Pretoria's War Against Mozambique

by Allen Isaacman

The war in Southern Africa is escalating. The highly publicized South African attack on the Mozambican capital of Maputo and Pretoria's continued saber-rattling against its African neighbors suggest that this region is likely to become a terrain of increasing international conflict. The apartheid regime's attempt to redefine the conflict in Cold War terms, describing its borders with Angola and Mozambique as "its first and second fronts against communism," carries ominous implications in terms of a broader global conflict.

What is often overlooked is that the May 23rd air attack against Mozambique, in which a number of Mozambican civilians were killed and wounded, is part of South Africa's long-term strategy to intimidate and cripple the young nation. This strategy dates back to 1974 even before that country had become independent, when senior South African officials contemplated a preemptive attack against Mozambique to prevent FRELIMO (the Mozambican Liberation Movement) from coming to power. In the end a sharply divided South African government concluded that such a strategy was not feasible, although it did give at least tacit support to an abortive white settler coup which occurred in September 1974.

Instead, South African policy-makers chose to put increasing economic and military pressure on Mozambique to ensure that the government of Samora Machel could not threaten the racist regime. Since FRELIMO inherited an economy which was totally dependent on South Africa, Pretoria was able to exert such pressure with ease. Shortly after independence, for example, it cut the number of Mozambican laborers working in the gold mines from over 100,000 to 30,000, depriving the new government of its single most important source of hard currency. The apartheid regime has also redirected high value South African exports away from the port of Maputo and has threatened to build a new Indian Ocean facility to replace Maputo entirely.

But it is in the military sphere where South African pressure has been most devastating. As early as 1976, South African intelligence, together with its Rhodesian counterparts, helped to organize an anti-FRELIMO fifth column comprised of former Portuguese secret police and ex-colonial troops, disaffected settlers and mercenaries which became the basis of the Mozambique National Resistance. The Secretary General of the MNR, Orlando Christina, for example, was a high-level secret police official during the colonial period. To this initial group were added ex-FRELIMO guerrillas who had been expelled for corruption or who had left because of unfulfilled personal ambition. Andre Matzangaissa and Alfonso Dhlakama, two former FRELIMO soldiers, received prominent positions to give the MNR visible Black leadership.

By 1978, from its bases in Rhodesia, the MNR was plundering agricultural cooperatives, burning schools and medical centers, interdicting railroad lines, disrupting commerce, attacking major economic projects and effectively paralyzing FRELIMO's efforts to improve the quality of life in the countryside.

With the fall of the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, the South African military transferred MNR headquarters and bases to the Transvaal, a northern province adjacent to Mozambique. These operations were witnessed at the time by a British military team under Lieutenant General John Achland who was supervising the transition to independence in Zimbabwe. Shortly thereafter, MNR commander Alfonso Dhlakama boasted to Portuguese journalists that South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan had made him a colonel and assured him that "your army is now part of the South African Defense Force."

Whereas the Rhodesian government used the MNR to collect information on Zimbabwean nationalist operations and to intimidate refugees who had fled to Mozambique, South Africa saw the roving bands as instruments of havoc. At a meeting between Dhlakama and Colonel Van Niekerk of South African security on October 25, 1980 at Zoabostad, a military base in the Transvaal, the MNR Commander unveiled plans to reestablish bases inside Mozambique, and to attack both the railroad lines between Beira and Zimbabwe and road traffic on the national north-south highway. Van Niekerk insisted that this was not sufficient. By the end of 1981 he ordered them to "interdict rail traffic from Malverne-Gwelo..."
[southern Mozambique], establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, open a new military front in Maputo province, and provoke incidents in Maputo and Beira." The South African strategy was clear—the MNR must extend its activity to the strategic southern provinces, thereby discouraging Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting its commodities through Maputo. To accomplish these broader objectives, South African officials agreed to provide large supplies of war material, including rockets, mortars and small arms as well as instructors "who will not only teach but also participate in attacks."

