In February 1990, the world applauded as Nelson Mandela walked out of prison, freed by South Africa's white minority regime after almost 28 years. In March 1990 Namibia became independent, 24 years after the UN declared South Africa's occupation illegal. And in May 1991 a cease-fire took hold in Angola. The Bush Administration has lifted most U.S. sanctions against South Africa, declaring its satisfaction with progress made and its trust in President de Klerk.

For the American public, the natural assumption is that the region's critical issues are resolved, with only minor details to be settled. The drama of apartheid's overt white racism is apparently gone. So are the Cuban troops that were the focus of Washington's anti-communist crusade in Angola. With the added distraction of history-making events in the Persian Gulf and in the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that the news media have relegated South Africa, and indeed the entire African continent, to their traditional status of neglect and obscurity. Politicians and the public, largely reliant on the media to tell them what is important, seem to have followed suit.

Yet the white minority regime remains in power in South Africa. It is seeking, through constitutional maneuvering and covert violence, to retain a dominant role in the coming post-apartheid order. The rate of killings in South Africa has escalated rather than diminished over the last two years. The plans for free elections in Angola in late 1992 are still fragile. In Mozambique, the brutal RENAMO army continues to ravage the countryside, backed by the same covert groups responsible for much of the violence in South Africa. Even if public debate in Washington has faded, U.S. influence — positive or negative — weighs heavily on the outcome of these continuing crises.

Hopes for a stable democratic post-apartheid order in South Africa and the region are indeed brighter than ever before. But without sustained international attention and pressure the transitions will be perilous. Even when the peacemaking and the constitution-writing is done, southern Africans will confront the same formidable problems of poverty and development faced by the rest of the continent. And they will still be living with the economic legacy of racial inequality, and the destruction wrought by apartheid's wars of the last two decades.

If supporters of the anti-apartheid cause opt out now, U.S. policy will be shaped by bureaucratic inertia, political expediency and the ideological biases of the administration. In practice, this will mean a continuing tilt to ignoring the human rights abuses and covert schemes of favored allies such as de Klerk, Savimbi and Mobutu. In the economic and social arena, it will mean applying to southern Africa the supposed panaceas of free-market ideology and structural adjustment. Concerns for equity, grassroots participation and redress of past injustices will be afterthoughts at best.
African demands for full democracy should be as compelling as those of people in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. And their quest for a just share of the world economy's surplus, if thwarted, will produce recurrent crises that an interdependent world will not be able to shove aside forever. The people of South Africa, like those of the region and the continent, still need and deserve solidarity from the rest of the world, for both moral and practical reasons.

**SOUTHERN AFRICA IS PART OF AFRICA**

The case for paying attention to southern Africa is part of a broader case for attention to the entire continent. Africa is the region most marginalized by the processes of economic development and underdevelopment. The southern African region—which has contributed directly to South African economic growth—includes some of the poorest countries on the continent: Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi. And South Africa is not as distant from this reality as is often portrayed. Despite the wealth of its white minority, South Africa's gross national product per capita is only $2,470 a year. This is in the range of figures for the USSR and Eastern Europe, not the rich nations of Western Europe or North America. South Africa is the richest of the African countries, but its economy falls far short of being able to provide for all its people.

Historically, both Europe and the Americas drew economic benefits from the slave trade which devastated much of the African continent for centuries. The effects of this long-term unequal relationship, and of the more recent decades of colonial rule, which deprived Africans of the right to direct their own political or economic destinies, arguably have much to do with Africa's position today as the most impoverished continent. Patrick Manning, in his recent historical study of *Slavery and African Life,* argues that Americans and Europeans have a responsibility to aid African members of the Atlantic family, not as charity or as reparations to specified individuals, but because of current need and remembrance of past injustice. The reality of international economic transfers, however, contrasts starkly to this ideal.

African development prospects depend not only on internal factors but also on ties to the world economy. These in turn are largely shaped by the advanced industrial countries and international agencies which they dominate, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Official development assistance to Africa from the developed countries has been static at $16 billion a year, while the IMF actually withdrew a net $4 billion from the continent between 1986 and 1989. In contrast, official development assistance for 1991 to Eastern Europe (excluding the Soviet Union) is estimated at $33 billion.

While the Marshall Plan after World War II funnelled two percent of U.S. GDP into Europe, in recent years Africa has been sending a net four percent of its GDP to the West through debt repayment (London Guardian, June 26, 1991).

In the U.S. more than 12 percent of the population is of African origin. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has succeeded in recent years in increasing the portion of the aid budget going to Africa. But neither the money nor the attention allocated to Africa even comes close to reflecting the significance of that historical human connection.

The upsurge in recent years of African grassroots groups around the continent, demanding democracy and seeking sustainable people-centered development, shows that many Africans realize the initiative for new directions must come from within. But with so many decisions vital to Africa's future being taken in the corridors of power in Washington or in the board rooms of transnational banks, the level of concern for Africa in the U.S. political arena—or its absence—will be felt across the Atlantic.

