The drought in Southern Africa, which now threatens as many as 18 million people with starvation or severe malnutrition, has attracted only marginal notice from international media. The Washington Office on Africa has joined with other concerned groups in urging increased U.S. funding for disaster relief (request our Action Alert of July 1 for details). But we are also concerned that lawmakers and the public reflect on the reasons for the scale of the crisis. While drought precipitated the current famine emergency, South Africa’s wars and international donor policies critically weakened the region’s capacity to respond.

Bill Rau, Ph.D., an independent consultant in development issues with seven years of experience in southern Africa, is a member of the board of directors of the Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund and coordinator in North America of Development Innovations and Networks (IRED), an international non-government organization. He is the author of From Feast to Famine: Official Cures and Grassroots Remedies to Africa’s Food Crises. The following remarks are condensed from his testimony on June 9, 1992 before the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Under normal circumstances, the people and governments of southern Africa would be able to cope with even these most difficult times of drought, relying only marginally on external aid. However, it is not a time of normal circumstances in southern Africa.

Two critical factors explain why the failure of the rains this year have such a great impact. Those factors are:
1) Over a decade of destabilization of the countries of southern Africa by the apartheid regime of South Africa, and
2) The negative influence of U.S. foreign aid policies in conjunction with World Bank structural adjustment policies.

Together, these factors have long-term effects on the abilities of people to produce or buy food to cope with shortages created by the drought. Together, these factors have undermined the ability of governments across the region to engage in development programs that can lead to food security. The loss of crops, ground water and animals may be due to the failure of the rains, but the vulnerability of people in dealing with their losses is largely due to these external factors.

The food emergency in southern Africa is not another example of failed African agriculture. Zimbabwe farmers have regularly produced surpluses of crops since independence, and those surpluses can be shared within the region; Zambian and Malawian farmers are resourceful and highly productive. The food emergency exists, in large part, because neither national policies nor national and regional resources can now be applied to support peasant farmers and low-income groups. Apartheid’s wars have diverted resources to defense and international donor policies have diverted resources to serving the better-endowed farmers.

There are actions that this Congress can take now, not only responding to the effects of drought in a way that will not do further damage, but also contributing to the self-reliant efforts of people across southern Africa so they can deal with future droughts without massive emergency food imports. Those actions can be undertaken at little or no cost to the U.S. taxpayers. In some cases, legislation already exists to shape a creative and supportive partnership with people in southern Africa.

DESTABLISHMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA

For over a decade, South Africa has violently resisted the attempts at change by people in southern Africa. Direct military attacks on Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland were combined with military support to anti-government rebels in several countries, particularly...
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in Mozambique and Angola.

The regional grouping of independent southern African countries (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference — SADCC) estimates the costs of destabilization at $60 billion since the mid-1970s. These losses exceed by at least 20 times all U.S. foreign aid to the region over the past decade. The figures represent actual losses to infrastructure and transportation, to social service facilities and other direct war damage. They also include the higher costs of transportation, insurance, security, and diversion of resources. The human costs — over 1.5 million killed, millions of others wounded or forced to flee their homes and livelihoods, the psychological impact on children orphaned or otherwise caught up in South Africa’s wars — are not as readily calculated.

These are lost resources that the states of southern Africa could have used to undertake needed land reform, open new land for farming, support peasant farmers (especially women), increase agricultural credit and improve agricultural marketing services. Governments have been unable to use these resources to help keep down food prices, improve income opportunities for low-income women, expand jobs in the informal sector, or improve the provision of basic social services.

The chances for achieving food security, from the household to the regional level, have been greatly diminished by South African aggression.

Angola and Mozambique have suffered the most. Each has lost over $15 billion in assets. The agricultural heartland of Angola, capable of providing food and agricultural exports, has been devastated by the UNITA forces backed by South Africa and the United States. Land that peasants once farmed is now scarcely used, as people have been forced to flee their homes or have found their fields mined. Angola has one of the highest per capita rates of amputees in the world. Infant mortality rates are at least double the norm for the region.

