

THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA

110 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002
(202) 546-7961

PRESIDENT REAGAN "VETOES" SANCTIONS AGAIN

THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA

RESPONDS TO

THE PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 2ND REPORT ON SANCTIONS

As required by PL 99-440, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, President Reagan sent to Congress on October 2, 1987, a report on the extent to which South Africa has made progress toward ending the system of apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy in South Africa. It requires that, "if the President determines that significant progress has not been made...the President shall include...a recommendation on which...additional measures should be imposed." The law states that the measure of such progress is that South Africa must: repeal the state of emergency, respect justice under law for citizens of all races, release all political prisoners and trade union leaders, permit free participation in the political process to all groups, establish a timetable for the elimination of all apartheid laws, negotiate with representatives of all racial groups the future political system in South Africa, and end military and paramilitary activities aimed at neighboring states.

Pretoria has met none of these conditions. The President acknowledged that there has been no progress toward ending apartheid but, as expected, he blamed that lack of progress on the U.S. imposition of limited sanctions on South Africa. Because of his conviction that "punitive sanctions are not the best way to bring freedom to

South Africa," the President has chosen to disobey the law by refusing to recommend additional measures. Rather, he calls for an undefined "period of active and creative diplomacy...to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations."

The President's report reiterates numerous unsubstantiated arguments in favor of the failed and rejected policy of "constructive engagement." It is built on a foundation of erroneous and misleading assumptions about the magnitude and scope of the crisis in South Africa and the extent of support there and in the U.S. for the strongest possible pressure against the Pretoria regime.

MINIMAL IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

The President reports that "sanctions have had minimal impact on ...trade because of [South Africa's] ability to find substitute markets..." It adds that "after years of contending with embargoes on arms and oil, South Africa has shown itself adept at evading sanctions."

The President attributes the minimal impact of current sanctions to the availability of alternative markets and South Africa's adeptness in evading sanctions.

However, he fails to report that the potential impact of the weak sanctions adopted by Congress has been minimized by the Administration's own lax enforcement of the law and its actions to prevent the imposition of coordinated sanctions by the international community.

The current U.S. sanctions were passed over President Reagan's vigorous opposition and veto last year. Although significant, these sanctions are weak, limited, and circumventable. Because of the President's fundamental opposition to sanctions, he has undercut the law by the imposition of weak regulations. For example, uranium hexafluoride is exempted from the ban on uranium and licenses have been granted for the import of uranium intended for re-export. The circumvention of the ban on uranium and the Administration's failure to implement other provisions of the law has been documented in a report by the General Accounting Office.

South African trade has benefitted from the loophole in the ban on new investments which permits short-term trade financing. Other loopholes permit the rescheduling of outstanding loans, the reinvestment of profits from South African operations and the acquisition of South African securities and financial instruments by U.S. nationals. These and many other loopholes in the law have allowed business-as-usual in many sectors of the South African economy.

It has been easier for South Africa to find alternative markets because the Reagan Administration, in violation of the intent of the sanctions law, has consciously blocked international imposition of the limited U.S. sanctions against South Africa. In Section 107 of the current law, the Congress urges the President to seek international cooperation "as a prerequisite to an effective anti-apartheid policy..." Section 401 says that "It is the policy of the United States to seek international cooperative agreements...to bring about the complete dismantling of apartheid" and directs that negotiations with "other

**SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT
ON SOUTH AFRICA'S PROGRESS
TOWARD DISMANTLING APARTHEID**

As required by the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress on October 2, 1987 on "the extent to which South Africa has made significant progress toward ending the system of apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy". **The President's report states that no significant progress has been made toward dismantling apartheid over the past year.** In fact, the report states, "the cycle of violence and counter violence between the South African government and its opponents has, if anything, gotten worse."

Although the Anti-Apartheid Act **requires** that the President recommend additional sanctions against South Africa if he finds that the situation in that country has not improved (as measured by specific conditions stated by Congress in the Act) the President's report does not call for new or stricter sanctions.

