Welcomed by wildly jubilant crowds and celebrations held worldwide, Nelson Mandela, imprisoned leader of the African National Congress (ANC) was released from a South African jail February 11. Mandela was unconditionally freed after serving 27 years of a life term.

The release was first announced February 2 by South African President F.W. de Klerk in his opening address to Parliament. De Klerk also announced other welcomed changes, including: the unbanning of the African National Congress and 33 other organizations; the partial easing of the State of Emergency including some media restrictions; a freeze on all political trials and executions; and the release of political prisoners jailed because of their membership in a banned organization.

The sweeping changes announced by de Klerk transform the political landscape in South Africa and signal an important turning point.

In his first public statement held in Cape Town Mandela said that the struggle has “reached a decisive moment: We call on our people to seize this moment, so that the process towards democracy is rapid and uninterrupted.” He added, “Now is the time to intensify the struggle on all fronts. To relax our efforts now would be a mistake which generations to come will not be able to forgive.”

The anti-apartheid movement, under the leadership of the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) gives every indication that it will take full advantage of the political opening and continue to aggressively pressure the regime for additional change.

The National Executive Council (NEC) of the ANC announced shortly after de Klerk's speech that it plans to:

- open a headquarters in Johannesburg and regional and local offices throughout the country,
- encourage the exile community to return home to organize and reverse the “brain drain” of talented and trained Black leadership from the country,
- add Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki to the NEC;
- appeal to the international community for aid to rebuild the organization within the country.

The above changes are geared towards facilitating the organizational transition of the ANC from its illegal status to that of a legal one. That transformation has become one of the main priorities of the movement. According to Murphy Morobe, publicity secretary of the UDF, that organization is reviewing its own structure to see how it can facilitate the transformation. Morobe predicts that eventually some 99.9 percent of the UDF membership will join the ANC.

The unbanning of the ANC, and the potential return of more than 15,000 refugees—some 9,000 members of the military wing—has the potential of furthering the successes of the anti-apartheid movement. Minimally, the potential for major gains in the organization of mass actions inside the country promises to make the movement even more of a force to be reckoned with. A unified and mature movement will be even more crucial if Pretoria, as expected, continues...
Dear Subscriber:

Welcome to the WOA of 1990! This first issue of *Washington Notes on Africa* describes both the victories we celebrate and the challenges we face this year. In step with the 18-year tradition of our national organization, WOA is working this year to provide high quality commentary, educational materials and lobbying tools. We are striving to expand and modernize our local and national Congressional lobbying tactics. To multiply our strength and impact, WOA’s work will reach out to new constituencies, including individuals and organizations that are supportive but not already active.

Please join us. The victories of the past few months are a clear testament to the importance of your past work supporting the liberation movements in southern Africa. But the current challenges facing the anti-apartheid community are as pressing today as they always have been.

Among the pivotal challenges of the region is U.S. policy toward South Africa. Nelson Mandela, and the democratic mass organizations of South Africa have renewed their calls to the international community to both maintain and increase sanctions. But, while bills to impose tougher sanctions remain idle, some in Congress consider weakening the already limited sanctions that are now in place.

As Congress waits on F.W. de Klerk’s next move, the Bush administration is refusing to consistently enforce the ban on South African iron and steel imports and is floating proposals to relax other sanctions beginning with the prohibition on air transportation with South Africa. While de Klerk announces his “power sharing” scheme to preserve apartheid and allow the minority to maintain most of their power and privilege, the Bush administration prepares to host apartheid’s President in the U.S. Concurrently, Congress is debating the response of U.S. policy if de Klerk allows South Africa’s state of emergency to expire without renewal this June.

And above all — while Congressional offices prepare for their targeted adjournment of early October and the fall elections — Members point out that they have heard very little on this issue from the people of their districts and states.

We must not take for granted that this Congress knows the U.S. movement that supported sanctions in 1986 is every bit as large and every bit as committed to the maintenance of those sanctions today.

Nor should we allow the compromises made by Congress when passing sanctions in 1986 to set limits on our calls for U.S. policy today. The modification provisions of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act specify four prerequisites but leave much to the interpretation of a future Congress. Yet, even compliance with those four would still leave most of apartheid firmly in place.

No — that is not “moving the goal post.” The call of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement in 1986 was and remains today quite clear; maintain U.S. sanctions and other pressures on apartheid until it is abolished once and for all.

Without heightened public demand, this nation’s government and its private sector might follow the poor example set by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and settle for minor reform and not the complete dismantling of apartheid.

