia.

South Africa has so far made no concessions whatever in response to the “carrots.” Indeed, it would seem that South Africa knows it can get better relations with the United States without having to bargain for them. As Ambassador McHenry said, “South Africa is likely to gulp up all the carrots tossed to them and ask for more.” In fact, the new US plan had picked up its main points from South Africa, as the Financial Mail, a South African business magazine, pointed out on May 1st:

*There was also a remarkable general similarity between [South African] Foreign Affairs director general Brand Fourie’s three requisites for a settlement, and the first publicly revealed clues of what the Western Five are considering.*

If the objective of the Reagan administration was to lessen the influence of the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries in the area, the new policy is likely to be remarkably counterproductive. Angola’s Foreign Minister Paolo Jorge stated that Angola would ask for whatever help it needed if the US was preparing to assist its enemies.

Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, whose government is often used as the example of what might be achieved in Namibia through diplomacy, pointed out the illogicality of linking a solution in Namibia to the withdrawal of Cubans in Angola: “The South Africans are not in Namibia because the Cubans are in Angola. If that is logic, then we should give a logic lesson to the American administration.” Cuban troops came in large numbers to Angola to defend it from South African aggression, and Angola has already stated that the Cubans would leave when its own security was achieved through Namibian independence.

It has not been lost on SWAPO that even if they did come to power in Namibia, South Africa would still be a major threat to its independence. Malan told Crocker in April: “Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving South Africa. We will have to invade Namibia, and other countries as well.”

The United States will shortly announce whether its diplomatic effort will be continued or abandoned. Dr. Crocker has warned all concerned that the US will not continue a “cha-rade.” Having engaged in an attempt to appease the South Africans, Crocker seems unperturbed by the unanimous African rejection. But, then, he was not perturbed by African rejection of the Rhodesian internal settlement in 1978. His pro forma performance has won enthusiasm from almost no one except the South Africans and their internal political allies.

The amount of political capital which has been wasted by the Reagan administration is not its own but the western allies’ and the entire international community’s. The tragic result will be more war, more suffering, more torture and more bestiality in Namibia. Having played in Pretoria, the current American farce will not make it in the other capitals of the world.
Reagan and South Africa: All Carrots, No Sticks

The Reagan administration . . . welcomes the opportunity to improve relations between the United States and South Africa . . . Let us then build on these shared interests and let us talk as friends of the differences between us. Most importantly, let this be the new beginning of mutual trust and confidence between the United States and South Africa, old friends, like Minister Botha, who are getting together again.

With this warm greeting Secretary of State Haig opened his working luncheon with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha on May 14. This toast is but one of many indications in the first five months of the Reagan administration of an open, close alliance which is developing between the US and the racist South African government.

The only consistent theme that has emerged thus far from Reagan's foreign policy is the need to combat the threat of Soviet influence worldwide. It is clearly through this lens that Reagan administration officials are viewing the problems of southern Africa, and it is a perception that the South African government shares. South Africa has boasted for years of its value as a bulwark against communism in Africa, and now the Reagan administration intends to use it in just that capacity.

In order to develop a closer relationship with the South African government, Reagan administration officials believe they have to correct some errors of past policy that weakened South Africa's confidence in the US as a trusted ally.

Therefore, they have made it clear to South Africa that they will no longer have to worry about the anti-apartheid rhetoric of previous administrations, nor of the possibility of sanctions or other forms of international pressure. Indeed, when Chester Crocker first appeared in June before the House Africa Subcommittee as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chairman Howard Wolpe of Michigan asked whether the Reagan administration would consider using any diplomatic "sticks" against South Africa. Crocker's answer was unequivocal: there has been a need to demonstrate historically that if there is progress in South Africa it will be rewarded. This is the most potent form of policy.

US and South Africa Shape an Alliance

The contours of a new US-South African alliance are just beginning to emerge, but US government officials have provided some indications of the common goals of an alliance and also of the bargaining that will have to occur to work out their somewhat different interests in the region. Two leaked State Department documents provide invaluable insights into the Reagan administration's plans. The documents, made available by TransAfrica to the Washington Post in late May, are a Memo of Conversation reporting on Chester Crocker's meetings with Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan in Pretoria on April 15 and 16, and a memorandum from Crocker to Secretary Haig preparing Haig for his May 14 meeting with Foreign Minister Botha in Washington.