The country imports food, using its oil revenue, even though it could be fully self-sufficient in basic foods.

In Mozambique, the war waged by RENAMO, as the rebel group promoted by South African special forces is known, is designed to disrupt the countryside, to prevent people from living normal lives, to hamper even the most basic development efforts. One-third of Mozambique’s population of 16 million are homeless or their lives too disrupted to be productive. They are dependent on government and external assistance. It was not drought that created these conditions. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN reports that in the years before this drought, Mozambique was able to produce only 35 percent of its national food needs, and those estimates are based on an assumed meager diet for most people.

The war waged by RENAMO has prevented people from farming and has disrupted markets. Cash crop as well as food production has fallen dramatically. According to World Bank figures, Mozambique earns less than $100 million from its agricultural exports; in 1981 the country earned three times that amount. Yet, like other countries in the region, Mozambique has the physical and human resources to be fully self-sufficient in food.

The social infrastructure of the country has also been targeted. Mozambique has lost half its schools to rebel attacks since 1981. Mozambique’s rapidly expanding preventive health care system

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PRODUCED BY: Imamali Countess (Acting Director), William Minter, Kristen Lee, John Metzel, Roberts Higgs and Sheila Clemons.
was halted, as clinics were destroyed and workers targeted for retribution. State resources were diverted to defense (40 percent of the annual budget). While early in the 1980s health services received nearly 12 percent of the budget, by the late 1980s they received less than five percent. Malnutrition rates for young children and for women were extraordinarily high, even before the recent drought.

The costs of resisting South Africa, together with declining world commodity prices for southern African resources, rising debt, and costly policy failures by governments, led to severe economic crises in most of the countries in the region. The economic crises gave external donors far greater influence over national policies. Agriculture has been one of the targets of external policy prescriptions. Unfortunately, donor policies have tended to undermine rather than enhance the food security of the region.

POLICIES LEADING TO FOOD INSECURITY

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have played key roles pushing for policy changes in southern Africa. Despite the arguments of these agencies, their policy prescriptions are not in the best short- or long-term interests of low-income people in southern Africa. Food insecurity, more extensive and deeper poverty and ever thinner margins for survival are outcomes of donor policies. What has happened?

First, these donor groups mention food security in their rhetoric but do not support it in practice. Support for indigenous land reform programs is minimal. Zambian and Zimbabwean agriculture remains distorted by land ownership patterns created during the colonial era. The best soils, the most complete network of roads and markets, and the most economic resources for farming are in areas occupied by large-scale commercial farms. After a partial program of land redistribution in the early 1980s, resettling 52,000 households, Zimbabwe ran out of money to complete its commitment.

The most creative, most sustainable, most equitable agricultural programs across the region have arisen from the efforts of women and men eager to use their skills for their collective well-being. The Green Zone cooperatives in Mozambique and peasant farmers associations in several countries are two examples. But in general there is little external support from major donors for these grassroots agricultural initiatives. Instead external donors push their own agricultural policies, which in the case of USAID generally reflect the logic of “trickle-down” economics or the special interests of U.S. farmers.

For example, in Mozambique a multimillion dollar USAID program of sup-

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port for the farming community is specifically targeted to private farms and corporate-owned estates. This group is but a small segment of the farmers. USAID has targeted these people because of their pre-existing assets or training which, the argument runs, makes them ready to engage in cash-crop production. Many of the people who have acquired land under this program are urban-based businessmen and bureaucrats taking advantage of increased producer prices and access to cash and state and external support.

While there may be other reasons for concentrating U.S. aid on such groups, such a focus does not contribute to greater food security. Peasant farmers—either displaced by the war or without assets to risk agriculture primarily for the market—are frequently excluded from productive land in favor of the better-off farmers. In some cases, land already used by peasants is claimed by larger farmers who have the resources to obtain title to the land. Large sections of land also are being opened for joint ventures between the government and large-scale external investors to produce for the export market. Even if these policies provide increased agricultural production for the country as a whole, it will occur along with greater inequalities within the farming community and greater poverty for many peasant farmers. The higher production figures—if they do occur—will mask the inequalities and poverty by being aggregated, rather than being disaggregated by type of production unit, by gender, or by the socio-economic character of producers.

