July 14, 1992

Dear Friend of Mozambique,

We send this newsletter to you today to bring your attention to the critical situation in Mozambique. As the drought in Southern Africa deepens, over 3.1 million Mozambicans are threatened with starvation. The situation is exacerbated by the ongoing destabilization and war waged by the RENAMO bandits. Their refusal to compromise has brought the current round of peace talks to another deadlock, thus blocking the creation of "corridors of peace" for food aid to drought-affected areas. Even if the rains come as expected, the famine is expected to last until harvest time next year.

Please read this newsletter carefully. It contains expanded information on the situation in Mozambique and in Southern Africa in general. We are open to any suggestions or criticisms you may have.

Additionally, we invite you to subscribe to Baobab Notes. A year-long subscription is only $5-10 (See page 3 of Baobab Notes for further details). We would also be highly grateful for any contribution you could make to our office to help us continue our work providing a much needed resource for information and news on Mozambique and Southern Africa.

A luta continua!

Karin Candelaria
for the Mozambique Solidarity Office
Peace Talks Update

The eleventh round of peace talks in Rome between Mozambican government and RENAMO delegations has come to another deadlock. This round, which started June 10, was stalled by the RENAMO delegation's insistence on discussing constitutional matters before the discussion of a cease-fire. This is a reversal of RENAMO Commander-in-Chief Afonso Dhlakama's April statement agreeing that the question of the constitution could be dealt with later while the military discussion should advance.

Another RENAMO reversal of agreement concerned the transport of food to drought-stricken Mozambicans. In May, Dhlakama agreed to allow road convoys to (Continued pg. 4)

Drought in Southern Africa Intensifies; Mozambique is Hit Hardest

The drought situation in Southern Africa has worsened. There are currently 18 million people directly threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition and 100 million people affected with the loss of crops, livestock and jobs. Even if the much needed rains come as expected in November, the drought is estimated to last until harvest time in April 1993, if not longer.

The situation in Mozambique is perhaps the worst in the region, with millions of people displaced from their homes and farms as a result of the continuing war. These people are totally dependent on foreign aid to survive the drought. The UN estimates that only 800,000 of the 3.1 million Mozambicans directly affected by the drought will receive food aid. A further 5.9 million urban dwellers depend completely on the rapidly dwindling market for food.

As water supplies dry up and food becomes more scarce, the RENAMO bandits are doing little to alleviate the situation. RENAMO leaders have refused to allow the establishment of "corridors of peace" which will permit food aid to reach drought zones. In addition, the local press reports that RENAMO soldiers have been attacking food convoys and robbing them of food meant for drought relief. (Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC), May-June 1992. The Washington Office on Africa, Action Alert, July 1, 1992.)

"POEM" by Jorge Rebelo

Come, brother, and tell me your life, come, show me the marks of revolt which the enemy left on your body

Come, say to me, "Here my hands have been crushed because they defended they land which they own"

"Here my body was tortured because they dared to sing my people's freedom"

Come, brother, and tell me your life, come relate to me the dreams of revolt which you and your fathers and forefathers dreamed in silence through shadowless nights made of love

Come, tell me these dreams become war, the birth of heroes, land reconquered, mothers who, fearless, send their sons to fight

Come, tell me all this, my brother

And later I will forge simple words which even the children can understand, words which will enter every house like the wind and fall like red-hot embers on our people's souls

In our land Bullets are beginning to flower.

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**So What's Next for Angola?**

With the September elections approaching quickly, there will be much to monitor as Angola attempts to establish a multi-party political system, which would be committed to free market policies. After 16 years of civil war between the MPLA, backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and UNITA, backed by the U.S. and South Africa, it will be interesting to note if such amends are possible. In the March 1992 *Lies of Our Times*, Elaine Windrich comments that "it would be impossible to create the conditions for free and fair elections in less than three years, considering the prior need to transform two rival armies into one national army, remove the land mines obstructing freedom of movement, resettle more than a million refugees and displaced persons and compile a census and electoral register." Reconstruction of an entire infrastructure in Angola takes much more than the writing up of documents and holding peace accords between the MPLA and UNITA. It will probably take many more years of strife to achieve liberation, peace and stability not only for the government but the individuals who make up the country of Angola.

Since Angola has been receiving insufficient funds to cover the cost of reconstructing the war-torn country, progress seems to be almost at a halt. Angola has received an estimated amount of $14.6 million in assistance through World Bank loans and South African firms. The United States has yet to grant any funds to aid Angola in its organization. However, it was suggested in a recent article by Presy Nesbitt and Anne Gola in *Africa Today* (1st and 2nd Quarters) that "the Bush administration found an estimated $75 million a year to give to UNITA in the final years of the war in Angola." Bush obviously finds it more important to grant aid for assisting war rather than promoting peace.