This Congress must hear from you swiftly and firmly.
APARTHEID IN CRISIS

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE HORIZON

The ANC has announced that it plans to send a high level delegation, led by Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, to meet with de Klerk to discuss "talks about talks" or the pre-conditions for negotiations. The meeting, set for early May, was postponed from April because of violent police attacks on peaceful demonstrators.

Prior to de Klerk's February statement the ANC and an ad-hoc group of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had developed statements outlining the pre-conditions for negotiations. The statement, called the Harare Declaration, was written and initially approved in August 1989. The Declaration has also been approved by the 101 member Non-Aligned Movement and by the December 1989 Conference for a Democratic Future held in South Africa.

The Conference, attended by some 4,000 activists representing over 2,000 groups, was the largest gathering of democratic organizations since the 1955 Kliptown meeting that ratified the Freedom Charter. The document was also accepted in modified form by the United Nations in December.

The Harare Declaration clearly spells out the conditions South Africa needs to fulfill in order to create a "climate for negotiations." The issues which have yet to be seriously addressed by Pretoria are:

- the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees and the repeal of laws which would impose restrictions on them;
- the removal of all troops from the townships;
- the repeal of the state of emergency and all legislation designed to curb political activity, including the Internal Security Act;
- any further substantive action on other apartheid laws, such as the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts, will be delayed until next year. At that time de Klerk plans to replace these laws with substitute laws intended to impose similar restrictions. De Klerk has also said that he plans to end the State of Emergency "soon," and that the release of prisoners should be part of the negotiations process.

Mandela and the ANC, however, say that the first issue must be settled urgently. To underscore the importance of this issue the 343 political prisoners jailed on Robben Island, embarked on an eleven-day hunger strike February 24.

MANDELA VISITS THE ANC IN EXILE

Shortly following his release Mandela embarked upon a two week tour that took him to Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Sweden and Namibia. On March 2, during meetings with the NEC in Lusaka, Mandela was unanimously named Deputy President of the ANC. The appointment makes Mandela the ANC's leader behind Oliver Tambo who is recovering from a stroke in Sweden and who has been unable to lead the ANC in its daily activities since August.

During the tour Mandela was greeted by a number of heads of governments, and by U.S. Secretary of State Baker who was in Namibia for the March 21 independence celebrations.

APARTHEID'S CRISIS

Mandela and the team of ANC negotiators begin talks with a government that is beset by serious economic difficulties and politically divided.

De Klerk's National Party, as the standard bearer of the apartheid system, used to think they could go it alone. However, as pressure from anti-apartheid organizations and from the international community increase, defections to both the liberal political sphere and the right have severely reduced the party's majority. The party's weakened position means de Klerk must make changes. Most importantly, de Klerk's moves since the election show that he knows he can no longer play to his right wing.

For white South Africans, the economic situation is one clear signal that change has to come.

Massive drains on South Africa's capital reserves, sanctions and limited economic growth have created a crisis for the econ-
Apartheid in Crisis, But Not Yet Critical

Despite this realization, however, and the dramatic shifts underway, the regime is still trying to salvage its leadership role. It is not yet willing give up its premiere position and dismantle the apartheid system. By taking the initiative with its own counter-strategy, the regime is still hoping to ensure the continued domination of the country and the region. The government has made dramatic shifts in stating its willingness to allow Blacks the right to vote and to eliminate the most racist apartheid laws, but it still aims to preserve the essential elements of apartheid — most importantly an entrenched white veto on changes that could affect their privileges.

They hope that by re-working previously sacrosanct official positions they will get a favorable nod from the international community while ensuring that the new South Africa has provisions that ensure that “no group dominates or is dominated.” This seemingly even-handed language means that a new government would be blocked by complicated racial checks and balances from redressing the legacies of apartheid inequality.

Internal Pressure Continues to Mount

While sanctions and a divided white community have given an impetus for change in South Africa, the main force has been continued pressure from an active, organized and politically mature anti-apartheid movement inside the country. Despite the repressive State of Emergency and the use of restriction and banning legislation to curb the activities of hundreds of activists, resistance continued.

South Africa’s Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, reported in 1989 that political violence had also escalated over the past two years. According to Vlok, confrontation with the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, made 1988 the most violent year in South Africa. The Minister said that 291 incidents were reported in 1988, compared with 235 in 1987, leaving 187 members of the security forces dead and 163 members of the ANC and the Pan African Congress (PAC) killed. And, in 1988, over 5,028 incidents of unrest and violence were documented. Figures for 1989 have not been reported.