Chester Crocker advised Haig to hold out to South Africa the possibility of what South Africa wants the most: "a relationship [that] could move forward toward a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests." While urging Haig not to make "excessive promises," he suggested "we can, however, work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically."

President Reagan meets with South Africa's Pik Botha, the first African foreign minister to visit the Reagan White House.

Crocker made it clear to the House Africa Subcommittee that drawing closer to South Africa should not be seen as being only in South Africa's interests. He informed the Subcommittee that the US is considering a reciprocal upgrading of military attaches and US training of South African Coast Guard personnel. Crocker argued that these moves should not be seen as American concessions to South Africa, although he acknowledged that South Africa requested them. He argued further that the US has at least as much reason to exchange more military attaches as South Africa does.

But there are not agreements on all aspects of the alliance, and the US and South Africa face an immediate disagreement over Namibia. Crocker advised Haig to tell Botha that "we share your view that Namibia not be turned over to the Soviets and their allies. A Russian flag in Windhoek is as unacceptable to us as it is to you" (emphasis in the original). But the Reagan administration is trying to convince the Botha government that the best way to blunt supposed Soviet influence in Namibia is to come to a relatively quick settlement. South Africa has not yet come to the same conclusion (see article on Namibia).

US and South Africa Look North

In the meantime, the two governments are working toward some agreements about South Africa's military and economic role in the southern Africa region. A major component of South Africa's "total strategy against the total onslaught" is military attacks on the frontline states that aid the South African liberation movement. The Reagan administration's campaign against "international terrorism" has further encouraged such attacks. Indeed, South Africa attacked three African National Congress houses in Mozambique on January 30, only two days after Secretary Haig announced that "international terrorism will replace human rights" as a top US priority. Regular South African attacks on Angola have also continued.

But if the US grants South Africa a place in the western strategic alliance, it will also want a bigger say over South Africa's military actions in the region. As Crocker advised Haig, "we cannot afford to give them a blank check regionally." Crocker implied to Ministers Botha and Malan that South African attacks that can be construed as reprisals for
support of guerrillas are acceptable: only if they go beyond that would the US agree with the African states that these attacks contribute to regional instability. And by requesting repeal of the Clark Amendment, the Reagan administration's once again holding out the prospect of joint US-South African military actions in Angola, promised by Henry Kissinger in 1975 but later blocked by Congress' passage of the Clark Amendment.

On the economic front, both South Africa and the US want to promote the continuing dependence of independent southern African states on South Africa. For South Africa, this gives them greater leverage over these countries to dissuade them from increasing their support for the South African liberation movement as the struggle heats up. In addition, for the United States, this gives American corporations based in South Africa continued access to expand into regional markets. South African officials made very derogatory remarks to Crocker in April about the poor economic performance of African states, saying that "African is a dying continent" which only South Africa can save. Last summer Crocker said in Congressional testimony that it would be "tragic" for the US to listen to "racially polarized instincts ... to promote the 'de-linking' of the region's economies and infrastructure along racial lines." But this "de-linking" is exactly what the frontline states themselves are trying to promote; through the nine-member Southern Africa Development Coordinating Committee they are trying to increase the economic linkages among their states and thus decrease their dependence on South Africa.

**Nuclear Relations May Go Forward**

Approval of two stalled contracts for export of enriched uranium fuel is one of the carrots that the Reagan administration is considering offering South Africa to cement their relationship. Nuclear relations were the main bilateral issue discussed during Botha's May visit to Washington, but the Reagan administration has yet to make a firm decision on contacts that were on "hold" throughout the Carter years. Under agreements reached in the mid-1970's, the US was to supply enriched uranium for South Africa's nuclear power plant at Koeberg for 25 years after its startup date in 1982, as well as highly enriched fuel for Safari I, a research reactor.

The Carter administration hoped to use the export licenses for this fuel as leverage to get South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In recent South African government document prepared as a basis for the May 14 meetings in Washington, Pretoria states that "South Africa cannot in the interest of its own security sign the NPT and thus set minds of its would-be attackers at rest." Nevertheless, it hopes that the US will agree to grant the licenses with minimal delay.

