Stepped-up violence continues to plague the Natal province of South Africa and has spread to the sprawling townships of Johannesburg in the Transvaal. The conflict—which has claimed more lives than the clashes in Beirut—is now squarely on the front burner for South African anti-apartheid activists. Their central demand is that the Pretoria government end the violence.

The high premium placed on ending the conflict was demonstrated in a series of nationwide actions in July conducted to draw the attention of the international community and to apply pressure on Pretoria. Most impressive was a national stay-away strike on July 2, joined by 67% of workers in Natal, and by over 80% in the Transvaal and eastern Cape.

Just prior to launching the nationwide actions the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) sent a delegation to the U.S. to meet with government officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to explain the escalating violence in Natal. The members of the delegation, trade unionist Willie Mchunu of the National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and lawyer Nicholas Haysom, are on the Joint Working Committee, a United Democratic Front (UDF) and COSATU formation that is responsible for monitoring the violence in Natal and finding ways to create peace. The following comments are excerpts from their interview with Washington Notes on Africa (WNA).

WNA: Why are you visiting Washington, D.C. now?

HAYSOM: What we are trying to tell people is that if the Natal violence is not sorted out, the peace process in South Africa is going to flounder. There can be no talk of a free political climate so long as the massacres continue.

Secondly, we're trying to put pressure on de Klerk to take responsibility for Natal. It's his area of responsibility to restore peace and manage the police.

Thirdly, we believe that law enforcement itself is not enough. There has to be pressure on Buthelezi to make substantial moves towards a durable peace agreement. Among the conditions for that, we believe, is that Buthelezi must be removed from control of the KwaZulu government and the KwaZulu police must be disbanded.

These are all demands that we have already made to the South African government. We are now trying to obtain support for them from NGOs and particularly from foreign governments.

MCHUNU: We feel that after having gone through many unsuccessful peace processes with Inkatha, some pressure continued on page 6
Message from the Director:

We at WOA, like many of you I'm sure, are still studying very carefully the impact of the June visit of Nelson Mandela on U.S. policy. One issue mentioned by Mr. Mandela, however, clearly remains a troubling blight on the region's hopeful present—the escalating war in Angola and the continuing responsibility of the U.S.

The Angolan war is overshadowed in the U.S. media by events unfolding in South Africa. But when one hears what is happening, one can not help but be dismayed at the continuing tragedy. The fact that U.S. aid to Savimbi's war continues unexamined in a time of glasnost sharpens the feelings of dismay, raising them to disgust.

WOA has always opposed the resumption of U.S. aid to UNITA. By funding the rebel group the U.S. exacerbated an already devastating South African-backed war of aggression. But today even the reasons offered by the White House for funding UNITA are outdated. Both Presidents Reagan and Bush cited the presence of Cuban troops and the fear of Soviet influence in Angola to justify arming UNITA, even though the Angolan government has consistently shown its willingness and desire to have normal relations with the U.S.

Today the Cuban troops are leaving ahead of the schedule developed in the December 1988 tripartite agreement. The Soviet Union has embarked upon a course of greater democratization and openness and is encouraging peaceful negotiations throughout the world. The Angolan government has met with UNITA and has expressed a willingness to negotiate. The Angolans have also stated their willingness to shift toward a multi-party political system, of greater democratization and openness and is encouraging government has met with UNITA and has expressed a willingness to shift toward a multi-party political system, designed to promote one party's political ambitions instead of reconciliation.

Change is occurring at a phenomenal pace the world over. And yet U.S. policy toward Angola remains the same. The South Africans, previously UNITA's principal ally, have withdrawn from Namibia and ended most aid to UNITA. But the Bush administration has not moved to reevaluate its alliance with UNITA.

Recent visits with legislative staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees reveal that covert action programs in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Angola are under discussion within Congress. Some Members of Congress do recognize the need to reevaluate policies in these changing times. But even in this election year legislators feel no urgency to accelerate the review process on Angola. Neither do they feel public pressure to bring the issue out of secrecy and become accountable to you as voters by openly debating in the Committees and on the floor of Congress.

Meanwhile UNITA attacks on civilians in rural areas are escalating, particularly in northern areas where U.S. arms are being poured in across the border from Zaire. Reported U.S. covert aid has mounted from $15 million in 1986 to at least $65 million this year. To undermine civilian morale, UNITA has carried out a series of terrorist bombings in the capital city of Luanda.

