MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER F. W. de Klerk took office as State President in September 1989, the promised transition to a post-apartheid order is still in the 'pre-negotiation' stage. Despite the dramatic release of imprisoned African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela in February 1990, the formal ending of the state of emergency, and a variety of other reforms, the basic issues are yet to be addressed. Nelson Mandela and other Black South Africans do not have the right to vote. Race is still the legal basis of political, social and economic discrimination. And there is no democratically elected government that can begin to redress the legacy of generations of racial oppression and inequality.

Formal negotiations on a post-apartheid constitution are predicted to begin in 1991. But like the 'talks about talks' this year, they are likely to be complicated and protracted. For the international anti-apartheid movement, this period is more difficult than earlier phases, when intransigent apartheid rulers regularly discredited themselves by blatant racism and scenarios of repression played out on television. But the need for continued struggle to abolish apartheid is as critical as ever.

DE KLERK'S SLOW-MOTION VETO

The front-page headline in the conservative Washington Times [October 25, 1990] summed it up perfectly, undoubtedly without intending to do so: "South Africa Offers Majority Rule If Whites Get Veto." The article details the government's model for a new political system, likely to serve as a basis for negotiations with the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid groups. But the headline also encapsulates de Klerk's overall political strategy: to move towards a system which provides formal equality regardless of race, and that can therefore gain international legitimacy, while preserving the maximum possible de facto power for the white minority.

As shown in talks this year about conditions for negotiations, the Pretoria regime under de Klerk is and will be a tough bargainer, rarely making a concession without a struggle and trying to get back in the fine print what it gives up in the concessions which make the headlines. As the ANC has come to realize, this means the regime is pursuing a two-track strategy: (1) unlike previous South African rulers, de Klerk is indeed serious about negotiating with the ANC, but at the same time (2) the regime is working equally hard to weaken the ANC and its anti-apartheid allies, by any means it can get away with.

The method can be seen clearly, for instance, in the case of the release of political prisoners.

Political Prisoners. The ANC, supported by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations, made the release of all political prisoners one of the key preconditions for negotiations, arguing that negotiations could hardly be fair when one side was behind prison bars. The same demand appears in the U.S. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAA) of 1986.

President de Klerk released Nelson Mandela and a handful of others in February, and the issue of other prisoners was high on the agenda of 'talks about talks' throughout 1990. But as of late November, most of the estimated 3,000 political prisoners are still incarcerated, and throughout the year the government has continued detentions without trial, as well as trials for political offenses.

After the first summit meeting between the government and the ANC, the Groote Schuur Minute of May 4 established a joint working group to deal with the release of prisoners and indemnity allowing exiles to return home. The working group report was presented to a second summit, which produced the Pretoria Minute of August 6. At that time the ANC announced the suspension of the armed struggle, and the two sides reached general agreement on procedures for identifying political prisoners and exiles eligible for indemnity. But it continued on page 3
How Many Mozambicans Equal One Kuwaiti?

For decades now conservative leaders in the United States, Britain, West Germany and elsewhere have sternly lectured the anti-apartheid movement against the use of economic sanctions.

With monotonous regularity we have been told that “sanctions don’t work”, or alternatively that “sanctions will only hurt black South Africans and the neighboring states.”

But in early August, we witnessed U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher leading the call for sanctions, not against South Africa, of course, but against Iraq, because of its invasion of Kuwait.

Nobody says that sanctions “won’t work” against Saddam Hussein. Nobody says that sanctions “will only harm the people of Kuwait, or the interests of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.”

Of course, the occupation of Kuwait is a clear breach of international law. But it is far from the first crime committed by the Iraqi regime. The voices now stridently demanding respect for Kuwaiti sovereignty were strangely silent when Saddam Hussein was killing Iraqi communists, or butchering the Kurdish minority in Iraq.

Sanctions were in place against Iraq within a week of the attack on Kuwait. South Africa began open military attacks against its neighbors in 1975, the date of its first major push into Angola—but it was only in the late 1980’s that most Western governments began to take hesitant steps towards economic sanctions against Pretoria.

So when an oil-rich Arab state is attacked by a powerful neighbor it takes a week for the international community to punish the aggressor, and declare a near-total blockade.

But when impoverished African nations are attacked by a similarly powerful neighbor it takes over a decade for far from comprehensive sanctions to be imposed grudgingly, and under great popular pressure, by that country’s trading partners.

Are Kuwaiti lives more precious than Mozambican ones? Is there something special about the sovereignty of Kuwait that makes it more valuable than the sovereignty of Angola?