By suspending until October 1st the penalty charges for the feed uranium that South Africa was to supply to the US for enrichment by late May, the Department of Energy has given the administration more time in which to reach a decision without further alienating South Africa. According to Nuclear Week, administration sources have suggested that South Africa go instead to the French for uranium enrichment, since French companies already hold the contracts for the construction of the Koeberg facility and the fabrication of enriched uranium into fuel rods for it. The South African document prepared in May indicates that South Africa would not object to such an arrangement if France did not insist on the same kinds of safeguards that the US is seeking. But now it is uncertain whether the Mitterand government would consent to enter into a new nuclear contract with South Africa.

**Export Policy Under Review**

The State Department is also considering sweetening economic relations with South Africa. Almost immediately after Reagan's inauguration, a review of the export controls on South Africa was begun. Administration officials insist that they will not tamper with the mandatory international arms embargo, but they have already weakened the ban on exports to the military and police that was imposed under President Carter following the 1976 Soweto uprising. New regulations published on June 30th permit the sale of medical equipment and supplies to the military on a case-by-case basis, even if they are intended for military use. They also permit the sale of such equipment as metal detectors to prevent interference with civil aviation on a case-by-case basis, as part of Reagan's policy against international terrorism. In addition, it is probable that the Reagan administration will loosen restrictions on sales of computers to South African government agencies and of certain dual-purpose goods such as some types of aircraft to private buyers.

South Africa would also like to see a loosening of the restrictions on Export-Import Bank credits, and their foreign agent, former House of Representatives member James Symington, has been exploring that possibility. But these restrictions, banning financing for any US exports to the South African government and requiring private purchasers to be "moving toward implementing" fair employment practices, were enacted by Congress in 1978 and would therefore require Congressional repeal. But the Reagan State Department is reviewing its implementation procedures, because the South Africa government has since 1978 blocked all transactions by refusing to allow State Department personnel to conduct on-site investigations of the labor practices of corporations that request financing.

**Opposition to the Tilt Toward South Africa**

President Reagan's swift and unabashed moves to establish closer ties to South Africa have angered many Americans concerned about US policy toward southern Africa. The Reagan administration has made no attempt to hide its new friendliness toward South Africa, beginning in March when President Reagan told Walter Cronkite that South Africa was a "friendly nation" strategically essential to the free world which the US could not abandon. Protests against this emerging alliance began in earnest when five South African military intelligence officials appeared in the United States on
a secret mission in March, meeting with officials at the National Security Council and the Pentagon as well as with UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Major Black organizations from the NAACP to the Congressional Black Caucus called for Kirkpatrick's resignation, noting that Andy Young was forced to resign for making secret deals with the PLO in violation of policy. But the Reagan administration did not even deign to reply.

Foreign Minister Botha's official visit to Washington in May brought more protest. The Washington Office on Africa helped to coordinate a rally at the White House which attracted more than 500 protestors on less than two weeks notice. The Black United Front called a similar rally in New York.

The Congressional Black Caucus zeroed in on Reagan’s South Africa policy for criticism at a major press conference in March and a Foreign Policy Summit in May. Rep. Bill Gray, Chairman of the Caucus’ Foreign Affairs Braintrust, said, “To choose the apartheid regime of South Africa is to alienate all of Black Africa. It is also a slap in the face to 26 million Black Americans.”

African leaders have also been strongly critical of Reagan’s policy toward South Africa. Less than two months into Reagan’s term, the Africa Group at the United Nations took the unusual step of asking UN Secretary General Waldheim to deliver a statement of opposition to US support for South Africa to Ambassador Kirkpatrick on their behalf. And Reagan’s tilt toward South Africa on the Namibia negotiations was one of the main topics of discussion at the Organization of African Unity summit meeting in June, where the heads of state passed a resolution condemning the “unholy alliance” between the US and South Africa.