**Apartheid and the U.S. Experience: A SPECIAL LINK**

It is no accident that Nelson Mandela is the African leader best known in the U.S., and South Africa the country most easily identified on the map. Despite numerous differences, the two countries share a common experience of racial inequality as a central issue for national identity throughout their histories and into the future.

When the abolition of legal apartheid becomes complete, the commonality of issues will be even more striking. Almost 130 years after the abolition of slavery, and more than 25 years after the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the U.S. is still struggling with the unresolved legacy of racism. South Africans, too, will be facing these issues for generations. For our own sakes as well as for the people of southern Africa, Americans attempting to build a just non-racial democracy here must engage in dialogue with those engaged in that quest in southern Africa.

U.S. policy, moreover, prolonged the suffering of the region's people. During the Reagan years, in particular, the policy of so-called "constructive engagement" with South Africa and the crusade against Angola bolstered the most militaristic forces in Pretoria. More than a million people died unnecessarily, and the war-related economic losses to Pretoria's neighbors totalled over $60 billion.

**Map of South Africa's provinces**

Those who fought for U.S. sanctions can take credit for some contribution to apartheid's eventual defeat. Even administration policy-makers can take some credit for eventually facilitating diplomatic settlements in Namibia and Angola. But the quick repeal of sanctions revealed how easily the U.S. political climate reverted to its customary biases.

The issues of economic reconstruction and political participation are long-term. Southern Africa, with a democratic South Africa as its strongest economy, has the prospect of serving as a powerful pole of development for the entire continent, and an attractive economic partner for the U.S.. The demand for democratic participation will be a continuing pressure on all governments in the region. But the next two years of transition will be critical, for South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and the region as a whole.
Washington Notes on Africa presents here a short basic guide to the issues of the 1990s, for South and southern Africa. It deals with the unresolved issues of transition to a nonracial democracy in South Africa and peace settlements in Angola and Mozambique. It also looks at the long-term structural problems of reconstruction for all countries in the region.

**Issues of the 1990s:**

**VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW**

The decade of the 1980s, in which apartheid's "total strategy" justified detentions, assassinations, open raids and sustained covert surrogate wars, left not only material damage and human casualties but also an institutional legacy of violence. Even excluding the structural violence of the routine administration of apartheid, literally millions of people have suffered in the military conflicts; tens of thousands have themselves committed violence, willingly or unwillingly.

Peace and security for ordinary citizens will not be restored simply by declaring ceasefires, but require sustained efforts to restrain those still committed to political violence, particularly if they are in positions of official power. Even when officials agree on political issues, the skills and tools of killing will still be pervasive. AK-47s and other sophisticated weaponry are easily available to ex-soldiers, covert operatives, private security firms, and criminal gangs.

There is widespread agreement in principle that the military and police forces in each country should be subject to democratic political control. They should be restrained by legal mechanisms against abuses of their power, and should take the initiative to protect communities from violent crime. But the obstacles are formidable.

In SOUTH AFRICA the apparatus of repression and covert military action is virtually intact, and the record of de Klerk's first two years gives little confidence that he is willing to address the issue. The Harms Commission on death-squad killings investigated only the handful of cases which had already been exposed in the media, and accepted the systematic refusal of government witnesses to provide information. The Civil Cooperation Bureau implicated in death-squad activity was reportedly shut down, but there was no open accounting for its personnel or for other covert operations. No senior officials suspected of involvement in covert violence have been prosecuted.

In August 1991 new revelations of government funding of Inkatha finally provoked the transfer of Defense Minister Magnus Malan and Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok to other posts. But the government still balks at independent investigations or a thorough housecleaning of the security establishment.

While the media focus on so-called "black-on-black violence" and the rivalry between Inkatha and the African National Congress (ANC), the government has sought to project its role as that of an innocent bystander. U.S. officials have tended to join in taking the regime's denials at face value.

It is undoubtedly true that political rivalries, and the climate of violence in South Africa's townships, contribute to the clashes. Once confrontations begin in a particular area, they easily take on a life of their own, as retaliation and self-defense blur together on the ground, and local youth, unemployed men and criminals get caught up on one side or the other.

Yet independent human rights groups, as well as the ANC, have charged a consistent pattern of government complicity with and instigation of the violence. Over the past two years, Amnesty International, Africa Watch, the International Commission of Jurists and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, as well as the Human Rights Commission in South Africa and others, have documented police failures to act impartially. Police complicity with Inkatha in attacks on ANC supporters is also well documented. There have also been repeated charges of involvement of a "Third Force" in hit-squad-type attacks and in clandestine assaults designed to be attributed to Inkatha or the ANC. Such mysterious provocative attacks have often occurred just when negotiations to end the violence are at a delicate stage.