The U.S.-funded military escalation accentuates Angolan fears that Washington and UNITA are aiming at total victory, and undercuts prospects for compromises on both sides. Even if a peace settlement is reached, there is a danger that covert efforts to promote Savimbi will continue.

Legislators say they hear nothing from their constituents on this issue. Feeling no pressure, they will not move, even now when the need is urgent. We urge you to demand a public debate on Angola and an end to U.S. subsidies designed to promote one party's political ambitions instead of reconciliation.

Aubrey McCutcheon, III  
Executive Director

IN THIS ISSUE:

Inkatha: Threat to South African Peace Process ................................. 1
Message From the Director ...... 2
Sanctions: Still Under the Gun .. 3
"Mandela mania" becomes "Mandela Magic!" .............................. 4

Statement on the Process of Change, June 1990

The National Conference of the South African Council of Churches resolves as follows on the process of change:

a. That the government be called upon to remove the remaining obstacles to negotiations;

b. That a Constituent Assembly of the people of South Africa, freely elected by universal suffrage, is the most effective means of negotiating a future non-racial democratic South Africa, and should be established with all possible speed;

c. That we maintain our current position on sanctions and other pressures until irreversible change has been achieved;

d. That the following definition of irreversibility of change be adopted and popularised nationally and internationally:

The dismantling of apartheid will be irreversible only when:

i) A Constituent Assembly is constituted;

ii) Sovereign power is removed from the existing apartheid legislative structure and invested either in the Constituent Assembly or another agreed interim structure;

iii) the white minority cannot legally reverse or veto the process through the present unrepresentative legislative structures.

Washington Notes on Africa 3
In an exhilarating whirlwind, Nelson and Winnie Mandela swept across the United States attracting unprecedented crowds of supporters. From the East to the West Coasts the Mandelas and the delegation of African National Congress (ANC) leaders were met by millions of U.S. citizens who were enraptured by the newly released leader.

As we got to know them during their ten-day stay, the Mandelas continued to stun us. Built larger than life in our imaginations by 27 years of prison, Nelson Mandela managed to live up to that image and indeed surpassed it. He dazed us with his warmth and good humor and he awed us with his honesty, integrity, commitment and strength.

While the trip was an unqualified success in achieving the ANC’s goals of fundraising and sanctions bolstering it also raised many new questions for U.S. anti-apartheid activists. New opportunities, new relationships to cement, new questions on tactics and organizing strategies exist for activists nationally. Cleveland Robinson of the New York Welcoming Committee and head of the UAW’s District 65 accurately summarized the current conditions as “a whole new ball game.”

The Washington Notes on Africa asked several activists what their impressions were of the “new ball game.” Specifically activists were asked 1) what impact the visit had on their area and 2) what they predicted for the future of the anti-apartheid movement in their area. Excerpts from two submissions are presented on these pages.

The responses of activists clearly reflect a sharp understanding of the need to begin to rethink strategies and to revise tactics. Lee Cokorinos, political action Co-Chair of the Association for Concerned Africa Scholars offered a few observations based on the experience of the Zimbabwe solidarity movement. In the July issue of the Toronto-based Southern Africa Report magazine he notes that prior to Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 there was a “vibrant and well-organized Zimbabwe support movement.” But “as the basis of solidarity shifted from morality to economics, from opposing white minority rule to opposing the logic of “structural adjustment”...the movement not only shed support but literally disappeared.

As South Africa advances along the path of negotiations, the U.S. anti-apartheid movement faces similar challenges. The following excerpts reveal that while Mandela’s visit they are conscious of the need to address these and other questions. How will the movement organize and utilize the momentum generated by the visit? How can we link the issue of apartheid with other issues both domestic and international? To what level will we be able to effectively influence U.S. policy towards promoting the sustainable economic development of the people of South and southern Africa? These are not the only questions but with the fast track that the negotiations may take and the lessons of the rest of Africa behind us it becomes more imperative that we begin to try to answer them.

SUBMITTED BY THE NEW YORK WELCOMING COMMITTEE:
Jim Bell, Coordinator
Nelson Mandela and the ANC delegation arrived in New York City on June 20, the first stop in his historic ten-day U.S. tour. The three-day visit in New York set a positive tone for the national tour, especially Mandela’s visit to the White House and Congress, by creating a groundswell of mass support for increased sanctions against South Africa.

