Dear Friend,

Thanks to your hard grassroots work, the anti-apartheid movement has taken a tremendous step forward in our work to end U.S. support for the apartheid regime in South Africa. On October 2nd the Senate voted, 78-21 to override President Reagan's veto of the selective sanctions bill passed by the Congress. Earlier, the House of Representatives voted 313-83 to override the same measure.

While we celebrate this victory, it is important to realize that we have only taken one step along the path towards our goal. Against a backdrop of increasing apartheid aggression in southern Africa, including the continued illegal occupation of Namibia, the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) continues its support for comprehensive economic sanctions. The present sanctions law, falls far short of the range of measures necessary to adequately pressure Pretoria at this time. However, passage of this law, in the present context, particularly by overriding a presidential veto, is a vital addition to the international anti-apartheid climate.

The grassroots support of sanctions through successful divestment action, local lobbying, demonstrations and other anti-apartheid protests, were an important ingredient for passing comprehensive sanctions in the House and selective sanctions in the Congress. Several years ago, many believed that passage of comprehensive sanctions was out of the realm of possibilities and that a Republican Senate would never consider any sanctions. However, as news of anti-apartheid resistance inside South Africa increased and the people of this country began to loudly support sanctions, the Congress had to change its tune.

We must redouble our efforts for renewed anti-apartheid struggle in the 100th Congress. It is important that activists focus on the continuing anti-apartheid legislative agenda both locally and nationally. States, cities and universities that have been receiving tremendous pressure to divest, must continue to be challenged. Campaigning Congressional Representatives and Senators must be questioned on their position on ending U.S. support for the apartheid regime. We have enclosed a "five-point platform" which outlines WOA's anti-apartheid strategy for the new Congress. We encourage you to generate and distribute a similar platform which outlines your strategy for the renewed struggle.

We look forward to continuing our work with you for a Free Southern Africa!

The Struggle Continues,

Damu Smith
Executive Director

Jackie Wilson
Network Coordinator

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FIVE POINT PLATFORM ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

This document is designed as a basic platform from which the Washington Office on Africa, in conjunction with members of Congress and other Southern Africa groups, will endeavor to map out a legislative strategy and devise a plan for anti-apartheid action in 1986-87.

1. COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. The fight for sanctions against South Africa has only just begun. The recent override represents a major victory, but the legislation, which contains a number of loopholes, is only the first step towards a comprehensive sanctions package.

2. AID TO THE FRONTLINE STATES AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC). Anti-apartheid work must focus more consistently on economic aid for the Frontline States and SADCC. Such aid would decrease their dependence on South Africa, and support their efforts to withstand the effects of apartheid's destabilization policies.

3. NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. The struggle for Namibian independence has been overshadowed by events in South Africa. Anti-apartheid groups must press for the independence of Namibia, where 1.5 million blacks live under apartheid colonialism. Support for Namibia is a litmus test for the actual goals of U.S. policy in the region, and must receive consistent attention and support.

4. SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. U.S. policy must move to embrace the official recognition of and support for the liberation movements and anti-apartheid organizations of South Africa and Namibia. Moreover, anti-apartheid groups must work to organize direct political and material support for these groups.

5. END U.S. AID TO UNITA AND OTHER SOUTH AFRICAN PROXIES. South Africa is waging war against its neighbors. We must work to end U.S. aid to UNITA and oppose any U.S. political and military support for other South African proxies such as NENAMO. Direct or indirect support for proxy groups aids South Africa and undermines the stated objectives of sanctions legislation. The U.S. cannot at once abhor apartheid and finance its regional expansion.

We have designed this platform to build on the selective sanctions legislation, and to bring about a more coherent and supportive U.S. policy towards the people and nations of southern Africa.
On October 2nd, the anti-apartheid movement and the U.S. Congress handed the Reagan Administration and the South African government a major political defeat, when the Republican-controlled Senate voted 78-21, to join the House of Representatives in overriding the President's September 26th veto of the congressional sanctions bill. The House, as expected, had already overwhelmingly voted to override the veto 313-83 on September 29th. Consequently, the focal point of the sanctions battle was the Senate.

The significance of this congressional action—in particular the Senate vote—cannot be underestimated. The override represents the first time President Reagan has ever been defeated on a major foreign policy issue. The Senate's action came in the wake of an unprecedented and intensive joint lobbying effort by the Administration, with the President and Secretary of State George Shultz taking the lead, the South African government, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS), and right wing apartheid supporters led by Jesse Helms.

This lobbying included personal phone calls from Pretoria's Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha as well as from Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who sought to pressure farm state Senators to vote with the President. Botha told Senators that if the sanctions bill passed, South Africa might retaliate by barring imports of U.S. grain. Many Senators were angered that members had been called from the Senate floor to receive Botha's message threatening retaliation. This strategy backfired and reportedly moved a few undecided Republican Senators to support the override.

As he had done last year, the President tried to convince Congress to accept another weak Executive Order. This time, however, he also sought to persuade members to abandon the stronger sanctions bill by appointing a Black Ambassador to South Africa, Edward Perkins (former Ambassador to Liberia), announcing a planned visit by Secretary of State Shultz to the southern African region, and proposing a $500 million aid package to some of the Front Line States. These moves sought to win Republican support for the President's position.