In July and August 1991, new press revelations with documentary evidence forced de Klerk to admit that Inkatha had been receiving covert financial support from the regime. Although he still denied direct government involvement with the violence, a series of defections from the security forces supplied numerous incriminating accounts. These revealed, for example, that South African security had been involved in setting up Inkatha from the start, that security police had worked closely with criminal gangs and Inkatha in attacks on ANC, and that units of the notorious special forces 5 Reconnaissance Regiment (5 Recce), on assignment in Natal and the Rand in 1990 and 1991, had been responsible for such incidents as the massacres on commuter trains in the Johannesburg area.
The government’s reaction—which was to issue blanket denials and begin investigations into the journalists who revealed the stories—indicates no change of heart. Many political analysts in South Africa saw de Klerk as still inextricably committed to an alliance with the security hard-liners, aiming to profit from their destabilization of the ANC while trying to retain deniability. Others claimed that de Klerk was unable, rather than unwilling, to control those in the regime involved with the violence. Whatever his motives, de Klerk’s refusal to allow independent investigations and his failure even to acknowledge the urgent need for impartial law enforcement continuously reinforces suspicion of the government.

In their constitutional proposals both the ANC and the de Klerk regime have included substantive human rights guarantees. South Africa has a large and experienced human rights legal community, with an apartheid tradition but also willing to criticize abuses by the ANC or other groups. But in practice human rights depend on a security apparatus that enforces these rights rather than violates them. Progress in this arena will be one critical test of real movement towards a post-apartheid order.

In Mozambique the war carried out by RENAMO, South Africa’s surrogate Mozambican army, continues unabated, although repudiated by the official policies of de Klerk. After more than a decade of war, this killing machine has a dynamic of its own, preying on the inability of Mozambican society to provide security. Its capacity to continue the war at such high levels depends on outside supplies and support that have not stopped. As recently as mid-1991, defectors from 5 Recce, the unit responsible for military oversight of RENAMO since 1980, revealed that RENAMO bases in South Africa were still receiving regular supplies and operational support. South African covert operations also bolster RENAMO indirectly, through military aid and facilities in Malawi and Kenya. Private right-wing groups, in South Africa, Britain and the U.S., are also still involved.

The FRELIMO government has introduced a new multi-party system in Mozambique. But RENAMO has repeatedly delayed negotiations, apparently fearing peace. The de Klerk regime is not yet interested in stopping the authorized or unauthorized support for the war from within South Africa. And even when peace finally does come, recovery of minimal security from the human and material destruction of the war will be an enormous task.

In Angola, a cease-fire is finally in place, with creation of a non-partisan national army drawn from government and UNITA forces scheduled to be complete before elections in the fall of 1992. But the process of regrouping troops from the two sides has just begun, and achieving an integrated force will be complicated. Already there have been complaints, particularly against UNITA, that troops are impeding the free flow of people. With extreme distrust still prevailing, genuinely neutral independent monitoring is a high priority. Yet the UN Verification Mission is to have a maximum strength of less than 750, including support staff — one-tenth the number involved in the Namibian transition, although Namibia had a relatively intact infrastructure and only one-tenth the Angolan population. With the U.S. past unwillingness to criticize human rights abuses by its client UNITA, non-governmental organizations will have to supplement the UN in independent monitoring.

Elsewhere in southern Africa, state violence and other abuses against human rights are most pervasive in the long established authoritarian states of Zaire and Malawi. Human rights groups have also expressed concerns at incidents in Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

In South Africa and throughout the region, moreover, economic conditions and social dislocation are producing levels of non-political criminality which threaten the personal security of both rich and poor. Even discounting political bias, police forces are ill equipped to deal with the scope of the problem; police abuse, overcrowded prisons and corruption are predictable results. As the experience of richer countries like the U.S. shows, even political stability and industrial growth do not guarantee solutions. In post-apartheid southern Africa crime is certain to be a high-profile political issue.

**Issues of the 1990s:**

**DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION**

In South Africa, President de Klerk and his colleagues have abandoned the language and the theory of apartheid, and recognized the need for a new constitutional order. But they have steadfastly refused to admit that their past practice of legalized racial inequality was morally wrong as well as a practical failure. Most importantly, they are trying to ensure that the future system will be hemmed in with mechanisms to preserve white minority privilege for the future.

In any future South Africa, inherited white economic privilege and educational advantages will ensure de facto inequality for decades to come. But the overwhelming political issue is whether the new constitutional order will provide a basis for change. Both the government and the ANC, as well as other anti-apartheid forces, favor constitutional protection for individual rights, for multi-party pluralist participation in the political system, and for a mixed economy with heavy reliance on market mechanisms. But de Klerk is still proposing blocking mechanisms that would virtually paralyze any future government’s capacity to respond to democratic demands. Pretoria also rejects an elected constitutional convention or any other democratic method of working out the new constitution.

The most recent proposals, presented in August 1991, have dropped explicit references to race or “cultural groups,” but insert disguised white vetoes at several levels. A lower house would be elected nationally on the basis of proportional representation, but there would be nine semi-autonomous regions reserving certain powers and electing representatives to an upper house with veto power. These regions would enjoy significant
constitutionally entrenched tax authority. Anti-apartheid forces do not oppose regional representation or decentralization as such, but suspect that regional borders would be drawn to preserve ethnic divisions and the split between impoverished Black homelands and rich urban areas.

The regime's proposals also envisage, for example, a three-person presidency from the three largest parties, operating by consensus and with a rotating chair — thus giving a veto to the National Party (NP) which might expect to come in second or third with support from white voters. They even suggest that in local elections the voices of property owners (overwhelmingly white) should be given greater weight than those of non-property owners (overwhelmingly Black).