**** Internal politics ****

The President's report gives external pressure partial credit for the National Party's victory in the last election. It claims that this victory, and the increased presence of far right-wing opposition, have "put a brake on any inclination toward fundamental reform by the South African Government."

The report also notes that the government of South Africa has used the state of emergency to silence the voices of opposition, particularly targeting the UDF.

The report contains virtually no reference to political developments among the black majority.

**** Regional Destabilization ****

The report cites the "increase in regional tensions triggered in part by a sharp expansion of South African military, para-military, and covert operations." The raids on Livingstone and Maputo, and covert operations in Swaziland, Botswana, and Zimbabwe are examples of these destabilization tactics. The President claims that "our sanctions were followed by an increase in such ill-considered actions", implying that because of sanctions, "Pretoria appears less inclined to consider external views than was previously the case." The report does not mention South African military aggression in illegally occupied Namibia, or South African attacks on Angola or its support for UNITA.

**** Effect on the White Community ****

The President's report sees the presence of ever-widening splits within the Afrikaner community as a positive development. It favorably notes the number of Afrikaners who left the National Party to run as independents in the last election. The report also claims that sectors of the government are beginning to recognize the need to negotiate "power sharing" with the black majority.

**** The Economy ****

The report claims that South Africa is not necessarily vulnerable to U.S. sanctions because South African export earnings come from the sale of primary products, especially minerals, "that have a ready market internationally whether or not we choose to buy them." It states that South Africa evaded the impact of U.S. sanctions by simply seeking new export markets, although this has resulted in "somewhat lowered profit margins". The areas of the economy hardest hit by sanctions are those which were already in decline for

purely economic reasons prior to sanctions: sugar, coal, iron and steel. The report emphasizes that "although the South African Government has been able to avoid some of the economic effects of our sanctions in the short term, the long-term effect on unemployment and growth rates may well be more serious". The report states particular concern that these effects "will hit blacks hardest."

The President's report indicates that U.S. direct investment in South Africa is down by almost half since 1982. However, the report states that disinvestment has worsened the situation in South Africa, depriving black workers of employee benefits and widening the gap between the white rich and the black poor by placing formerly American-owned companies in white South African hands.

**** Recommendations ****

Despite recognizing that the situation in South Africa has deteriorated over the past year, and despite the law's stipulation that the President shall recommend additional sanctions if he finds that South Africa has not made progress toward dismantling apartheid, President Reagan refused to suggest additional measures against the apartheid regime. Instead, the report calls for "a period of active and creative diplomacy bilaterally as well as in consultation with our allies and friends in Africa focusing on doing all that is possible to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations leading to the building of a democratic society."

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Copies of the President's Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 501 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 are available from the Public Affairs Office of the Africa Bureau, Department of State, (202) 647-7373.

industrialized democracies and other trading partners of South Africa...should begin promptly" and that within 180 days of enactment, the President "should convene an international conference...in order to reach cooperative agreements to impose sanctions against South Africa..." There have been no negotiations and no international conference. Moreover, the U.S. representative to the UN Security Council on February 20, 1987, vetoed the international imposition of sanctions identical to those adopted by the United States.

To date the major industrialized nations have imposed weaker measures or have omitted sanctions included in the U.S. sanctions package. Coal, for example, is the South African export second in importance as a foreign exchange earner only to gold. The U.S., Australia, Canada, Denmark, France and Sweden have banned South African coal. However, Britain, West Germany, Italy and Japan continue to import large quantities of it. The U.S. prohibition on coal has been undermined by the Administration which has done nothing to pressure these allies to join the ban on South African coal.

