Mondale and South Africa

As violence escalates in strife-torn South Africa, an increasing number of Americans are looking at the November presidential election and what it will mean for future US policy toward that racially divided country.

Traditionally, Africa policy receives scant attention in presidential campaigns. Certainly in 1984, issues of arms control and US military involvement in Central America and the Middle East have overshadowed other foreign policy concerns. Foreign policy issues, in general, have taken a backseat to the domestic pocketbook issues that the candidates assume will determine the winner in this election.

But the system of white minority rule and racial oppression in South Africa and the US response to it have gained new prominence, particularly for the Democrats. US policy toward South Africa was discussed in all six Democratic primary debates and the issue was brought up several times at the Democratic convention. There are a number of reasons for the heightened interest in African issues in this election, but three factors stand out as especially important:

First, the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" has aligned the US more closely with the white South African government than it has been in over a decade. As part of this closer alliance, the administration has extended to Pretoria economic, political, and military support. Since 1981, this administration has lifted controls on certain exports to the South African military and police; permitted over $100 million in exports of goods on the State Department Munitions List to South Africa; supported a $1.1 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to the South African government; set up a trade promotion office in Johannesburg; linked a settlement for Namibian independence to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; and vetoed UN Security Council resolutions condemning South African invasions into neighboring countries. In the words of Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "constructive engagement" has sought to work toward "a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests" and an end to "South Africa's polecat status" in the world community.

Violence, unrest, and repression have simultaneously increased in South Africa. Pretoria continues to defy the international community by refusing to withdraw from its illegal occupation of Namibia. And South Africa has escalated its brutal military attacks into neighboring states. Reagan's radical shift in US policy has generated outrage in Congress and among the American people as a whole as the US is seen to be supporting the most racist regime on earth.

Second, spurred by this policy, the American anti-apartheid movement has significantly expanded its influence and activities across the US. On the local level, the divestment movement has won significant victories in the last two years. Legislation divesting billions of dollars in public funds from banks and corporations doing business with South Africa has been passed in the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, and Nebraska, as well as the cities of Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, DC. On the national level, the House of Representatives approved several strong sanctions, including a ban on new US corporate investment in South Africa and a prohibition on new bank loans. These sanctions are now pending in a House-Senate conference committee. Last year the Congress also passed into law strong restrictions on US support for future IMF loans to South Africa. This Congressional action reflects the American public's growing awareness of apartheid and US involvement.

Third, the presidential candidacy of Jesse Jackson successfully brought African and other Third World issues into the campaign debate. Jackson condemned the Reagan Administration's "official partnership with the racist regime," calling it a "moral stain" on this country. While there was a tendency to treat Africa as a non-issue on the part of former Vice President Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart, Jackson continued to push for a more progressive Africa policy from the other candidates and from the party.

The Africa plank in the Democratic Party platform approved at the July convention in San Francisco reflected the influence of Jackson and the anti-apartheid movement. Compared to the 1980 and 1976 party platforms, the 1984 Africa position is much more forthright, more specific, and less imbued with East-West concerns. It calls for "a policy of substantial increases in humanitarian assistance," and a "cessation of the unfortunate
tendency to hold such aid hostage to East-West confrontation or other geopolitical aims," in order to help alleviate Africa's hunger, drought, and famine.

On South Africa, the platform states that a Mondale Administration will "reverse the Reagan Administration's failed policy of 'constructive engagement' and strongly and unequivocally oppose the apartheid regime in South Africa." Specific sanctions are promised:

- "maximum pressure" on South Africa to establish a "democratic, unitary political system within South Africa";
- "scrupulous enforcement" of the mandatory arms embargo, including a ban on "dual use" equipment exports;
- a ban on new bank loans to the South African government and private sector, and a prohibition on new corporate investment in South Africa;
- a ban on exports of sophisticated computers and nuclear technology; and a ban on the importation of South African gold coins; and
- withdrawal of landing rights to South African aircraft.

The platform also demands the release of Nelson Mandela, imprisoned leader of the banned African National Congress, his wife, Winnie, who is under house arrest, and other political prisoners.