Mozambican field commanders with whom I spoke indicated that "Boers" regularly accompanied MNR bands in the central part of the country. When pressed for concrete examples, a young officer who had fought in Manica province revealed that his battalion discovered several dead European soldiers when it overran an MNR base at Chidogo. South African passports and other documents were captured at other MNR bases. Sara Muchalima, a twenty-six year old woman who had been kidnapped by the MNR, saw ten European advisors who, along with Dhlakama, were evacuated by helicopter shortly before Garagua fell.

Emphasis, however, is on South Africa training MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal and providing supplies and logistical assistance to the guerrillas inside Mozambique. According to Mozambican field commanders in Tete and Manica provinces, MNR forces are regularly resupplied at night, and FRELIMO forces lack the communications and air support to prevent these air-drops. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings which are becoming more frequent. Captured MNR documents suggest that this is the preferred route—it is much cheaper for South Africa, and Mozambique's fledgling navy cannot patrol effectively.

Western diplomats in Maputo estimate the MNR numbers at about 5,000—appreciably lower than Dhlakama's claim of 17,000 armed soldiers. Most MNR recruits seem to have been coerced into joining. According to Sara Muchalima, "The bandits came to my house and told my parents I had to go with them. My father refused, but they beat him up, tied my hands, and with a gun to my head took me to their base at Garagua."

John Burlison, a British ecologist held prisoner by the MNR for several months, reported seeing hundreds of forced recruits who were kept under armed guard.

Nevertheless, Mozambique's serious economic problems make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, which the MNR attribute to the alienated ancestors, the Mozambican government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane provide fertile ground for MNR overtures. So does the MNR's manipulation of tribal divisions and appeals to Shona chiefs, spirit mediums and "traditional" Shona values.

MNR Practices Terrorism

Whatever the initial attraction of these appeals, widespread plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate support for the MNR and alienate the rural population which, above all else, wants to be left alone. Western missionaries living along the Mozambican-Zimbabwe border reported that in December 1980, the MNR launched a terrorist campaign around Esangabera in Manica "beheading Machel loyalists, abducting girls, and press-ganging young men into service." Peasants from Gaza who fled to Zimbabwe also spoke of repeated MNR atrocities. "At Madura, they came and demanded money and food. They accused some people of being informers for government forces and cut off the nose, lips and ears of a number of people. Then they told them to go and report to FRELIMO."

Pretoria has embarked on a campaign to compel its neighbors not to provide any sanctuary or support for the ANC freedom fighters.

Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members, but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding and terrorism. A captured bandit, Raque, admitted that he and his compatriots were ordered to rob and terrorize the population in order to discredit the government. "We cut off many people's ears," he said. "We sent them off and said, 'Now go to FRELIMO and say that we've been here.'" One high-ranking Western diplomat, who admitted that he was initially skeptical, now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible."

These tactics, together with the MNR's reliance on narrow tribal appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie the MNR's claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the FRELIMO's Party's Marxist strategy. Apart from its anti-communist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates.

Nevertheless the MNR has played an important role trying to sabotage the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordinating Conference), the integrated regional alliance of Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique forged in 1980 to break South Africa's economic hegemony. The roving bands of terrorists
regularly cut the railroad lines between Maputo and Zimbabwe, harassed trains from Beira, Mozambique's second leading port to Zimbabwe, and periodically blocked rail traffic between Beira and Malawi. Pretoria's strategy is clear. Mozambique's ports serve as the international gateway for many of the landlocked SADCC countries—most notably Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia. Without a viable transportation and communication network all other forms of regional cooperation would be impractical and the SADCC would be aborted from the outset, thereby insuring South Africa's regional domination.

As the economic stakes increased, South African commandos no longer even bothered to maintain the facade as "instructors." In November 1981 marker buoys at the entrance of the Beira harbor were blown up. This was a sophisticated operation, which Western diplomats in Mozambique agreed was obviously beyond the technical capacity of the MNR. Similarly, South African commandos destroyed the strategic bridge across the Pungue River, blocking road communications to Beira and periodically mined the railroad lines linking that port city to Zimbabwe. It was in one such commando operation, according to The Observer, that a British mercenary, Lieutenant Alan Gingles, working for South African security forces, was killed when a mine detonated prematurely. At the end of December 1982 South African raiders destroyed thirty-four oil storage tanks in Beira valued at more than $40 million, causing severe shortages in Zimbabwe.

