In mid-March, Mozambican leaders sat down with their South African counterparts and signed a nonaggression pact which both sides heralded as a first step toward lasting peace in the region. Just one month earlier, South Africa signed a ceasefire with Angola that some observers felt could bring an end to over two years of continuous South African occupation of southern Angola and result in a Namibian settlement. In Washington, the Reagan Administration, eager for a foreign policy success, hailed these new agreements as a "watershed" for peace, claiming success for its "constructive engagement" policy in the region.

Yet the nonaggression pact and the ceasefire will not bring peace to Southern Africa because they do nothing to eliminate the fundamental cause of tension in the region: white minority rule in South Africa. Furthermore, these events can be seen as a victory for Ronald Reagan's policies only insofar as "constructive engagement" has supported South Africa as it brutally forced its frontline neighbors to the negotiating table.

The roots of both these accords lie in the white minority government's continuing attempts to ward off majority rule and self-determination within South Africa itself. The successive independence of countries in Southern Africa from colonial and white minority rule has eroded white South Africa's geographic buffer against encroaching African nationalism. Pretoria's response has been to further militarize South Africa against what it perceives as a threat from liberation movements based in neighboring countries.

This view has been warmly embraced in Washington where maintenance of South Africa as a regional anti-communist power is a keystone of US policy in Southern Africa. American policy in Southern Africa, dominated by a Cold War ideology, has backed up South Africa's efforts to recreate buffers around its borders. Only if Pretoria's borders are secure, the Reagan Administration argues, will Prime Minister P.W. Botha have the political strength to carry out reforms within South Africa. US policy ignores the fact that apartheid itself is the fundamental source of instability in the region and that the present South African government has no intention of abolishing white minority rule. Initially, the Reagan Administration focused almost exclusively on relations with Pretoria. But in the past 18 months US officials have asserted a more active role in regional affairs, and the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, has shuttled between African capitals with increasing regularity. In a variation of the "good cop, bad cop" routine, the Reagan Administration has complemented South Africa's regional aggression with offers of aid to those willing to deal with Pretoria.

South Africa, meanwhile, has focused on recreating its cordon sanitaire. According to the government's own figures, between 1975 and 1981 the number of troops deployed on South Africa's borders and in Namibia increased by over 5,000
percent. Since 1981, Pretoria has actively sought to undermine its neighbors’ stability through crossborder attacks and support for anti-government dissidents, and has used its economic might to squeeze their fragile economies. By combining military and economic pressure, South Africa’s whites hope to end their international isolation and prevent their neighbors from supporting South African and Namibian freedom fighters. With these goals in mind, South Africa embarked on the military campaigns that led to the signing of agreements earlier this year. But, precisely because the agreements are intended to preserve white minority rule, they are inherently unstable and unlikely to bring peace to Southern Africa.

The Nkomati Accord

The Nkomati Accord calls on both Mozambique and South Africa “to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other” and to resolve future disputes without resort to force. The accord, signed March 16 on the banks of the Nkomati River astride the Mozambique-South Africa border, also specifically prohibits either country from allowing its territory to be used as a base for groups launching armed attacks against the other or as a transit corridor to a third country.

Both Mozambique and South Africa acknowledge that the Reagan Administration played an important role in bringing about the accord. Crocker and his deputy, Frank Wisner, were active in the negotiations as they shuttled between capitals. The Americans appeared to offer US food aid and the lifting of Congressional restrictions on development assistance as “carrots” to Mozambique if it signed the accord.

Both Mozambique and South Africa hope the agreement will initiate greater economic cooperation and increased trade and tourism. As a first step, the two countries signed an agreement with Mozambique’s former colonial ruler, Portugal, on May 2, setting new conditions for South African purchases of electricity from the large Portuguese-owned Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power station in Mozambique. In June a delegation of forty South African businessmen visited Maputo to look into possible investment opportunities.

Mozambique’s central interest, however, lies in the security agreement. Mozambique has not known peace since shortly after independence in 1975, when it closed its border with white minority-ruled Rhodesia and began supporting Zimbabwe’s liberation movements. The Rhodesian military retaliated with a series of punishing attacks, bombing Mozambican civilian and economic targets and organizing a terrorist group, the “Mozambique National Resistance” (MNR), opposed to the ruling FRELIMO government.

After Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the Mozambican government expected the attacks would end and the country could turn its attention to the pressing need for economic and social development. But Zimbabwe’s independence did not bring peace.

Confronted with majority rule in Zimbabwe as resistance escalated among its Black population, South Africa took the offensive. Mozambique, a strong supporter of liberation, became a prime target for South Africa’s new offensive. Pretoria took over control of the MNR from the white Rhodesians, and expanded its attacks on the Mozambican people and economy (see Washington Notes, Spring 1983). South Africa also escalated its economic war, cutting off trade and investment in Mozambique and vigorously working to destroy the economy. Mozambican officials estimate that, since independence, Pretoria’s economic war has cost them over $3 billion.

The effects of this destabilization have been aggravated in the last three years by severe drought, followed in early 1984 by devastating floods. The drought alone has taken over 170,000 lives and relief efforts have been severely hampered by the MNR. “Without peace,” journalist William Minter noted in a recent issue of Africa News, “the country’s survival as an independent nation and any prospects for development might well be forfeited.”

Because the agreements are intended to preserve white minority rule, they are inherently unstable and unlikely to bring peace to Southern Africa.

Mozambican leaders hope that the Nkomati accord will end Pretoria’s sponsorship of the MNR rebels and provide a chance for the country to recover from a war which has not stopped since independence. As of mid-July, however, the Mozambicans reported that MNR attacks were continuing and expressed dissatisfaction with Pretoria’s adherence to the accord. There is evidence that Pretoria heavily resupplied the MNR shortly before the accord was signed.

For South Africa, the Nkomati Accord and the expected expansion of economic relations and tourism are significant steps toward breaking its diplomatic isolation in Africa. South African Prime Minister Botha’s highly publicized European trip, his first since becoming prime minister, is another result of the accord. And shortly after the Nkomati Accord was signed, Swaziland announced it had secretly signed a similar agreement with South Africa almost two years ago. A number of conservative African states have also made overtures to Pretoria since the accord was signed.

Following up on these agreements, South Africa is now placing heavy pressure on Botswana and Lesotho to sign similar pacts. After a meeting in Washington with President Reagan in May, Botswana’s President Quett Masire charged that South Africa had threatened to disrupt trade between their two countries if Botswana did not sign a nonaggression pact. South Africa has already been pressuring Lesotho, disrupting border traffic, holding up shipments of goods destined for Lesotho, and, in one incident in 1982, blatantly invading the country and killing 42 people. Lesotho government officials charge that these actions are all intended to force Lesotho to sign some type of accord.
In addition to bilateral relations, the Nkomati Accord will also affect the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC was formed in 1980 by nine black majority-ruled nations in Southern Africa to reduce their dependence on South Africa and to promote regional integration. Both Mozambique and South Africa are now discussing greater bilateral investment and trade and such moves are likely to be a setback to SADCC’s goals of reducing dependence on Pretoria. Greater South African investment in Mozambique, combined with other openings to western investment that FRELIMO has taken (such as moving to join the International Monetary Fund), have the potential of making Mozambique more dependent on western and South African capital—a dependence that SADCC was formed to try and avoid.

On the other hand, the accord will also have some positive benefits for SADCC. Much of the SADCC countries’ exports are now transported through South Africa and securing alternative export routes has been a key goal of the regional grouping. If the Nkomati Accord effectively shuts down the MNR—and with it attacks on Mozambique’s railways—then the SADCC countries will be able to ship more goods through Mozambique and, to a certain extent, reduce their dependence on South Africa. At this stage it is too early to tell what long term impact the accord will have on efforts at regional cooperation.

The accord’s impact on Mozambique’s support for the ANC is also difficult to judge. Mozambican officials flatly refused to sign an initial draft of the accord which would have banned any ANC presence in their country, and since the accord was signed, government officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their “political, moral, and diplomatic” support for the ANC. The ANC will be permitted diplomatic representation in Maputo, but the FRELIMO government is anxious to show it is living up to the agreement and the ANC’s presence in Mozambique is severely restricted. These restrictions and Mozambique’s coerced signing of the accord are a temporary setback for the struggle for majority rule in South Africa.

**Angolan Ceasefire**

With American encouragement, South Africa and Angola signed a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia on February 16. Almost one month later South African troops gradually began withdrawing from their forward positions in southern Angola. The Reagan Administration hoped that the ceasefire would lead to an Angolan withdrawal of Cuban troops and hailed it as a significant step towards a settlement in Namibia. Yet, as of mid-July there is no indication that South Africa intends to end its nearly seventy year occupation of Namibia.