The New York Welcoming Committee organized over 15 events, which directly reached over a million people and brought the message of the ANC to millions more; and raised $1.8 million. Events included an ecumenical service, mass rallies, fundraisers, major policy addresses to the business community and at the United Nations; and a mass rally for Winnie Mandela. Mayor David Dinkins provided extraordinary support and leadership, including hosting the visit with the tremendous resources and services of the city.

The outpouring of solidarity and support was overwhelming: the entire 15-mile route from JFK airport to the Brooklyn Bridge was lined at least three-deep with people; 75,000 people welcomed Mandela at Boys and Girls High School in Brooklyn, another 500,000 in lower Manhattan, another 250,000 in Harlem (the largest mass rally ever in Harlem), and 52,000 at Yankee Stadium. It was a celebration of the human spirit and our deepest hopes for the freedom, unity and dignity of all people, which are all symbolized by Mandela and the ANC, that elevated this city like nothing ever seen before. (Indeed, there was not a single arrest at any of the mass events and the police report that the crime statistics ebbed significantly during the three days of Mandela’s visit.)

Mandela’s visit spurred the quick and unanimous passage of Mayor Dinkins’
increased sanctions bill by the City Council. In general, Mandela's visit has created new opportunities for the anti-apartheid movement. It broke the myth that the struggle is over and made the public aware of the need to "keep the pressure on." Anti-apartheid networks like the Labor Committee Against Apartheid, co-chaired by AFSCME’s [American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees] Stanley Hall, ILGWU’s [International Ladies' Garment Workers Union] Edgar Romney and UAW [United Auto Workers] District 65's Cleveland Robinson; and the Religious Action Network,

chaired by the Rev. Wyatt Tee Walker, played major roles in the visit and their work has been given a tremendous boost in building broader support. Grassroots organizations which have long toiled in the trenches are attracting new activists. Students and young people throughout the city have rallied to a role model and the freedom cause.

Specifically in this next period we hope to build on the momentum of the visit to "keep the pressure on" to push for divestment legislation at the state level, raise additional funds for the ANC and press for the maintenance and increase of sanctions at the federal level.

SUBMITTED BY THE BAY AREA ANTI-APARTHEID NETWORK
Jennifer Drayton writing for the Bay Area Anti-Apartheid Network, a coalition of over 25 anti-apartheid organizations.

In many ways the Bay Area was no different than the other areas of the country Mandela visited. Immediately following the announcement that Mandela was coming, there was an overwhelming response from people wanting to be involved with the visit. This created the opportunity to expand the base for future anti-apartheid activities through building ties with people who do not define themselves as anti-apartheid activists. But it also presented activists with the challenge of working with individuals vying for power and insuring that a political balance be maintained in the work.

Unfortunately, the Mandelas had a scheduling error and were not able to stay for all of the planned events in the Bay Area. They were only present for the Oakland Coliseum event and a small impromptu reception. A formal high dollar reception was canceled and a ten-dollar-a-plate dinner and an event celebrating women of South Africa were held without the Mandelas. Nonetheless, the impact was significant for the work of long-time Bay Area activists. Activists had the opportunity to organize for large audiences, thus reaching a wide ranging constituency and also developing sharper organizing skills along the way.

The Bay Area saw the Mandela delegation come to the Coliseum, present a positive image of a Black man and woman and recognize them as significant role models for the world community. A variety of southern Africa stories were published daily by local media for 14 to 20 days before the visit. Regular coverage of southern Africa continues today.

All these benefits, however, are not without a price. A coalition structure brought together diverse elements of the Bay Area community, including church, labor, anti-apartheid, civic and other leaders, but was ill-defined. Concerns over authority and responsibility were never adequately resolved, and created problems throughout the tour. Relationships between hired and volunteer staff and the coalition was weak and undefined. The incipient "united democratic front" fell apart.

One of the most disturbing elements was the inability of the coalition to fully incorporate the contributions and resources of activists from the area. Irreparable damage was done in some instances. The result is that there are some people who are very angry with individuals and the coalition, as well as the ANC, who they see as accountable for the event. It is a concern that cannot be taken lightly as anti-apartheid activists struggle for moral and financial support for our organizations, the ANC and, moreover, the people of South Africa.