In 1989, to protest the September elections and apartheid laws, anti-apartheid forces launched a massive peaceful defiance campaign. The campaign successfully attacked apartheid’s laws, called for a boycott of the elections and effectively unbanned the people’s organizations. Many of de Klerk’s “reforms” were simply the acknowledgement of gains already declared won by the people of South Africa.

In the present period, the major challenge for the anti-apartheid forces is to implant solid organizational structures and continue the pressure inside South Africa. An extraordinary outburst of popular resistance has erupted, in Black
townships around South Africa and in the so-called independent homelands. But harnessing and disciplining this surge so that it can be most effective is an enormous task.

Meanwhile, de Klerk has still not lifted the State of Emergency, and South African security forces are responding with increased violence to popular protest. The most right-wing forces are well represented in the police, and many are anxious to reverse the concessions de Klerk has made. The regime has begun to sideline some of its internal right-wing opponents, and there is a judicial investigation under way of death-squad killings by secret police and military units.

What de Klerk does or doesn’t do to control the violence by his own security forces will be one of the most decisive tests of the regime’s willingness to move towards serious negotiations.

**WORLDWIDE CELEBRATIONS**

The world has watched the recent developments in South Africa closely and Mandela’s release provoked celebration worldwide. Some of the celebrations were spontaneous, other events were planned by the Nelson Mandela International Reception Committee (IRC) formed in January.

The Committee, after consultations between Oliver Tambo and Archbishop Trevor Huddleston in London, launched an international appeal that sparked the development of 35 National Committees throughout the world including the U.S.

The Committees, modeled after the National Reception Committee of South Africa, have sponsored rallies, demonstrations and cultural events celebrating Mandela’s release and appealed to the movement for continued vigilance on sanctions.

The most notable success of the IRC was an international concert in tribute to Mandela held in London’s Wembley Stadium April 16. The concert drew a sellout crowd of 72,000. It was broadcast to over 50 countries and viewed by an estimated one billion. Mandela, the featured speaker, used the opportunity to deliver a strongly worded statement on the continued need for sanctions and condemned politicians who say that sanctions should be relaxed. The concert was blacked-out in the U.S. because of its political content.

Here in the U.S., offices of the National Nelson Mandela Reception Committee (USA) were established in both Washington and New York. The Washington office is headquartered at the Washington Office on Africa. Activities sponsored by the Committee were held in Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, Oakland, Cham-

Continued on page 12
NAMIBIA: THE ROAD AHEAD

By Betsy Landis

From this day forth, the contrasting events of the Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, 1960 and Namibia’s independence on March 21, 1990 will become indelible images of apartheid’s savage cruelty and its inevitable defeat.

THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

From the most elderly and infirm to young women with babies on their backs or in their bellies they came. After so many years of waiting for settlements that never happened everyone turned out to vote. Many had risen before dawn and walked miles to the polling place, only to wait all day in the broiling sun to vote and then to trudge home again.

The voters’ lines were as implausible as they were inspiring since earlier events had hardly encouraged any sober observer to believe that the election would ever come off.

UN Resolution 435, which set the guidelines for the election, was the result of extensive compromise with South Africa. It put Pretoria, not the UN, in charge of the electoral process. UN Special Representative, Maarti Ahtisaari imposed further limitations by narrowly interpreting the powers of his United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). For example, he ignored his specific duty under the resolution to prevent all intimidation and interference, saying that South Africa had “primary responsibility” for law and order. UN-TAG police were forbidden to investigate complaints or even to intervene when violence occurred in their presence.

Similarly, the barely adequate election law was issued in October instead of, as scheduled, in May. Party officials — themselves election novices — had 20-odd days to learn election rules and then teach their followers how to mark a ballot they could not read.

Only the courage and determination of the Namibian people made it possible to overcome these obstacles and to hold a peaceful election.

Incidents of violence and intimidation were reported until days before the election. But the five days of balloting were peaceful except in the Kavango area in the center of the northern war zone near Rundu. There was some confusion but little obvious fraud or cheating.

SWAPO, backed by an overwhelming majority from Namibia’s north, took 41 seats in the 72-member Constituent Assembly. This was less than the two-thirds needed to dictate a constitution, but a clear enough victory to send Namibians into the streets in joyous celebration.

This victory was followed by quick agreement on a new constitution. SWAPO’s early announcement that it would accept the 1982 “constitutional principles” (human rights provisions) encouraged a series of compromises resulting in unanimous adoption of the final document. Among the generally acclaimed features are a prohibition on the death penalty, the absence of a proposed provision for preventive detention, and a prohibition on derogation from specified rights even under martial law or state of emergency.

The new Namibian government is headed by President Sam Nujoma. Hage Geingob, former head of the Namibia Institute in Lusaka, is Prime Minister.