**The Reagan Administration’s policy has been actively encouraging South Africa to wage war on its neighbors.**

The current South Africa-Angola negotiations have not dealt with the question of Namibia’s independence. In fact, a Namibian settlement has been indefinitely delayed because the US and South Africa continue to insist on linking it to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola—a linkage rejected by all of Africa and many of the US’ European allies. “The so-called signing of the ceasefire has not touched Namibia,” the Anglican Bishop of Namibia, James Kaluma, told us in late April. “It has not brought any change to life in Namibia, it has not reduced the tension of war in Namibia.”

All that has been agreed to so far is the phased withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, a process which still had not been completed as of mid-July. In return, the Angolan government has agreed to “restrict” the movement of SWAPO guerrillas south into Namibia—something the South Africans never achieved on the battlefield. Indeed, South Africa has gained a great deal through the South Africa-Angolan Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) established as part of the ceasefire. While the JMC has moved against SWAPO guerrillas, there is no evidence it has done likewise against UNITA, the South African-backed Angolan rebel group. By restricting SWAPO’s movement in the area, South Africa hopes to allow more room for UNITA which Pretoria feels is a more trustworthy deterrent against SWAPO than the Angolan government. Recent reports indicate South Africa would like the JMC to be a permanent fixture in order to monitor and stop SWAPO. For its part, SWAPO has said it would honor the ceasefire in Angola, but vowed to fight on for independence in Namibia itself where there is no ceasefire.

South Africa has sacrificed little in the current accord. Namibia remains firmly in South African hands as a strategic buffer and Pretoria has retained the “right” to make military strikes into Angola. Nor does the ceasefire limit Pretoria’s ability to support UNITA, whose forces continue to attack and harass the Angolan people and economy. The ceasefire with Angola will not stop Namibia’s struggle for liberation, nor will the Nkomati Accord stop black people in South Africa from fighting for their rights. Opposition to apartheid and support for the ANC and SWAPO is fundamentally rooted inside South Africa and Namibia. “It is not a nonaggression pact with one or even all of the black-ruled neighbors that will blow away the threat of political instability in this country,” said one black South African interviewed by the New York Times shortly after the Nkomati Accord was signed. “We need meaningful change that will address itself to the political, economic and social requirements of the majority of the people of this country.”

In one convincing demonstration of this point, in mid-May the ANC staged a series of armed attacks in the coastal city of Durban. Likewise in Namibia, SWAPO staged an attack after the Angolan ceasefire. Public protests have continued in both countries since the accord were signed. In South Africa, the United Democratic Front has been able to draw thousands to large anti-apartheid gatherings and has now launched a new campaign to collect one million signatures on a petition (continued on page 8)
US Policy Neglects Africa’s Drought

Africa is languishing in the third year of its most serious drought of this century. Hundreds of thousands have already died, from Mauritania and Ethiopia in the North to the tip of Africa in the South. One in three Africans—some 150 million in all—now face starvation because of this drought. Of the 31 affected countries, 24 have acute food shortages.

Mozambique has been hit the worst of all. More than 170,000 Mozambicans died in the last year from malnutrition or other drought-related causes, including the infrastructure damage and disruption of food deliveries caused by South African-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) rebels. International relief officials fear another 500,000 in Mozambique will die of starvation this year unless emergency supplies arrive soon; in any case, nearly five million Mozambicans will go hungry in 1984.

Administration Delays, Congress Muddles

The US has responded by providing too little, too late. Although the US has historically supplied 35 to 50 percent of the world’s disaster relief needs, the Reagan Administration has so far provided only 17 percent of Africa’s needs during this drought. In addition, no funding for the transportation and distribution of emergency food aid has yet been appropriated for fiscal year 1984.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) alerted the world in May 1983 to the critical need for substantial emergency food assistance to Africa. In September, FAO projected a total emergency food need of $650 million for Africa, plus another $100 million in non-food emergency relief (seeds, fertilizer, medicines, transportation and distribution assistance) through fiscal year 1984. Yet the Reagan Administration waited until February 13, 1984 and then requested from Congress only $90 million in emergency funds for Africa.