In the aftermath, however, the Bay Area Anti-Apartheid Network (BAAAN) is ready to ride the wave of "Mandela-mania" as new opportunities for anti-apartheid organizing open. The challenges facing BAAAN at this time are to further strengthen itself as an organizing force, broaden its constituency through relating anti-apartheid work to domestic issues, build upon the ties initiated through the coalition, and assist the ANC in particular during this phase of struggle.

Washington Notes on Africa 5
Inkatha from page 1

needs to be brought on the State President [F.W. de Klerk] to intervene in the situation and to ensure that peace is brought about.

Western countries should assist by putting pressure on Mr. de Klerk to make peace in Natal. And we believe that the main ingredients for peace are the jailing of the warlords who are aligned largely with Inkatha. If warlords are within our camps, they should also be jailed.

Also, we have long called for an independent commission of inquiry into the role of the police who have been actively involved in either fanning the violence or, through acts of omission, ensuring that the violence continues.

The KwaZulu police must be disbanded because they have been actively involved in the killings in most of the communities. The police force contains people like Kenneth Mathe who is in charge of security for Inkatha—in our eyes the police cannot be identified as a neutral monitoring force.

Which then brings us, as well, to the question of impartial and effective policing. We are saying that is necessary and should be done by one policing unit in the region.

WNA: We bear that the conflict in Natal has its root in political and ideological differences but that it has degenerated into a vicious cycle of “black on black violence.” What are the real reasons for the conflict?

HAYSOM: This phrase “black on black violence” carries with it a notion of some primitive African tribalism which justifies white concerns about the future of South Africa and which justifies the State of Emergency.

Now, there are several misconceptions that we should correct. There is no tribal fighting in Natal. It is a political conflict between Chief Buthelezi and his supporters who operate within the homeland government structure and those forces which have always been at the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle. Chief Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement has sought to prevent the emergence of any alternative political presence in Natal. Such a presence would undermine his own stature as the so-called leader of the Zulus.

The roots of the conflict lie in the emergence of alternative political presences in Natal in the mid-eighties. First, in 1983, there was the formation of the United Democratic Front, the largest anti-apartheid coalition. This particularly included youth groups, many of whom had a presence in Natal. Then there were the trade unions which came together in 1985 to form COSATU, the largest trade union federation.

Once these groups began to establish a presence, particularly in the Pietermaritzburg area, Inkatha decided to embark on a forced recruitment drive. Court papers document that in 1987 members of communities in Natal were ordered to attend Inkatha rallies and to join Inkatha.

Around this same time there was a work stay-away called by COSATU. Inkatha opposed the call. Therefore the response to the call was going to be seen as the index of who supports who. The stay-away was overwhelmingly successful and nobody went to work, except five to ten percent of the townships.

This was a real slap in the face for Buthelezi. Inkatha blamed a COSATU affiliate (the Transport and General Workers Union) for the failure of people to go to work. Then there was a violent attempt to force members of that union to leave the union and join Inkatha.

In the course of that conflict, eleven, as I recall, bus drivers were shot dead. After that a pattern develops in which Inkatha claims a certain area, and then attacks people or torches their houses if they refuse to join. Eventually whole communities come to be seen as opposed to Inkatha and whole communities are attacked by Inkatha.

The consequence was each group started to fight back. For example, incorrectly in my view, some people stoned buses traveling to the Inkatha areas and rapidly the conflict took on a geographical form. In other words, if you live in an Inkatha area you are a member of Inkatha. If you live in a UDF area you are a member of UDF. And that way the conflict became all pervasive, everybody was touched.

There are a couple of features which I want to stress. One is that Inkatha has overwhelmingly been the aggressor—indeed statistics back us up on this—and the people who belong to our communities have overwhelmingly been the victims of the violence. That feature has not been picked up by the press. They have not shown how the conflict emerges out of apartheid both because of Buthelezi’s position but also because of the police collusion with Inkatha in the conflict.