USAID has also conditioned aid to Mozambique on agreement to policy changes desired by the U.S. Agricultural prices are a key area of concern to the U.S., and substantial pressure has been put on the government to steadily increase corn prices to international levels. As a result, locally produced corn is as costly as imported subsidized U.S. corn. With aggressive marketing and a large food aid program, the U.S. has aided American farmers while limiting production options for producers within Mozambique.

According to Carol Thompson, an expert on food security in southern Africa, the situation in Mozambique is a part of a long-term strategy by the U.S.

We are willing to work, to contribute to the improvement of our community. But this year, between the drought and ESAP [Economic Structural Adjustment Programme], we have nothing. We are hungry. We have no tools, no money, no resources. We have only our hands. And without resources, all our efforts disappear into the air.

to create a market for U.S. corn. Subsidized U.S. corn, provided on easy terms, has displaced Zimbabwe's grain surpluses from serving the food needs of the region. Clearly, this outcome does not contribute to food self-reliance in the region.

USAID is not alone in pursuing policies that contribute to food vulnerability in southern Africa. In Zimbabwe in 1991 the World Bank, arguing that the cost of storage was too costly, strongly urged the government to sell a major part of its million-ton grain surplus. At the same time, the U.S. and the World Bank conditioned aid to Zimbabwe on cuts in prices offered to farmers for corn, to prevent further surplus growth. Farmers switched to higher-value export crops, and in the 1991/92 season planted only 60 percent of the area previously allocated to corn. The timing could not have been worse. Now, Zimbabwe must turn to grain producers in the U.S., Argentina, Canada and Australia, rather than its own farmers, and purchase grain at three times the price gained from its earlier surplus sales.

For a year now, Zimbabwe's policies have been under the direction of a World Bank structural adjustment program. Subsidies on basic foods have been reduced substantially, so that food prices tripled. Subsidies on public transportation also were cut and the price of gas rose. Rural people frequently buy some food from towns with savings set aside for periodic crop failures. However, the cost of food to rural consumers has effectively doubled. The policies have weakened household and community economies, increased the vulnerability of low-income groups to the food shortages associated with the drought, and raised the likelihood of widespread hunger and deprivation across the region.

A member of the Organization of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP), one of the strongest indigenous NGOs in Zimbabwe and in all of Africa, makes the connection between drought and the structural adjustment impacts. She has said, "We are willing to work, to contribute to the improvement of our community. But this year, between the drought and ESAP [Economic Structural Adjustment Programme], we have nothing. We are hungry. We have no tools, no money, no resources. We have only our hands. And without resources, all our efforts disappear into the air."

Other donors have contributed to the food insecurity in the region. The European Community offered to provide a loan to build storage silos for a regional grain reserve but conditioned it on controlling the timing of grain distribution, so as not to interfere with Europe's grain marketing program. The southern African states refused the loan rather than
hand over authority for food aid policy to outsiders.

UNDERMINING FOOD SECURITY

Policy conditions and tied aid, such as the examples cited above, have severely hampered food security efforts in southern Africa. Food prices have skyrocketed in most countries as a result of structural adjustment programs of the World Bank. Most other donors have followed the World Bank lead, conditioning loans and grants on governments’ acceptance of World Bank advice. Thus, there is little flexibility either for governments or grassroots movements and non-governmental organizations to create or sustain viable food security programs that run counter to the external advice.

Further, the structural adjustment programs have deepened rural and urban poverty and increased socio-economic inequalities across the region. For example, malnutrition has steadily worsened in Zambia since the late 1970s, as food prices outpaced the ability of households to earn sufficient incomes. In the mid-1970s, malnutrition was a direct factor in the deaths of about 19 percent of children under 15 years of age in the major hospital in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia. After a decade of struggling with a declining economy and IMF and World Bank guidance, the figure more than tripled, to 62 percent. A UNICEF study found that in 1984 60 percent of urban households had incomes below the level needed to purchase basic goods; that was a 40 percent increase over 1980. Since then, conditions have only worsened.