On Namibia, the party promises to demand compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 435, the formerly agreed upon plan for Namibian independence, the imposition of severe fines for US firms doing business in Namibia, and finally, "progressively increasing effective sanctions against South Africa unless and until it grants independence to Namibia and abolishes its own abhorrent apartheid system."

The Democratic platform's Africa plank is in open conflict with the one passed in Dallas one month later. The Republican Party platform begins by placing the continent in the context of the US struggle with the Soviet Union. Africa as an arena for East-West ideological struggle, in fact, seems to dominate the Republicans' statement, including reaffirmation of the need to link the issues of the Cubans in Angola to Namibian independence. Certainly Africa policy is one area where the Democrats and Republicans seem very far apart.

**Will Mondale Do It?**

But does the Democratic platform portend a bold, new Mondale policy on Southern Africa? Not necessarily. Platforms often reflect the contending balance of forces during a campaign more than a prediction of future policy. "I don't think a platform is, in John Garner's immortal words, worth a bucket of warm spit," said Donald McHenry, Carter's ambassador to the UN and a key policy player on Africa, in a recent interview. "The discussion which took place [during the primary campaign] is, from my point of view, not indicative of anything, not worth anything."

With that note of realism, what would Mondale's Africa policy look like? Interviews with Mondale foreign policy advisers and top officials who made Africa policy during the Carter Administration have yielded some light on this question.

- **Official friendliness toward South Africa, evident in Reagan Administration policy, would probably end.** Gerald Funk, former African adviser on Carter's National Security Council (NSC) and the man who is presently the Mondale campaign's key adviser on African issues, told us there would be a "reversal" of "constructive engagement." "People see policies of the Reagan Administration with respect to Africa and 'constructive engagement' as being basically anti-human rights," said Funk, who is frequently mentioned as a candidate for Chester Crocker's job in a Mondale Administration. Mondale, Funk argued, would state clearly his opposition to apartheid.

Anthony Lake, Director of the State Department's Office for Policy Planning under Carter, and someone likely to take an important State Department position under Mondale, agrees. In a recent article in Foreign Policy, Lake argues that "unless and until real progress is made within South Africa, Washington should conduct only a cool and limited official relationship with Pretoria."

- **Diplomatic "carrots," such as the relaxation on export controls, extended to Pretoria by the Republicans would be rescinded.**
- **The Reagan Administration's linkage of Namibian independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola would be abandoned.** "We would very politely but firmly insist," said Funk, "that the South Africans get back to the business of UN Resolution 435 on Namibia and quit stalling and quit trotting out the phony issue of Cuban presence in Angola as an excuse for not giving independence to Namibia."
- **The fundamental blame for regional violence will be laid at Pretoria's door.** McHenry predicted that a Mondale Administration would not be "quiet and seeking to rationalize the destabilization policy of the South African government. I think the [Reagan] Administration gave South Africa a blank check." Lake similarly advocates that US officials "more frequently and thoroughly" discuss with South Africa its "dangerous destabilization campaign against its neighbors."

The differences between Reagan and Mondale on Southern Africa are fairly clear. Certainly the South African government sees it that way. The South African newspaper, Beeld, known for its close ties to the government, editorialized in July that "what the Reagan Administration regards as its interest in Southern Africa coincides remarkably with what the South African Government in turn considers to be its own interests" and that "a new term for President Reagan would be preferable all around."

What is less clear is how a Mondale Administration will differ from the Carter Administration's Southern Africa policy. Specifically, will a Mondale Administration, despite the rhetoric in the platform, hold its Africa policy "hostage to East-West confrontation" as the Carter Administration sometimes did? And will a Mondale Administration follow through on its promise to pro-
gressively increase effective sanctions if Pretoria remains intransigent on Namibia and its apartheid system?

Cold War Views Still Prevalent

To answer these questions it is helpful to re-examine Carter's Africa policy. The Carter Administration vacillated between an "Africa centered" policy and one which stressed East-West confrontation. Jimmy Carter entered office on the heels of Henry Kissinger's failed intervention in Angola, determined to both stop any further radical revolutions in the region and prevent similar policy blunders. The administration began its tenure with a strong denunciation of apartheid (articulated by Mondale himself), and a new emphasis on Africa as a whole, policies similar to those promised by Mondale during this campaign.