Perhaps several hundred innocent Kuwaitis have been killed in the Iraqi invasion. The United Nations estimates are that between 1980 and 1988 there were 900,000 war-related deaths in Mozambique, and 500,000 in Angola. The majority of these were children under the age of five. By now, those figures will be considerably higher, of course.

If the western world had reacted to South African aggression with the same admirable speed that it now shows towards Iraqi aggression, then most of those 1.4 million people would still be alive. Furthermore the Mozambican economy would not have been destroyed, the country would not be obliged to live on international charity, and the government might never have had to embark upon an IMF and World Bank sponsored structural adjustment program. But then maybe that was the whole idea...

And had the West reacted promptly to South Africa’s aggression against the Frontline States, and imposed a serious embargo, it might also, ironically enough, have helped the Kuwaiti people. For the most sophisticated artillery the Iraqi army possesses is of South African manufacture. That is the G5 mobile cannon, produced by the apartheid state-owned arms company Armscor, and which Iraq has been buying from South Africa every year since 1981.

excerpt from Mozambiquefile, August 1990
South Africa

from page 1

was November 1 before a set of guidelines for implementation was agreed.

Even then the government was still insisting that only several hundred people could possibly qualify as political prisoners, as opposed to 3,622 listed by the ANC, and estimates of 3,000 or more by the South African-based Human Rights Commission. The government was still arguing that cases had to be considered one by one, while the ANC said that categories were clearly eligible under the guidelines.

The return of exiles is similarly delayed by bureaucratic procedures, with the government demanding that exiles complete elaborate forms listing all their political offenses in detail when applying for indemnity—a recipe for delay, or for intelligence gathering if exiles complied fully.

After the November agreement, government spokespersons immediately announced a new undiscussed condition: the timing of release of prisoners, scheduled to be complete under the guidelines by next April, would be contingent on the progress of negotiations and on the ANC’s windup of the armed struggle and “all related activities.” This included, according to the government, not only the suspension of violence already implemented by the ANC, but such measures as the handover of all ANC arms to the government and dismantling all underground networks.

Lawyers for political prisoners said the new government position—not presented in earlier negotiations—made the prisoners continuing hostages and bargaining chips for the regime.

The unseen cost for the ANC in such complicated and protracted negotiations is that it must divert time and energy from political organizing, while supporters wonder what they are getting out of it. Meanwhile, the government reinforces its international credibility and strengthens its claim to legitimately control the process of transition.

On the other hand, if the ANC refused to negotiate, it would make the government look good and weaken the international case for continued sanctions. It might also block the gradual return of released prisoners and exiles who are needed to bolster the ANC’s political organizing.

The de Klerk regime is relying on dilemmas like these to strengthen its hand in the next stage: constitutional negotiations.

...if the Land Act which reserves 87 percent of land to whites is repealed how can Blacks afford to buy land? If guarantees against nationalization or ‘excessive taxation’ are built into the constitution, how will the concentration of almost all capital in the hands of whites be addressed?

Racial Checks and Balances. Despite hints that they might be willing to drop the racial code word ‘group rights,’ the government is still advancing constitutional proposals based on a racial model of society. In early October the Washington Post headlined one official’s statement that the government had given up ‘group rights’ based on race or color. But only a month later another headline read “Pretoria Eyes New Version of ‘Group Rights.’” The contradiction was not explained.

In practice the apartheid regime’s model centers on a two-chamber parliament, in which the lower house will be elected on the basis of one-person, one-vote, and the upper house will be some complex combination of regional and ‘group’ representation. Both houses, which South African officials frequently compare to the U.S. House and Senate, would have to agree on issues involving ‘minority rights.’ These issues might include such topics as guarantees for free enterprise, protection against high taxes and the right to “live, worship, work and play with your own people,” in essence a local option for segregation.

How the groups and regions would be defined has not yet been publicly explained. There would be more regions than the present four provinces [Natal, Transvaal, Cape and Orange Free State], but the racial balance of potential regions is unclear. Groups would not be defined by automatic racial classification. Rather, according to a leaked internal government document, any group sharing a common language, culture or religion with at least 500,000 voters could register to have ten votes in the Senate. Votes might be offered the option, for example, to register as “Afrikaners,” “Zulus,” or “Asians,” much as U.S. voters can register Republican or Democratic.

With such a complex and cumbersome arrangement, ethnic and racial divisions would be reinforced, and whites could block strong central government action to redistribute wealth, provide social benefits or integrate facilities over local opposition.