At the same time that South Africa intensified its military pressure, it expanded its long-term objectives. Fearing both the increasing popularity of the African National Congress and the liberation movement's ability to attack strategic points within South Africa, Pretoria embarked upon a campaign to compel its neighbors not to provide any sanctuary or support for the freedom fighters. The first indication of this policy was the 1981 attack on the homes of South African refugees, some of whom were ANC members, living on the outskirts of Maputo. The August 1982 assassination of Ruth First, a leading member of the ANC and an outspoken critic of the apartheid regime, and increased South African border violations were other indications of Pretoria's intent. Most ominous was the explicit warning of South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan in August 1982 that his country might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique to rid it of "ANC terrorists."

**Reagan's policies send a signal to Pretoria—that aggression against South Africa's neighbors is acceptable.**

The brazen December 1982 attack against ANC homes in Maseru, Lesotho, coming precisely at the same moment when the Beira oil facilities were attacked, was meant as a clear warning to Mozambique that Maputo would be next. Indeed, in January the MNR initiated an offensive to capture or, at least, isolate southern Mozambique, including the capital. According to Sebastiao Mabote, Mozambique Chief of Staff, by April MNR forces had been routed. Coming at the time of the assassination of MNR Secretary General Christina in Pretoria by internal dissidents, the battlefield losses represented a major setback for the terrorist organization.

**South African Attacks Escalate**

It is against this backdrop that South Africa launched the recent air attack on Maputo on May 23. Ostensibly, it was in reprisal for an ANC attack which took place in Pretoria several days earlier. Although South Africa claimed that it struck at ANC military bases in Mozambique, Western observers remain skeptical. A group of reporters who toured the area unescorted reported "that all the victims appear to be civilians and that there was no evidence of hits connected with the ANC, and no sign of Mozambican missile installations," as the South Africans claimed. In fact, the area attack took place in Matola, Mozambique's principal industrial zone. The message was clear. Mozambique's fragile economy would be held hostage. Indeed, there is growing concern that the next target will be the Limpopo Valley, the nation's breadbasket, located within easy striking distance of the South African border.

Ironically, the air attack occurred less than a month after a high-level Mozambican delegation had met with South African officials at the border town of Komatiport. At this meeting, as in the case of an earlier meeting held last December, the Mozambicans reaffirmed their commitment to "promote peaceful coexistence with all countries, regardless of their social systems." They also gave assurances to South Africa that there were no ANC military bases in Mozambique, while acknowledging that they lacked the ability to patrol the long unmarked border which separates the two countries. Moreover, Western diplomats indicated that after the first encounter a number of ANC members and South African refugees left Maputo. According to rumors circulated in Maputo, their departure was part of an agreement in which the South Africans promised to reduce support for the MNR.

Whatever the case, Mozambique's leaders remain both firmly opposed to the racist system of apartheid and committed to providing sanctuary for South African refugees. Based on their own wartime experience, however, they remain convinced that revolutionary change in South Africa cannot come from the outside but only through the internal struggle of the South African people. For Mozambique's unflinching opposition to apartheid, its commitment to create a nonracial socialist society, and its efforts to forge an independent regional economy, the young nation will undoubtedly suffer many more South African attacks along with other front-line countries such as Zimbabwe and Angola.