This concern with human rights, however, was often offset by perceived "national security interests," Cold War policies, and a refusal to back up rhetoric with effective action. Carter's vacillation was often pinned to policy conflicts within the administration. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's hardline, Cold War policies were often played off against UN Ambassador Andrew Young and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who argued for a more restrained stance, although these differences often reflected a difference in tactics rather than strategy. The Carter Administration's interventionist policies were particularly evident in its support for Morocco, its intervention in the Horn, the establishment of new US bases in East Africa for the Rapid Deployment Force, and western intervention in Zaire during the Shaba crises.

Although Brzezinski himself is conspicuously absent from the campaign, Mondale's inner circle of advisers includes a number of people who worked closely with Brzezinski in the Carter Administration. Although many liberals informally advise Mondale and several, such as McHenry and Lake, will undoubtedly obtain important State Department positions in a new administration, Mondale's top foreign policy advisers include people who are known to look at the world from an "Europeanist," East-West perspective.

- Madelene Albright served on Brzezinski's NSC from 1978 to 1981, being responsible for foreign policy legislation. Her specialty is Soviet and East European affairs.
- Richard Holbrooke, Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, is another top adviser. Holbrooke advocates that the Democrats move back to the "responsible center" in its foreign policy positions. In an article he co-authored in the New York Times Magazine last year, he criticized Carter for sending a "message of drift and weakness." He advocates a renewed coalition of liberals and conservatives—a coalition that split during the Vietnam War—and a rejection of anti-intervention politics. The Vietnam War should be "a grievous lesson to be remembered," he argues, "not a crippling wound that disables thought and action."

Mondale may want to take a second, serious look at the issue of South Africa and its growing importance in the minds of Americans.

Mondale seems to have taken Holbrooke's advice to heart. Throughout the campaign he has carefully tread the middle ground. This reflects Mondale's interpretation that Carter lost the 1980 election, in part, because he was perceived as being too naive about the Soviet threat. It also reflects Mondale's failure to choose between the Cold War policies offered by Brzezinski and the more liberal policies suggested by Vance. Now Mondale must also contend with a third force: Jesse Jackson's "Rainbow Coalition" and its unequivocal support for human rights and opposition to US intervention in the Third World.

Throughout the primary campaign, Mondale faced criticism from both Hart and Jackson who advocated more liberal foreign policies. Mondale was frequently at odds with Hart on the question of US intervention in the Persian Gulf and Central America, calling Hart "naive in his opposition to intervention. He vehemently disagreed with Jackson on the questions of nuclear weapons, Cuba, and the Middle East.

(continued on page 8)
Reagan Obstructs Namibian Independence

After four years of Reagan Administration-led diplomacy to reach a settlement for Namibia's long-overdue independence, no settlement is likely anytime soon. Neither the stalled February ceasefire between Angola and South Africa nor two rounds of failed talks this summer has been able to produce the administration's much sought-after foreign policy success, but only more tragedy, delay, and disappointment. South Africa's refusal to withdraw from its illegal occupation represents the final proof of the bankruptcy of the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement."

A Series of Stalls

Recent events regarding Namibia illustrate this bankrupt policy. Many in the administration saw the February 16 ceasefire between Angola and South Africa, signed in Lusaka, Zambia with critical US support, as a break in the deadlock over Namibia. The accord provided for the complete withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory (where they have been for over two years) by March 31, 1984, and a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to oversee the terms of the agreement. The US hoped that this would lead to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, the international plan for Namibian independence through UN-supervised elections—if implementation could be linked to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

The ceasefire agreement, however, was irrelevant to Namibian independence. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma stated that SWAPO would honor the agreement and not enter the occupied area in Angola, but since South Africa had not signed a ceasefire with SWAPO in Namibia, SWAPO was forced to continue the armed struggle. "SWAPO fights inside Namibia," he stated in March, "for the independence of Namibia and its people."

