



WASHINGTON NOTES ON AFRICA

Fall 1993

As the spectacle of U.S. troops being killed forced Somalia onto the front pages, the administration was forced to shift course from the previous military-dominated agenda of "getting Aidid." But the questions remain: Will future policy have any basis other than getting the troops out? Will informed policy-making be sustained once the publicity subsides?

In retrospect, it was relatively easy for the press to identify UN Representative Admiral Jonathan Howe and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the main culprits for the foolish decision to target Aidid. But the negative consequences of that decision, the consolidation of Aidid's support, were obvious at the time, even to casual observers. There were substantive complaints about the UN command's insensitivity to Somali opinion, significant dissent within UN structures, and strong criticism of the disproportion between military resources and support for humanitarian and political initiatives.

The question is why these had so little effect on U.S. policy. The short answer, as unsatisfactory in detail as it is discouraging for the future of this and other African issues, is that no one with sufficient clout to effect a change was paying any attention to critical voices.

Even if the status quo that existed before the last months of confrontation with Aidid is restored, the complex task of supporting Somali civil society, demilitarizing and restoring viable state structures will require consistent and sensitive U.S. policy. So will other African crises. So far, despite initial hopes, there are little signs that the Clinton administration is developing the institutional capacity for this. More common instead is, on the one hand, diplomatic business-as-usual with little urgency or clout, or, on the other,

U.S. Africa Policy: Still No Direction

high-profile and uncoordinated crisis-mode response on the model of Somalia.

High on the list of the crises characterized by neglect is Angola. The U.S. has continued efforts to promote negotiations, and finally recognized the Angolan government in May. But it worked to delay UN arms and fuel sanctions against Unita (finally adopted in September), and has made no aggressive effort to implement the sanctions. Journalists visiting Huambo, for example, have reported the regular arrival of flights from Kinshasa, Zaire. But there has been no sign of vigorous pressure by the U.S. on Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko to stop violating the embargo.

An unnamed U.S. diplomat is quoted in a recent *Washington Post* article as saying, "We didn't create Savimbi. We may have rented him for a few years. This is a messy situation but it's not our fault." Such attitudes are a cheap evasion of responsibility. The U.S. joined with South Africa to build up Unita's military

capacity; it now has an obligation to act decisively to restrain its former client. We cannot simply walk away, blaming the destruction on the Angolans alone.

The war in Angola is intimately related to developments in neighboring countries. The keys to an effective embargo on Unita are Zaire and South Africa. Failure to complete democratic transitions in those countries made it possible for them to provide Unita with military support to restart the war.

Angola in turn sets a disturbing precedent for Zaire, South Africa and Mozambique. Each has heavily armed groups opposed to democratic transitions—Mobutu's elite army units in Zaire, homeland and government security forces in South Africa, Renamo insurgents in Mozambique. In all three cases, the feeble U.S. response increases the likelihood of escalated violence.

No single formula can guarantee successful peacemaking in these diverse situations. All parties need to restrain their followers and show flexibility in negotiations in order to avoid escalation or new outbreaks of violence. But the international community, particularly the U.S., must go beyond bland appeals to all parties to show restraint. When there is clear evidence that one party is violating agreements or otherwise inciting violence, the U.S. should focus pressures on that party, beginning with strong and unequivocal public statements.

ZAIRE

A September report by Amnesty International charged that "Zaire is sliding inexorably towards a total breakdown of law and order ... marked by ruthless brutality of government security forces under the control of President Mobutu

Sese Seko, who have murdered or tortured thousands of civilians and members of the peaceful political opposition."

Although the National Conference, which was set up to oversee a transition to democracy, elected Etienne Tshisekedi as prime minister in 1992, Mobutu's security forces have refused to acknowledge his authority. Mobutu appointed his own prime minister in March, and the rival authorities have been locked in a stalemate since then.