In Mozambique in 1990, three years into a structural adjustment program outlined by the World Bank and the IMF, workers in the capital were spending half their monthly income on food which lasted only two weeks. Thus, it is not uncommon for people to work two jobs or more, to take on a variety of non-formal money-making activities, and to cut back on all purchases. A prevailing joke among workers in Mozambique, in response to the government’s call to “tighten your belts”, is that if they tighten their belts any further, they will break in half. In Maputo, the capital, chronic malnutrition among young children is four to five times greater now than in 1986, prior to the structural adjustment program. Shops display goods, but this is only a facade of prosperity: the vast majority of people simply cannot afford to buy anything but the most basic items.

The confluence of drought, war and structural adjustment programs falls most heavily on women who head households, their children, other households which are already poor, and young people now largely excluded from any form of formal employment opportunities. Thus, the inequalities which already exist and which are the base for vulnerability, hunger and exploitation are being exacerbated, rather than resolved.

ACtIONS TO BE TAKEN

The following recommendations outline ways in which United States policies and programs can become supportive of, rather than contrary to, the needs and interests of people in southern Africa. While the immediate need to deal with the current shortages has financial implications for the United States, these actions can be implemented without adding to the cost of United States commitments.

1. Recognize that the knowledge, skills, resources and motivation to create economically viable and socially just societies exists among the people in southern Africa.

At one level, this is an acknowledgment that elements of past development assistance programs have worked, by supporting the education and training of local people to guide their own institutions. At another level, it is recognition that people in the region — whether as a part of a village association or a national government — have the best ideas and understanding of ways to address their needs.

The United States can be most sensitive to these indigenous needs by listening to and supporting groups that incorporate the interests and needs of grassroots people, such as cooperatives, unions, the informal sector, women’s groups or peasant associations. Commit-

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Fair Share for Africa or Benign Neglect?
Questioning the Candidates

In this election year, with foreign policy marginal to the election campaigns and no presidential candidate particularly interested in showing sensitivity to concerns of Black people at home or abroad, United States policy still plays a vital role in African issues. Whether by action or inaction, decisions in Washington will help decide whether Africans live or die, whether the international community plays constructive roles in resolving conflict, whether dictators decide to linger or to leave the scene, and whether long-term development issues are addressed.

With the disappearance of the Cold War, the motives for much negative U.S. intervention in Africa are now gone. But there is little sensitivity to African realities in Washington. The media only sporadically highlights crises threatening millions of Africans, while events threatening European lives warrant almost daily coverage. The consequences of "benign neglect" are heavy, from continued tolerance of violence in South Africa and dictators like Mobutu in Zaire to failure to bolster African grassroots groups taking initiatives for democratization and development around the continent.

CONGRESSIONAL CHANGES

There will be major changes in Congress this year regarding Africa. With key Africa advocates retiring, initiatives on Africa will depend largely on whether newcomers decide to give it priority.

The House Africa Subcommittee has undergone a series of radical transformations over the past two years, and its future leadership and composition is unpredictable.

The three voting Republicans on the Subcommittee [Dan Burton (IN), Amo Houghton (NY), and Toby Roth (WI)] plan to remain if they are re-elected. But all the Democratic seats are subject to change. Congressman Mervyn Dymally (CA) took over as Chair of the subcommittee during the Spring of 1991. This spring Dymally as well as subcommittee members Edward F. Feighan and Howard Wolpe announced their resignation from Congress.

Dymally resigned his seat reportedly due to both age and poor health. Wolpe said his decision to leave the House was "triggered by redistricting which "dismembered" the Third Congressional District. For ten years, Wolpe served as the Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee where he became one of the leading congressional opponents of apartheid.