While the Administration argues that sanctions do not work and has obstructed the global application of sanctions against South Africa, the Secretary of State has campaigned vigorously for global measures against Iran and the U.S. maintains total sanctions against Libya and Cuba. This hypocritical stance reveals the true intent of the Administration to protect the apartheid regime from sanctions. Despite the adoption of some limited measures, the major industrialized nations continue to trade extensively with and invest in the apartheid economy. They provide critical support to Pretoria in the form of trade credits and bank loans, energy production (oil), technology transfers (computers and electronics), and capital equipment (heavy machinery). As long as the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, Israel, Canada, Japan and other nations, along with oil companies and arms dealers, continue to do such business, Pretoria will be able to

circumvent and to minimize the impact of sanctions and existing UN supported bans on oil and arms.

The President can not have it both ways. The U.S. cannot impose selective sanctions, undermine their limited effectiveness with weak regulations, block their global application and then argue that sanctions do not work!

' SANCTIONS HURT BLACKS '

The President claims that "to the extent that our sanctions contribute to" South Africa's economic problems, "we will have contributed...to an increase in [black] unemployment..."

The President's claim that sanctions have exacerbated the unemployment and hardships of blacks seeks to absolve Pretoria of responsibility for its brutal oppression of the black majority. Apartheid is **the** principal cause of unemployment and suffering in South Africa. The apartheid economy is built upon the exploitation of cheap labor. The South African government has established bantustans and relocation camps in the barren countryside to create vast pools of people who can be forced to work for slave wages, under horrendous conditions, in its mines, domestic service, factories and farms. Representatives of the Detainees Parents Support Committee and the Black Sash have estimated unemployment rates **before sanctions** at between 35% and 50%. In some areas, like the bantustans, the rate is as high as 90%.

Long before the discussion of sanctions, apartheid was creating suffering for black people. Apartheid is responsible for a high infant mortality rate (25% in some rural bantustans), a high tuberculosis rate (200 cases per 100,000), a high incidence of malnutrition (as high as 78% in rural villages) and unjust and inadequate health care (1 doctor to 5000 people in rural areas, compared to 1 doctor per 1000 people in urban areas serving mainly white people). An Operation Hunger study (August 1987)

provides evidence that the rate of malnutrition in some South African rural areas exceeds that of Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Sanctions critics' sudden "concern" for suffering blacks.

Only when the campaigns for divestment and sanctions over the years began to gain momentum and threaten U.S. profit-making in South Africa did the suffering of black South Africans become an issue for opponents of sanctions. Since sanctions have become a reality, U.S. corporations, certain members of Congress and the Reagan Administration have further escalated their rhetoric proclaiming concern for "the victims of apartheid," declaring that "sanctions will only hurt those we seek to help." Little was heard from these detractors about the enormous suffering caused by apartheid to its victims long before sanctions and divestment emerged at the center of the debate about U.S. policy toward southern Africa.

Archbishop Tutu and others have derided the sudden sympathy of these critics of sanctions. The welfare of black South Africans has been made a principal argument against sanctions whereas similar reservations about the effect of sanctions on Poles, Cubans, Libyans, or Nicaraguans have not even been mentioned.

Blacks call for more sanctions

Labor unions, churches and political groups in South Africa have appealed to the U.S. and other nations to impose stiffer and comprehensive sanctions against their government. They recognize that a total trade ban and disinvestment would result in some increased unemployment. But they recognize, also, that apartheid is the principle cause of unemployment and the misery they suffer from daily. Just as the Union of Mineworkers accepted the loss of income and jobs and the threat of violence, when over 350,000 miners struck for higher wages, black South Africans and Namibians

have decided that they are prepared to accept a short-term increase in suffering in order to bring an end to the perpetual oppression of apartheid slavery.

The widespread popular support for comprehensive sanctions has been documented by a survey conducted in August and September of 1987. The Community Agency for Social Enquiry opinion poll of rural and urban blacks showed that 67% said that sanctions should be applied to bring an end to apartheid (Weekly Mail, Oct. 16, 1987).

It is the white South African community that reaps the benefits of apartheid. According to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, with 1 million members it is the largest federation of South African trade unions), "Whites who make up 15.5% of the population earn 61% of the income while blacks, who make up 84.5% of the population earn 39% of the total income." Such statistics make a mockery of the frivolous claim in the President's Report that "...concentration through disinvestment of more of South Africa's wealth in local white hands has...marginally enlarged the economic gap between the races."