The police took sides early on. They did more than take sides. They helped generate the conflict either by arming Inkatha or failing to disarm them. At this point over 3,400 people have died; in Maritzburg alone—a town the size of Albany, NY—about 3,000. In March 180 people died. Our first weekend in Washington, DC, 27 people died outside Pietermaritzburg. It is common for families to lose both a husband and a child or two children in this conflict. Eighty
percent of all political-unrest-related deaths come from Pietermaritzburg. But this conflict, and the causes of it, have largely been ignored by the international media.

The other thing is that 60,000 people have been reduced to homelessness; they’ve been driven out of their homes. There were 30,000—all UDF supporters—only in March. The disruption of community has been pervasive, and so has the brutalization of peoples’ social lives, the brutalization of children. What is happening in Natal is going to have long-term consequences even after we are able to achieve a peace settlement. Natal is a very populous province with a large industrial base, and the conflict in the area could just provide a region of havoc in which no economic reconstruction is possible after the end of apartheid.

So those are the reasons we’re particularly concerned. And we have trouble really putting it on the political map because the media and the South African government, and other governments as well, have conveniently approached this thing as “black on black violence.” World War II or the conflict in Ireland is not described as “white on white” violence. Why refer to the Natal conflict as “black on black” conflict unless you want to pass it off and ignore it.

Many governments are unwilling to confront Buthelezi on his role in the violence. And in our view, he has played a major role in blocking peace.

**WNA:** Reports indicate that the political waters are further muddied by the presence of a criminal element in the fighting. Can you elaborate on this?

**MCHUNU:** The violence is clearly a political violence and it is generated by political interests. What one can not avoid in a situation where there is constant fighting and war is going on, is people who have other interests, other than politics, going into political groupings and taking actions to achieve their own particular aims and revenge. They would want revenge of course because there are killings going on. You will get the criminal element in any war.

And South Africa has got a lot of criminals amongst Blacks. Blacks suffer a lot of unemployment, so some become criminals. And in a political climate, criminals are also individuals. They identify themselves with either of the groupings. Now, in ANC, UDF, and COSATU groups we would not deny that within our ranks there could be criminal individuals who may associate with us for political reasons or for their own criminal reasons.

In a violent situation, they also find ways of furthering their interests as criminals. We have suffered a lot of looting. For example, in the Durban area, there are squatter areas where they naturally have a lot of problems with criminals who may foment violence in order to come and loot from within the established townships where most people have jobs.

This is a serious problem. That’s one reason we are saying that if this violence is not brought to a standstill, it’s going to get worse and worse.

**WNA:** Can you describe Buthelezi’s role in the conflict?

**HAYSOM:** Well, Inkatha is a very hierarchical organization. Buthelezi has an enormous capacity to determine the strategies that it follows. And in that sense, one should really look at the belligerent tone of his speeches. A substantial portion of each speech is always devoted to justifying his antagonism to the UDF. In one of the most recent incidents he called to Inkatha to place themselves on a war footing, his demands were that he be given full respect before there can be any peace. In other words, all criticism of him should cease before there is to be peace. Which is effectively a form of threatening the people of Natal with violence if they don’t stop criticizing him. That kind of approach feeds the violence.

Secondly, we believe he has the direct capacity to discipline members of his movement, who are the main perpetrators of the violence. He knows who they are. We know who they are. The press knows who they are. The police know who they are. If he were serious about peace he would not promote—as he has done—the worst of the warlords, within his organization, and he would take action against them.

And then finally, whenever a peace agreement has been near fruition, he has raised some new obstacles. Let me give you a classic example: the intended joint rally with Mandela and Buthelezi. This was to be held as a result of the personal agreement between the two of them. Buthelezi aborted that arrangement by organizing the rally himself in one of his strongholds, an area from which Inkatha warriors had just attacked large groups and killed substantial numbers of UDF supporters. He organized the rally there without consultation, rather than agreeing to have a meeting on neutral ground. Buthelezi made it impossible for Mandela, even if he had wanted to, to hold a rally there and certainly to attract members of the UDF. It raised the belief amongst ordinary people that it was an attempt to sabotage the gathering or to place Mandela in an embarrassing position.

**WNA:** Can you say more about the role of the police?

**HAYSOM:** My belief is that from the beginning the police have been a conduit for—but not of—peace. They are able to achieve a peace settlement. There were 30,000—all UDF supporters—only in March. The disruption of community has been pervasive, and so has the brutalization of peoples’ social lives, the brutalization of children. What is happening in Natal is going to have long-term consequences even after we are able to achieve a peace settlement. Natal is a very populous province with a large industrial base, and the conflict in the area could just provide a region of havoc in which no economic reconstruction is possible after the end of apartheid.