The complex veto would be enhanced by minimum percentages necessary for certain kinds of legislation. And South African Constitutional Affairs Minister Gerrit Viljoen has also spoken of a ‘collegiate cabinet’ which would operate by consensus, instead of a strong president who could choose and direct cabinet officers.

Such a constitution, together with inherited white advantages in education and experience in government, would guarantee that any efforts to redress the massive inequalities of the apartheid system would be faced ‘with all deliberate delay.’

Some indication of the pattern can be seen in the latest reform in apartheid laws. The Separate Amenities Act, bar—

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In late October, in the mad dash to wrap-up the session prior to November elections, the House and Senate voted for a conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Act that contains language signifying the first step towards questioning the Reagan Doctrine crusade against Angola. The little publicized vote followed months of activity by advocacy groups, grassroots activists and key Members of Congress who pressed for Congressional recognition of the need for changes in U.S. policy towards Angola.

The victory is limited, because the compromise measure adopted still allows U.S. military aid to continue. A stronger measure presented by Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA) and others failed.

But given the line-up of forces, the fact that any such measure passed was an important first step in undoing the stranglehold that UNITA and its supporters have had on U.S. policy. The subject was debated openly for the first time, and brought out of the closed doors of the Intelligence Committees. UNITA and the administration lobbied hard against the amendments, and were shocked at their loss. The Angolan news agency has noted that Angola has already come close to satisfying the conditions for suspending the aid, and that Unita leader Jonas Savimbi must now wonder how long his blank check from Washington will last.

MANY EFFORTS PRECEDED LIMITED VICTORY

In the Congress, key Members had several months of careful planning behind them before the October vote. Initial hopes and efforts had been pinned on an amendment offered in the House Intelligence Committee that would have reduced aid to UNITA. This amendment lost by two votes. Then Congressmen Dellums (D-CA), Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, Steven Solarz (D-NY), member of the Intelligence Committee, Howard Wolpe (D-MI), Chair of the House Subcommittee on Africa and his Subcommittee staff gained the support of the House leadership to bring the Angola debate to the floor on October 17th.

Dellums initiated the debate with an amendment that called for an end to the aid program until it had been openly acknowledged and publicly debated. The Dellums amendment would have effectively ended the funding program for the remainder of this year. The measure was similar to one introduced in 1986 by Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) and defeated by a vote of 229-186.

The debate on the Dellums amendment was vigorous and intense but it was defeated, by a margin of 246 to 175.

Despite the defeat, the debate over the amendment was crucial for its information content. Most importantly it set both the tone and the context for the introduction of a second, more limited measure introduced by Congressman Steven Solarz (D-NY) immediately after the Dellums vote.

Solarz called for limitations on lethal aid to UNITA. The conditions and restrictions of the amendment were numerous, complicated and would have required presidential certification before aid could be cut. The Solarz amendment passed a first vote by a comfortable margin of 213-201. House conservatives called for a second vote, however, which resulted in a tie leaving Speaker of the House Thomas Foley (D-WA) to cast a tie-breaking vote, his first ever. The victory was particularly striking given that the Chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Congressman Dante Fascell (D-FL), opposed the amendment.

Following the House vote, the act had to be reconciled with its Senate companion, which lacked provisions for UNITA aid. As is general congressional procedure, a Conference Committee, composed of House and Senate Members met to hammer out the differences between the bills and to develop a compromise. The Conference Report then had to be passed by both Houses in before it could be sent to the President for signature or veto.

The final version of the Angola language is a further weakened version of the Solarz amendment designed to satisfy the concerns of Senate conservatives and to guard against a possible presidential veto.

STOP THE

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"COLD WAR ANACHRONISM"

In reviewing the debate over the Dellums and Solarz amendments the argument that appealed most to Members was that offered by Congressman Dellums who called the policy a "cold war anachronism" and "an unnecessary and expensive drain on limited resources."

Many policymakers recognized and were sympathetic to the reality of changed world conditions symbolized by the end of the Cold War. Even many who supported the administration's funding of "UNITA freedom fighters" against the "Soviet-backed, Marxist-Leninist MPLA," recognized the stagnant quality of the old arguments.

Persistent overtures by the government of Angola and the new international climate will continue to condition the legislative environment and possibly result in further shifts in policy.

Dellums also persuasively argued the
of the End?

In his closing remarks, the Congress-man pointed out the racist character of U.S. policy on Angola. He noted that if similar conditions existed in Eastern Europe the Congress would “end this madness.” But given the color of the Angolan peoples’ skin Congress feels little urgency to act.