The U.S. claims to support the transition to democracy in Zaire. Concrete measures to put pressure on Mobutu through his overseas economic assets have been under consideration for over a year. But the administration still insists that Mobutu has a constructive role to play in the transition. Its response to Mobutu's delays, his repeated use of violence, and his assistance to Unita's war in Angola, have been quiet and ineffective diplomatic statements. Neither high-profile condemnations nor substantive economic pressures have been forthcoming.

MOZAMBIQUE

The October 1992 cease-fire is still holding, but the peace process and election timetable have fallen far behind schedule. Elections are now set for October 1994. In order to meet that deadline, however, key steps must begin right away, including demobilization of troops, training of a new national army, extension of central administration to Renamo-controlled zones, and preparation for the election.

Renamo has repeatedly raised new demands in order to delay demobilizing its troops. It still prevents freedom of movement in the areas under its control. The UN has over 7,000 peacekeeping personnel in Mozambique, but has warned they cannot stay indefinitely.

A Security Council resolution in September

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calling for no further delays and an October visit by UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali to Maputo resulted in apparent agreement on troop demobilization. Nevertheless, new delays were likely.

SOUTH AFRICA

The African National Congress, the South African government and most other parties have now reached agreement on a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) that will oversee critical government functions until the April 27, 1994 election for a constituent assembly.

But right-wing Afrikaner groups, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party, and the homelands of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei still refuse to recognize the TEC or the election process. All are well-armed. Their repeated threats to escalate violence, as the prospect of a democratic vote erodes their power base, should not be taken lightly.

Already violence has reached new heights, with more than 500 people killed each month since the election date was announced. The South African police have not yet made a good-faith effort to stop the violence, and plans for a neutral peacekeeping force are still vague.

Continuing the policy of the Bush administration, the Clinton administration has still refused to lay blame for the violence or to acknowledge the seriousness of the threat it poses to a free and fair election in South Africa.

This quick review, limited to the most prominent political cases in southern Africa, is far from comprehensive. But it is consistent with what Africa advocates are reporting concerning issues elsewhere in the continent, both political and economic. Deprived of the old Cold War guidelines, and benefiting from no strong leadership at any level, U.S. Africa policy is adrift. It is buffeted by old prejudices of serving officials, ad hoc responses, and priorities dependent on erratic and sparse press coverage.

Rhetorical support for admirable goals such as conflict resolution, democracy and sustainable development provides the context for some positive initiatives. Translating goals into day-to-day policy has never been easy. It is even harder when easy identification of ally and enemy is ruled out, and the demand is for sensitivity to multiple voices rather than an

establishment consensus. Effective policy requires active advocacy by Africa groups and oversight by Congress. But its implementation also depends on leadership on Africa issues within the administration. Unfortunately, such leadership is still not visible.

This issue of *Washington Notes on Africa* highlights new developments in Angola and South Africa, including several recent documents.

■ "Angola: Recommended Policy Framework." The policy framework was prepared by the Washington Office on Africa and is presently being circulated to groups for endorsement. As we go to press, there are reports that new talks between Unita and the Angolan government may be beginning in Lusaka, Zambia. Despite an announced cease-fire by Unita, fighting continues in most parts of the country.

Few observers expect any conclusive outcome from the talks, unless Unita's military capacity is significantly weakened by sanctions or battlefield setbacks.

■ Statement by U.S. groups on the end of sanctions and the Code of Conduct of the South African Council of Churches. Many states and municipalities have moved quickly to respond to Nelson Mandela's call to lift sanctions, but the campaign to promote new responsible investment in South Africa is just beginning. The House of Representatives version of the bill lifting sanctions, as a result of work by the Washington Office on Africa and other groups, includes a provision calling for U.S. companies to work together with South African churches and trade unions to promote codes of conduct for investment, to address the historical inequities of apartheid.

■ A listing of new policy resources on a range of African issues, available from groups and on-line.