The purpose of sanctions is to increase the cost of maintaining apartheid to whites. A total ban on ALL bank loans to South Africa, and a prohibition on short-term trade credits, for example, would affect those who seek and receive international trade financing: white South African businesses. Of course, there will be some unemployment repercussions for the black labor force if comprehensive sanctions are imposed on South Africa. In spite of this, the majority of black South Africans, accustomed to suffering under apartheid, have stated and re-stated their support for comprehensive economic sanctions:

The present regime has demonstrated over and over again its intransigence and its unwillingness to willingly move towards a real solution. This is why our recent

Congress resolved to support the call for 'effective pressure which will assist in bringing about a non-violent, truly democratic and non-racial South Africa.' We have declared support for comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions as one of the few options left to those fighting to end apartheid. (COSATU, September 24, 1987)

COSATU has been joined in the call for stronger sanctions against Pretoria by NACTO, the second largest federation of trade unions, the National Union of Mine-workers, the South African Council of Churches, the three million member United Democratic Front, the African National Congress and other organizations. The President's report ignores their appeals.

' SANCTIONS HAVE CUT BACK SOCIAL PROGRAMS '

The President laments the withdrawal of American businesses from South Africa by saying, "...the most painful impact of this trend toward disinvestment has been the disappearance of company-funded social, housing, educational, and job training programs designed to improve living standards and career opportunities for Black South Africans."

Once again, the President misses the point. The key point is that such corporate sponsored social and educational programs do not address the structural nature and injustices of the apartheid system. COSATU has made it clear that, "the crisis in our country is **structural** and cannot be solved through superficial reforms. Only a democratic state can implement a program that would address the gross inequalities and restructure our society to meet the needs of the majority of our people."

The reality is that U.S. corporations in South Africa must operate under apartheid laws and therefore within the framework of the racist apartheid system. Such programs do not, and cannot, fundamentally alter the system which oppresses the black

majority. In fact, according to Bhekokuhle Sibiya, South African Breweries Projects Officer, "CSR [corporate social responsibility programs] is implemented in such a way as to preserve and perpetuate the **status quo** by, for instance, supporting racially segregated schools, technikons and universities and developing racially segregated residential areas." (Weekly Mail, October 2, 1987)

The President praises the contribution of U.S. corporations to the welfare of blacks and claims that, "during the past decade, U.S. companies have spent nearly \$200 million on [education, training, and community improvement] projects." However, he is unrealistic to suppose that a 70 cents per person per year contribution by businesses has done anything to alleviate the suffering caused by apartheid! The President's report never mentions that less than 10% of black South Africans have been affected by ANY of the very limited U.S. corporate social programs. According to Daniel W. Funnell, Executive Director of Signatory Companies Statement of Principles, "Sullivan programs affect 2.5 million blacks at an educated guess." He mentioned that his estimate included "adoptive schools and health clinics which [Sullivan companies] support but do not wholly pay for." Only those working for U.S. corporations or potential employees have very limited access to any job training and on-the-job social benefits. Since U.S. corporations employ less than 1% of the Black workforce, very few will be assisted by improved working conditions or employment opportunities.

Corporations benefit apartheid.

While the President makes much in his report of the contribution of U.S. corporations to the social welfare of blacks in South Africa, he says nothing about the apartheid wages paid by those corporations to their black workers. According to the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRRC), over the last three years some U.S. businesses have been inching their minimum wages up to 50% over the black poverty

level. But most companies continue to start workers **below** the poverty level. If U.S. businesses operating in South Africa paid living wages, then employees would have less need for corporate handouts.

Corporate taxes contribute to the maintenance of the apartheid system. Moreover, U.S. corporations provide vital economic and technological support to the apartheid economy. IBM may have had social welfare programs in South Africa. But, IBM technology and products continue to automate the apartheid system which represses black South Africans.