MAKING THE TRANSITION

The new Namibian government faces unusual difficulties.

Many of SWAPO’s government leaders left Namibia years ago and still have to reacquaint themselves with their homeland. They will discover that all the problems they face are interrelated and that they all cost more money than the government has. All need to be solved first, making it difficult to establish a rational plan of action.

The new government will enter office without any substantial “hands-on” experience, and often may be dependent on the goodwill of their South African predecessors. During the transition, documents, studies, or data invaluable to the incoming government may be lost or “disappeared.” The new government will have to move quickly, therefore, to make an inventory of all official and quasi-official documents and to find out where crucial information is kept.

The new government will also have to move to integrate newcomers with officials from the South African occupation government. It cannot afford to dismiss or alienate those whose technical skills and expertise are necessary. But it also has to monitor those who have been responsible for corruption,
repression or bias in the past; some will undoubtedly have to be dismissed. There must, however, be a critical mass of sympathetic and competent personnel to carry out the new policies.

OVERCOMING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Namibia inherits a very distorted economic structure. The country has little manufacturing, weak and inherently limited agricultural potential, inferior infrastructure (except military-related facilities), a highly regressive tax structure based on a ten percent sales tax, and severely restricted social services. The major source of revenue is mining of uranium, diamonds, and other minerals, non-renewable resources. Almost one-fifth of the gross domestic product goes out of the country to foreign companies and shareholders. Within the country the inequality between the modern sector and the subsistence sectors is one of the greatest in Africa. The current rate of unemployment is estimated at 30 to 40 percent.

The government has ambitious and admirable plans to improve the basic structure of the Namibian economy, starting with diversification of production out of mining into other sectors and upgrading and creating better conditions for workers. SWAPO accepts Namibia’s need for foreign capital and technology, but it is essential to get better terms. The government hopes to renegotiate mining concessions to increase the revenues kept within Namibia. In legal terms, the government could seek damages under UN Decree Number One for illegal exploitation of its natural resources during the South African occupation. But this is not a practical option, and the mining companies will probably only make some limited concessions.

Another key project, proposed in plans by the UN Namibia Institute, is to expand agriculture, in considerable part by irrigation, to make Namibia less dependent on imported food. Fairly large-scale irrigation appears possible in Ovamboland and smaller, simpler projects might be deployed along the Kavango River.

The government will probably move to protect Namibia’s endangered fishing resources by declaring a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone in the South Atlantic. But to develop this resource also will require investment.

Continued South African control over Namibia’s principal port, Walvis Bay, also poses multiple problems for development of the Namibian fishing industry.

“Land has been crucial in the liberation struggle in Namibia. White land titles all rest ultimately on dispossession of the original inhabitants . . . many Namibians expect the new government to restore their "stolen" land.”

Virtually every project requires revenue the government does not have. Until last year South Africa supported its proxy Namibian government with a substantial subsidy, much of which went to ensure the loyalty of the very well-paid officials of the now defunct ethnic “representative authorities.” Phasing out this structure, which duplicated government services for each separate ethnic group, will save some money. But that will take time, and the government will have to pay for new political institutions as well as any development projects.

To the extent that these projects require multilateral or bilateral funding, Namibia must now compete for limited funds. Aid for Third World and African countries in particular is not growing. There is competition from the politically glamorous countries of Eastern Europe. Namibia will join the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and the UN has a special interest in Namibia. But they too are feeling the financial pinch.

Namibia is, moreover, already being pressed to repay the billion or so rands ($390 million) borrowed over the last decade by the occupation regime in Namibia and guaranteed by the South African government. These debts were incurred allegedly on behalf of Namibia, but in fact to maintain South Africa’s illegal occupation of the territory. Although the money was lent in flagrant violation of the World Court’s 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia, some Western countries as well as South Africa are threatening that refusal to pay will undermine Namibia’s ability to tap the world’s financial markets.

The US could strengthen Namibia’s bargaining position in this dispute by just restating an earlier position. In 1970 U.S. Ambassador to the UN Yost clearly stated that the U.S. would not support the claims of an American citizen against an independent Namibia, if they were based on these illegal debts.

Other complicated economic issues include monetary and customs relations to South Africa. Namibia is part of the Rand monetary bloc, and will need to move soon to establish its own currency. It is also a member of the Southern African Customs Union. At least as long as South Africa controls Walvis Bay, it will be very difficult to consider withdrawing from the Customs Union, which also includes Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

LAND PROBLEMS

The new government will face difficult dilemmas in land policy.