To the extent that the Reagan administration chooses to view events in Southern Africa through the prism of the Cold War and adopts a pro-South African posture, its policies send a signal to Pretoria—a signal that aggression against South Africa is acceptable.
House Committee Bans US Support for IMF Loans to South Africa

The House of Representatives took a landmark step in economically isolating South Africa on May 9 when the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs approved (by voice vote) a subcommittee recommendation to instruct the US representative at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to vote against any loans to countries which practice apartheid. The South African provision amends the FY 84 IMF Authorization Bill (HR 2930). The amendment was offered in the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy on May 5 by Reps. Jerry Patterson (D-CA) and Mike Lowry (D-WA) in cooperation with Rep. Julian Dixon (D-CA), chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus and sponsor of HR 1083, the free-standing bill to cut off IMF loans to South Africa. The amendment passed in subcommittee by voice vote after a substitute amendment offered by Rep. Stephen Neal (D-NC) failed (vote below).

The IMF South Africa amendment has the best chance of passing Congress of all the different South Africa-related legislation now before the legislature because of the precarious state of the IMF Authorization Bill. The Reagan Administration has requested $8.4 billion as the US' new contribution to the Fund. The administration and many moderate members of Congress see this re-authorization as desperately necessary to bail out the crippled international financial system. Traditionally, the far-Right, isolationist wing of Congress has fought such large US contributions to multilateral financial institutions. This year the Right is being joined by some mainstream Democrats who feel the money could better be spent at home.

The liberal-moderate coalition that would normally support a re-authorization will be seriously threatened, however, if the South Africa provision is deleted from the bill. Although no public promises or threats have been made as yet, it is very possible the 21-member Congressional Black Caucus and several liberal white Congressmen will refuse to support the bill as a whole without the South Africa provision. This grouping could hold the balance of power and insist on keeping the South Africa amendment throughout the House-Senate conference. (It is unlikely that the Senate will pass such an amendment and it will be up to the conference to settle the discrepancies between the House and Senate versions of the bill.) Likewise, because Reagan wants the re-authorization of IMF funds, it is highly unlikely he will veto the bill.

The present debate was brought on by the IMF's November 3, 1982 decision to grant South Africa a $1.1 billion loan. The Reagan Administration supported the loan despite strong Congressional opposition at the time. Minutes leaked from the November 3 IMF meeting show that the loan passed with only 52 percent of the votes. Most of the Third World representatives voted against the loan or withheld approval by reserving their positions. These representatives raised serious economic objections to Pretoria's receiving the loan, pointing to the fact that the $1.1 billion loan roughly equals the cost of South Africa's war in Namibia and Angola over the past two years. Criticisms were also raised regarding the "structural rigid­ity" of apartheid that has "prevented an efficient functioning of the labor market." Indeed, because of this unprecedented opposition to the loan from within the IMF, if it was not for the Reagan Administration's support for the loan (which consists of 19.64 percent of the total vote in the IMF's skewed voting procedure), Pretoria would not have gotten the money.

Congressional opposition (led by Neal) to the South Africa amendment in the Banking Committee was focused on the criticism that the cut-off provision "politicized" the IMF. The amendment's supporters argued that it was the loan itself that politicized the Fund. Reports from the South African press indicate Pretoria did not really need the loan at all but felt the IMF's approval would be a "feather in their caps" as far as international opinion was concerned. In addition, the IMF disregarded its own economic criterion in granting the loan, imposing none of the austerity conditions it usually insists upon for many Third World countries. The amendment's Congressional supporters also argued that the administration's support for the loan was political, in line with Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy of support for South Africa, and that IMF loans to other countries (such as Vietnam, Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua) had previously been supported or opposed by the administration because of political considerations.

The bill is expected to reach the House floor in July. Send letters immediately to your Congres­smember supporting the Patterson-Lowry amendment.

Vote in Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy on May 5 on Neal substitute amendment to scuttle the Patterson-Lowry amendment (those voting against the Neal substitute support the Washington Office on Africa position): Against the Neal substitute: Patterson, Lowry, Patman (D-TX), Coney (D-PA), Roemer (D-LA), Lehman (D-CA), Kaptur (D-OH), Levin (D-MI), and Leach (R-IA). For Neal substitute: Neal, LaFalce (D-NY), Lundine (D-MA), Barnard (D-GA), Cooper (D-TN), Parris (R-VA), McCollum (R-FL), and Dreier (R-CA). Absent: Hansen (R-ID), Shumway (R-CA), and Roukema (R-NJ).