The Reagan administration has responded to African concerns with nothing but disdain. The State Department went so far as to accuse the Organization of African Unity of making statements that were “untrue and unhelpful” to a Namibia settlement and to peace in southern Africa. America’s European allies, however, are more sensitive to African concerns because of their more important economic ties to the region. So African thinking may have an indirect impact on Reagan via Europe. Reagan administration officials were surprised by the concerns expressed about southern Africa policy and particularly Namibia by the foreign ministers of France, West Germany and even Britain in their introductory meetings with US officials in the spring.

Even though Crocker and Haig are now treating independent African countries as being of little importance to the US, this behavior will not be productive for long even from their own point of view. The current oil glut will not last long, and Nigeria’s influence as the second largest oil supplier to the US cannot be ignored. In addition, the US is trying to reduce the balance of trade deficit with Africa, and faces competition from European countries for expanding export markets in many places in Africa. Even though Reagan’s sympathies with the white rulers of South Africa may not lessen, his defense of rewarding the Botha government for bringing reforms will wear thin as it becomes evident that this policy leads only to more government repression against South Africans working for fundamental change. Because of these political realities, it is possible for Americans who oppose apartheid to have some eventual impact on Reagan’s policy, and it is imperative that work to organize this opposition intensify.

The 97th Congress and Southern Africa

In the two Congressional battles on southern Africa thus far this year—over the confirmation of Chester Crocker and the request to repeal the Clark Amendment on Angola—the administration has won one and is still fighting on the other. These debates provide important insights into the role conservatives and liberals are playing as they vie for influence over US policy on southern Africa.

Senator Jesse Helms mounted a three-month, high-visibility confrontation with Chester Crocker over his confirmation, but Helms actually did a great service to the administration. Raising exaggerated criticisms from the right, he deflected criticism from the left of both the administration’s Africa spokesperson and the alarmingly conservative Africa policy which was being unveiled.

Helms Mounts Challenge from the Right

North Carolina Senator Helms—a vociferous supporter of white rule in Africa—is truly a Neanderthal in the way he views southern Africa. Helms proclaimed himself the standard-bearer of President Reagan’s true beliefs on Africa and accused Crocker of holding views that are “barely indistinguishable from those of his predecessor, Mr. Richard Moose.” But his criticisms are hardly accurate. He accused Crocker of forcing South Africa to give up its “advantages of power” and to surrender to a SWAPO government in Namibia, of giving a “subsidy for terrorism” by supporting “the Marxist redistributionist programs of Mr. Robert Mugabe, who came to power through terrorism,” and of failing to give the “unconditional support of the United States” to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola by favoring instead a coalition government which would not completely oust the MPLA. Like the most conservative “verkrampte” Afrikaners, Helms favors brute force over negotiations if negotiations might lead to a freely-selected socialist government.

When Helms finally lifted his “hold” on Crocker’s nomination and the Senate voted to confirm him on June 9th, Helms mustered only six other Senators—Denton of Alabama, East of North Carolina, Hatch of Utah, Humphrey of New Hampshire, and McClure and Symms of Idaho—to vote with him against Crocker. Even though he lost, Helms was taken seriously by the administration because of intra-party Republican politics, as Secretary Haig’s mid-May meeting with Helms on the Crocker nomination indicates. So when Crocker is formulating policy, the memory of Helms’ challenge will keep him looking toward the right.

Senate Liberals Choose Compromise Approach

Instead of mounting an equally strong challenge to Reagan’s Africa policy from the left, Senate Democrats directed their anger at Helms and soft-peddled criticisms of Reagan’s policy. They may well have figured that Crocker, being more moderate than many other Reagan appointees, was the best they could get. But they nevertheless foresook the opportunity of the confirmation hearings to challenge the administration’s policy. Senator Alan Cranston, the Democratic party whip, quoted Reagan at length on South Africa and declared it to be a good policy. Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts, the unquestioned leading Democratic spokesperson on Africa in the Senate, committed himself from the outset to supporting Crocker’s nomination and to working with Crocker on Namibia while he had an opportunity to try a new approach.

Senate Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee, led by Paul Tsongas, did take on the administration on the
Clark Amendment repeal. But, because of their minority position in the now Republican-dominated Senate, they pursued a compromise strategy from the start. Senator Tsongas’ approach was based not only on power relationships in the Senate, but also on his personal priority on redefining American liberalism by attacking not liberal ideals but liberal inflexibility.