On the one hand, land has been crucial in the liberation struggle in Namibia. White land titles all rest ultimately on dispossession of the original inhabitants, whether by force or legal flimflam, and many Namibians expect the new government to restore their “stolen” land.

On the other hand, any large scale redistribution would alienate whites, for-
feit their support for the coalition government, and possibly cause extensive economic disruption.

Facing such realities, the government has apparently decided not to expropriate functioning white farms, although it will “appeal” to owners of exceptionally large or multiple farms to give up some of their property for redistribution. Idle farms can probably be parcelled out without provoking serious objections by whites.

This limitation will add to the difficulties of crafting a policy to improve conditions for most of Namibia’s rural population. But the government will move quickly to provide aid, for the first time, to small subsistence farmers. International voluntary organizations, as well as UN specialized agencies, should be able to assist such projects.

Improving conditions for black workers on white farms is another urgent and particularly difficult task. These farm workers are currently the poorest of the poor, subject to the arbitrary authority of the farm owners; most apparently voted according to their employers’ instructions in the elections. Protective legislation and encouragement for organizing will be necessary to begin to abolish this servitude.

In the midst of these economic and social problems, Namibia’s ecology also requires protection. Some of the necessary actions, such as limiting overgrazing by goats, affect SWAPO’s own political base, and will need careful planning and enforcement to be sustained.

BUILDING A NEW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

South Africa never provided adequate education, health care, housing, or other social services for the Black population in Namibia, and the rural Black population was particularly deprived.

Integration of facilities — finally begun this year in Namibian schools — may bring improvement in urban centers. But it will require substantial funds and trained personnel to begin to provide services, let alone equalize them, in the countryside.

Fortunately, the government has an opportunity to adopt and extend existing small-scale, locally conceived projects, such as simple housing schemes based on “sweat equity.” It can integrate proposed programs with those of church schools, hospitals, and clinics in the north, as well as employ some of the very successful health and education measures developed by SWAPO in its refugee camps.

Guaranteeing security may be the new government’s most urgent task. It cannot yet discount threats from South Africa or from those nostalgic for the old order.

But delivering services may be particularly difficult in much of the country because the population is spread out over vast areas.

The new government will probably emphasize public health and preventive medicine. One of the most urgent needs is legislation to protect uranium workers against long-term radiation diseases. Over the decades ahead it will face the consequences of the lack of past protection as increasing numbers of Namibian miners develop cancers.

To protect the general Namibian population from similar dangers, the government will have to be prepared to refuse tempting financial offers for the right to dump nuclear garbage or other toxic materials in the Namibian desert.

The government will also have costly choices on providing education (which is guaranteed to all through high school by the new constitution). In addition to integrating the separate and highly unequal education systems set up by the South Africans, the government will face demands to expand primary and secondary education, and to decide what higher education institutions are most urgent.

SECURING NAMIBIA FROM DESTABILIZATION

Guaranteeing security may be the new government’s most urgent task. There are several potential dangers: unemployed soldiers from Koevoet or other South African-organized units may have retained their weapons; right-wing white farmers, most of whom own personal arsenals; soldiers of the Angolan rebel group UNITA, who have been involved in cross-border cattle-rustling and banditry, and who might retreat into Namibia from defeats in Angola. Sizable arms caches reportedly are hidden in northern Namibia for possible destabilization by South African agents. Finally
there are thousands of South African troops based in Walvis Bay, less than an hour by air from any part of Namibia.

The British government has offered to train Namibian police and military forces, integrating former SWAPO, Ko eveot and other government soldiers, uniting them in loyalty under the new government, and bringing them up to standard in training. Among the new police are up-to-2,000 officers hired by the South African Administrator-General at the end of 1989 in a spiteful gesture to prevent the new government from choosing its own personnel.

This British project may be helped by private attempts recently made in the north to reconcile former enemies. But forging reliable security forces from such a mix is a delicate task which will take time.

The long history of abuses by South African-organized security forces must be overcome. And recent revelations of former mistreatment of detainees by SWAPO’s own security personnel are also a source for concern. One Namibian has even argued in the press that the government should not have any army at all but only police. But the new government cannot yet discount threats from South Africa or from those nostalgic for the old order.

**WALVIS BAY**

One major unresolved issue with the potential for ongoing dispute with South Africa is the port of Walvis Bay, Namibia’s principal port which South Africa still claims and effectively occupies. SWAPO’s acceptance of a settlement before this issue was resolved was a reluctant compromise, accepted despite international legal support for Namibia’s claim to the enclave. In practical terms, it gives South Africa the possibility to strangle the Namibian economy, as well as providing a military and intelligence base.