Background resource available: "A Billion Dollars for South Africa" by Jim Morrell (April 1983). Available from Center for International Policy, 120 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002 ($1.50).
Administration Profile: Jeane Kirkpatrick
South Africa's Friend at the UN

Jeane Kirkpatrick has been an eloquent spokesperson for the Reagan Administration's renewed alliance with South Africa. Prior to appointing her US Ambassador to the United Nations in 1980, Reagan had been impressed with Kirkpatrick's article, "Dictators and Double Standards," in Commentary in which she suggested that the United States should be more tolerant of dictators that are friendly to the US. In the same article Kirkpatrick revealed her views of race relations when she stated, "slavery is an alternative view about how to get a society's work done." From the beginning of her tenure as the administration's representative at the UN, Kirkpatrick has been faithful to Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy, making it clear that South Africa will remain a close friend of the US.

Kirkpatrick: "The United States must use whatever level of force required to keep US allies in power, if the alternative is revolution."

On March 2, 1981, Kirkpatrick gave notice that the US considered South Africa a friend worth standing up for when she voted against rejecting the credentials of South Africa to the UN. Not too long after, she met with Chief of South African Military Intelligence, Lt. General PW Van der Westhuizen and three other South African military officers. In explaining the meeting, Kirkpatrick stated that the nineteen-year-old US policy of not meeting with South African military officials was not an established custom, and then summarily denied any knowledge of the South Africans being military personnel. In an apparent effort to justify the talks Kirkpatrick stated, "I will continue to meet people... my experience as a scholar leads me to believe that the best way to approach a problem is to listen to diverse views." However, on a subsequent tour of Latin America the ambassador declined to meet with human rights activists in Argentina and Chile, leaving that to her aides.

Less than a month later, on April 30, 1981, Kirkpatrick cast a veto in the UN Security Council on a resolution demanding sanctions against South Africa for its intransigence in refusing to grant independence to Namibia. This was followed on August 31 with another veto of a resolution condemning South Africa for its invasion of Angola, a resolution that had overwhelming support within the UN. At a press conference the same day, Kirkpatrick gave her explanation of the vote: "South Africa's political system has some good elements in it... it is a democracy for whites and a dictatorship for Blacks..." Kirkpatrick further angered African foreign ministers and others by publicly lecturing them on the "futility" of such resolutions and declarations against South Africa. This prompted many UN ambassadors to express the opinion that the US ambassador lacked any knowledge of international diplomacy.

Despite bitter opposition to the US stance on South Africa in the UN, Kirkpatrick continued to give solid support to the white minority regime. In a speech in late 1981 she stated, "I take a dim view generally of the United States or any other nation trying to destabilize existing governments and build new ones. It almost never works." Statements such as this helped lay the foundation of the administration's "constructive engagement" policy, opening its arms to Pretoria while alienating the rest of the African continent. It was no surprise then that toward the end of 1982 Kirkpatrick emphatically stated that the United States had no "real allies" in the UN.

In December 1982, the United States opposed nine out of ten resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly attacking South Africa's apartheid policies and condemning its escalating acts of aggression against African states. The only resolution the US supported was an appeal for increased contributions to the UN South Africa Trust Fund, an agency which helps defend political prisoners in South Africa. This is ironic because the Reagan Administration has requested that Congress appropriate no money for the Trust Fund in 1984.

In addition, only a few months before, Kirkpatrick had deliberately held up the US contribution to the UN Institute for Namibia, citing a need to determine the involvement of SWAPO, Namibia's liberation movement, in the Institute. The Institute for Namibia, based in Lusaka, Zambia, trains and educates Namibians unable to receive a decent education in their own country. Two of Kirkpatrick's top aides at the UN, Kenneth Adelman (now Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and Carl Gershman, were instrumental in this delay which has resulted in the US 1982 contribution to the Institute still not released. These unwarranted actions have demonstrated that the Reagan Administration is more obsessed with "Soviet expansionism" than with the protection of human rights. Kirkpatrick summed this up in her statement: "Marxism is more dangerous than racism."