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Angola: Recommended Policy Framework

The war raging in Angola since late 1992 is one of the world's most serious and most neglected humanitarian crises. As many as 1,000 are dying each day, agricultural production is paralyzed in many areas by ongoing combat, and thousands of displaced people are pouring into government-held urban areas. Diplomatic hopes for a renewed cease-fire have been repeatedly disappointed. The international community has deplored Unita's resort to war and called on all parties to continue negotiations, finally imposing a mandatory arms and oil embargo against Unita. But the slow international response has failed to bring effective pressures to bear to restore peace. Despite what former United Nations Representative Margaret Anstee called "a conspiracy of silence by the international media," it is urgent to mobilize support for active implementation of effective policies.

Premises

1. Any lasting solution to the conflict in Angola must build on the May 1991 Peace Accord and the legitimacy of the elections carried out under its terms in September 1992. Whatever adjustments may be necessary to achieve future settlements, they must be designed to reinforce the trust that millions of Angolans put in these guarantees of peace and democracy, rather than to entrench the cynicism aroused by the violation of these agreements by force. Respect for the democratic verdict in Angola is a test case for South Africa, Mozambique and indeed the entire continent. And it is a measure of the credibility of the U.S. and UN commitments to the democratic initiatives they endorse.

2. While no party can escape blame for incidents reinforcing mistrust, primary

responsibility for the relapse of Angola into vicious warfare lies with the leadership of Unita, which systematically evaded the Peace Accord's provisions to disarm and demobilize and used its military advantage to reignite war after refusing to accept election results regarded as generally free and fair by international monitors. The United Nations and the three countries designated as observers (the United States, Russia and Portugal) failed to expose and to react in a timely fashion to these violations of the Peace Accord.

3. There can be no purely military solution to the conflict. Total military victory by one side or the other is neither possible nor desirable. All parties should resist the tendency towards attitudes of intransigence or ethnic hostility, and should take measures to end human rights abuses by their security forces. Despite repeated frustrations, negotiations must continue.

4. At the same time, experience to date leads to serious doubts about the good faith of the Unita leadership in negotiations. Without constraints on Unita's military power, or other concrete demonstrations of good faith, appeals for talks and new opportunities for talks are likely to be empty charades. Unless international resolutions are accompanied by practical efforts to curb Unita's war-making capacity, they will continue to be seen as empty gestures to be ignored in favor of the ebb-and-flow of the battlefield.

5. The United States, with South Africa a principal sponsor over the years of Unita's military capacity, holds a special responsibility to take serious action to restrain its former client, rather than to walk away blaming the destruction it helped foster on the Angolan parties.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

1. The U.S. government should take the lead in implementing the mandatory United Nations embargo on the supply of arms, fuel and other war-related material to Unita.

Unita's military capacity, while dependent in part on stockpiles and captured arms, also relies on resupply through Zaire and by air from South Africa. These supplies are funded partially via sales of diamonds by Unita. The arms and oil embargo approved by the United Nations Security Council in September must be implemented urgently. It is an essential prerequisite for any credible policy of negotiations and a guarantee for implementation of any new settlement that is reached. To be effective, it requires, at minimum:

- allocation of intelligence resources to identify states, companies and individuals involved in delivery of supplies to Unita;
- pressure on Zaire and on diamond merchants involved in purchasing diamonds originating from Unita-controlled areas of Angola;
- technical assistance to Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe in identifying overflights of supply planes between South Africa and Angola;
- insistence on full cooperation by the South African authorities in preventing flights, including those from the nominally independent homeland of Bophuthatswana.

Like all embargoes, such measures could not be 100% effective. But it is critical that symbolism be followed up with practical measures which will force the Unita leadership to take the alternative of good-faith negotiation more seriously.

2. The U.S. government should reiterate, at high levels, its warnings to Unita not to attack U.S. and other oil installations in Cabinda and offshore at Soyo. It should also make clear that it does not recognize the legitimacy of Unita's acquisition of territory by force, nor recognize any government that might be established on that basis.

While such statements have been made on several occasions by U.S. representatives, Unita may continue to doubt U.S. commitment unless new statements are accompanied by evidence of stepped-up contingency planning for protection of these installations. The United States should also initiate or expand sharing of intelligence data relevant for defense with the Angolan government.

3. The U.S. government should express its willingness to support a greatly expanded United Nations presence in the case of a renewed settlement.