Neither of the remaining Democrats on the Africa subcommittee members, Donald Payne (NJ) and Steven Solarz (NY), has indicated an interest in applying for the chairmanship. Payne is not a permanent member of the Foreign Affairs committee and is therefore not eligible for the seat.

Solarz, also a vocal Africa Subcommittee member and in line to "become the second-ranking member of Foreign Affairs next year" is facing a serious re-election challenge, as a result of redistricting and the House Bank affair (he had 743 overdrafts). After his district was carved up six ways, he announced his candidacy for a new majority-Hispanic district, angering many Latin activists. Solarz is expected to win the primary given his name recognition and a $2 million campaign "war chest."

The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), the other major source of Africa advocacy within Congress, will likely increase from its current 26 to a possible 36. As individuals and as a voting block the CBC has been instrumental in developing legislation promoting humanitar-

ian and development aid to Africa, sanctions against the minority regime in South Africa and cut-offs of aid to oppressive regimes like Mobutu's in Zaire.

The increase in numbers, however, does not guarantee increased support for Africa nor additional expertise. In fact, given the current trends in Black politics, the increase may produce the most conservative Caucus ever. The Caucus founders generally were politicians who emerged from the movements of the 60s and 70s to positions of national leadership. Today's Black politicians are often either the beneficiaries of redistricting, or individuals who have worked their way through state or local-level political machines. Most will require both pressure and education on African issues.

There are a few hopeful races of candidates with progressive views, including Melvin Watt, running for a House seat from North Carolina, and Carol Moseley Braun, the Senate candidate in Illinois. Braun's victory, establishing a visible Black presence in the Senate, could be particularly significant.

In the Senate advocacy has generally suffered from the lack of a Black caucus and the low-profile of the African Affairs Subcommittee.

Recently, the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee, headed by Senator Paul Simon, has emerged as a leading force on policy questions. In Spring 1991 the Subcommittee hired a staffperson, Adwoa Dunn, one of the veterans from the House Africa Subcommittee. Under her energetic leadership the Subcommittee has worked effectively with foreign policy legislative associates in both parties.

Neither the Senate nor the House, nor an incoming administration of either party, is likely to pay much attention to African issues unless there is public
pressure to do so.

That is why the presidential candidates need to be reminded that there are Americans who care. And congressional candidates, including an unprecedented number of newcomers with possibly fresh perspectives, need to be encouraged to move Africa out of last place on their agenda.

term policies that promote food self-sufficiency for African countries.

Two examples of how U.S. policy has been less than helpful:

• Fighting among factions in Somalia blocked international relief shipments completely for months, and still restricts relief efforts to a fraction of the need. The U.S., which had for years backed social services. More will die from the drought since their family reserves are already low.

DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIPS

Despite the wave of democratization movements around the world, and

Sample Questions for Candidates

On Famine and Development

1) Will you support increased funding for African disaster relief, and where will you cut (for example, defense budget) to make that possible?

2) Will you give priority to aid supporting long-term food security and peasant agriculture in Africa, as opposed to exclusive support for market-oriented commercial export farming?

On Dictators and Democracy

1) What measures do you support to demand that South African President de Klerk live up to his reformist image and accept free and fair elections in which all South Africans can vote, with protection of the rights of all but no special privileges or veto rights for losing parties?

2) What measures will you take (or support) to ensure that President Mobutu steps down from office, leaves Zaire, and stops blocking the transition to democracy in Zaire?

On Violence and Peace

1) Will you support both the principle and the necessary funding for adequate international monitoring of violence in South Africa? Of elections in Angola? Of the peacemaking processes in Liberia and Somalia?

2) What pressure will you bring to bear to block any continued outside support for Renamo’s war in Mozambique, whether from South Africa, Malawi or right-wing groups in the United States?

The following points highlight major issues that you can raise with the candidates, by your letters and questions in public meetings.