As long as Jeane Kirkpatrick represents the United States at the UN, South Africa will continue to be given the strongest possible support. "The United States," she has said, "must use whatever level of force required to keep US allies in power, if the alternative is revolution." With that logic the US will become increasingly isolated at the United Nations, along with its "friend" and "ally," South Africa.

Jeane Kirkpatrick (Associated Press)
Drive for Divestment Red Hot!

The issue of US corporate divestment from South Africa has been the subject of increasingly intense dialogue within churches, universities, corporations, unions, city and state legislatures, and has recently re-emerged in Congress. Three states and thirteen cities have passed divestiture legislation in the last two years. Presently, 21 states and eight cities and counties have similar bills pending. The issue is red hot and rapidly gaining momentum.

On April 15–16, a National Conference on Public Investment in South Africa was held in Boston to continue this momentum. This conference, co-convened by the American Committee on Africa and Mass Divest, brought together state and local legislators to address and strategize on divestment legislation. The conference was held in Boston to draw attention to the recently passed Massachusetts state bill, and the Beverly Hills and Chicago which requires the state pension fund to sell all stocks and bonds in companies investing in South Africa. Because of its strength, this bill is being used as a model for divestment in other areas.

The success of the campaign against investment in South Africa is evidenced by the frenzy the South African government has portrayed over the introduction and passage of divestment legislation across the country. Because of the overall potential of this soaring movement, the South African government has spent millions in organizing opposition to pending bills. Among its propaganda agents are John Sears and Stuart Spencer, both former Reagan campaign managers, and the lobbying and legal firm of Smyington, Smathers and Herlong. Spencer’s public relations firm was recently hired at $150,000 a year to monitor the divestment movement and promote the South African government’s policies in the Congress. Smyington’s firm sent a lobbyist to Boston to fight the Massachusetts bill, and the Beverly Hills and Chicago South African consulates have been providing pro-South Africa witnesses spewing anti-divestment rhetoric to legislators during hearings. Pretoria’s determined political and financial efforts to defeat these bills are a solid indication of the crucial importance of continued US investment to South Africa.

Not all of the attention, however, has been focused on US corporations inside South Africa; some regions have had to contend with South African corporations investing in the US. Southern Sun Hotel Holding Co. Ltd. is one such corporation, seeking to operate a hotel and casino at $300 million in Atlantic City, N.J. Southern Sun is located in Bophutatswana, one of the homelands which South Africa has granted nominal “independence.” Soloman Kerzner, the firm’s managing director, classified Bophutatswana as a country with a Black government, stating that his country is opposed to any form of discrimination. The Rev. Sipo Mzimela, however, who is a South African exile serving as rector of an Episcopal Church in an Atlantic City suburb said, “Bophutatswana is to us what concentration camps and ovens were to the Jews.”

On May 18, the City Council of Atlantic city entertained a resolution asking the Casino Control Commission to deny a license to Southern Sun Hotel. The resolution was tabled for thirty days, despite a groundswell of testimony and massive community opposition. Local activists have been lobbying the Council to deny Southern Sun’s license and were key in convincing the City Council in mid-April to pass a divestment bill. It remains to be seen whether Atlantic City will make real its recently passed divestment ordinance or be lured to the glitter of South Africa’s wealth.

Congress to Consider Divestment

The unprecedented city and state initiatives around the country have been instrumental in fostering the political atmosphere for national legislation curtailing investment in South Africa. Currently, congressional activity in South Africa is soaring, with the issue of US investment in South Africa on the front burner. On April 27, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 21–12 in support of HR 1693. Sponsored by Rep. Stephen Solarz (D–NY), the bill, now amended to the Export Administration Act, would mandate that American companies in South Africa abide by the Sullivan fair employment code, and would ban Krugerrand (South African gold coin) sales in the US and new bank loans to the South African government.