Believing the amount was too low, Senators Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN) and John Danforth (R-MO) introduced a $150 million emergency food aid bill in the Senate as a “first installment” on the US response. Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY) went further, introducing a House bill to provide $300 million in food and $50 million in support funds. The Weiss bill would have provided half the total FAO estimate of needs. Both bills, however, were fatally stalled in committee.

The full House Appropriations Committee held hearings on the administration request on February 27, approving an increase to $150 million in food, with an additional $90 million in export credits. The bill passed the House on March 6 by a vote of 374-69.

The Senate Appropriations Committee, however, attached 36 unrelated amendments to the bill, including controversial military assistance to El Salvador and covert aid for Nicaraguan rebels. The Central America controversy effectively delayed the provision of food for starving Africa for many weeks. Certain committee Republicans did this at the behest of the Reagan Administration, which tried to use Congressional sympathy toward African drought victims to sell US military aid to Central America.

Despite these roadblocks, Senator Danforth was able to release $90 million in food aid, and on March 22, a House-Senate conference committee appropriated a total $90 million in food aid, together with $90 million in export credits.

The remaining $60 million was stalled until the House and Senate reached a compromise on the Central America aid in late June. President Reagan signed the bill on July 7. In the meantime, the $90 million that had been appropriated in late March was used up in little more than a month.

In another effort to provide needed funds for African drought victims, Rep. Julian Dixon (D-CA) introduced an amendment on June 6 that would transfer $25 million in supplemental Economic Support Funds for Central America to provide distribution, transportation and medical relief in Africa. The need for such funding was underscored by a May 7 letter to President Reagan from a bipartisan group of 15 Senators appealing for emergency military airlifts of food to Africa’s most severely stricken areas, as was done during the Sahel drought in West Africa during the mid-1970s.

A US Policy Famine

According to Bread for the World, a Christian lobby on hunger issues, US relief efforts during the present drought in Africa have been hampered by four key problems:

- Poor assessment of available information by the US Agency for International Development (AID), combined with poor reporting of this information to Congress;
- Lack of coordination between government agencies, resulting in confusion and further delays;
- “Woefully inadequate” budget requests and allocations, creating the need for time-consuming emergency supplemental legislation; and
- A “lack of political will” to respond in a timely, sufficient and creative way to Africa’s food emergency.

Prospects remain dim. AID estimates that Southern Africa will need to import up to 7 million tons of food in 1985; the region normally exports 2 to 3 million tons. The millions of people who now face starvation in Africa will face almost certain death if the US does not reverse its trend of increasing military assistance while decreasing development and food aid to the Third World. Thus far, the Reagan Administration has indicated it is unwilling to commit the necessary monies for adequate levels of food aid in 1985. Unfortunately, as Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) commented recently, “nobody gives a damn” in Congress—“on either side of the aisle.”

Map: Christian Science Monitor
South Africa Bill Still Pending

Months after the US House of Representatives and Senate acted on their separate versions of the Export Administration Act (HR 3231/S 979), the bill is still bottled up in a House-Senate conference committee. The House version of the bill contains four important South Africa provisions which were passed in October 1983. The provisions are: 1) Gray provision ending new US corporate investment in South Africa; 2) Solarz provision mandating compliance with the Sullivan fair employment principles for all US corporations investing in South Africa, prohibiting commercial bank loans to the South African government, and banning the importation of South African gold coins, including Krugerrands; 3) Berman provision reinstating controls on exports to the South African military and police; and 4) Wolpe provision expanding nuclear nonproliferation controls to prohibit certain nuclear equipment, parts, and technology transfers to countries (including South Africa) which refuse to accept full-scale International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear facilities. The Senate passed its bill, which contains only a version of the nuclear (Wolpe) provision, in March 1984. Since that time, the bill has been under consideration in a House-Senate conference committee which will work out a joint version of the bill.

The first meeting of the House and Senate conference brought up Title III which contains the most controversial Gray and Solarz provisions. On the Senate side, both Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) supported Title III. Cranston, who had endorsed the legislation as a Presidential candidate, stated that he thought the Senate should accept the House provisions. Of the three Republican Senate conference, two, Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) and Senator John Tower (R-TX), opposed the House provisions. This left Senator John Heinz (R-PA), the Senate floor manager of the bill, as the deciding factor. Senator Heinz refused to state his position at that time.