All parties are agreed on the necessity of such an expanded presence, the lack of which is generally agreed to have been one of the failures in 1992. As specified in the points agreed at the Abidjan talks of May 1993, it is necessary to ensure genuine disarmament, full demobilization of partisan military forces, a policy of no reprisals and completion of the second round of presidential elections. A clear declaration by the U.S. pledging necessary resources would be an incentive to a renewed settlement.

4. The U.S. government should continue and expand active support of UN and other efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to Angola. It should also immediately initiate programs of development aid in conjunction with the Angolan government and non-governmental organizations, in those areas of the country

United Nations on Angola

With the further intensification of the fighting, the humanitarian situation has worsened dramatically. The humanitarian dimensions of the Angolan tragedy are catastrophic as some 3 million people, particularly the most vulnerable population groups — children, women and the elderly — are suffering from the consequences of the conflict. It is widely estimated that more than 1,000 persons die every day from the direct or indirect effects of the war, the highest fatality rate of any conflict in the world.

Secretary-General's Report, 13 September 1993

where security considerations permit. Plans for both private and public-sector economic cooperation, through trade and investment, should not be held hostage by the war.

It is urgent that obstacles to the delivery of aid to war-affected zones be removed. Additional resources should be allocated to city residents immediately, including large numbers of persons displaced by the war, as well as others in areas where security does not impede assistance. There is urgent need for medical and other services as well as food aid.

While any comprehensive program of development or economic cooperation must await abatement of conflict, there is significant scope for programs aimed at relatively secure areas, particularly the coastal cities as well as Lubango and the surrounding agricultural area in Huíla province. In particular, the U.S. should play an active role in assisting the nascent Angolan non-governmental organization sector, and should consider support for health, education, informal sector development and other programs in accessible urban areas.

5. The U.S. government should stress to both parties the urgent imperative for respect for the laws of war, particularly concerning attacks on civilians, kidnapping, summary executions, and lack of respect for

humanitarian relief operations.

While responsibility for renewed conflict and attacks on civilians lies primarily with Unita, both sides have been guilty of serious human rights abuses in the course of the fighting. Both the Angolan parties and the international community have the responsibility for establishing mechanisms for investigating, exposing and ending such practices.

6. The U.S. government should recognize that stability in Angola depends on completion of the democratic transitions under way in Zaire and South Africa, and urgently address itself to the obstacles threatening those transitions.

While activities in Angola set a bad precedent for Zaire, South Africa and Mozambique, delays in installing democratic institutions in those countries in turn promote continued conflict in Angola. U.S. policy on Angola must be accompanied by effective action to promote the departure from power of Mobutu in Zaire, and to ensure that violence and other obstacles do not block the transition to elected democratic institutions in South Africa. A policy of complacency toward threats of violence by those threatened by democracy will enhance the prospects of escalating region-wide conflict in southern Africa in the future.

Statement on the Announcement of Elections and the Call for End of Sanctions in South Africa

The South African government has finally agreed to hold free and democratic elections in which Nelson Mandela and the Black majority will vote for the first time. This is an important milestone on the road to democracy for the people of South Africa.

The African National Congress and the democratic movement in South Africa have told us that they hope these elections will be free and fair. Nevertheless, they have asked us to be on guard for violations of this historic agreement and we intend to honor that request.

Today those of us who have worked long and hard to end apartheid are pleased to be able to join Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress, the trade unions and the democratic movement in calling for an end to economic sanctions.

This will not bring an end to our concern for the people of South Africa. Apartheid will leave a terrible and bitter legacy of inequality, injustice and poverty. We believe that Americans can contribute to overcoming that legacy. As sanctions are lifted we will urge corporations to uphold the standards set by the democratic forces in South Africa for socially responsible investment that will promote equal opportunity, workers' rights, environmental protection and community development.

People of conscience throughout America can take great pride in the fact that we helped to make this historic victory possible. We launched a successful drive to use our investment funds and our purchasing power to combat the evil of apartheid. Now we must strengthen our partnership with the people of South Africa to eliminate the legacy of apartheid and build an equitable and peaceful society in which all can enjoy the fruits of democracy.