U.S. reluctance to support the Namibian position on Walvis Bay has apparently been influenced by the excellent military facilities there, including electronic equipment that reportedly furnishes information to the U.S. and other Western countries. Namibia by itself has little leverage to pressure for South African concessions.

The options include planning for an alternate port — a time-consuming and costly choice — or hoping for resolution once a democratic government takes power in South Africa. But in the meantime South African occupation is both a symbolic and real threat to Namibian sovereignty.

“The new government will probably emphasize public health and preventive medicine. One of the most urgent needs is legislation to protect uranium workers against long-term radiation diseases.”

**UNIFYING ETHNIC GROUPS**

Despite the successful forging of a common Namibian nationality, ethnic divisions, long exploited by South Africa, will still be an issue after independence. The separate ethnic administrations set up by South Africa have built in vested interests in divisions.

And it did not help that some of the SWAPO detainees who suffered abuses in exile were non-Ovambo. This issue was effectively exploited in the election campaign, with charges that “the Ovambo, or even a sub-group of Ovambo, went after members of other ethnic groups. In fact, the tension leading to the abuses may have been more due to generational and educational divisions than to ethnic ones. But there is little doubt that this was an effective election argument. It was enhanced by SWAPO’s failure to forthrightly admit fault and disavow the perpetrators, instead of simply urging reconciliation in general terms.

Future regional council elections will give some indication of the continuing importance of the issue. They will also ultimately affect the composition of the National Council, the second house of Parliament which will be established later under the new constitution.

One important ethnic issue the new government cannot avoid is the future of the San people (often known by the derogatory term “Bushmen”). Their traditional living area was taken from them as a game preserve and their way of life perverted by the South Africans, who turned them into army trackers and camp followers. Those who survive cultural upheaval, rampant illness, and depression will need help to find a new way of life — a costly and chancy project for a government that will have many demands on it by more numerous and powerful constituents. Imaginative and well-funded projects are needed to save these people from extinction.

SWAPO in exile has had the advantage of time to plan for the independent nation. There are numerous reports, by the United Nations and other agencies, laying out what needs to be done.

Now, however, the new government must not only adapt the reports and plans to the current situation. It must come up with the material and human resources to implement its policies.

Even during the election campaign, Namibia attracted relatively little international attention. After independence, it will be easy for major powers to adopt a policy of neglect. But the international community, which allowed South Africa to delay independence for decades and squander resources on repression and a top-heavy apartheid administration, has an obligation to help the new nation. Namibia’s friends should demand the obligation be met.

Betsy Landis is a leading authority on the Namibian issue, a lawyer and a former senior political officer in the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.
The historic peace agreement on southwestern Africa, signed in December 1988, has been largely implemented. Namibia is independent. Cuba has withdrawn more than half of its 50,000 troops in Angola; the withdrawal is scheduled to be completed in mid-1991.

Since South African President F.W. de Klerk took office in August 1989, he has pledged to stop support from South Africa for terrorist actions by Renamo in Mozambique. Even Defense Minister Magnus Malan has said there is no more need for South Africa to attack neighboring states.

REGIONAL WAR CONTINUES

In Angola and Mozambique, however, the countries most devastated by South Africa’s regional wars, the killing has not stopped. Despite a series of reforms and new peace initiatives by the governments, and much diplomatic maneuvering by various parties, both Renamo in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola continue their wars aimed primarily at the civilian population and economy.

The outside forces still fueling these wars include private right-wing groups, elements of South African military intelligence (their present official status unclear) and, in the case of UNITA, the U.S. government.

In Mozambique even the South African government repudiates any support for Renamo’s massacres. The United States says it has urged Renamo to accept Mozambican government offers to lay down arms and participate with other citizens in constitutional reform as well as economic reconstruction.

But indirect talks, mediated by Mozambican church leaders and the presidents of Kenya and Zimbabwe, have reached an impasse. Renamo says it will not talk to the Mozambican government, but only to the ruling Frelimo party. This means that they refuse to accept the legitimacy of the post-independence laws, and want to start from scratch in writing a constitution. The government thinks this means Renamo is not at all serious about ending the war. Observers doubt that the Renamo warlords, steeped in a culture of violence, will negotiate seriously as long as the arms supplies continue to arrive from South Africa. And so far de Klerk says he is unable to stop this allegedly private aid.

U.S. REPLACES SOUTH AFRICA IN ANGOLAN WAR

In Angola the threat of large-scale South African military involvement is over. UNITA can no longer count on regular logistics and troop reinforcements over the Namibian border. Some veterans of South African covert units have been reported fighting with UNITA, and some air resupply from South Africa may be continuing. But it is now CIA supply flights above all that keep UNITA’s war effort going.