On the House side, most of the Democrats, including Rep. Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee have agreed to back Title III "to the wall." However, Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY), a long time supporter of US investment in South Africa, made a formal motion that the House drop the South Africa provision in Title III. He was joined only by Rep. Ed Zschau (R-CA). The rest of the conference, including the three other Republicans, Toby Roth (R-WI), Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Douglas Bereuter (R-NE), voted against Solomon's effort to drop the Gray and Solarz provisions.

There was no roll call vote on Rep. William Gray's "no new investment" amendment when it was passed on the House floor on October 27, 1983. However, many Congressmen have expressed their support by signing a "Dear Colleague" letter advocating the provision's final passage. The names of the signers are listed below. If your representative did not sign the letter urge him or her to take a stand in support of this vital legislation.

Gary Ackerman (D-NY), Joseph Addabbo (D-NY), Daniel Akaka (D-HI), Bill Alexander (R-AR), Michael Andrews (R-WI), Herbert Bateman (R-WA), Jim Bates (D-CA), Berkley Bedell (D-IA), Howard Berman (D-CA), Ed Bethune (R-AR), Mario Biaggi (D-NY), Lindy Boggs (D-LA), Edward Boland (D-MA), David Bonior (D-MI), Robert Borski (D-PA), Frederick Boucher (D-VA), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), C. Robin Britt (D-NC), George Brown, Jr. (D-CA), John Bryant (D-TX), Sala Burton (D-CA), Thomas Carper (D-DE), Bob Carr (D-NC), James Cash (D-NC), William Clay (D-MO), Carl Levin (D-MI), John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI), William Coyne (D-PA), George Crockett, Jr. (D-MI), Thomas Daschle (D-SD), Ronald Dellums (D-CA), Butler Derrick (D-SG), Julian Dixon (D-CA), Brian Donnelly (D-MA), Thomas Downey (D-NY), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Bernard Dwyer (D-MA), Marilyn Dunmally (D-CA), Dennis Eckart (D-OK), Robert Edgar (D-PA), Don Edwards (D-CA), Mickey Edwards (R-OK), Glenn English (D-OK), Lane Evans (D-IL), Walter Fauntroy (D-DC), Victor Fazio (D-CA), Edward Feighan (D-OH), Geraldine Ferraro (D-NY), Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY), James Florio (D-NJ), Thomas Foglietta (D-PA), Harold Ford (D-TN), Wyche Fowler, Jr. (D-CA), Barney Frank (D-MA), Martin Frost (D-TX), Don Fuqua (D-FL), Robert Garcia (D-CA), Edward Gephardt (D-MO), Henry Gonzalez (D-TX), Willis Gradison (R-OK), Katie Hall (D-IN), Tony Hall (D-CA), Frank Harrison (D-PA), Augustus Hawkins (D-CA), Charles Hayes (D-IL), W.G. Heinzer (D-NC), James Howard (D-NJ), Sheny Hoyer (D-MD), William Hughes (D-NJ), Andrew Jacobs, Jr. (D-NJ), James Jeffords (R-VT), Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI), Barbara Kennelly (D-CT), Dale Klise (D-MI), Ray Kogovsek (D-CO), Joseph Kolter (D-CA), Peter Kostmayer (D-PA), Tom Lantos (D-CA), Jim Leach (R-IA), Richard Lehman (D-CA), Edward Markey (D-MA), Mickey Leland (D-TX), Sander Levin (D-MI), Mel Levine (D-CA), William Lipinski (D-IL), Clarence Long (D-MA), Gillis Long (D-CA), Michael Lowry (D-WA), Thomas Luken (D-OH), Stanley Lundine (D-NY), Frank McCloskey (D-IN), Matthew McHugh (D-MA), Buddie Mackay (D-TX), Edward Markey (D-MA), Matthew Muench (D-CA), Robert Matsui (D-CA), Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Norman Mineta (D-CA), Parren Mitchell (D-MD), Jim Moody (D-WI), Bruce Morrison (D-CT), Robert Mraszek (D-MA), Austin Murphy (D-PA), Henry Nowak (D-NC), James Oberstar (D-MN), David Obey (D-WI), Jim Olin (D-VA), Solomon Hobdy (D-TX), Robert Ohting (D-NY), Major Owens (D-CA), Leon Panetta (D-CA), Robert Packwood (D-OR), John Pickle (D-TX), Carl Pursell (R-MI), Charles Rangel (D-NY), William Ratchford (D-CT), Richard Ray (D-CA), Peter Rodino, Jr. (D-NJ), Robert Roe (D-NJ), Buddy Roemer (D-LA), Charles Rose (D-NC), Edward Royal (D-CA), Martin Sabo (D-MN), Fernand St. Germain (D-RJ), Gus Savage (D-IL), James Scheuer (D-CA), Claudine Schneider (R-II), Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Charles Schumer (D-NY), James Shannon (D-MA), Gerry Sikorski (D-MN), Paul Simon (D-IL), Ike Skelton (D-MO), Jim Slattery (D-KS), Stephen Solarz (D-NH), Bruce Staggers, Jr. (D-WV), Fortney Stark (D-CA), Louis Stokes (D-OH), Jerry Studds (D-MA), Allen Swift (D-MA), MartinSynar (D-OK), Robin Tallon (D-SC), W.J. Tauzin (D-LA), Robert Thomas (D-GA), Esteban Torres (D-CA), Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), Edolphus Towns (D-NY), Bob Traxler (D-MI), Morris Udall (D-AZ), Tim Valentine (D-NC), Vincente Valentine (D-CA), Doug Walgren (D-CA), Henry Waxman (D-CA), James Weaver (D-OR), Ted Weiss (D-NY), Alan Wheat (D-MO), Charles Whitley (D-NC), Pat Williams (D-MT), Charles Wilson (D-TX), Timothy Wirth (D-CO), Robert Wise (D-VA), Howard Wolpe (D-MI), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Sidney Yates (D-IL), Robert Young (D-MO)