Previous NP proposals in a similar vein have been dropped when their biases were exposed. But de Klerk's constitution writers seem to have an inexhaustible store of variations on the same theme. This, along with the violence, is one of the principal stumbling blocks to achieving a negotiated agreement on a new constitution.

Democratic forces in South Africa are very conscious that formal democracy, if this can be achieved, provides no guarantee of popular participation and government responsiveness. The easiest course for a new government, even one democratically elected, will be to make their peace with the established structures of bureaucracy and economic power. Some such compromises are inevitable, but outside criticism and pressure will be vital if formal democracy is to serve the people's interests and involve people in participatory change. Government policies and support from outside the country can either encourage or discourage such grassroots initiatives.

South Africa is fortunate in having a strong set of groups within society that have emerged from and contributed to the anti-apartheid struggle. The trade union movement is the strongest on the African continent, and probably one of the liveliest areas of democratic debate and popular participation anywhere in the world. The multitude of groups which came together in the 1980s in the United Democratic Front, and which are now being regrouped into new coordinating organizations, helped train community activists and dealt with a wide range of issues. Civic associations, professional groups, and other non-governmental organizations constitute a potential source of democratic vitality.

Elsewhere in southern Africa, comparable initiatives are emerging in almost all countries. A new, better educated generation is ready to criticize the veterans of the independence struggles, and to suggest that it is past time for new strategies to deal with the crises the countries are facing.

In countries like Angola and Mozambique, with very high illiteracy rates, the human resources for such efforts are in short supply. But the political climate is increasingly open. Such groups are probably most highly developed in Zimbabwe, despite a government tendency to resent and suppress criticism. Nowhere in the region do groups involved in active criticism have an easy existence. Malawi is particularly hostile to democratic initiatives of any kind. But the overall trend is clearly towards encouraging a more open and more active civil society.

In terms of formal multi-party democracy, new constitutions are already in place in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. A peaceful debate on the issue is under way in Tanzania. In Mozambique and Angola, ironically, the process is most likely to be endangered by the South African-sponsored groups who most loudly proclaim their support for democracy. RENAMO shows no willingness at all to participate in a peaceful election. While the incumbent government may be unpopular, RENAMO is far more hated and feared by the people. In Angola UNITA clearly hopes to propel itself into office via ethnic loyalties and economic discontent. But it also seems, in violation of the peace agreement, to be relying on its military control of part of the countryside and on the threat of force. Four months after the cease-fire, although Angolans of all political views were allowed to circulate freely in government-controlled zones, UNITA had yet to permit freedom of movement in its areas.

In these war-battered countries, elections which are genuinely fair and free from intimidation will be difficult to carry off, despite the apparent strong commitment to do so by Presidents Chissano of Mozambique and dos Santos of Angola.

Zaire is the country with the most intense recent struggle over the transition to democracy. President Mobutu Sese Seko has been trying to hang on to power, in the face of a wide coalition of opposition groups demanding his resignation and a representative national conference to chart a new political structure for the country. A massacre of over 100 students in 1990 and repeated smaller incidents since then attracted little U.S. press attention. In October, after an army mutiny, Mobutu agreed to a coalition government with opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi as the prime minister. But Mobutu still controls the army and there is the potential for much future violence.
BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND

The smallest of the southern African states in population, these three countries share a common history of British colonial rule and near-total economic integration with South Africa. All are members of the South African-dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which provides a large share of government revenues. All have suffered raids by South Africa against political exiles.

Yet the issues each now faces are significantly distinct. Botswana, with its diamond wealth and a per capita income over $2,000, could be a significant source of investment capital for the region. Lesotho's almost total dependence on migrant labor (and future water sales) to South Africa makes its economic fate hostage to bilateral agreements. Swaziland's economy is more diverse than Lesotho's, but still overwhelmingly dependent on South Africa.

In political terms, Botswana's stable parliamentary democracy (although dominated by one party) contrasts with the authoritarian Lesotho (the only country in the region, except for Zaire, which has suffered military coups). Human rights concerns and establishing political democracy are major unresolved issues for Lesotho and Swaziland. For Botswana the focus is on equitable and productive management of diamond income and preservation of the fragile ecology of the mostly desert nation.

ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA

Zimbabwe and Namibia each achieved independence by negotiated settlements after years of guerrilla war. Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia a decade later. Apart from South Africa, the two countries had and still have the largest proportion of whites in the region. Unlike Angola and Mozambique, where the bulk of settlers fled at the prospect of liberation movement takeovers, Zimbabwean and Namibian movements made numerous concessions designed to get the whites to stay and to avoid economic disruption. The result has been relatively undamaged economic infrastructures, combined with reinforcement of much of the inequality built into the social structures.