DROUGHT, FAMINE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The famine in southern Africa, precipitated by the worst failure of rains in this century, threatens almost 18 million people with starvation or severe malnutrition. Over 20 million people are also at risk of famine in northeastern Africa, particularly in conflict-ridden Somalia and Sudan. The United States is contributing relief, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and PL480 food aid. But funding levels need to be increased, and high-level attention should be directed to violence that is blocking deliveries in many areas and to long-
dictator Siad Barre, did not take leadership to mobilize timely international relief, and balked at proposals for an armed UN peacekeeping force to protect the shipments.

• In the late 1980s, Zimbabwe built up a large surplus of grain, as part of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference’s plans for food security. Just before the drought, the government with U.S. and World Bank encouragement sold off the stockpile as “un-economic” and even lowered prices for corn while raising prices for export tobacco. Farmers planted 40 percent less corn, and now Zimbabwe has to import expensive grain from the U.S.

Similarly short-sighted and rigid structural adjustment policies, urged on African countries by the U.S., have increased the vulnerability of poor households with high prices and cutbacks in pledges of responsiveness to grassroots demands in South Africa and other African countries, both the South African white minority regime and aging Cold War relics such as Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Banda of Malawi and Moi of Kenya are still clinging to power.

In terms of general rhetoric, the United States supports democracy. But policy-makers have largely closed their eyes to the unfulfilled promises and persistent stalling tactics of these undemocratic regimes. The delays and the indifference in Washington are disillusioning democracy campaigners. They also threaten to abort the transitions to democracy, offering instead the prospect of increasing violence and chaos in which there are no winners.

Two examples:

• In South Africa, the negotiation at the continued on page 8
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) are stalled, in part over the government’s failure to stop the violence (see below) but also because the de Klerk regime is still committed to building a white-minority veto into a future constitution. Although buried in complex talk which some label technicalities, the fundamental issue is whether the existing regime would be guaranteed the perpetual right to veto actions of a popularly-elected government. The process could break down at any time, while the Bush administration refuses to listen to public and congressional demands to tell Mobutu definitively good-bye.

**VIOLENCE AND PEACEMAKING**

More than 7,000 people have been killed in South African townships since January 1990. The June 17 massacre of over 40 people at Boipatong was only the latest and the best publicized incident. At the grassroots level the violence has in some areas become a matter of back-and-forth retaliation between migrant workers in hostels organized by Chief Buthelezi’s Inkatha, and township dwellers loyal to the African National Congress.

Nevertheless, recent reports by Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and other human rights observers stress that (1) the initiative for violence most often comes from the government-allied Inkatha warriors, (2) there is massive documentation for inaction, partiality and cover-ups by the security forces, with no evidence of serious reform efforts by top officials, and (3) the de Klerk regime shows no interest in exploring evidence presented by investigative journalists and human rights observers of direct involvement in instigating the violence by some individuals and groups within the security forces.

Aid from South Africa from official or unofficial sources also still fuels the brutal Renamo attacks on Mozambican civilians, as does access by Renamo to Malawi and support from private right-wing groups in the United States. Despite almost two years of peace talks, Renamo is still finding new excuses for not signing a cease-fire. Diplomatic observers doubt that Renamo or its shadowy backers want the war to end.

In countries like Liberia and Somalia, sustained international support for African peacemaking efforts will be necessary in order to restore even the minimal bases for national government and personal security for citizens. In Angola, while the cease-fire signed last May is still holding, few observers think the elections scheduled for the end of September can be held in an orderly and peaceful manner, and without intimidation, as long as the international presence is starved of personnel and funds. Simply in logistical and administrative terms, the election process needs massive support to be carried off successfully. Citizens must be protected from intimidation from either side, and international pressure must ensure that not only the government but also UNITA comply with the peace treaty’s provision to open areas under its control to free movement and political campaigning.

In all these cases, perfunctory attention by Washington and the international community in general, as well as the tendency to hold former U.S. clients to lower standards of human rights, threaten to delay the achievement of secure civil peace and security.
Negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the government of South Africa were suspended on June 23 as a result of escalating political violence.