THE CONFERENCE REPORT

While much of the actual Intelligence Authorization Act Conference Report language is classified, the published sections call for holding 50 percent of the lethal aid authorized for UNITA in a restricted account until March 1991 while the remaining 50 percent may be released by the President immediately. In March 1991, the President must issue a report to both House and Senate Intelligence Committees certifying either that the conditions listed below have been met and recommending that and funding be suspended or that funding should continue. For the aid to continue, the Intelligence Committees must then take a new vote to approve the aid.

The importance of this provision is that it gives an opportunity for the committees to raise the issue again in six months, rather than giving the remaining 50 percent program funding for an entire year.

To suspend the aid President Bush must certify that:

- the Government of Angola has expressed a willingness to accept a reasonable cease-fire and a political settlement and proposes a reasonable and specific timetable for internationally supervised free and fair multi-party national elections in which UNITA would be free to participate;

- that the Soviet Union has indicated it has ceased providing lethal assistance and has withdrawn those advisors, trainers, and technical assistants involved in assisting the Angolan government in the planning or execution of military actions in Angola, and that intelligence has indicated that such cessation and withdrawal has occurred;

- that intelligence has indicated that other outside sources are not supplying such material or advice to the Government of Angola; and

- that the Government of Angola has not begun a significant offensive against UNITA.

The act further states that if after March 31, 1991, any of the conditions are met but later cease to exist, or if a significant offensive against UNITA is imminent, the President may resume aid. If the President has not certified by March 31, 1991 that “the conditions required for suspension of lethal aid to UNITA have been met” he must indicate in his report why he is not able to make the certification.

In fact Angolan and Soviet proposals have already come very close to meeting all these conditions. The catch is that the interpretation of ‘reasonable’ is left up to President Bush, and that the administration’s hostility to the Angolan government is unabated. And the ‘intelligence’ provided will come from agencies that are interested parties rather than objective analysts.

Immediately after the passage of the Conference Report by the Congress the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers’ Party—the ruling party in the Angolan government) Central Committee issued a release announcing a timetable for elections and declaring support for a multi-party democracy. The committee announced its plans to have a multi-party political system in place by March 31, 1991, a full review of the constitution concluded by the end of 1991, and “direct universal suffrage elections within three years of a truce with UNITA.”

Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos says that Angola’s 15-year war has devastated the country, destroying most of the social infrastructure including mechanisms—like a national census—that would be a prerequisite for an election. This reality necessitates the 36 month delay between the cease-fire and elections. No one even knows the current population of Angola. The last census was conducted prior to the 1975 independence and since then there has been terrific dislocation and death. National resettlement, refugee repatriation, famine relief and elimination of the threat of violence throughout the countryside are just a few of the impediments to a national voter registration process necessary to a free and fair election.

Despite this recent pronouncement by Angola’s ruling party, however, and other steps indicating the government’s willingness to move towards democratization, economic restructuring and a multi-party system, the relatively open conditions of

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of arms sales to the Saudis. Most significant was the encouragement the Reagan administration gave to South Africa’s ‘total strategy’ of aggression against its southern African neighbors. South African troops repeatedly intervened directly in Angola to help UNITA, and also provided large-scale logistics and intelligence support.

In 1985 the Clark amendment was repealed and by 1986 “covert aid” to UNITA began to flow from the U.S. as well. Although the precise figures are classified, and creative accounting may disguise even higher levels, press reports indicate that the U.S. has sent at least 240-295 million dollars worth of military supplies and equipment to UNITA since 1986:

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**TOTAL:** 240-295 M

Despite administration claims that they are primarily interested in peace in Angola, in practice U.S. policy supports the view of many analysts that Washington is still hoping to remove the Angolan government from power and install a government headed by long-time U.S. client Jonas Savimbi.

With U.S. support, UNITA is prolonging the war in the hopes of further weakening Angola as the Cubans complete their withdrawal and Soviet support decreases. Elections might then be held with Savimbi’s army intact and the electorate held hostage to the threat that Washington and UNITA would begin the war again if Savimbi did not win. In short, this would be a variant of the Nicaraguan model.

In Congress the forces taking such a hardline approach, wanting to chalk up another Cold War victory even if it means prolonging the war in Angola, are still strong. But the legislation recently passed, despite its clear weaknesses, is an indication that patience for the anti-Angola vendetta is on the wane. Because of the long history of U.S. government hostility towards the government of Angola, changing course is hard. But the amendment provides an opening to press harder for peace. And the new deadline in March provides an immediate opportunity.

**WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?**

While the vote is a step forward, it still isn’t time to hand up the protest signs nor retire the phone tree lists. The next few months will be crucial times to monitor the actions of the administration and the Intelligence Committees.

It will also be an important time to again let the full Congress know that the U.S. public is opposed to the continuation of this deadly war. Repeatedly Members responded to our visits with: “We don’t get any mail on this issue.” While anti-apartheid groups and the Congressional Black Caucus played active roles, the issue was not given high priority by national Black leadership, church institutions, trade unions groups or other organizations.

It was the waning of Cold War logic, above all, that seems to have swayed Congress. Even a modest increase in lobbying by grassroots groups could help those seeds of doubt grow. Congress needs to hear that the American people do not want to spend money to promote terrorism and block a peaceful solution in Angola, just to satisfy Savimbi’s ambitions and vengeful Cold War impulses. Even with the threat of war in the Gulf and continuing problems in South Africa, work on this issue is essential to improve the prospects for peace in Angola.
ring Blacks from public facilities, was repealed by parliament in June and became formally defunct after a grace period in mid-October. In theory Blacks now have equal access to public libraries, swimming pools, toilets, transport and other facilities.

The Group Areas Act still ensures residential segregation, however, and many local councils are moving to establish special fees for non-residents. Whites in Bethal, about 100 miles east of Johannesburg, for example, can use their local library free; but Blacks who are forced to live outside the city limits have to pay a new $80 annual fee to use the library; another local council requires a $4 deposit for non-residents on each library book borrowed. Many of the local councils enacting such policies are dominated by Conservative Party opponents of de Klerk. But the government itself in September provided a set of standard bylaws for "maintaining civilized standards" in municipal facilities. Thus de Klerk both takes credit for reform and tries to retain conservative white support by spelling out how to get around the reform and maintain white privilege.

As the case of the Separate Amenities Act shows, dismantling apartheid and its legacy is no simple matter. The agenda is long. Even if the Land Act—which reserves 87 percent of land for whites—is repealed, how can Blacks afford to buy land? If guarantees against nationalization or 'excessive taxation' are built into the constitution, how will the concentration of almost all capital in the hands of whites be addressed? How can a new government deal with issues of unemployment and job training, or with grossly unequal spending on health and education? These tasks will be difficult enough under any circumstances. With an effective white veto built into the constitution they will become impossible.

It is likely that the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups will have to make some constitutional concessions during the negotiations. But if a white veto is indeed enshrined as de Klerk and his colleagues want, it will extend the dead hand of apartheid even farther into the future.

**CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES FOR ANTI-APARTHEID FORCES**

Internationally and inside South Africa, anti-apartheid forces are concerned with making plans for the time when political apartheid at least will be replaced by a new constitutional order. But despite the illusions of those who confuse de Klerk's rhetoric with reality, the challenges of getting there are still daunting.

On the one hand, there are the enormous practical difficulties of setting up open internal political organization. The ANC's clear leadership among anti-apartheid forces has its advantages, but it also poses enormous problems of coordinating a coalition with many diverse voices: trade unions, community organizations, youth, guerrillas, homeland leaders, white intellectuals, people in exile, the South African Communist Party, and church leaders, to list only a few components. It must find some way to make the conflict with other organizations—from Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha to Black Consciousness organizations—a democratic debate rather than a fratricidal struggle. It must balance militancy and keeping the pressure on the regime with making compromises when it has to. Such an agenda would be hard in a free political climate. But while the ANC has renounced the armed struggle, the regime has maintained its capacity for repression in place. Even if de Klerk does not approve of all the actions of the hard-liners within the police and security forces, he has consistently been reluctant to curb their actions.

Thus while some demonstrations are permitted, others are attacked by police who kill and wound demonstrators. While some prisoners are free, new ones are detained. Although there have been a few arrests of armed men associated with Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha movement, the general picture is still one of police bias. There is well-founded suspicion that the government still deliberately encourages so-called "Black on Black" violence, aiding anti-ANC forces and tolerating the use of provocateurs.

A few months ago observers speculated that hard-line Minister of Defense Magnus Malan would soon be out, discredited by involvement in death squads and his intransigent opposition to change. But the Harms Commission, set up in February by the government to investigate unexplained killings after newspaper reports of police involvement in death squads, proved to be a farce. Malan's position now seems secure. And General 'Kat' Liebenberg, who earlier had commanded covert operations such as South African support for Renamo terrorism in Mozambique, was promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces.