Zimbabwe's productive agricultural economy, for example, was opened up to serve African peasant farmers, while simultaneously maintaining the large white-owned farms. But Black farmworkers on white farms remained in abysmal conditions, and many peasant families remained without access to good land. And a current structural adjustment program threatens to heighten the gap between rich and poor. Namibia is only beginning to confront the problems of agricultural inequality, but the disparities between white and black are enormous. In every sector of the economy, the two countries face hard choices between simply incorporating a minority of Blacks into the top levels or seeking strategies which could reduce inequality as well as maintain production.

In political terms, Zimbabwe faced intense conflict after independence between the ruling ZANU party and the adherents of ZAPU, which was exacerbated by covert South African action. Despite periods of serious human rights abuses, the two groups' political leadership eventually arranged a merger to preserve national unity. Now there is concern that this merged body may impose a one-party state and block outside political criticism. So far internal disagreement and protest have delayed such a move, but critics still point to the government's tendency to repress criticism among students and others.

Namibia's delicately balanced multi-party democracy is still new, with the liberation movement SWAPO in the majority but seriously constrained by the necessity to negotiate with other parties and by the bureaucracy left over by the South Africans. Recent revelations that opposition parties were the beneficiary of South African covert efforts to tilt the election have not yet dented the general mood of reconciliation. But the loyalty of SWAPO's own supporters may depend more on rapid action to deal with structural inequalities in the society.

TANZANIA AND ZAMBA

Under Presidents Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, Tanzania and Zambia played central roles for three decades in the international campaign to rid southern Africa of colonial and white-minority rule. By providing asylum and base facilities to liberation movement exiles, by lobbying within the Commonwealth and the UN, by persistent collective diplomacy finally embodied in the Frontline States and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, these two pioneers of African independence never forgot the commitment to continental freedom.

At the same time, their early successes at home with policies of social welfare and development under slogans of African socialism were not sustained. Tanzania in particular did succeed with literacy and rural health programs, but its agricultural economy never broke out of its dependence on a few export crops with dubious world market prospects. Zambia's mining-based economy never recovered from the drop in world copper prices in the early 1970s. Both countries were forced into International Monetary...
In both countries economic crisis and political stagnation eroded trust in the veteran independence leaders. Tanzania’s Nyerere voluntarily retired as president in 1985, and gave up his chairmanship of the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi in 1990. Although contested elections had long provided an avenue for some dissent within the one-party state, by 1990 Tanzanians, including Nyerere, were actively debating the need to shift to a multi-party system.

In Zambia Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) faced vigorous challenges from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), with support in the highly urbanized country particularly among businessmen, intellectuals and trade union members. An election scheduled for October 1991 was to pit opposition leader Frederick Chiluba, a trade union leader, against Kaunda’s ruling establishment.

**ZAIRE AND MALAWI**

Huge Zaire on the northern flank of southern Africa, and small Malawi surrounded by Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania on the east, hold the joint distinction of being the most long-lived authoritarian regimes on the continent.

Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire came to power as a CIA protege in the “Congo crisis” of the early sixties, and has held sway virtually alone since the mid-sixties. He has presided over the country’s economic decline and his own personal transformation into reportedly one of the world’s richest men. Hasting Banda of Malawi quickly eliminated his younger rivals after independence, establishing a highly repressive political system and a society largely cut off from outside scrutiny. Much of Malawi’s economy came under control of companies controlled by the Life-President.

Both leaders, by virtue of their pro-Western rhetoric and opposition to radical views, have enjoyed support from key Western powers over the past quarter century. Both have also cooperated with South Africa in opposing radical liberation movements and supporting destabilization against their southern African neighbors. Zaire served as a base for actions against Angola since the conflict at Angola’s independence in 1975. And Malawi has, since the early 1980s, provided a channel for outside support for RENAMO’s attacks in Mozambique.

Although Malawi has preserved its economic infrastructure, in contrast to the virtually total disintegration of roads and services in Zaire, both countries have systematically neglected social services for the majority of their populations.

In recent years a strong pro-democracy movement has been challenging Mobutu’s rule, despite repression and little attention from the outside world. In Malawi so far, Banda and his expected successor John Tembo have succeeded in imposing a climate in which not even quiet criticism, much less open opposition, is allowed.

**MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA**

Mozambique and Angola were both colonies of Portugal, which refused even to consider granting independence. After more than a decade of guerrilla warfare by liberation movements, the Portuguese army overthrew the long-lived dictatorship in Portugal in 1974 and conceded the loss of Africa the next year. The compound legacies of Portuguese colonialism, guerrilla war and the exodus of Portuguese settlers as independence approached in 1975 left these two countries with high illiteracy rates, crippled economies and weak state administrations.

The movements that came to power, with programs of radical transformation towards socialism, had initial popular enthusiasm, but little capacity for implementing ambitious economic programs of any kind. Early advances in areas such as health and education were soon threatened by involvement in the ongoing conflict with white minority regimes.

Mozambique provided bases and support for the guerrilla war for independence of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). Angolan provided bases for SWAPO’s guerrilla war in Namibia, and training bases for the ANC. Mozambique gave political support and asylum for ANC refugees, although refraining from offering bases. First white Rhodesia and then South Africa sponsored an armed group called RENAMO, which targeted civilians and economic infrastructure in Mozambique. South Africa directly invaded Angola. With the U.S. it also backed attacks by Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement.