The President's assessment of the "trend toward disinvestment" is unsubstantiated. Since 1980, 113 U.S. corporations have announced plans to "withdraw" from South Africa. But of that 113, only 7 corporations (including Ashland Oil, Bell and Howell, Boeing, Eastman Kodak and Elolair) have actually disinvested from South Africa. Disinvestment is when a corporation removes ALL of its money, equipment, technology, products and services from the apartheid economy. Many of the corporations claiming to have "disinvested" maintain service contracts, warehouses, leasing arrangements, technology exchanges, licensing agreements, and receive a percentage of the sales of their products in South Africa. For example, although Coca-Cola announced that it was withdrawing, the company maintains a licensing agreement and still profits from the sales of its products in South Africa. Consequently, the soft drink giant still supports apartheid.

The President argues that U.S. corporations are a progressive force for change in South Africa and glorifies the benevolence of their meager corporate social programs. In fact, U.S. corporate support for apartheid repression continues, and ultimately U.S. businesses in South Africa do more to buttress apartheid than to help its victims.

' SANCTIONS SET BACK FAIR LABOR STANDARDS '

One of the most incredible statements made by the President in the report is that "the main impact of disinvestment has been to damage fair labor standards programs" in South Africa.

We ask, what is the President referring to? Does he refer to the inhuman and cramped single sex hostels, lack of death and accident benefits and slave wages which black mineworkers raised as issues in their most recent strike, brutally repressed by the mining conglomerates? No fair labor standards exist for black workers in South Africa and Namibia.

' SANCTIONS DECREASE U.S INFLUENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA '

The President reports that sanctions have resulted in "a marked reduction in our ability to persuade the South African government to act responsibly on human rights issues."

The President expects people to believe that before sanctions, the Administration had persuaded the apartheid regime to act responsibly on any human rights issues. Nothing could be further from the truth. Under the Reagan Administration and previous U.S. Administrations no such persuasion ever existed. Before last October's sanctions, the utterly failed policy of constructive engagement "persuaded" the Botha regime in 1984 to adopt a deceptive new constitutional arrangement and tri-cameral parliament which sought to entrench apartheid by coopting Indians and so-called "coloreds", totally excluding the black majority, and perpetuating white power. It was this crucial move by the apartheid regime which convinced blacks of the futility of pressing for reforms and precipitated an unprecedented wave of anti-apartheid struggle which, in turn, sparked intensified anti-apartheid protests in the U.S. and throughout the world from 1984 to 1986. The South African government responded with the most brutal repression, resulting in the deaths and

SOUTH AFRICAN CHURCHES AND UNIONS CALL FOR COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS
Frank Chikane, General Secretary, South African Council of Churches
(excerpts from a telex, Oct. 9, 1987)

For us, sanctions must be understood comprehensively to include all non-military action by the world community of states that is intended to contribute to the immediate ending of apartheid. Sanctions will include economic, military, diplomatic, cultural and any other action that seeks to exclude South Africa from the community of nations and is designed to increase the cost of maintaining apartheid especially to those who benefit most from it.

The general view of the unions is that while sanctions may be painful to the people initially, the choice is to suffer pain forever or to suffer increased pain over a shorter period in order to extirpate the root causes of the suffering of the people. The Second National Congress of COSATU called for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, monitored by the United Nations Security Council. COSATU pointed out that selective sanctions, as applied hitherto, are actually dangerous and counter-productive because they create serious regional unemployment, further monopolization of the South African economy and generally serve the interests of the trans-national corporations and state. COSATU has called on the world community to accept the fact that the ending of apartheid means a change of government, for if they come to accept that reality they may be able to prescribe the correct combination of sanctions.