Democratic Committee members were united and well-organized for the intense two-hour negotiations with their Republican counterparts over the Clark Amendment. They could actually have won a vote in the Committee on May 13th to preserve the Clark Amendment, which gives Congress authority over all military or paramilitary aid to any group in Angola. But, because they feared that this position would be defeated by the full Senate, they decided to work out in advance compromise language that they hoped they could get key Committee Republicans to defend on the Senate floor.

The language that the Committee adopted by 14 to 2 calls for an immediate repeal of the Clark Amendment, and requires that, prior to any aid being given to any group in Angola, the President must report to their Committee (and to the parallel committee in the House) on the national security reason for the aid and the details of the aid, and on a determination that “substantial progress, including an effective ceasefire and preparations for an internationally supervised election, has been made toward a settlement” in Namibia. This language is not what proponents of the Clark Amendment wanted, but, with the addition by Senator Tsongas of the clause on Namibia, it may have been the best language that could be sustained in the full Senate.

Moderate Republicans Hold the Key

What the Democrats failed to get, however, was a strong commitment from both of the key Committee Republicans to defend this language on the floor. While Chairman Percy voted for the “Percy-Tsongas Amendment,” which was in fact based on report language that he had drafted, he had shown a preference during the debate for weaker language requiring no report to the Committee at all or a determination only on whether, not that, progress had been made in the Namibia negotiations. Senator Percy has had a personal interest in a negotiated settlement in Namibia since he visited there in 1976. An overarching concern for Percy is trying to achieve consensus in his committee that will prevail in the full Senate, and he appeared to be unhappy with the language that the Democrats forced him to accept.

The other key Committee Republican, Africa Subcommittee Chairwoman Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas), cast one of the two votes against the compromise. She has taken a genuine interest in Africa, even though she would have preferred to chair the subcommittee dealing with Latin America and she admits to her substantial lack of knowledge of Africa. Kassebaum is noted in the Senate for her integrity, and her vote in the Committee against the appointment of Ernest Lefever for the State Department’s human rights post is believed by many to have been the final straw against him.

In January Senator Kassebaum expressed concern about the poor timing of the administration’s request to repeal the Clark Amendment, given the stalemated Namibia negotiations, and also about the strong reaction that repeal would elicit from Nigeria and other independent African countries. Kassebaum’s concern about Nigeria stems not only from its importance as a supplier of oil, but from specific links Nigeria has with Kansas—Kansas State University helped to set up colleges of veterinary medicine and agriculture in Nigeria and also has contracts with six Nigeria states to provide training assistance. Kassebaum also takes a sympathetic view towards Zimbabwe and its agriculture development strategy. But when it comes down to votes, Kassebaum’s Committee vote on Angola suggests that she feels constrained whenever possible to following the administration’s policy.

House Liberals Come Out Swinging on Southern Africa

Liberals in the House of Representatives—both Democrats and Republicans, both Blacks and Whites—have launched a determined protest against Reagan’s policies toward southern Africa, establishing a tone strikingly different from that in the Senate.

The House Africa Subcommittee is now under the competent, strongly liberal chairmanship of Michigan Democrat Howard Wolpe. Wolpe is well-suited to chair the subcommittee, since he did fieldwork for his Ph.D. in political science in Nigeria and has authored a book on that country. This background bolstered Wolpe’s challenge of moderate Florida Democrat Dan Mica for the subcommittee chairmanship in the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Democratic caucus in February. Wolpe’s low-key but effective campaign won him the position after the Democrats voted 11-to-8 against Mica even though Mica outranked Wolpe in seniority. Since 1978 Wolpe has represented a traditionally Republican district in Kalamazoo, Battle Creek and suburban Lansing, Michigan, headquarters of Kellogg’s and Upjohn pharmaceutical companies, both of which invest in South Africa. Aware of the political disadvantage that chairing a subcommittee on faraway Africa was for former Senate Africa Subcommittee chairman Dick Clark in 1978, Wolpe held a seminar on investment opportunities in independent Africa this spring geared to his Michigan business constituency.