(SPRING/SUMMER 1984)
South Africa’s ability to start up Koeberg, its first nuclear power reactor, last March highlights some glaring deficiencies in US nonproliferation law. It also underscores the extent of the Reagan Administration’s alliance with South Africa, including its continued willingness to risk South African nuclear weapons proliferation. However, a campaign against nuclear collaboration with South Africa initiated by the Washington Office on Africa has begun to make the Reagan Administration more cautious. And a bill now pending in a Congressional conference may end some of this collaboration.

The US, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and other western powers have continued their nuclear collaboration with Pretoria, providing nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel. Especially important has been South Africa’s acquisition of enriched uranium for its nuclear reactors. Pretoria was able to obtain two shipments of enriched uranium from Europe for Koeberg in 1981 and 1983. In both cases, an American firm, Edlow International, based in Washington, DC, bought and transported the enriched uranium on behalf of South Africa with the consent of the Reagan Administration (see Washington Notes on Africa, Summer 1982 and Winter 1983).

Edlow was able to do so legally because of a loophole in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The act prohibits exports of nuclear fuel to countries, like South Africa, which have refused to submit all of their nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection in order to prevent military use, but does not prohibit brokering fuel.

The Reagan Administration also saved Pretoria millions of dollars when in February 1984 it suspended indefinitely a 1974 contract to supply enriched uranium for Koeberg. The contract required Pretoria to provide over 300 tons of natural uranium to the US to be enriched and eventually sent back to South Africa. However, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, passed in 1978, prohibited the US from supplying the enriched uranium to South Africa. Despite this, the contract still required Pretoria to continue supplying the raw uranium to the US, giving the State Department a potential lever to press the apartheid regime for nuclear proliferation safeguards.

The Reagan Administration was determined to eradicate this “irritant” in its relations with Pretoria. Washington’s stated policy was to attempt to convince Pretoria to agree to full scope IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities in return for the contract’s cancellation. But the administration continued giving assistance without receiving any concessions. The State Department four times pushed back the delivery deadline for the South African uranium shipments to the US, and allowed Pretoria to sell to US utility companies some of its uranium then being stockpiled at Department of Energy warehouses in Piketon, Ohio. This assistance culminated in the February suspension of the contract. The only guarantee Pretoria gave was that it would not sell uranium, nuclear equipment or technology to other countries unless those countries accepted IAEA safeguards. The Reagan Administration failed to obtain South African agreement on IAEA safeguards on its own nuclear facilities.