Consequently, such recent outbreaks in Boipatong, South Africa and the devastating drought throughout much of Southern Africa have drawn much focus away from the country of Angola. It will be hard to determine what outcomes will occur in the Fall elections. Perhaps with the United States concentrated on their own presidential elections, less influence and attention will be given to Angola. It is also worth noting that as long as the U.S. has access to Angolan resources and the Angolan president Eduardo dos Santos continues to construct a multi-party government, the U.S. has little reason to change its policies toward Angola. However, in May 1992 article in Z Magazine such a question was proposed that "if the MPLA win the Fall elections will the United States recognize Angola?" This question leaves us with the wonderment at the possibility of yet another long, hard battle towards achieving so-called peaceful resolutions.

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**South African Peace Talks Result in Another Massacre in Boipatong**

The Peace Talks between the ANC and South African National Party seemed like the beginning of a movement towards peace and equal rights. However, with 40 people dead and hundreds injured, peace and equality are far from ever advancing to the negotiating table. According to Dr. Beyers Naude, a senior churchperson in Cape Town, South Africa, "the government is not going to make any meaningful concessions. They are going to hold out on power for as long as possible. They are going to ensure that politically and economically and militarily they remain in control. And that, in my mind, can only lead to an open conflict which will inevitably also lead to bloodshed in our country" (*South Africa Church News*, 14 June 1992).

It was further stated that the violence in South Africa is part of a major operation financially supported and backed by the National Party. This operation is called "Operation Thunderstorm." A senior official of the ANC Intelligence Department describing the core of Operation Thunderstorm states that "every plan and action—particularly on the question of violence—is aimed at weakening the ANC so that it is eventually forced into a constitutional coalition. At the heart of the plan is the NP goal to be the main partner in a future government, controlling all levels of power—partially the army, police and intelligence" (*Southern Africa Partnership Project*, 23 June 1992).

One of the main components of Operation Thunderstorm, which has been in effect for quite a while, is to aim at unleashing random violence in black areas in order to dissuade people from openly supporting the ANC. Such a component is reflected partly in the support given to activities of organizations like Inkatha. Another aspect is the arming and deployment of criminal gangs, agent provocateurs, Askaris, RENAMO, Koevoet and others. Such an operation is at the very heart of the destruction during these peace talks in South Africa. (*Southern Africa Partnership Project*, 23 June 1992).

Currently, this unsteadiness in South Africa has forced the ANC to focus only on the violence erupting so quickly throughout the country. Mandela comments that "resumption of negotiations did not depend on the government's carrying out a specific list of deeds so much as on a demonstration of a change in attitude" (*The New York Times*, 24 June 1992). It is quite clear that violence was never part of Mandela's intentions. He only desired the hope for a more peaceful coexistence and equal treatment among all in South Africa.
Further Investigation of "Katina-P" Disaster Reveals Tanker's Unseaworthiness

Investigation of last month's environmental disaster in which the oil tanker "Katina-P" sank off the Mozambican coast, polluting Maputo bay with 3000 tons of heavy fuel oil have revealed that the tanker was not seaworthy and was in fact destined for the scrapyard. During its trip from Rio de Janeiro to the Indian Subcontinent to be sold for scrap, it received orders to turn around, pick up a cargo of 66,000 tons of oil from Venezuela and ship it to Fujirah in the oil-rich United Arab Emirates. The news that the "Katina-P" was on its last voyage raises serious doubts as to its seaworthiness. It would also explain the captain's decision to hug the South African and Mozambican coasts, that land could be reached in case of an emergency.

Testimony of crew members to the commission of inquiry reveals serious contradictions as to the actual location where the problems began for the tanker. Some crew members say that the tanker began to leak only when it reached Mozambican waters, while others maintain that the crack formed off the coast of South Africa, far south of Maputo bay. Although some of the information available to the inquiry suggests that problems did indeed begin in South African waters, the disappearance of three crucial logbooks, and some tampering with others, has hindered the work of the commission of inquiry.

Meanwhile, oil is still escaping from the sunken tanker even though it is under 2000 meters of water at the bottom of the Mozambican channel. Overflights during the week of June 15 spotted a fresh, six-kilometer-long oil slick drifting southward from the site of the sunken vessel. This finding refutes the opinions of foreign experts who had asserted that the oil would remain virtually solid within the tanker due to the low temperature and high pressure at the bottom of the channel.

Cleanup operations still continue in damaged areas. Oil has been removed from Maputo's Polana and Costa do Sol beaches. Catembe and Macaneta beaches are currently being washed, while the islands of lesser and greater Xefina are next to be cleaned. (Mozambique Information Office, June 18, 1992.)