Even South Africa admits the ceasefire had nothing to do with Namibia. South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha declared in March that there was "no possibility" of a Namibia settlement in 1984, concluding it was "probably still a long way off." Instead of producing a Namibia settlement, the ceasefire allowed Pretoria to better control SWAPO's movements in southern Angola and further strengthen its Angolan client, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels, into a serious threat to the Angolan government. UNITA has continued to receive material and logistic support from South Africa, and, as a result, has greatly escalated its military attacks throughout Angola.

The US attempted to show its support for the JMC by placing a five-member military team in Namibia's capital, Windhoek, to "observe" the ceasefire. The US team is known to travel through Namibia in South African Defense Force (SADF) transports and receives all of its intelligence on the ceasefire from the SADF. The only concrete result of this American presence in Namibia has been the deaths in mid-April of two US personnel in an apparently random bomb explosion in northern Namibia.

SWAPO has protested this new US presence in Namibia, saying that it gives more legitimacy to South Africa's illegal occupation.

The Lusaka ceasefire has now definitively stalled. As of early September, at least two battalions of South African troops remained in Angola, with no sign of leaving soon. And South Africa has proposed that the JMC be made a permanent fixture, perhaps also to include Zambian and other African forces that might serve a similar role inside Namibia in the event of a Namibian ceasefire. So far there have been no formal talks in this South African attempt to replace the UN monitoring forces, the backbone of Resolution 435.

South Africa has been actively seeking to bypass the UN plan. On March 21, South Africa's Administrator General in Namibia, Willem Van Nieuwerkerk, stated that it was a "reasonable assessment" that UN Resolution 435 was "moribund." The apartheid regime used this excuse to attempt an alternative "internal settlement" that would be more to its liking. South Africa initiated a roundtable conference in Lusaka in May, with Van Nieuwerkerk, a grouping of six internal Namibian parties known as the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), and SWAPO attending.

Nujoma, who headed the SWAPO delegation, came prepared to negotiate a full ceasefire and initiate implementation of Resolution 435. The talks stalled, however, after only two days because South Africa insisted that Cuban troops in Angola must be withdrawn before there could be any settlement. This condition had originally been introduced into the negotiations by the Reagan Administration.

A second round of talks between SWAPO and South Africa, held in Cape Verde on July 25 without MPC participation, was no more successful than the May Lusaka conference. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Wisner, Jr. also attended, over both South African and SWAPO objections. South Africa refused SWAPO's proposal during the talks that the two sign a joint declaration inviting UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to initiate the implementation of Resolution 435 by negotiating the cessation of hostilities. A SWAPO delegate said that South Africa had again insisted on the departure of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition to any ceasefire, and had also demanded a unilateral SWAPO surrender. Given South African intransigence, SWAPO felt it had no choice but to continue and intensify its armed struggle.

The Washington-Pretoria Axis

The Reagan Administration's continued insistence on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, and refusal to pressure Pretoria to implement Resolution 435 indicates that "constructive engagement" is not merely a failed policy, but a Washington-(continued on page 8)
Reagan Introduces "Anti-Terrorism" Measures

The Reagan Administration has introduced new initiatives to combat "international terrorism." Abroad, these policies have translated into concrete support for anti-communist regimes, like South Africa, no matter how repressive. Domestically, they have meant increased surveillance and targeting of groups opposed to Reagan's foreign policy.

The initiatives include a new presidential directive and the introduction of new legislation. The directive, issued by President Reagan on April 3, 1984, authorizes an increase in CIA intelligence and paramilitary operations. The legislation is designed to target domestic opponents of US intervention in the Third World. Both the directive and the legislation, if enacted, could seriously endanger the civil liberties of those working against apartheid and in support of the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

The introduction of HR 5613/S 2626 has caused the most concern. The bill makes it a crime to "act in concert with" or to provide "support services" to groups or countries designated "terrorist" by the Secretary of State. This bill gives the Secretary of State unlimited discretion in the designation of "terrorist" groups and countries, and the penalty for violating these provisions is a fine of up to $100,000 and/or ten years in prison. In the Senate, the bill was introduced by Senators Jeremiah Denton (R-AL) and Strom Thurmond (R-SC) in the Judiciary Committee. In the House of Representatives, Reps. Dante Fascell (D-FL) and William Broomfield (R-MI) brought the bill before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

"Anti-Terrorism" is becoming the new McCarthyism at home, and a rationale for supporting apartheid in South Africa.