The Reagan Administration has given additional aid. In October 1983, the US Department of Energy (DOE) granted a license for US companies to bid on a service and maintenance contract for South Africa’s Koeberg. The $50 million, ten-year contract includes providing technicians and engineers, making repairs, procuring materials, and training South African nuclear personnel. Although the French company, Framatome, and the South African subsidiary of the US-based Fluor Corporation subsequently obtained a portion of the contract, it is expected that the US firm, Westinghouse, will obtain the bulk of it.

Reagan’s willingness to provide nuclear assistance to the apartheid regime was underscored by a US General Accounting Office (GAO) report on US nuclear exports released last September. The study showed that South Africa was the third largest recipient of US nuclear exports between July 1, 1981 and June 30, 1982. The administration approved seven nuclear-related exports to South Africa during that time period, including computers, ultrasonic tracking equipment, radio navigation equipment, and calibrating testing equipment, totaling more than $164.1 million. Totals for 1983 and 1984 have not yet become available.

Despite this growing nuclear aid, the Campaign to Stop US-South Africa Nuclear Collaboration, launched by the Washington Office on Africa in December 1982, has slowed down the Reagan Administration’s nuclear collaboration. Several exports have been stopped, and the press credited the campaign for the administration’s hesitancy in granting the DOE license to bid on the Koeberg service contract.

The Washington Post cited government sources saying, “the delay [in granting the license] stems . . . from White House uneasiness over the potential fallout of appearing to be eager to do nuclear business with South Africa.” This view was echoed by Nuclear News, a nuclear trade publication: “The applications [for the license] . . . have been held up for some time in the White House because of concern . . . that approval could prove a domestic political liability by antagonizing US opponents of South Africa.”

Although the administration eventually approved the license for the maintenance contract, if a provision in the House-passed Export Administration Act becomes law, that contract too may be stopped permanently. The provision, sponsored by Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI), will stop certain nuclear exports under Commerce Department jurisdiction, as well as certain DOE “technology transfers,” such as the approved maintenance contract, to South Africa and other countries which have not submitted to full scope IAEA safeguards. The Senate passed a similar but weaker provision in its version of the bill at the initiative of Senators Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN) and Carl Levin (D-MI). Final reconciliation of the Export Administration Act is expected in September.
Activists Tour Ohio

In an effort to bring the issue of apartheid before the American people, twelve national anti-apartheid activists participated in an educational speaking tour of Ohio and West Virginia in May, organized by the Washington Office on Africa, together with the American Friends Service Committee and Lutheran World Ministries. Covering Wheeling, West Virginia and three-quarters of Ohio, the tour brought home the reality of apartheid and US support for it to thousands of people. The media and public response was overwhelming.

The key to the tour’s success was the linking of the apartheid issue to racism and unemployment here in the US. When people heard that the US imports coal and steel from South Africa while mineworkers and steelworkers here are unemployed, they were outraged. They quickly understood that helping their brothers and sisters in South Africa, oppressed by apartheid propped up by US corporations, would be a concrete way to promote justice in the US as well.

As a result, activists throughout Ohio are forming a coalition, Ohio Divest, to support Ohio’s divestment bills, SB 53, sponsored by Senator William Bowen, and HB 283, sponsored by Rep. C.J. McLin. The bills would remove an estimated $2.6 billion in public funds from companies which invest in South Africa.

Resolution Urges Freedom for Mandelas

A non-binding Congressional resolution (H.Res. 430/S.Res. 386) has been introduced by Rep. George Crockett (D-MI) and Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) urging freedom for Nelson and Winnie Mandela. The resolution expresses the sense of Congress that the South African government should immediately release Nelson Mandela from prison and revoke and cancel Winnie Mandela’s banning order, and that President Reagan should “use his good offices” to secure their release.

The Mandelas are Black South African political prisoners who have been held in detention for more than 20 years because of their opposition to apartheid. Nelson Mandela was the head of the banned African National Congress when he was arrested and jailed in 1963. The Mandelas have been the focus of an international petition campaign urging their freedom which will culminate this October at a ceremony at the United Nations. In a June 13 “Dear Colleague” letter, Rep. Crockett compared the Mandelas to imprisoned Soviet Nobel Peace Laureate Andrei Sakharov. “But unlike Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner,” Crockett wrote, “the Mandelas and their human tragedy have gone virtually unnoticed in the United States, and seem to have merited little outcry from Members of Congress.”