Signatories (partial list): Julian Bond, civil rights activist; William Booth, President, American Committee on Africa; Mark Boorke, President, Professional & Technical Employees Union; Edmond L. Browning, Presiding Bishop, The Episcopal Church; Paul J. Brownridge, City Treasurer, City of Los Angeles, CA; Dr. Joan B. Campbell, General Secretary, The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.; Ernie Chambers, State Senator, Nebraska Legislature; Dr. Benjamin Chavis, President, NAACP; Sophia Collier, President, Working Assets Common Holdings; Imani Countess, Executive Director, Washington Office on Africa; Mario M. Cuomo, Governor, New York State; Jennifer Davis, Executive Director, The Africa Fund; Wilhemina Delco, Representative, Texas State Legislature and Chair, South Africa Task Force, National Conference of State Legislatures; David N. Dinkins, Mayor, City of New York; Donald Fraser, Mayor, City of Minneapolis, MN; Wayne E. Glenn, President, United Paperworkers International Union; Avel L. Gordley, State Representative, Oregon State Legislature; John C. Harrington, Harrington Investment; Elishu Harris, Mayor, City of Newark, NJ; Lynn H. Johndahl, State Representative, New York; Amy Isaacs, National Leadership Conference of Women Religious; Carol Moseley-Braun, U.S. Senator; Joseph M. Neal, Senator, Nevada State Legislature; John F. Peterson, Chairman and CEO, Chartwell Surety; John Ray, Councilman, City of Washington, DC; Mark Ridley-Thomas, Massachusetts State Legislature; James Scheibel, Mayor, City of St. Paul, MN; David Scondras, Councilman, City of Boston, MA; Wayne D. Silby, Chairman, Calvert Social Investment Fund; Virgil Clark Smith, Senator, Michigan State Legislature; Joyce Sohl, Deputy General Secretary, Women's Division, United Methodist Church; Joan Specter, Councilwoman, City of Philadelphia, PA; Richard Trumka, President, United Mine Workers of America; Donald Tucker, Councilman, City of Newark and Chairman, New Jersey Black Issues Convention; Albert Vann, Assemblyman, New York State Legislature; Rabbi Eric H. Yoffie, Union of American Hebrew Congregations; Richard Zelik, for the Steering Committee, National Catholic Coalition for Responsible Investment; Robert Zevin, United States Trust Company, Boston.

Code of Conduct for Businesses Operating in South Africa

Introduction

The apartheid system has historically burdened South Africa with gross economic distortions, stagnation, secrecy, severe discrimination and natural devastation. It has deprived the country's workers, communities, and environment of the fundamental rights written into international conventions and upheld in other countries.

In order to reverse this crippling legacy and to improve the economic well-being of all South Africans, investments by both South African and multi-national companies need to be reshaped in the image of an equitable, democratic and life-enhancing society.

It is out of this grave concern and motivation

based on ethical religious considerations that the South African Council of Churches, meeting in conference on 8 July 1993, takes this initiative to introduce and support this code of conduct. The code outlines ways in which business can play a constructive and creative role in partnership with workers, communities and other members of civil society, to lay the economic foundations for a stable and prosperous South Africa.

While these standards are also expected to inform the policies of a democratically elected government, in the interim, they are designed to apply to companies operating in South Africa.