Savimbi had cooperated with the Portuguese before independence and gained U.S. and South African sponsorship in the civil conflict around independence, when Cuban and Soviet military assistance helped the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to win control in Luanda.

In recent years, under the pressures of war, economic stagnation and changes in the former Soviet bloc, both Mozambique and Angola have moved to establish new constitutions with multiparty pluralist systems. They have adopted market-oriented economic adjustment programs on the advice of the World Bank.

Despite a cease-fire in Angola, RENAMO’s failure to gain any international political respectability, and the establishment of a number of new parties in both countries, the political future of the two countries is uncertain. Notwithstanding Angola’s oil wealth and Mozambique’s potential as outlet to the sea for much of the region, the prospects for economic recovery also remain hostage to military and political developments.
ISSUES OF THE 1990S: DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF

For the southern African region, the burden of past war destruction weighs heavily on future economic prospects. In one country, Mozambique, the destruction continues, with RENAMO attacks systematically targeted at civilians and economic infrastructure. Over the period 1980-1988, according to a UN study, the countries of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) lost $62.5 billion as a result of the war: more than twice their combined Gross Domestic Product for 1988.

Angola and Mozambique have suffered particularly heavy material and human damage. Total losses over the 1980-1988 period are estimated at $30 billion for Angola and $15 million for Mozambique. The UN also estimates deaths directly or indirectly due to the wars as more than 900,000 in Mozambique, and more than 500,000 in Angola, more than half children in each case. In mid-1991 there were approximately 1.2 million Mozambican refugees in neighboring countries, and 1.7 million people displaced from their homes inside Mozambique. In Angola up to 800,000 people were believed to be at risk of famine in mid-1991.

Yet with Western news media no longer much interested in starving Africans, the flow of relief supplies falls far short of meeting immediate needs. The needs for reconstruction and development are even more enormous. Repairing roads and railways, rebuilding clinics, schools and other buildings, supplying farmers with at least the minimum of hand tools and seeds to restore food production will be on the agenda for years. Whether or not international support for such efforts is conceived as reparations, it is clearly a moral imperative, particularly for South Africa and the U.S. which bear much of the responsibility for the destruction.

Long-term development in the region is not simply a matter of material reconstruction and financial aid. Throughout southern Africa the issue is how to sustain development: how to make necessary economic adjustments to crisis, increase productivity in agriculture and industry, and build the material, human and institutional infrastructure that can bring prosperity.

With the exception of diamond-rich and sparsely populated Botswana, newly independent Namibia, and South Africa itself, practically all the countries in the region have been forced into one version or another of IMF and World Bank structural readjustment programs.

Most critics of these programs admit that many of the policies of market liberalization, exchange rate adjustment and budget cuts are in part justified. But, as a package, they argue, the structural adjustment remedy offers false promises of future viability after the intensive belt-tightening. And while the majority are tightening their belts to impossibly constricted sizes, a minority are growing fat. Budget cuts in social services are so severe as to endanger the human capital of the countries, crucial decisions are removed even further from grassroots control to air-conditioned offices in Washington, and the burdens of debt and trade imbalances produce a net transfer of resources away from Africa to the industrialized countries.

Even in terms of purely quantitative growth, as the World Bank itself is coming to realize, free-market remedies must be balanced by:

- development of responsive local government structures,
- investment in the spread of health and education to the majority of the population,
- provision of infrastructure which does not provide short-term profit, and
- favorable international economic policies.

When one considers not only quantitative macroeconomic growth, but also the welfare of the majority—peasants, workers, unemployed—the inadequacies of simplistic free-market formulas become even more apparent. No one suggests that a rigid command economy provides a viable alternative; there is no development formula to be applied mechanically. But grassroots groups and dedicated professionals throughout southern Africa argue that sustainable development strategies require active and honest governments responsive to their own people, not primarily to foreign agencies with ideological agendas nor to minority elites aiming at their own enrichment.

The details of policy are far beyond the scope of this essay. But it is clear that the resources and the will must be found to invest in the health and education of the people of southern Africa. Agricultural development for the peasant sector will continue to fail unless policies are directed towards the majority, largely women, whose labor goes primarily into subsistence food production. And African efforts at self-reliance and reform will continue to fall short if the international community is not more responsive with debt relief, trade concessions and aid policies.

To take only one example of many: At a time when health care through the region has been reduced because of war, budget cuts or both, the AIDS epidemic is already a major burden on medical resources in Zaire and Tanzania, and is rapidly growing in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Although Angola, Namibia and South Africa report fewer cases...
so far, the patterns of labor migration and refugee displacement throughout the region make it likely that without large-scale preventive action transmission will also accelerate there. The consequences will be profound, not only for individual suffering but also for economic development. Any effective response requires not only local initiative but also large-scale international support.

In economic terms, South Africa too will have difficult choices to make in development strategies. Its manufacturing industry cannot compete in world markets, and the gold industry which has always been a mainstay faces major new problems of declining viability. A large proportion of the private sector is controlled by a small number of financial groups, unemployment levels are as high as 40 percent, and costly investment will be needed in the social sector to even begin to address racial inequalities.