The Africa Subcommittee continues the pattern of previous sessions by being one of the most liberal subcommittees in the House. Even so, the bipartisan challenge it has posed to Reagan’s southern Africa policy has been remarkable. In two important hearings on Angola, both Democratic and Republican Subcommittee members grilled administration witnesses on their unconvinving rationale for repealing the Clark Amendment. None of the Subcommittee members actually supported retention of the Clark Amendment in principle, according to the administration’s view that this unique amendment restricting CIA actions in only one country should be repealed. But the Subcommittee voted unanimously to reject the repeal request “at this time,” because of the likely detrimental impact on the Namibia negotiations and on relations with independent Africa, and the prospect that the Angolan government would increase rather than reduce the Cuban troop presence if it were threatened with CIA intervention. Testimony by the President of Gulf Oil Exploration and Production, Melvin Hill, that repeal of the Clark Amendment could lead to Nigerian retaliation by cutting off oil shipments to the US also had an impact.

The Congressional Black Caucus has been another center of activity on southern Africa in the House of Representatives. Representative Bill Gray, head of the Caucus’ Foreign Affairs Braintrust, continues to take leadership in the Caucus on Africa, even though he left the Africa Subcommittee this session to take a seat on the Appropriations Committee and its Foreign Operations Subcommittee. Gray delivered a strong attack on Reagan’s support for South Africa at a press conference called by the Caucus in March, and has introduced legislation banning new investment in South Africa and urging the Executive Branch to normalize relations with Angola. Several members of the Caucus met with Secretary Haig in May, but Haig refused to respond substantively to their strong criticisms of the new US alliance with South Africa.
It is still too early to judge whether the Africa Subcommittee and Black Caucus views on southern Africa will prevail in the House as a whole. The House has given several important victories to President Reagan on budget issues, but its position on foreign policy issues has yet be to tested. The full Foreign Relations Committee's 19 to 5 vote against Reagan's request to repeal the Clark Amendment is a hopeful sign. Among the many issues in the foreign aid authorization bill which the Committee differed with the President, the Clark Amendment was the only one on which the Committee stood firmly and did not compromise. On El Salvador, where the administration argues that it must prevent a victory by the Soviet Union, the Committee voted to add some restrictions to US military aid rather than to cut the aid completely. But in the case of Angola, the Congress is perhaps more reticent to give the administration a free hand. Here, Reagan is threatening intervention in order to roll back perceived Soviet dominance in a region that is not seen to be central to America's geopolitical interests. In addition, the House has no strong ideological proponent of white interests in southern Africa similar to Jesse Helms in the Senate. For these reasons, the House of Representatives provides the best political forum in which to work to blunt Reagan's open support for South African interests.

**NEWSBRIEFS**

**Act Now on the Clark Amendment**

The full Senate and House will vote soon on whether to reject President Reagan's request to repeal the Clark Amendment on Angola. The Washington Office on Africa urges you to write immediately to your Senators and Representative asking them to vote against any amendments that would weaken or prevent the Clark Amendment, which bans military and paramilitary aid to any group in Angola unless the Congress authorizes it. Repeal of the Clark Amendment would threaten Angola with CIA intervention, alienate all of independent Africa, and shatter the possibility of cooperation with the frontline states and SWAPO to gain independence in Namibia.

The votes in both houses have not yet been firmly scheduled, but it is likely that the Senate will vote on the measure in late July and the House will vote in September following the August recess. The votes will come to the floor as part of the foreign aid authorization bill.

We place top priority on the House vote, since the Foreign Affairs Committee upheld the Clark Amendment in its entirety by a strong, bipartisan vote of 19 to 5 in May, while the Senate committee adopted compromise language. If the House sustains the position of its committee, that will put us in a strong position going into a conference with the Senate.

It is imperative that we go all-out to demonstrate to the Reagan administration that there is broad opposition to his racist and interventionist policy toward southern Africa.

**Divestment Conference Targets Public Funds**

More than twenty-five public officials were among the 175 participants in a conference in June on divesting state and city public funds from corporations doing business in South Africa. The Washington Office on Africa was one of the sponsors of the conference, along with the American Committee on Africa, TransAfrica, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the American Friends Service Committee, and the United Methodist Wo-