Because of tremendous opposition in the Congress from Democrats and Republicans alike to the vagueness and sweeping scope of this legislation, the administration was forced to retreat. Two new drafts were offered, eliminating the prohibition on "support services" for "terrorist" groups. The prohibition of such services to "terrorist" countries, however, although the administration deleted the clause making it illegal to "act in concert" with such countries. Despite such modifications, the latest draft is still vague, sweeping, and, therefore, dangerous. The administration has yet to give its definition of "terrorism." As the American Civil Liberties Union testified before Congress in opposition to this latest draft: "Under this bill, the President could license speeches favoring the government of South Africa, but deny licenses for speeches favoring the government of Nicaragua."

Does the Reagan Administration consider the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia, to be "terrorist"? State Department officials refused to say at hearings this summer, but in the past, high level Reagan Administration officials have called them such. For example, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, testifying before Senator Jeremiah Denton's Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism two years ago, condemned "all terrorist and other violent acts" that SWAPO and the ANC "take to try to bring about change in Namibia and South Africa."

Washington's and Pretoria's interests coincide in this campaign against "terrorism." On January 30, 1981, just two days after former Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that the primary focus of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy was shifting from "human rights" to "international terrorism," South African commandos attacked ANC headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique. South African military chief, Constand Viljoen, justified the invasion, saying the headquarters was being used as a "springboard for terror against South Africa." At an international conference on "terrorism" held in Washington last June, Secretary of State George Shultz called for "appropriate preventive or pre-emptive actions" to combat "international terrorism." Pretoria could not have said it better. The Reagan Administration has never condemned the South African regime's policy of terror in invading other countries, assassinating opponents, or continuing its violent policy of apartheid.

The Reagan Administration's "anti-terrorism" legislation serves to strengthen its repressive partnership with South Africa. If "anti-terrorism" legislation is passed, members of solidarity groups may be imprisoned for supporting groups (like the ANC or SWAPO) or countries that the administration opposes. "Anti-terrorism" is becoming the new McCarthyism at home, and a rationale for supporting apartheid in South Africa. The legislation is pending in subcommittee in both the Senate and the House, and will likely be taken up again in 1985. Letters should be sent to Congress opposing this legislation.

Secretary of State Shultz at terrorism conference.

Call the Hotline! The anti-apartheid action hotline offers a 3-minute taped message changed weekly providing up-to-date information and action suggestions. We had been experiencing technical difficulties over the summer, so if you tried it once and did not get through, we urge you to give it a second chance.

Call (202) 546-0408.

WASHINGTON NOTES ON AFRICA 5
Grassroots Divestment Action Continues

Congress Stalls on South Africa Bill

As Congress reconvened in September, the fate of the Export Administration Act containing several South Africa sanctions was still unknown. The bill, which has many controversial measures, has been in a House-Senate conference committee since April. If the conference does not reach a compromise before the end of this session, the bill will die a quiet death.

The House version of the bill, approved in November 1983, contains four important provisions sanctioning the South African government because of its racist apartheid policy. The provisions are: 1) Gray provision ending new US corporate investment in South Africa; 2) Solarz provision mandating compliance with the Sullivan fair employment principles for all US corporations investing in South Africa, prohibiting commercial bank loans to the South African government, and banning the importation of South African gold coins, including Krugerrands; 3) Berman provision reinstating controls on exports to the South African military and police; and 4) Wolpe provision expanding nuclear nonproliferation controls to prohibit certain nuclear equipment, parts, and technology transfers to countries (including South Africa) which refuse to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear facilities. The Senate passed its bill, which contains only a version of the nuclear (Wolpe) provision, in March 1984.

Senator John Heinz (R-PA) has been the swing vote among the Senate conferees. As we go to press, Heinz has yet to agree to any meaningful compromise, despite continuing pressure from his constituents. Heinz has received thousands of letters and phone calls urging him to support the provisions. Leading media attention has also been focused on Heinz. In June, community leaders in Pittsburgh held a press conference urging Heinz to accept the provisions. In July, a group of Black leaders held a similar press conference in Washington, as did leading citizens from the Philadelphia area in August.