While the Sullivan Principles provision is, at best, illusory in its attempt to marshall progressive change in South Africa, Congress will have the opportunity to strengthen the bill as Rep. William Gray (D–PA) is expected to offer an amendment on the House floor. This proposed amendment, similar to his bill (HR 1392), would prohibit any new investment in South Africa.

Along with the Gray and Solarz initiatives curtailing US investments in South Africa, Congress will likely have to consider a complete divestiture bill pending before the Washington, D.C. city council. The D.C. bill is the most comprehensive municipal bill to be introduced in the nation, barring deposits of city funds in banks that have lent to the South African government or to corporations and banks active there. It would also require the district’s pension funds and housing finance agency to sell their holdings in any bank or corporation with financial links to South Africa, with the proceeds re-invested in acceptable firms. If passed by the city council and signed by the mayor, Congress will have 30 legislative days to consider the bill. Rep. Stan Parris (R–VA) has already announced his intention to block the bill, thus requiring a vote in Congress.

The red hot national movement for divestment from South Africa is a strong indictment of the Reagan Administration’s open alliance with the Pretoria regime and counters the policy of constructive engagement.

US companies are instrumental in the running of apartheid.
Exim Bank and South Africa

For the first time since 1978, the US Export-Import (Exim) Bank may grant loans to companies in South Africa. This would take the form of bank guarantees and export credit insurance for US corporations and South African corporations using American-made equipment.

The dearth of Exim Bank support for corporate operations in South Africa over the last several years resulted from failure to approve the Evans Amendment in 1978. That law prohibits Exim support for transactions with South African government agencies, but allows support for private corporations if they comply with the Sullivan fair employment principles.

The State Department, after passage of the Evans Amendment, developed a questionnaire to evaluate corporate compliance with the Sullivan code and laid out procedures for regular inspection of plant sites in South Africa. However, Pretoria balked at this increased supervision of corporate activity and refused to comply, arguing that the Evans Amendment procedures were an infringement on its sovereignty. Pretoria’s indignation stopped all Exim Bank support in South Africa.

The Reagan Administration, in line with its policy of increasing corporate investment in South Africa, has moved to soothe Pretoria’s concerns. Changes have been made in the questionnaire removing reference to the Evans Amendment. State Department officials indicate there are three applications now pending for Exim support in South Africa. Although the company names are kept secret, the Rietspruit open-cast mine, a new open-pit coal mine in the Rand Mine Group, has expressed interest in receiving Exim guarantees. Other companies have received strong encouragement to apply from US consulate officials in Johannesburg. The first credits could be extended as early as this autumn.

"Project Democracy"

Once again the Reagan Administration has shown its arrogant disregard for the true needs of the African people. The administration’s latest program is called “Project Democracy,” although some, like Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA), more accurately refer to it as “Project Right-Wing Democracy.” According to United States Information Agency (USIA) officials it is “an ambitious, long-term, positive program...to advocate the principles of democracy.” A closer look at the programs, however, reveals a deliberate effort to push Reagan propaganda—all while the administration is drastically cutting development aid and increasing military assistance to Africa.

For Africa, “Project Democracy” is centered around three main program requests: $1 million to teach English in Africa; $920,000 to “assist Liberia’s transition to democracy”; and $800,000 for an African-US Scholar Exchanges and University Linkages Program. Citing the need for approval of these programs, USIA Director Charles Z. Wick told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, “some of them have marvelous minds, those Black people over there.”

The push for “Project Democracy” and its $85 million price tag comes in the wake of the Reagan Administration’s outright refusal for FY 84 to request a single cent for the UN South Africa Trust Fund or the UN Institute for Namibia, two organizations that directly benefit those affected and displaced by South Africa’s apartheid policies. “Project Democracy” is simply another tool of the Reagan Administration’s Cold War policy in Africa.