The South African churches have recognized the fact that the authentic voice of the oppressed people as expressed through their unions and political organizations has been a call for sanctions with a sting against the South African Government. In response to the problems that may be created by sanctions, the Methodist Church of South Africa has pointed out that the responsi-

bility for any hardship that may arise lies with the South African Government and not with the people who are struggling to free themselves from the snare of apartheid. The Catholic Church in southern Africa has pointed out, in an explanatory paper, that the issue of who controls investments is indissolubly bound up with the question as to who controls society as a whole. Thus they argue, the question is not simply one of job loss with disinvestment or job creation with investment. Those who are concerned with job creation must also be concerned with the creation of a new economic structure in South Africa.

In conclusion, we wish to point out that the issue of sanctions against the apartheid regime must be seen in the context of the total struggle against apartheid. It will not be sanctions alone that will bring about an end to apartheid but the determined struggle of the people of South Africa. Their call to the international community is that if they cannot see their way clear to support their just struggle the least they can do is to stop supporting and propping up the apartheid regime. Sanctions are one way in which the international community can embark on a programme of "constructive disengagement" from the apartheid system and thereby leaving it open for the people to smash it, and extirpate it from the face of the earth.

The South African Council of Churches joins the majority of the people of South Africa in calling for immediate comprehensive and mandatory sanctions that are aimed at sapping the energy of the apartheid state. We believe that the imposition of such sanctions is the only way to effect change in South Africa with minimum violence.

detentions of thousands and the imposition of two states of emergency.

In fact, it was the failure of the Reagan Administration's constructive engagement policy to "persuade" South Africa to do anything to stop its internal and external policies in southern Africa, which forced the American people and the Congress to finally repudiate the Administration's policy toward South Africa.

' SANCTIONS HAVE NOT ADVANCED U.S. GOALS '

The President states that "South African white leadership has reacted defiantly towards these measures" and concludes that the impact of sanctions "on the government itself and its political choices [has] not advanced our goals."

Naturally, the apartheid government, receiving an unexpected rebuke from the United States after years of support from the Reagan Administration's constructive engagement policy, reacted defiantly towards sanctions. No government would ever openly admit that it was capitulating to the pressure of sanctions. Despite their outward defiance, white South Africans have been responsive to pressure, and are anxious to prevent the application of stronger measures by the United States. The South African government has been conducting an extensive campaign against sanctions, except in the case of its own sanctions against neighboring states. Botha argues that sanctions will not work and that they will only hurt blacks. This concern for the welfare of blacks does not seem to restrain Pretoria's policies which lead to the detentions, shootings, forced removals and impoverishment of black South Africans.

According to Sheena Duncan, former President of the Black Sash and currently the acting Associate General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, the white business community in South Africa is very responsive to international economic and political pressure. Since the imposition of sanctions, a number of business

leaders and Afrikaners have met with the outlawed African National Congress, and spoken more forcefully against the state of emergency and other harsh measures by the government. A small but growing number of Afrikaners in South Africa, including some prominent politicians and intellectuals have become increasingly critical of the Nationalist Party's policies and have publicly sought to distance themselves from some of Botha's actions. Even the President's Report concedes that, in response to sanctions, "the single ray of hope ... was the appearance of ferment within the Afrikaner community where there is increasing public discussion of power sharing."

Although the denial of national political rights to blacks has been a fundamental creed of the National Party, the combined external and internal pressure has forced the white minority regime to attempt to show that it is moving toward appeasing black political aspirations. The Botha government has appointed several reform commissions and taken other steps aimed at showing anti-sanctions forces in the U.S. and throughout the world "evidence" that "reform" is on the horizon in South Africa -- which is not the issue. Many of the so-called reforms are merely "window dressing" for the same brutal apartheid policies. For example, the South African President's Council commission recommending reforms guarantees "that most of South Africa will remain racially segregated" (Washington Post, October 6, 1987). The commission's proposals are rightly condemned as being "neo-apartheid" by anti-apartheid leaders in South Africa. But much of this charade would never have been launched if the threat of U.S.-led global sanctions did not loom close to becoming reality.