Over the next months and years, while many outside assume that apartheid is almost over, there will be deadly serious unresolved issues at stake in South Africa. The Bush administration, consistent with past U.S. policy, will tilt towards de Klerk. The media in this new phase will shed even less light than usual on the issues. If anti-apartheid forces in the U.S. are to make their weight felt, there is an enormous job of education ahead.
South Africa's Political Prisoners

The following is a partial compilation of statistics and individual cases over five months of 1990, taken from the Apartheid Barometer column of The Weekly Mail, a South African newspaper.


Four Months Later:
June 1 — At least 353 people are currently being held in detention without trial in South Africa, according to the latest report of the Human Rights Commission (HRC). This includes 294 people being held under the Emergency regulations, 39 people held under the Internal Security Act, and 14 in Bophuthatswana.


June 8 — Since the February 2 speech of State President F.W. de Klerk, 176 people have been killed, directly or indirectly, by police action while 1,563 people have been injured, according to minimum estimates compiled by the HRC.

June 15 — There are at present about 3000 political prisoners in the country. Although since February 2 eighty people have been released — with a further 48 to be freed in terms of State President de Klerk's promises of June 7 — the releases are offset by new convictions, according to the HRC.

July 27 — According to press reports at least 40 Umkhonto we Sizwe and South African Communist Party members have been detained over the last two weeks in connection with an alleged attempt to set up underground structures should talks between the government and the ANC break down. Police have only confirmed the detention of eight people, including ANC National Executive Committee member Mac Maharaj.

Maharaj is being held under section 29 of the Internal Security Act. He is the most senior ANC member to be detained since the organization's unbanning. Maharaj, 56, who came home last month, spent 12 years on Robben Island and 13 years in exile.

August 6, 1990 — The South African government and the ANC sign the Pretoria Minute, agreeing to a suspension of the armed struggle and to procedures for release of political prisoners and indemnity for exiles.

August 17 — Jeremy Seebers became the first person to be held without charge since the Pretoria Minute was signed, when 15 policemen detained him under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act last Friday. His wife said her husband was a member of the ANC, but could not say why he was being held. He was denied access to his lawyers.

August 31 — Alfred Ndlovu, the first vice-president of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), has been in detention since June 1987. He is married with five children and worked as a bus driver in Pietermaritzburg when he was arrested.

He was held for 10 months under section 29, and then convicted of terrorism and accessory to murder, with concurrent sentences of five years for each charge. He was accused of harboring an alleged ANC guerrilla.

Ndlovu was a key figure in peace talks between Inkatha and the Congress of South African Trade Unions.

September 14 — The HRC reports 283 people currently being detained in South Africa and the homelands.

Mac Maharaj is still being held under section 29 and was admitted to St. Aidan's Hospital in Durban on Wednesday, reportedly for neck injuries.

Billy Nair was released from detention on Wednesday, after suffering a heart attack. He is currently in intensive care at a Durban hospital.

September 21 — Detained South African Communist Party member Mac Maharaj has laid a charge of assault against the police. He has not been allowed to see a private doctor and is being held in leg-irons for short periods and during transit.

October 5 — Evelina de Bruin is South Africa's only female prisoner serving a death sentence. One of the 'Upington 14,' she was sentenced in May 1989. She was convicted for the November 1985 murder, by common purpose, of a municipal policeman in her town.

A domestic worker for 30 years, De Bruin is now old and frail. She is very religious and has a history of ill health. Although, according to the court record, De Bruin did not play an active role in the fatal attack. She has been refused bail. Appeals by the 'Upington 14' should be heard in the first half of 1991.

There were 323 prisoners on Death Row at the end of August, of which 58 were for political offenses. Executions have been suspended, but the sentences remain in effect.

October 12 — There are currently 8 people held under the Unrest Areas Act, 126 under section 29, one under section 31, 18 in the Transkei and 35 in Bophuthatswana.

October 26 — Edna Sethema, 33, was detained on June 29 in Warmbaths in the Northern Transvaal under section 29. Sethema had been working for Checkers [a supermarket chain store] in Warmbaths. At the time of her detention, she was part of the South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union team negotiating with management about a pending strike. Sethema has an 11-month-old baby, being cared for by her parents.

Her lawyer, who has not been granted access, has been informed by police that her detention arises from an investigation revealing she had locally received military training under the auspices of the ANC.

According to the HRC, a total of 265 people have been killed and 2,988 injured through police actions in unrest in South Africa and the homelands since February 2.