Many South African government and business leaders now argue for privatizing much of the state sector, before a more representative government comes into power. The ANC no longer holds to the strong nationalization pledges of earlier years. But they know that a strong state sector played a major role in South Africa’s industrial growth and in promoting white economic welfare. And it will continue to be essential if prosperity is to be extended to the majority of the population as well. The rush to privatization is seen as an effort to weaken the state just when it might begin to address those issues.

Renewed post-apartheid growth will depend not only on political stability, but also on striking a balance between economic planning and private initiative. Equitable participation within South Africa is essential, as is equitable cooperation with countries in the region that have been closely linked with the South African economy for a century.

**Issues of the 1990s:**

**EQUITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF POVERTY**

The social and economic inequities of apartheid are well known, and do not require extended repetition here. One has only to recall: the separate and grossly unequal educational facilities, with expenditures of one-seventh as much per African as per white in the mid-1980s; the division of the land, with 13 percent of the land reserved for the 73 percent of the population which is of African descent; the mass deportation of millions of Blacks from areas zoned as white over the last few decades; the segregation within the cities of townships for Black residents; the unequal health facilities, leaving infant mortality rates for Africans as much as ten times the rates for whites. The list could go on and on.

Even the South African regime now recognizes the urgency of addressing these issues. But it is important to understand for the future how resistant to change many of these structural inequalities will be, and how widely the patterns of inequality have ramified throughout the country and the region.

Equality of political rights, however genuine, can only be the beginning of change, not only along the racial divide, but in a series of other structural divides: between urban and rural, educated and uneducated, employed and unemployed, men and women, between Blacks who have retained citizenship of South Africa and those assigned to the apartheid-created “homelands,” between relatively developed and less privileged geographic zones within South Africa and within the wider region.

In a 1978 study, South Africa's coefficient of inequality among income groups was the highest of 57 countries for which data was available. More recent data is not available, and some estimates had the opportunity to advance. But the influential Carnegie study *Uprooting Poverty* estimated in 1989 that these figures were the most accurate to date. Annual disposable income for whites per capita in 1983 was 6,242 Rand, as compared to 1,366 Rand for Africans in metropolitan areas and 388 Rand for Africans in “non-growth areas.”

Similar sharp distinctions also still apply within countries in the region with large white populations, such as Namibia and Zimbabwe. In other countries the elite groups composed of whites, mestizos, and Africans with higher education or leverage over government resources form a sharp contrast to the ordinary farmer or urban worker. In virtually every country, and particularly in the poorer countries such as Mozambique and Zaire, the contrast is enormous between those who have some access to the capital city and those in more remote regions.

In South Africa, the apartheid “homeland” system has created de facto social realities, with corrupt bureaucracies dependent on Pretoria's subsidies and suspicious of the better educated urban residents who are more strongly mobilized in favor of the ANC. Real inequalities can easily become the ground for ethnic or regional rivalries, manipulated by forces with other motives. In countries such...
Regional Cooperation

Southern Africa has long been a closely interlocked network of economic and political influences. The flow of migrant labor to the South African mines, British dominance in the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century, and the common heritage of racial ideologies closely linked its diverse countries in the colonial period. In the years of struggle against white minority rule, the complex diplomatic and military strife of apartheid’s struggle to survive intertwined the countries even closer.

The Frontline States played a key role in coordinating African support for liberation. And the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) proved a modest but effective effort at cooperation in development projects. Formed in 1980 with the goal of reducing economic dependence on South Africa and fostering regional development, SADCC’s efforts were largely offset by the destruction from South Africa’s attacks on member states. It did, however, create a framework for regular consultation among governments in the region, and heightened the consciousness of regional identity.

Both SADCC and the Frontline States reached beyond the strictly geographical southern region to include Tanzania, largely by virtue of its active role in supporting liberation. Zaïre, which was not invited to join SADCC, played an active albeit opposite role in regional affairs, serving as an outport of support for South African intervention.

As the apartheid era comes to a close in South Africa, the institutional framework for regional cooperation is certain to shift. Closer economic cooperation could build a strong regional bloc within the world economy, a large and potentially well-integrated unit with a diversity of raw materials, industrial capacity and regional transport networks.

Even beyond the region, there is widespread expectation that South Africa could become the power house of African development.

Yet if this promise is to be fulfilled, South Africans and their neighbors alike will have to deal with a difficult heritage of inequalities. The ANC has called in its program for regional economic cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. But the economic actors best placed to take advantage of the new opportunities are foreign and white South African businessmen.

Without political will, careful planning and a willingness to balance the market with state control and initiatives, the most likely outcome would be to accentuate the inequalities that exist.

As of 1989, South Africa, with one quarter of the region’s population, accounted for two-thirds of its Gross Domestic Product. If the division were calculated in terms of race, the disparity would be even more enormous. South Africa’s GNP per capita is almost thirty times that of neighboring Mozambique; it is three times that of Namibia, even counting Namibia’s substantial white population.