Heinz may hope to avoid answering his constituents by allowing the bill, with all its controversial parts, to die at the end of the 1984 session. The President has indefinitely extended the current Export Administration Act so the current Congress does not have to finish the bill. If a compromise is not reached the next Congress will have to start the legislative process over again. Whether the South Africa provisions will be attached to a new bill in 1985 remains to be seen, although the groundwork has been laid for future action.

Although losing the bill would be a setback, the progress which the anti-apartheid movement made during the campaign for this legislation was significant. One result of the work on the legislation has been an increased visibility of the apartheid issue throughout the country. Citizens across the country mobilized to push their Congress members to support the South Africa legislation. The strength of this mobilized constituency was demonstrated on the floor of the House when thirty-six representatives from both parties, including Southern Democrats and Republicans, spoke in favor of the Gray amendment while only 4 conservative Republicans spoke against it. Once the bill passed the House of Representatives, the growing opposition to US support for apartheid had to be taken seriously.

The increased concern for this issue in Congress led to the House passing by voice vote four "sense of the Congress" resolutions on South Africa on September 18. These non-binding resolutions are: Rep. George Crockett's (D-MI) measure calling for the freedom of Nelson and Winnie Mandela; Rep. Robert Mrazek's (D-NY) measure condemning Pretoria's bantustan and forced removals policies; Rep. William Gray's (D-PA) measure condemning South Africa's continued detention of Namibians at the Mariental prison in Namibia; and Rep. William Coyne's (D-PA) resolution urging the State Department to refuse any more South African honorary consulates in the US.

This increased visibility led the Democratic candidates for President to endorse the South Africa provisions during the primaries. This endorsement, along with Jesse Jackson's influence, led the Democratic convention to adopt the most specific and progressive anti-apartheid plank ever in any major party platform.

Most importantly, the campaign to support this legislation brought many new people to the anti-apartheid movement and helped fuel the fires of the state and local divestment movement. The national legislation was a great help to the Washington, DC divestment campaign which faced a Congressional review in the House District of Columbia Committee. Indeed, the national legislation would not have been possible without the successes of the growing grassroots divestment movement. That local divestment work will continue and intensify, no matter what happens in Congress.

The divestment movement has heated up over the past year. In April, Nebraska, a state not known for its large Black or liberal community, passed a divestment bill which hinges partly on the Sullivan principles, but which is stronger than the Connecticut divestment bill passed in 1982. Boston passed a divestment bill in July. Trustees of the New York City pension system are discussing a strategy for divesting the pension fund system from corporations and banks operating in South Africa. The State of New York is also considering a divestment bill which has strong support from many sectors of the community, including the New York State Catholic Conference. Both the city of Baltimore and the state of Maryland may pass divestment bills in 1985. State-wide divestment citizen coalitions have formed in Ohio and Pennsylvania where similar bills are pending. Many other states, including New Jersey, will see action on their divestment bills in the coming year.

It is this type of local action all across the country which will eventually lead to a national policy cutting off US support for apartheid. Even if the Export Administration Act dies in conference, it will not stall the growing momentum of the anti-apartheid movement. It has come too far.
South Africa Erupts in Violence

At least 40 deaths, 200 detentions and four bombings marked the inauguration of South Africa’s so-called "new constitutional dispensation." Two rounds of elections were held in late August and a new segregated, tricameral parliamentary system was installed on September 3.

On August 19, more than 20,000 people nationwide attended rallies protesting the elections scheduled for August 22 and 28 and celebrating the first anniversary of the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF, a non-racial coalition of over 500 member and affiliate organizations, was formed in 1983 to protest the new constitution which established the new parliamentary system giving limited “representation” to 2.7 million “colored” (mixed race) and 870,000 Asian citizens, but excluding the 21 million African majority and maintaining white domination. At a rally at Johannesburg’s City Hall, UDF official Casim Saloojee denounced the new system as “nothing more or less than oppression three times over” and reiterated the UDF’s call for a mass boycott of the elections.