However, unlike last year, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Senate Africa Subcommittee Chairwoman, Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), refused to join Majority Leader Dole in supporting the President. Throughout the override process, they firmly maintained their support of the congressional sanctions package and their commitment to influence other Republican votes, in spite of vigorous lobbying by Senator Dole. In particular, Senator Lugar's leadership was a major reason some Republicans and conservative Democrats voted against the South African government/Reagan Administration position.

The Washington Office on Africa joined with other anti-apartheid lobbying groups to defeat efforts by the Administration and the Pretoria regime to sustain the Presidential veto of the sanctions bill. Mindful of the President's successful 1985 effort to undermine sanctions, anti-apartheid activists redoubled their efforts to retain enough Senate votes to override. Because 14 Senators had originally voted against the sanctions bill, the President needed 20 additional votes to prevent the Senate from attaining the two-thirds majority necessary for an override. However, the President gained only seven votes: Thad Cochran (R-MS), Robert Dole (R-KS), Don Nickles (R-OK), Alan Simpson (R-WY), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Ted Stevens (R-AK), and Barry Goldwater (R-AZ; not present for 8/15 Senate sanctions vote).

The new anti-apartheid law falls far short of much needed comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. However, in spite of the bills'
weaknesses (see Strengths and Weaknesses sheet), clearly its significant sanctions provisions were enough to raise the ire of the South African government and the Administration. The President's veto shifted much of the focus of the debate on sanctions from one of substance to one of principal. The issue, therefore, became a judgement on the effectiveness of Reagan's failed constructive engagement policy, and whether or not the U.S. would continue to appear to be in league with apartheid. A major reason for the success in overriding the veto was that Members of Congress, including the Republican Leadership, had become increasingly frustrated with the Administration's open and politically embarrassing support for the apartheid regime and the President's unwillingness to take stronger action. Passage of this bill has buried constructive engagement and has also contributed to the growing international sanctions effort being applied against Pretoria.

**HOUSE DEFENDS HAMILTON AMENDMENT**

The victory on sanctions came in the wake of the September 17th defeat of Representative Lee Hamilton's (D-IN) amendment regarding U.S. "covert" military aid to the South African-backed UNITA forces in Angola. Hamilton's amendment would have required Congressional debate and approval for any further UNITA aid for fiscal years 1986 and 1987. A motion to strike the Hamilton language (section 107) from the Intelligence Authorization Bill (HR 4759) was proposed by Reps. Bob Stump (R-AZ), ranking minority member of the House Committee on Intelligence, and Claude Pepper (D-FLA), one of the original proponents of UNITA aid. Despite intensive lobbying efforts by House leadership and anti-apartheid activists, the Stump-Pepper motion passed by a vote of 229 to 186.

A majority of southern Democrats (47) and sixteen (16) northern Democrats were joined by nearly all the Republicans (166) in voting for Stump-Pepper. The voting pattern was very similar to the July 1985 repeal of the Clark Amendment, prohibiting aid to UNITA. Thirty-three Democrats and 173 Republicans voted for the repeal. The similarities in the voting patterns, and the individual votes, suggest that many Representatives were persuaded, as argued by Rep. Bob McWeen (OH), that the debate on Hamilton was a debate on whether to reimpose the Clark amendment that was repealed last year.

Major portions of the debate by UNITA supporters focussed on the implications of Hamilton's language for covert aid programs in general, and on the need to confront "Soviet expansionism" in southern Africa by aiding the Angolan "freedom fighters". Unfortunately, there was not enough substantive debate on the disastrous consequences of UNITA aid for U.S. credibility in the region, as well as for the people of Angola and Namibia, to combat the conservative rhetoric. The anti-apartheid movement must challenge the tendency to view the issue of UNITA aid in terms of East-West rivalry, rather than as a question of U.S. support for apartheid's foreign policies. We must work to shift the debate on UNITA aid and end U.S. aid to South Africa's regional war.

**WHAT YOU CAN DO?**

**Challenge** candidates during this election year. Make the deepening crisis in South Africa an election year issue. Call, write or directly ask your Representatives their position on comprehensive economic sanctions and divestment. Urge their support for tougher sanctions in the 100th Congress.

**Begin now to hold meetings of your anti-apartheid group to discuss specific ways of implementing your strategy—such as WOA's 5-point platform—for stronger legislation on southern Africa in the 100th Congress.

**Focus your actions on Namibia.** Make sure that in divestment language, state, local and university funds are divested from U.S. corporations illegally operating in Namibia as well as South Africa.

**Increase all educational activities around exposure of the U.S./South Africa military alliance in Angola.** Work to make the connection for local activists and legislatures to generate more support for No Aid to UNITA. Aid to UNITA is aid to South Africa.

**Visit your Congressional Representative and Senators at their home offices to encourage them to make Southern Africa a priority in their 1987 foreign policy agendas.** If they voted in support of sanctions against South Africa or against the Stump Amendment in the House, please thank them for their support.