*South African Council of Churches,
July 1993*

- 1. Equal Opportunity:** Companies should ensure that their operations are free from discrimination based on race, sex, religion, political opinion or physical handicap, and implement affirmative action programs designed to protect the equal rights and treatment of the historically disadvantaged.
- 2. Training and Education:** Companies should develop and implement training and education programs to increase the productive capacities of their South African employees in consultation with the trade union movement.
- 3. Workers Rights:** Companies should recognize representative unions and uphold their employees' rights to organize openly, bargain collectively, picket peacefully and strike without intimidation and harassment.
- 4. Working and Living Conditions:** Companies should maintain safe and healthy work environment and strive to ensure that the working and living conditions they provide accord with relevant international conventions.
- 5. Job Creation and Security:** Companies should strive to maintain productive employment opportunities and create new jobs for South Africans.
- 6. Community Relations:** Companies should share information about their practices and proposed plans with communities affected by their operations, and develop social responsibility programs in ongoing consultation with representative bodies in these communities.
- 7. Consumer Protection:** Companies should inform consumers of any possible dangers associated with their products and cooperate with consumer protection and broader community organizations to develop and uphold appropriate product safety and quality standards.
- 8. Environmental Protection:** Companies should utilize environmentally sound practices and technologies, disclose how and in what amounts they dispose of their waste products, and seek to minimize hazardous waste.
- 9. Empowerment of Black Businesses:** Companies should strive to improve the development of black-owned South African businesses by purchasing from and subcontracting to such firms.
- 10. Implementation:** Companies should cooperate with monitors established to implement these standards by disclosing relevant information in a timely fashion.

Selected New Policy Resources on Africa

Africa, Make or Break: Action for Recovery. 1993. 38pp. Oxfam (UK), 274 Banbury Rd., Oxford OX2 7DZ United Kingdom. Tel: 865-311311. Fax: 865-312417.

Famine Defeated: Southern Africa, UN Win Battle against Drought. By Carole Collins. August 1993. 12pp. Africa Recovery, Room S-931, UN, NY 10017. Tel: 212-963-6857. Fax: 212-963-4556.

The Humanitarian Monitor: A Quarterly Review of Humanitarian Issues in the Horn of Africa. June 1993 (number 1). 30pp. InterAfrica Group, PO Box 1631, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Tel: 251-1-150275. Fax: 251-1-510277. Internet: IAG@padis.gn.apc.org.

Nigeria: Democracy Derailed. August 27, 1993. 19pp. Africa Watch, 1522 K St., NW., Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: 202-371-6592. Fax: 202-371-0124.

One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN. By Alex Vines. June 1993. 46pp. Catholic Institute for International Relations, Unit 3, Canonbury Yard, 190A New North Road, London N1 7BJ, United Kingdom. Tel: 071-354-0883. Fax: 071-359-0017.

Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces. July 1993. 35pp. Also available, *Somalia: Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment.* African Rights, 11 Marshalsea Road, London SE1 1EP, United Kingdom. Tel: 071-403-3383. Fax: 071-403-4023.

South Africa: The Transition. September 1993. 31pp. Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Southern Africa Project, 1450 G St., NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: 202-662-8600. Fax: 202-783-0857.

South Africa: Traditional Dictatorship; One Party State in KwaZulu Homeland Threatens Transition to Democracy. September 1993. 45pp. Africa Watch, 1522 K St., NW, Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: 202-371-6592. Fax: 202-371-0124.

War in South Sudan: The Civilian Toll. October 1993. 9pp. Africa Watch, 1522 K St., NW., Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: 202-371-6592. Fax: 202-371-0124.

Zaire: Violence Against Democracy. September, 1993. 25pp. Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 8DJ United Kingdom; or 322 8th Ave., NY, NY 10001.

New on-line resources for keeping up: Subscribers to PeaceNet, a non-profit on-line service, are getting better access to regular news on Africa from a variety of sources. While some sources are also available in public news groups on the Internet, and more information is available on expensive commercial services such as Nexis, the PeaceNet conferences on Africa are an increasingly useful resource for advocacy groups and individual activists. There are, for example, regular updates on Somalia (from Bernhard Helander in Sweden), on Zaire in French and English (Info-Zaire from Canada), and on South Africa (several different sources). There are news stories daily from Inter Press Service, selected portions of Africa News On-Line (full version currently only available commercially from Nexis or Newsnet), UN documents and press releases, and other items from a variety of groups.

Information on PeaceNet, which charges a minimum fee of \$3/month, is available from 18 De Boom St., San Francisco, CA 94107. Tel: 415-442-0220. Fax: 415-546-1794.

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