Two days later, South African police arrested at least 35 leading members of the UDF in raids beginning at 2:00 a.m. The same day, police used teargas and nightsticks to break up protests by over 40,000 black students which closed 70 schools and colleges. The students, who had been boycotting classes for several months, were protesting the inequities of apartheid education as well as the new parliamentary system.

August 22, the date of elections for 80 seats in the “colored” house of parliament, was marked by a mass boycott of the polls and the closing of virtually every “colored” educational institution in the country as 630,000 students stayed home. More than 150 boyboctters were arrested by police for “intimidating” voters by staging placard demonstrations at polling stations. Although only 18% of the eligible voters actually cast ballots, Constitutional Minister Chris Heunis declared the turnout “reasonable.”

The next day, a bomb exploded in the Department of Education and Training in Johannesburg, but caused no injuries. The Department is responsible for administering schools for the black population. The bomb was followed a day later by another, this time at the offices of the Ministry of Cooperation and Development, which is responsible for overseeing the “pass laws.” Five people were injured in the after-office-hours blast.

A week after the “colored” elections, another round was held on August 28 to decide the 40 seats in the Asian house of parliament. The elections, in which 17% of the voters took part, were marred by a continuation of the boycotts. The police, attempting to curb the protests, used whips, nightsticks, teargas, and rubber bullets on the crowds of protesters. Twenty journalists were beaten by police, and four police were injured. The school boycott also continued. In all, more than 100 persons were injured by police, including a nine-year-old schoolgirl.

The opening of Parliament on September 3 was surrounded by violent unrest in the black townships around Johannesburg, most of which centered in Sharpeville, the scene of the March 21, 1960 massacre of 69 black protesters against South Africa’s “pass laws.” The riots, sparked both by dissatisfaction over the new parliamentary system and by rent and electricity rate increases, were marked by looting and the beating to death of two township officials by protesters. At least 28 were killed in the protests. In addition, an electric power station and the Ministry of Internal Affairs building in Johannesburg were bombed. New government violence was reported at Soweto on September 12 when police disrupted meetings commemorating Steve Biko’s death. A new government decree has banned all meetings of more than two people until September 30. Also, church services and funerals have been disrupted by the regime. Protests have continued through to the time this report goes to press.

US response to these events has been meager. On August 23, State Department spokesman Alan Romberg expressed the administration’s hope that the elections, though “flawed” by the exclusion of the black majority, would “accelerate the process of reform which the prime minister has said is under way.” On the arrests of UDF leaders, Romberg commented that they “represent a violation of fundamental human rights and political liberties” and “appear to undercut the commitment to reform.” A September 5 State Department communiqué expressed the “deep concern” of the administration about the violence, which “dramatizes the urgent need to establish a system of government based on the consent of the governed.” Another official commented privately that the State Department was adopting a “wait and see” attitude.

Apartheid in 1988 Olympics?

South Africa has been making a concerted effort to be readmitted to the Olympic games in time for the 1988 competition. Since 1960, South Africa has been banned from Olympic competition because its apartheid policies violate Olympic Charter rules which prohibit exclusion of athletes based on race, color, religion, or politics.

South Africa’s rightful exclusion from the Olympic Games is being challenged by at least four members of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). William Simon, President of the USOC, F. Don Miller, the Executive Director, Julian Roosevelt and Douglas Roby have all stated that they would favor early readmission of South Africa to Olympic competition, according to the National Council of Churches Commission on Justice and Liberation.

Simon was quoted as saying that he “abhors apartheid,” but would “love to see” South Africa back in the Games, and also that it is “hypocritical” of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to ostracize South Africa while allowing certain other countries to compete. Miller has said that he would support readmission even over the objections of other African nations. More disturbingly, Julian Roosevelt was quoted in the San Jose Mercury News early in July as saying that he had been “particularly impressed by South Africa’s black swimmers because “blacks generally don’t like to swim—they don’t like the water.”