Racism warps President's analysis

The President misrepresents the results of the 1987 whites-only elections as "a nationalistic backlash to foreign interference," which has "put a brake on any inclination toward fundamental reform..." In the May 1987 whites-only elections the

National Party won an overwhelming majority of the seats in Parliament. **Although other domestic issues and the issue of security were featured in the South African elections, there was virtually no discussion of U.S. sanctions.** President Botha waged a campaign calling for a mandate for his definition of "reform". He did this while brutally repressing anti-apartheid opponents and militarily attacking South Africa's black-ruled neighbors. Under these circumstances, the generally conservative white electorate gave him the mandate he wanted.

There are two fundamental errors in the President's assessment of the South African political situation. He believes that change in South Africa will come through **reform** in the apartheid system. This contradicts the view of the majority, black South Africans, that apartheid can not be reformed but must be removed. The President's report is built on the racist preconception that a future of racial justice and representative government in South Africa depends upon whites.

' ECONOMIC GROWTH RATHER THAN SANCTIONS' WILL END APARTHEID

The President argues that "economic growth and the openness of the South African economy have been among the major forces eroding apartheid. They also offer the best chance of bringing about its end."

Many opponents of sanctions like Helen Suzman (of the Progressive Federal Party in South Africa), Jerry Falwell and conservative members of Congress have also advanced this argument and have called for increased investment in South Africa and no more sanctions. Like the President they believe that economic growth of the apartheid economy leads to increased economic power for blacks, stronger unions, improved education, and better social conditions. Economic development and growth, they hold, will aid blacks in the long term by eventually ending apartheid.

The two major periods of economic growth

in South Africa were the early 1960's and 1976-78 when international gold prices skyrocketed. Yet those periods are renowned for the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres. Repression in South Africa has consistently increased. At the same time, the widespread poverty, malnutrition, chronic health problems, massive unemployment, forced removals and other miseries of life, which have characterized black suffering in South Africa, continued unabated. The President's Report gives no evidence to support the contention that economic growth leads to greater political power for blacks.

Furthermore, continued or increased investment in South Africa will primarily benefit whites and increase their stake in the exploitative, repressive apartheid system. They would be less likely to relinquish their monopoly of political power when they are dealing from a position of economic strength. Increased investment in southern plantations and rising profits from the exploitation of slaves would not have led to freedom or political enfranchisement for slaves in the antebellum U.S. South.

DISCUSSION OF NAMIBIA OMITTED

The President's Report never mentions Namibia, where one and a half million blacks suffer under racist apartheid colonial rule. This is a particular failing of the report, because the sanctions applied to South Africa by the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 are also applied against Namibia. Official U.S. policy proclaims support for UN resolution 435, the internationally accepted plan for Namibian independence. Yet despite this, the President offers no information or analysis on the effects of the continued, illegal South African occupation of Namibia. Nor does he provide any assessment of the impact of sanctions on the lives of black Namibians.

In 1987, the U.S. vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for the imposition of mandatory global comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, which had been proposed in

response to South Africa's opposition to Namibian independence. The Reagan Administration's insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for Namibian independence prolongs South African domination and exploitation of Namibia and the suffering of the Namibian people.

A free Namibia would be a significant "sanction" against South Africa. Economically, Namibia's rich natural resources provide substantial income for the engines of apartheid. Militarily, Namibia is pivotal for South Africa's war against Angola and other neighboring states. South Africa provides bases and training for UNITA forces in northern Namibia. The termination of South African control of Namibia would bring the cost of the war of destabilization closer to home for whites.

SANCTIONS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR INCREASED REGIONAL DESTABILIZATION

The President states that there "has been an increase in regional tensions" in southern Africa. He says, further, that South African security forces have raided Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. He argues that "sanctions [by the U.S.] were followed by an increase in such ill-considered actions."

The President erroneously implies that if there had been no sanctions there would have been no increase in South Africa's destabilization of its neighbors. South Africa's economic, political and military destabilization is part of its "total strategy" to protect and perpetuate apartheid domination at home and in the region, much like Nazi Germany did to extend Nazism to the rest of Europe. **The policy of total strategy was not adopted or implemented because of sanctions.** Pretoria has escalated its attacks against its neighbors since the mid 1970s and early 1980s when white rule began to collapse in these countries. South Africa formulated "total strategy" as an official doctrine aimed at stopping an alleged "communist onslaught".