U.S. officials say that this military support, which without any open congressional debate has increased to as much as $80 million in FY 1990, is necessary in order to convince the ‘hardliners’ in the Angolan government that there is no military solution to the war. In fact, the aid is having precisely the opposite effect, encouraging UNITA’s Savimbi to reject compromises, increasing Angolan distrust of Savimbi and of the United States, and making it very difficult for Angolan diplomats to sell any further compromises to their own colleagues.

Angolan government spokespersons say they have made repeated conciliatory gestures and compromises. But instead of making reciprocal gestures, Washington has responded with increased aid for Savimbi and sabotage of African efforts to promote a negotiated solution.

The complex indirect negotiations were initiated by the Angolan government in early 1989, almost immediately after conclusion of the international agreement on Namibian independence, Cuban troop withdrawal and an end to South African military involvement in Angola. Angola had failed to get formal assurances in the agreement of a stop to U.S. military aid, but felt they had a U.S. commitment to continue the peace momentum.

SAVIMBI SABOTAGES TALKS

A series of meetings involving African heads of state resulted in a proposed settlement including a cease-fire and integration of UNITA cadres into Angolan government structures. This would include leadership positions, including, according to some diplomatic reports, top posts in several provinces and several government ministries. The terms included acceptance of the “temporary retirement” of Jonas Savimbi, an option which had been raised by Savimbi himself in a March press conference.

Eight African heads of state, from Angola, Congo, Gabon, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, met in Luanda in May and approved the plan. President Mobutu of Zaire was assigned to present the proposal to UNITA and to the U.S.

Mobutu then hosted a meeting in Gbadolite, Zaire on June 22, 1989 for further discussions. Eighteen African heads of state attended, with representatives of two others. UNITA’s leader Jonas Savimbi was also present. Zaire has served as the principal staging ground for U.S. covert aid to UNITA, but has also been under strong pressure to make peace with neighboring Angola.

Angola’s hopes were that African pressure on Zaire would force Mobutu to play a constructive role. If Zaire agreed to a peace plan, then it would be difficult for the U.S. and UNITA to continue the war.
Mobutu hoped for greater international prestige from his role as mediator, but was caught between pressures from Angola and U.S. insistence on supporting UNITA both in military and diplomatic terms.

The formal declaration of Gbadolite included a cease-fire to take effect two days later, and general declarations about peace and national reconciliation. Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA President Jonas Savimbi shook hands in a gesture applauded by the presidents. But the crucial understandings on the political terms of the cease-fire were verbal, and immediately subject to disputed interpretations by the parties.

The Angolan delegation and the other heads of state present thought that Savimbi had agreed to the framework as previously discussed by the leaders. (Savimbi was brought in at the end of the meeting to see the heads of state and hear a summary of the conclusions; earlier Mobutu was responsible for keeping him informed as the discussion proceeded). Whether the divergence came from deceptive ambiguity on Savimbi's part or from hasty and misleading communications by Mobutu to the different parties, after leaving Gbadolite Savimbi quickly denied he had ever agreed to "integration" of UNITA or to his own political retirement.

Reports circulated that Savimbi was encouraged to reject these terms by supporters in the U.S. and by President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, who was jealous of Mobutu's role in the talks. The cease-fire announced at Gbadolite lasted little more than a few days. Initially, diplomats and aid workers in Angola say, there was an eased atmosphere. Media broadcasts on both sides became more temperate; in some areas government and UNITA troops were reported fraternizing. But then UNITA seems to have launched a coordinated offensive of new guerrilla attacks. The government came under internal criticism for having let down its guard.

The Gbadolite meeting, instead of bringing peace, reinforced the convictions that Savimbi's word was not to be trusted, and that the U.S. was working behind the scenes to sabotage African peace efforts.

The eight African heads of state involved in the peace process, including Mobutu, met again in Harare in August. The summit statement reaffirmed the Angolan interpretation of the agreement in Zaire, in effect calling Savimbi a liar. The UNITA leader reacted angrily, officially repudiating the cease-fire and refusing to attend the next summit meeting in Zaire. He quickly reversed this public stance under U.S. pressure, but in fact UNITA military actions continued.

The UNITA attacks were aimed at civilian as well as military targets, and included the detonation of several bombs at public buildings in Luanda. In January 1990 nine trucks were destroyed in a UNITA attack in Benguela province, including five belonging to a UNICEF relief mission.