**Nicholas Haysom, lawyer.**


Inkatha
from page 7

Regulation for the violence. The violence could never have reached its proportions without the police performing in the way that they have. Either directly assisting Inkatha or protecting them from any prosecution by simply failing to arrest, notice or to prosecute them. And in that way they’ve been able to generate the conflict.

This is not to say that Inkatha doesn’t have its own political agenda and its own forces. But one analogy would be like the Contras in Nicaragua. The Contras may well have had a cause of their own, but they were mobilized by outside forces.

What is taking place in Natal is an internal form of the destabilization that’s been played out in Mozambique and Angola. It’s a strategy of preventing the development of resistance to apartheid by keeping communities prisoners of the violence.

There are indications that the South African government is rethinking its strategy in Natal. There have been indications at the highest levels that they would like to accommodate our criticisms of the policing role; that they see the Natal violence now as being something that is out of control. But there is no indication that the concern at the top has permeated down to the actual people doing the policing.

WNA: The issue of calling on the South African Defense Force (SADF) to police the situation in Natal has been difficult for some in the international community to understand given SADF repression.

... if the Natal violence is not sorted out, the peace process in South Africa is going to flounder ...

Can you explain why Mandela and others have supported the use of the SADF in Natal?

MCHUNU: We definitely feel that COSATU and the UDF must take responsibility for restraining our forces in cases where there is some undisciplined actions. But the problem is if one tries to do that in an environment where you talk peace on your own side and yet the other side is constantly attacking and it’s not being restrained, then there can be no success.

HAYSOM: No peace agreement or political accord, which is what we would be looking for in the long term, is possible without an effective policing. Our peace initiatives have failed because any flare up breaks down the process completely when there is no effective policing agency. So, unless there is a situation in which people have effective remedies when they are victims of violence and there is real legal prosecution of murderers, we’re going to find it very difficult to put together a peace accord.

Some of our attempts have been to, in a sense, slightly reform the police. We are now trying to develop some accountability between the police and the communities; some kind of influence over the police who’ve traditionally just ignored Blacks.

The other thing, to give you a sense of the future, we recognize that there has to be some political accommodation by both parties. There is a groundswell of ordinary people who want to see peace. And we would like to see committees developing locally and regionally, performing a monitoring function. Such that when an incident of violence occurs members of both sides of the community will participate in resolving it and forming the embryo of the peace movement. It must be a peace movement rooted in ordinary communities.

Sanctions
from page 3

modify the sanctions law.

On the other hand, sanctions supporters say the original intent of the law was to maintain sanctions until at least the legal pillars of apartheid are dismantled or until the negotiating process is “irreversible.” A resolution by the National Conference of the South African Council of Churches provides some clarity and guidance by defining “irreversible.” [See the box on page 3 for the full resolution.]

There is no clear indication when the administration will try to lift sanctions. Cohen’s Labor Day prediction has passed, but analysts fear the possibility of a “lame duck session” following this November’s elections. Such a session reconvenes the old Congress which consists of those reelected, those who lost their election and those who are retiring. Without the immediate pressure of an election, legislators have often felt that they could tackle issues that were previously unpopular or controversial but might now win them favor with the Executive Branch. Another possible scenario is that the administration will wait until early 1991—when South Africa’s profile in the U.S. may be lower or when Pretoria has been able to enact a few more reforms.

Another priority for sanctions supporters remains the question of sanctions enforcement. The administration’s failure to enforce is a de facto way of relaxing the law without provoking public discussion or a possibly contentious debate within the Congress during an election year. Even though the current law is weak and full of loopholes, the Bush administration, like Reagan before it, is weak on enforcing the law. Congressman John Bryant (D-LA), in a floor statement following Nelson Mandela’s address to the Joint Meeting of the Congress, reports that the two administrations “had permitted 1.8 billion pounds of steel and iron products” into the U.S. from 1987 to 1989. Bryant, citing a May 13th article in the Philadelphia Inquirer, reports that U.S. companies have done $3.28 billion dollars worth of business with South Africa, leaving the U.S. their third largest trading partner. ■