Pretoria has always sought to protect the privileged white way of life which has also been built on the exploitation of labor and natural resources of the southern Africa region.

It is interesting to note that this section of the report never mentions Angola, where the Reagan Administration has allied itself with South Africa by its covert military aid to the Pretoria-backed UNITA rebels, led by Jonas Savimbi. The U.S. has provided more than \$30 million since 1986 to Savimbi's rebels who help South Africa destabilize the Angola government and economy. The war in Angola escalates daily. Although the President criticizes South African "covert operations" against neighboring states, the CIA channels covert U.S. military aid to Savimbi.

Moreover, continued Reagan Administration support for South Africa has actually encouraged Pretoria to maintain its support for the Renamo rebels in Mozambique, despite official U.S. support for the FRELIMO government. Angola and Mozambique are South Africa's principal targets for regional destabilization. And South Africa believes that it can continue to attack these and other countries in southern Africa and never fear a strong U.S. or Western response. Thus, the very South African destabilization policy which the Administration claims it condemns, is actually aided and encouraged by U.S. policy.

MORE OF DOING NOTHING IS ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE

The report clearly indicates that the President is committed to doing nothing in South Africa. Constructive engagement has failed, yet the President proposes much the same by urging nothing more than an undefined "period of active and creative diplomacy". Although the President says that the U.S. should "do all that is possible to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations leading to the building of a democratic society," his report proposes no tangible

steps towards that goal. He continues his opposition to sanctions by violating the law which mandates that the President recommend additional measures if South Africa has not made significant progress toward ending apartheid.

Once again the American people and the Congress are forced to define U.S. policy in southern Africa. Stronger sanctions against South Africa must be mandated by Congress and fought for by the people of this country and the world. Several sanctions measures are pending. These include loophole closing measures, such as the elimination of tax credits to U.S. companies operating in South Africa, the prohibition of bidding on U.S. oil leases by oil companies operating in South Africa, a ban on the importation of South African and Namibian diamonds, and a limitation of South African investments in the United States.

Ultimately, the necessary response to the deteriorating conditions and increasing repression in South Africa is comprehensive economic sanctions. Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA) has introduced H.R. 1580 which mandates a total trade embargo and disinvestment from South Africa. In addition to imposing its own measures, the U.S. must take the lead in the international imposition of comprehensive sanctions.

The Washington Post (October 13, 1987) reported Archbishop Desmond Tutu's response to the President's Report. According to the Post Tutu was, "sharply critical of President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for not applying harsh

enough sanctions against South Africa." He was quoted as saying, "If it were blacks who were oppressing whites, you would have the marines here." Tutu's critical remarks are a stark reminder of the intense feelings among a broad spectrum of South African blacks who continue to view U.S. policy as being supportive of white minority rule in southern Africa.

Comprehensive sanctions alone, imposed by the U.S. and other Western powers, are not the only means of supporting the struggle in South Africa, nor will comprehensive sanctions be a quick fix solution to the crisis in the region. However, **strong sanctions are a critical part of the long term process of removing the existing layers of strategic economic and political support which the international community continues to provide for the apartheid regime.**

In addition to imposing stiffer sanctions against South Africa, Congress must also heighten the impact of sanctions on South Africa by increasing U.S. aid to the nations of southern Africa, advocating immediate U.S. support for Namibian independence without preconditions, and terminating U.S. military support for South Africa's war against Angola. These and other measures would support the liberation struggle of the black majority, raise the cost of apartheid to white South Africans and increase the likelihood that a combination of internal and external pressures will bring an end to apartheid.

November 1, 1987

For updated information on sanctions legislation and other measures concerning southern Africa, phone the Anti-Apartheid Action Hotline 202-546-0408.

Prepared by
The Washington Office on Africa
110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-7961