**ANGOLAN WAR ESCALATES**

In response to the continuing attacks, the Angolan army launched an offensive in late 1989, aimed at cutting off UNITA's capacity to resupply its units from the Mamba area in Angola's remote southeast. According to news reports, Angolan troops took the key outpost of Mavinga in early February, blocking the delivery of supplies through the Mavinga airstrip.

In late November a CIA C-130 plane carrying arms to UNITA from Zaire crashed in Angola, killing four Americans. U.S. airlifted supplies reportedly continued throughout the conventional fighting in December and January. Nevertheless, without the overland supplies from South Africa and the reinforcement of South African troops, UNITA was not able to hold its own against the Angolan army.

Cuban troops did not participate in the fighting, but the Angolan operation was dependent on continued supply of Soviet equipment.

In statements in January, Angolan President dos Santos and other officials reaffirmed Angolan plans to open up the political process, including providing for non-party members to run for election as independent candidates. They also raised the possibility of a future transition to a multi-party system, as a result of constitutional changes. But they say UNITA and U.S. inflexibility are blocking progress on ending the war.

The bottom line is not the details of a settlement, but one of trust. Given Savimbi's history of unscrupulous opportunism and the long-term U.S. refusal to respond to Angolan overtures for friendly relations, many in Luanda (and not only 'hard-liners') fear any agreement leaving a separate UNITA army in place, under Savimbi's leadership. Both Savimbi and the U.S. still refuse to accept the legal existence of the Angolan government, and Angolan...
Legislation on southern Africa currently pending before the Congress includes bills to impose additional sanctions against Pretoria, a resolution to demand that Congress maintain sanctions until apartheid is ended and a supplemental aid package which would allocate aid to Namibia and South Africa. A House resolution calls for improved relations with Angola and conservatives in the Senate have introduced two resolutions condemning the Angolan government and calling for additional aid to UNITA.

**H.R. 21/S. 507:** The Dellums/Simon Comprehensive Economic Sanctions Bill is still pending before the Congress. In the House, H.R. 21, introduced in January, 1989 has 135 cosponsors, while S. 507, introduced in March, 1989 has 16. Some of the key provisions of the bill are: mandatory disinvestment by all U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa; an end to most trade between South Africa and the United States; and a restriction forbidding federal oil or gas leases for any U.S. oil company selling goods to South Africa.

**H.R. 3458:** The Financial Sanctions Bill was introduced by Congressman Walter Fauntroy (D-DC) on October 12, 1989. Presently the bill has 41 cosponsors. The key provisions include a prohibition on U.S. persons or companies holding any loans with South African individuals, banks, or other institutions.

**HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 270:** This resolution was introduced by Congressman John Conyers (D-MI), on February 22, 1990. The Resolution has 41 cosponsors. The key provisions include a prohibition on U.S. persons or companies holding any loans with South African individuals, banks, or other institutions.

**SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL FY 1990:** An amendment to the FY 1990 Supplemental Appropriations bill has been passed by both the House Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees. This amendment calls for $10 million in aid “to support programs and activities of organizations to encourage negotiations leading to a peaceful transition to genuine democracy” in South Africa. An additional $10 million has been proposed to assist Namibia. Funding for this program is intended to come from the restored $30 million borrowed from the Africa Fund to aid Panama. Aid to Namibia is welcome, if distributed and administered properly, it is nevertheless not an increase in Africa aid. The amendments only divide further the total aid allocated to Africa.

**HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 203:** Congressman Howard Wolpe (D-MI) introduced this resolution that recognizes the peace initiatives attempted by the Angolan government. It also calls for U.S. diplomatic recognition and humanitarian aid to help rebuild Angola’s war-torn infrastructure and economy. The bill has 101 cosponsors.

**SENNATE RESOLUTION 196 AND SENATE RESOLUTION 239:** Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) has introduced two Resolutions in support of UNITA. In October, 1989 he introduced S. Res. 196, which expresses the sense of the Senate supporting continued U.S. military aid to UNITA and falsely asserting that the Angolan army broke the June, 1989 cease-fire agreement first by launching an unprovoked attack against UNITA in southern Angola.

On February 1, 1990, Senator DeConcini introduced Senate Resolution 239, expressing the sense of the Senate and condemning the Angolan government for the ongoing and successful offensive against the UNITA rebels. S. Res. 239, which has 11 bi-partisan cosponsors reaffirms U.S. support for negotiated settlement in Angola and asserts that the Angolan government is hampering that process.

**APARTEID IN CRISIS**

From page 5

Fears that an agreement could be followed by a CIA plot to overthrow them are not irrational.

U.S. military aid to UNITA, and refusal to make any gesture of compromise towards the Angolan government, reinforce these doubts and delay the possibility of a peaceful settlement.