Anti-Apartheid Activists on European Tour

Jean Sindab, Executive Director of the Washington Office on Africa, was a member of a delegation organized by Jerry Herman of the American Friends Service Committee to travel to Europe for discussions with anti-apartheid and peace activists. From April 16 to May 4, the delegation visited London, Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels, Munich, and Geneva. The objective was to plan international strategy for stopping western support for apartheid. Included in the tour was a consultation on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa held in Leiden, Holland and attendance at the Paris UN Conference on Namibia. While at the conference, delegation members met with Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge and SWAPO President Sam Nujoma. Jorge asked for international support for Angola which has been beset with 10,000 persons killed and $10 billion worth of property damage sustained in attacks by South Africa since 1976. The Paris conference included a meeting of non-governmental organizations from around the world involved in anti-apartheid activities. Strategies were discussed to prevent the British company Marconi from selling to Pretoria $8 million of radar equipment which will be used to intensify the war in Southern Africa; prevent the French sale of a nuclear plant and US nuclear materials and technology to South Africa; and raise the visibility of the war being waged by Pretoria against its neighbors. The delegation planned methods by which international activists could maintain more regular communication with each other and share information about their respective governments’ activities to support the South African regime.
Murdered SA Leader Sparks Congressional Resolution

For many years now it has been the practice of this government to move people and remove them—to uproot people and to dump them—irrespective of how or when they acquired their land, irrespective of the promises made to them, irrespective of ancestral graves, irrespective of distance from employment facilities or basic amenities.

B. Waite "Catalogue of Shame"
The Black Sash, August 1974

The practice portrayed above poignantly illustrates the South African government’s policy of forced removal of “black spots” from areas officially designated as part of “white” South Africa, and resettling by dumping the original inhabitants on remote, desolate land in “homelands.”

Within a mere 13% of the total land mass of South Africa, the government has unilaterally formed ten homelands, four of which have been granted “independence” by the South African regime. This “independence,” however, is but a figment of Pretoria’s imagination which no other nation in the world has recognized.

The policy of forcibly uprooting and hauling Blacks to inferior areas was the catalyst which led to the April 2 murder of Saul Mkhize at a protest meeting called to oppose government plans for the relocation of over 5,000 residents of the village of Driefontein in the southeastern Transvaal. Driefontein was classified a “black spot” scheduled for white occupancy, despite the fact that the land was purchased by an African lawyer for community development in 1912, a year prior to the introduction of the Natives Land Act which virtually forbade the sale of land to Blacks. Days prior to his murder by a white policeman, Mkhize, chairman of Driefontein’s Council of Directors, had written to various South African officials seeking negotiation of the resettlement, but was told that the village should make preparation for removal and that “there is nothing further to discuss.” Informing the officials that the removal was unacceptable, he organized the April 2 meeting where he was gunned down.

Sparked by this abhorrent development, Congressman Robert Mrazek (D-NY) introduced H. Con. Res. 122 on May 6, “expressing the sense of the Congress that the Republic of South Africa should cease its ‘blackspot’ policy of removing black South Africans from their ancestral land and relocating them.” The salient features of this resolution call for a US condemnation of the South African homeland policy and a continued policy of US non-recognition of the homelands. The resolution also charged that it was this callous policy of removal which led to the death of Mkhize.

By ordinary interpretation, Mkhize would not be classified radical, but the fact that he had the audacity to organize for Black land rights made him radical in apartheid’s eyes. Sheena Duncan, president of Black Sash, a South African organization, said of Mkhize, “he was a rural landowner and he built his resistance movement around the fact that they have owned this land since the beginning of the century and their dead are buried there.”

Because Congressman Mrazek’s concurrent resolution denounces the destructive homelands policy, it can be expected to be a thorn in the side of constructive engagement.

Pretoria’s War Against Mozambique, continued

Africa’s neighbors is acceptable. The failure of the Reagan administration to publicly and unequivocally condemn South African aggression against Mozambique and the reign of terror which the South African-backed MNR has inflicted on unarmed men, women, and children in Mozambique can only reinforce Pretoria’s bellicose attitude. Finally, there are ominous signs that U.S. agencies are or were cooperating with the South African war-machine. The most relevant is the February 1981 exposure of CIA activities in Mozambique, including documented charges that American agents passed on information which facilitated the South African attack on the Maputo suburbs. Washington has never denied or refuted these charges.

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