At the request of South Africa, the IOC has agreed to send a commission to South Africa to assess its sports program. This would be the first step towards a possible vote for South Africa’s readmission to the Games. Readmission by the IOC would be a tragic sanctioning of South Africa and its apartheid policies by an international body. Letters opposing Pretoria’s readmission to the Olympics should be sent to Simon and Miller, USOC, 2560 Walnut Street, Culver City, CA 90084.
Mondale and South Africa, continued from page 3

Interestingly, Africa was also an issue of contention. According to Dr. Ronald Walters, Jackson's foreign policy adviser and a professor of political science at Howard University, the Mondale forces had originally attempted to inject a Cold War statement into the Africa section of the platform during the drafting stage. The Jackson forces strongly objected, saying, "We're not going to have this Cold War thing shoved down our throats." When the Jackson forces said they would "embarrass the Democratic Party" on the convention floor if the section remained, Walters said, Jackson's alternative language was substituted.

Shortly after the convention there were indications that Mondale's foreign policy was getting more conservative. One Mondale campaign adviser told the New York Times that the debates during the primaries and at the convention were too the left because "the fights came from the left. We had to defend ourselves." But after the convention, Mondale's advisers wanted to ensure that their candidate did not sound "out of the mainstream" in his campaign against Reagan. Indeed, shortly after Labor Day, Mondale advisers told the New York Times that Mondale "will be moving to the right on foreign policy issues."

South African Sanctions

Mondale's commitment to implement the sanctions against South Africa listed in the Democratic Party platform is also unclear. Only time, of course, will tell, but again, the Carter record may provide some clues. Despite the Carter Administration's imposition of limited sanctions against Pretoria, the administration was always solidly behind continued US corporate investment in South Africa. Vice President Mondale told National Public Radio in July 1980 that the Carter Administration rejected economic sanctions: "We think the threat of sanctions is a more persuasive strategy at this time, coupled with meaningful talks..." (emphasis added)

But as Pauline Baker, former staff director of the Senate Africa Subcommittee, noted in a recent interview, the trouble with the Carter South Africa policy was the fact that Pretoria knew the US "was not serious about sanctions," that the threats were "rhetoric, not policy." Mondale's former membership on the board of Control Data, one of the largest computer corporations involved in South Africa, and the ties between the Democratic Party and many large corporations with South African investments will also be a hindering influence on Mondale's implementation of economic sanctions.

Nevertheless, a Mondale Administration will not duplicate the Carter Administration, if for no other reason than the fact that times have changed. Zimbabwe is already independent. Namibia has suffered from eight years of Democratic and Republican "diplomacy" and is still not free. The armed struggle in South Africa has escalated. The anti-apartheid movement is stronger. There will be greater pressures on Mondale to take forthright, concrete action to impose sanctions on South Africa. According to McHenry, "[A]fter you have exerted a certain amount of pressure you reach the point where, unless you are willing to engage in force or engage in economic sanctions, you are unlikely to move a stubborn government like South Africa."

But that's only if he gets elected. As the election nears, Walter Mondale may want to take a second, serious look at the issue of South Africa and its growing importance in the minds of Americans. He might find that departing from his usual caution and raising the issue as a colossal failure of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy will excite a great number of black Americans who are unsure about going to the polls in November, and a growing number of whites concerned about ending US support for apartheid.

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Pretoria collusion to block the UN plan. South Africa has learned that on Namibia, as on other issues, it can continue to stall and obtain a settlement on its own terms. The Reagan Administration has offered all "carrot" and no "stick," indicating that Washington and Pretoria have similar goals for Southern Africa.

"Any observer of events in Southern Africa can clearly see the American hand in South Africa's maneuvers" to bypass the UN, commented Andimba Herman Toivoja Toivo, recently released from South African prison and now Secretary General of SWAPO's internal political wing. SWAPO President Nujoma was even more direct: "Both Washington and Pretoria maintain the same position on the linkage issue, which is blocking progress and thus holding the independence of our country to irrelevant and alien issues over which the Namibian people have absolutely no control."

On September 10, Newsweek reported that the negotiations between SWAPO and South Africa "have been shelved until after the US elections... Although talks are still underway, South Africa plans no new initiatives until it's clear that Ronald Reagan will be in the White House to help execute them." But Namibia will not bring a US foreign policy success until the Washington-Pretoria axis of collusion is broken, allowing the international community to pressure South Africa to withdraw from its illegal occupation and allow Namibian independence. As long as this collusion continues, the administration can only expect to further alienate the forces for fundamental change in Southern Africa.

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