The House resolution, which already has 120 co-sponsors, was approved unanimously by the House Africa Subcommittee on April 10. The full House Foreign Affairs Committee is expected to vote on the resolution in late July and take it to the House floor in September. Senate action is unlikely. Please contact your representative and urge co-sponsorship of this important resolution.

Mariental Resolution Introduced

William Gray (D-PA) has introduced a new Congressional resolution (H.Con.Res. 298) promoting the cause of the Mariental prisoners in Namibia. On May 4, 1978, the South African Defense Forces attacked a Namibian refugee camp at Kassinga, Angola, ruthlessly killing over 600 refugees. Approximately 100 survivors were abducted from Angola and removed to a military internment camp near Mariental, Namibia. They have been held there without charge, for the past six years. There are reports that these captives have been tortured, physically mutilated and subjected to harsh conditions and hard labor.

In an effort to gain the release of these prisoners, the Namibian law firm of Lorentz & Bone, supported and financed by the Washington, DC-based Southern Africa Project of the lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, filed an application for the release of the detainees in the Supreme Court of Namibia. In a response which raised an international outcry, South African Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee killed the case by invoking an obscure provision of South Africa’s Defense Act which allows him to stop any case against the state.

However, international pressure forced the South African government to release 56 of the detainees saying they were no longer “a threat to the state.” Yet, the remaining prisoners are not scheduled for release. Rep. Gray’s resolution reaffirms non-recognition of South Africa’s illegal military occupation of Namibia, and demands that either all the Mariental detainees be released immediately or the Supreme Court case against the state be allowed to proceed. The resolution is awaiting action in the House Africa Subcommittee.
Congress Focuses on Southern African War

A Congressional luncheon briefing focusing on US policy and the war in Southern Africa was held on April 25, 1984. The event was organized and coordinated by the Washington Office on Africa and co-sponsored by the Congressional Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on Southern Africa, the Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, and the Congressional Black Caucus.

Approximately 200 people attended the event, including representatives from the press corps, ambassadors and representatives from over 20 embassies and diplomatic missions, and 13 members of Congress. C-SPAN television network broadcast the program across the country.

A distinguished panel of experts spoke on South Africa’s war against the Frontline states, the Nkomati Accord, and the continuing liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa. The speakers were: Dr. Gerald Bender, Professor at the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California; Dr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; His Excellency Major General Joseph Garba, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations and Chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid; and Congressman Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa.

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rejecting a new constitution recently drawn up by the government.

Far from promoting peace, the Reagan Administration’s policy of “constructive engagement” has been actively encouraging South Africa to wage war on its neighbors. US military and political assistance has escalated. But the administration has been unwilling at the same time to pressure the white minority government to make fundamental changes in its internal policies.

Under “constructive engagement” the Reagan Administration has supported South Africa as a regional power able to militarily and economically dominate its neighbors. While this policy has offered Pretoria the “carrots” of improved diplomatic, political, and economic relations with the West, it has not extracted any political concessions in return. If the past is any guide, real change in South Africa will only come when the people of that country force the current rulers to change. If the US is to play a part in this process, then it must begin to apply effective political and economic pressures on Pretoria.

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visions. It was then agreed that the staffs would meet to work out a compromise proposal.

The staff members have met several times with little or no progress. Heinz, through his aide, Bill Reinsch, has said that he opposes the House provisions and that he is only willing to accept voluntary economic sanctions against the South African government. Several House staffers, pointing out that voluntary sanctions are meaningless, insisted on mandatory sanctions.

As Congress adjourned for the Democratic convention, it appeared that the battle to retain the South Africa sanctions in the Export Administration Act would continue until September. While the work must focus on Senator John Heinz from Pennsylvania, it is important to bolster our allies in both the House and Senate as well. If your representative or Senator is a conferee, express your support for the House-passed South Africa provisions, especially the “no new investment” provision.

The conferees are: Senate: Heinz (R-PA), Proxmire (D-WI), Cranston (D-CA), Gann (R-UT), Tower (R-TX); House: Fascell (D-FL), Hamilton (D-IN), Solarz (D-NY), Bonker (D-WA), Mica (D-FL), Barnes (D-MD), Wolpe (D-MI), Gejdenson (D-CT), Berman (D-CA), Lantos (D-CA), Gray (D-PA), Roth (R-WI), Snowe (R-ME), Bereuter (R-NE), Solomon (R-NY), Zschau (R-CA).

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