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks deadlocked in May, over the de Klerk regime's insistence on an effective white veto in the constitutional assembly. Following the June 17 massacre of over 40 people at Boipatong, the African National Congress withdrew from the talks, demanding that the South African government take effective action to end township violence. ANC President Nelson Mandela charged that de Klerk, whether directly or by indifference, was complicit in the wave of violence. President de Klerk, rejecting the charges "with contempt," blamed the ANC's campaign of peaceful mass action for provoking the violence.

Political violence has been a feature of the apartheid political system since its inception. But it has been at its most intense since President F. W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela and unbanned the African National Congress in February 1990. Anti-apartheid activists charge that it is part of a deliberate campaign by the South African security forces to destabilize opponents of the government and terrorize Black communities, while concealing government involvement and presenting the existing regime as the force of stability.

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The violence has included random attacks against commuters on trains, as well as targeted assassinations of anti-apartheid leaders and large-scale massacres. Train attacks alone have taken 112 lives and injured 204 people since January 1992, with little evidence of effective police protection.

According to a new report by the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC), 49 massacres have taken place in the Transvaal since July 1990, for a total of 1,250 dead. Members of Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha were responsible for 34, township supporters of the ANC were implicated in six incidents, and security forces alone or unidentified whites in the others. Police or unidentified whites were also allegedly involved in many of the incidents attributed to Inkatha. No one has been convicted for any of the massacres.

Following the suspension of talks, the African National Congress initiated a large-scale mass action campaign of civil disobedience. It also demanded significant international involvement in monitoring the process. The United Nations Security Council agreed only to the limited step of sending Special Envoy Cyrus Vance.

In particular, the demands of the African National Congress include:

- The termination of covert operations by the government;
- The dissolution of all special forces;
- The commencement of the conversion of hostels into family domiciles;
- The re-implementation of a ban on the possession of dangerous weapons;
- The establishment of an international investigation into the massacre at Boipatong as well as other incidents of violence;

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Attee hearings in the region, with peasant farmer and NGO representatives, can provide a way to hear African opinion. Another way is to assure that the U.S. agencies responsible for implementing foreign assistance legislation provide a channel for learning with and from indigenous groups.

2. Compliance by USAID with Congressional intent requires more vigorous oversight than has been the case in recent years. The authorizing legislation of the Development Fund for Africa calls for both project and policy reform assistance to promote a well-defined set of objectives. Growth is to be "equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and self-reliant" (Section 496(c)(1)); agricultural measures should promote "increased equity in rural income distribution" (Section 496(i)(A)), and emphasize "maintaining and restoring the renewable natural resource base" while increasing agricultural production, especially food production (Section 496(i)(A)(A)). The legislation specifically indicates that non-project assistance is to promote the same purposes (Section 496(h)(1)).

The means to assure that these objectives are reached are also defined in existing legislation. The Development Fund for Africa legislation directs USAID "to take into account the local-level perspectives of the rural and urban poor in Sub-Saharan Africa, including women, during the planning process for project and program assistance..." (Section 496(c)(1)). U.S. and African non-governmental organizations are specified as mechanisms for consultation, and "cooperatives, credit unions, trade unions, women's groups, non-profit development research institutions, and indigenous local organizations" are explicitly named among those to be consulted.

Thus, legislative mechanisms exist that can give African grassroots people more input into the form, content and direction of U.S. assistance programs.

Support Additional Funding for Southern Africa Drought Relief

The ten nations of Southern Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, are in the midst of the worst drought to hit the region in this century. Over 100-million people will be affected by the loss of crops, livestock, and employment. International relief efforts, including transport support have prevented a disaster, so far. However, the region's estimated food needs have not been met. The shortage of water supplies are literally forcing the evacuation of entire cities, such as Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second largest city. Moreover, the effects of the drought will continue at least until April, 1993, assuming the rains come in November. These measures are shortly to go before the Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations subcommittee and already have been approved by the House.