Donor Policies Partially to Blame for Drought Suffering

"Starvation is already apparent in Mozambique" reports Carol Thompson in the South African April 24 to 29, 1992 Weekly Mail and she points to the "agricultural policies pushed by donors" as bearing responsibility for Southern African countries' inability to respond adequately to the needs of their citizens.

The manipulation of African grain production by Western countries predates the current drought and is a precursor to the present misery. The United States' policies are particularly characteristic of this. In the past, the US pressed the Zimbabwean government to lower corn prices so that farmers would grow instead tobacco, a crop that would bring in foreign exchange. For several years, Zimbabwe resisted this policy on the grounds of regional food security. By 1990, however, corn prices were lowered and farmers did switch. Now, in the midst of the present drought, the corn is needed and with the high international demand for corn, inflated prices will consume the foreign exchange earned by tobacco.

In 1986 a triangular aid package was formed between the US, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. This plan involved the purchase of wheat from the US by Zimbabwe which would be paid for by exporting corn to Mozambique under the name of US aid. However, in 1986-87 when Zimbabwe was faced with a 2 million ton corn surplus, the US agreed to transfer only 7000 tons of corn in exchange for wheat. The US Department of Agriculture explained this by stating that US food aid was to reduce surplus of corn in the US, although US yellow corn is considered cattle feed in Mozambique.

The European Community (EC) is guilty of similar manipulation of aid. In 1988, the EC agreed to finance Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference's (SADCC) plan to build silos to insure grain reserves. Later, the EC qualified their agreement by demanding the right to control "who received the grain and when." On these grounds, SADCC refused the aid, stating: "We cannot allow foreigners to administer our food aid programme...major donors are using food aid as a weapon to influence policies of government." Had the SADCC been able to fund the silos, regional grain costs would now be much lower.

Now, most of the grain must be purchased at high international prices. Early estimates show that only one-third of the 10 million tons needed will be in the form of aid. Although some donors have helped SADCC with some successful programs, such as the transport of the life-saving corn, the fact must be faced that their agricultural consultation policies have been inappropriate and even fatal for Southern Africa.
The Disappearance of Youth in Mozambique

It would seem that war between people is devastating enough, but to bring innocent children into the battlefield should be perceived as intolerable. Yet, RENAMO finds the use of children undeniably acceptable. RENAMO has even managed to have a "well-documented history of kidnapping young children, giving them military training and forcing them to kill and these young children are used increasingly in attacks in the southern provinces, especially around the capital, Maputo" (Southern African News Feature, May 1992).

In 1991 three child psychologists devoted a book to children growing up in war zones called No Place to Be a Child: Growing Up In a War Zone. Focusing specially on the country of Mozambique, James Garbarino, Kathleen Kostelny and Nancy Dubrow write that the "physical conditions for children are so appalling in Mozambique that it is easy to lose sight of the quality of their internal experience, their subjective lives. This is understandable. To see children with their heads split open from machete attacks and children who have lost legs and sight to mine explosions screams out for some direct aid and comfort. And the psychological cost seem self-evident in many respects. The horror of witnessing your parents beheaded before your eyes must be traumatizing" (80).

RENAMO has successfully destroyed the course of these children having healthy and productive lives. The daily toils have had a great impact not only on the outcome of these children's lives but the future of Mozambique.

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RENAMO-held areas only if they were "effectively and independently monitored with no government or RENAMO soldiers involved." In these latest talks, however, RENAMO has refused any shipments except by air, a very inefficient means of distribution.

RENAMO's continual stalling is considered to be simple delaying tactics enacted with RENAMO's knowledge that they cannot win a free and fair election. Their terrorization of the Mozambican citizenry has left them with little popular support. (Mozambique Information Office, 18 June 1992, SARDC May 1992)

IDEAS FOR ACTION

• The People of Mozambique Need Your Support

The Mozambique Solidarity Office, in conjunction with the Mozambican Embassy, is initiating a fund-and awareness-raising campaign to provide the desperately needed food aid for victims of the drought in Mozambique. Checks made out to the Mozambique Solidarity Office and memoed "Emergency Drought Relief" can be of absolutely any comfortable amount. Please give what you can.

• FRELIMO -- 30 Years of Struggle for the People

On June 25, 1992, the Mozambique Liberation Front celebrated its 30th anniversary of struggle. Throughout the years, FRELIMO has been committed to the Mozambican people, as they lead them through the colonial years to Independence. They have been the major participants in the organization of the reconstruction of Mozambique. Their struggle continues in the war of destabilization fighting against the South African-backed bandits.

Now more than ever, FRELIMO needs financial support and messages of solidarity from people in the US. The Mozambique Solidarity Office encourages letters to be sent to the Mozambique Embassy at 1990 "M" St, NW, Suite 570, Washington, DC 20036.

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