Decisions on regional cooperation will involve numerous potential conflicts of interest, and will require both skill and sensitivity to resolve.

Although the comparison is of course not precise, the disparities between South Africa and the region have some analogy to those between the U.S. and Central America. Despite the intimate economic and military connections to Central America, most U.S. citizens know relatively little about their southern neighbors. Similarly, neither migrant labor nor wars have provided the average South African—Black or white—with much information about or understanding of their northern neighbors. South African businessmen and government officials have gathered information they need to manage their interests in the region. But the South African public has been cut off behind an apartheid curtain of ignorance from the rest of Africa.

Even with the political will for equitable cooperation, working out the details will not be easy. South Africa is the natural exporter of manufactured goods to the region: its exports do not compete well on the world market and have the advantage in Africa of lower transport costs. But what measures can be taken to protect manufacturing industries developed so far in Zimbabwe, for example, or
to ensure that other countries are not entirely blocked by South African competition from developing their internal capacity? How will the planning and division of benefits of regional electric power grids and water schemes be decided? How to reconcile competition between different railways and ports serving as outlets for the interior, when South African firms still control most of the shipping and handling facilities? How to deal with the rights of some 370,000 migrants from neighboring countries working legally in South Africa, and possibly more than a million “illegal” migrants? With unemployment in South Africa at an estimated 40 percent, how to handle the potential conflicts over immigration?

The list of questions is long. But the potential for dynamic and mutually beneficial cooperation is also enormous. If democratic governments in the region are able to deal realistically with potential conflicts of interest, and the complementary resources of the region’s countries are mobilized efficiently, southern Africa could become one of the most prosperous regions of the global South.

**QUESTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY**

As this is written in October 1991, the issues of U.S. policy towards southern Africa have all but disappeared from public debate. But as the killing continues, in South Africa and in Mozambique, there are hard questions that need to be asked. As demonstrators in Kinshasa shout for democracy for the 35 million people of Zaire, they surely deserve more than a minuscule fraction of the attention given the few millions who sought self-determination in the Baltic states. And even when the immediate political crises pass, the 150 million people of southern Africa will be affected by the weight of U.S. influence in multilateral banks, aid consortia and other forums.

In summary form, here are some of the immediate and long-term questions that should be on the agenda:

(1) The U.S. double standard on violence, human-rights violations and pro-democracy movements.

In SOUTH AFRICA the administration has consistently favored the de Klerk administration, seeking excuses to lift sanctions and ignoring the evidence of massive state-sponsored violence against anti-apartheid activists and Black communities.

In MOZAMBIQUE the administration has condemned RENAMO and supported Mozambique’s turn to a multi-party system. But it has shown little interest in mobilizing pressure against South Africa, Malawi, Kenya or U.S. right-wing groups — all administration allies — to block the outside support that continues to fuel RENAMO’s killing machine.

In ANGOLA the administration has officially pledged neutrality in upcoming elections. But it continues to provide covert support to UNITA, and has consistently refused to consider seriously evidence of human rights violations by UNITA. It refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Angola until after elections, a striking contrast to its stance on South Africa.

In ZAIRE the administration is still reluctant to support pro-democracy demands for departure of its long-standing client Mobutu Sese Seko and inauguration of a new democratic constitution.

(2) The U.S. voice on the future of democracy, participation, equity, and development.

Throughout southern Africa, indeed throughout the world, people are asking how to secure both democratic participation and economic progress that benefits the majority of the people. The bankruptcy of centralized party-state domination is clear. But those in the global South with experience of foreign and elite-dominated “free-market” solutions know it is easier to say what doesn’t work than what does. For the majority, the jubilation of peace, democracy or economic progress but rather a Darwinian survival of the fittest that writes off those unable to compete.

There are no easy solutions. But grassroots southern Africans and their friends in the U.S. will legitimately judge to what extent U.S. policy helps or hinders their search for answers. Will the U.S. show that it is willing to pay attention to Africa in some proportion to the need? Will a starving Russian or Kurd continue to be worth many times a starving African, as measured by news coverage, attention of policy makers, or dollars allocated? To what extent will U.S. officials measure progress towards democracy on the basis of their ideological agreement with the winning parties? To what extent will the U.S. be responsive, in its support for “civil society,” to grassroots groups demanding equity as well as to groups offering charity or to those promoting U.S. solutions to African problems?

To what extent will it be recognized that despite the lip service to democracy, more and more decisions about government policies and economic directions of many countries are being taken in the offices of the IMF, the World Bank, USAID and similar agencies? One of the current catchwords of development advice is transparency, meaning that government budgets of developing countries should be visible for public inspection and outside critique. When and how will the deliberations of foreign agencies become visible to the people of the countries whose fates are being discussed?

To what extent, finally, will it be recognized that the collective problems people face in the U.S. and southern Africa are interrelated, and that they require dialogue, mutual debate and common action rather than simply the transmission of expert advice? Unemployment, racial and gender inequality, violence and crime, the availability of health care, adequate housing, equal access to the political system for rich and poor—the list could go on—surely these are real issues both on the northwestern and the southeastern corners of the Atlantic Ocean.

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