It is urgent that the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee:

- Retain the $80-million one-time appropriation earmarked for drought relief. The House authorized OFDA to direct these funds toward SADCC, church organizations, and other Non-Governmental Organizations for miscellaneous costs associated with the transportation and storage of food supplies.

- Maintain funding for the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) at $69-million and keep the borrowing authority of the OFDA at $50-million. This will allow some of the infrastructure-rebuilding needs to be met.

- Maintain the funding level for the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) at $50-million. This is the regional body which has been helping Southern African nations free themselves from import dependency on South Africa.

WHAT YOU CAN DO


2. When the measure reaches the Senate Floor, write or call your Senators.

3. Organize a letter-writing campaign in your community and organize visits to the district offices of your Senators when the Appropriations bill reaches the Senate floor. Call the Washington Office on Africa for more information.

3. Substantially cut the U.S. contribution to the World Bank and the IMF, conditioning any further contributions to the adoption by those institutions of criteria for both lending and program design and implementation that include consultation with indigenous NGOs, unions, cooperatives, women's and peasant organizations, among other organizations likely to be affected by proposed loans, as Congress has already specified for USAID.

4. Use the savings from the reduced U.S. contribution to the World Bank and the IMF to support reconstruction efforts in southern Africa.

5. Assure that the forthcoming elec-
Pending Legislation: July 1992

H. RES. 5036  Emerging South African Democracy and Open Markets Support Act

House Resolution 5036, introduced by Representative Mervyn Dymally and cosponsored by five other Representatives, proposes the establishment of a South African-American Enterprise Fund to promote the following:

1) equitable participation in a free market economy in South Africa and joint ventures between U.S. persons and black South Africans;
2) policies which allow for private sector development among black South Africans;
3) respect for human rights;
4) democracy and free market systems;
5) sectors which promote development.

The resolution calls upon the President to establish a private, non-profit organization to oversee appropriations and funding for (1) the establishment of Employee Stock Ownership Plans owned principally by black South Africans; and (2) technical and other assistance to support the development of indigenous South African credit unions.

This bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Subcommittee on Africa, and the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade.

For further information contact Marvajo Camp, Staff Consultant for the Africa Subcommittee, at (202) 226-7807.

S. RES. 301  Ongoing Violence Related to Apartheid

Senate Resolution 301, proposed by Senator Paul Simon on 20 May 1992, condemns the ongoing violence in South Africa. The bill urges the President of the United States to prepare and submit to Congress a report describing the nature of the violence, the roles which the participants in the violence play, and the impact of the violence on the democratic transition.

S. Res. 301 was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations where it presently remains. It has 16 cosponsors as of July 1992. The key staff aide working on this legislation for Senator Simon is Michelle Learner, (202) 224-2152.

H. RES. 497  Representative Mervyn Dymally submitted House Resolution 497 on 18 June 1992. H. Res. 497, identical to S. Res. 301, condemns the ongoing violence in South Africa. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Africa.

For more information on H. Res. 497 contact Marvajo Camp, (202) 226-7807.

Washington Notes on Africa
Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage

The WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA announces the publication of an important new policy paper, Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage.

By the time this newsletter reaches you, the Sovereign National Conference (SNC) in Zaire is expected to announce the formation of a transition government, adopt a transitional constitution, and name a new prime minister.

President Mobutu is already on record opposing the SNC’s right to choose an interim prime minister or to adopt an interim charter without his expressed approval. There are signals, furthermore, that the Mobutu regime already has plans to close the SNC by force. In its July 7 report, "Zaire: Two Years Without Transition," Africa Watch warned of "the kind of bloodshed and destruction that have ravaged countries like Liberia and Somalia."

Act now to receive additional copies of Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage, which outlines why the United States government needs to act now to demand that Mobutu relinquish his hold Zaire. The document includes policy recommendations endorsed by over 150 churches and other groups. This publication is an excellent reference so consider a bulk order for your key activists!

Send today for your copies of Zaire: A Nation Held Hostage. Return the attached form along with your check or money order to the Washington Office on Africa as soon as possible — quantities are limited.

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