11 May 1989

Dear [Name];

I had hoped that by now Senator Simon and others would have circulated Bill Minter's report with an attached "Dear Colleague" letter to other members of Congress. Unfortunately, this has not happened. We need to give Bill's report more visibility in Congress. Could you please send the report and a personal letter highlighting the report to;

1) Your Senators
2) 1-2 targeted Congress people (especially friendly Congress people that could be helpful)

Please do this ASAP as we need to keep the bandidos and their South African owners constantly in the mind of the Congress.

Thank you.

A luta continua!

Prexy Nesbitt
Abstract:

This report, based on recent interviews with 32 ex-participants in the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), describes the operations of this guerrilla group and its linkages with the South African Defense Force.

The interviews provide compelling new evidence for two major conclusions:

1. A high proportion of the Renamo rank-and-file combatants, probably in excess of ninety percent, is recruited by force, and kept in the Renamo ranks by control mechanisms including threats of execution for attempted desertion.

2. The professionally competent Renamo military operations are sustained by regular supplies from South Africa as well as by a centralized system of command, control and communications (C3) and a coordinated program of basic and advanced military training.

During a seven-week research trip in November and December 1988, the author carried out the interviews individually, out of hearing and sight of officials. Half of those interviewed had accepted the amnesty offer of the Mozambican government, the other half were prisoners captured in battle. Of the 32 interviews, nine were in Maputo, ten in Chimoio in central Mozambique, and thirteen in Zambézia province, ensuring representation of Mozambique's three major geographical zones.

The interviews averaged 45 minutes to an hour. All but two were in Portuguese. The respondents clearly distinguished their own direct observations, what they had heard from other Renamo combatants, and questions that they lacked information to answer.

The average age of the interviewees was 27, their average level of education between third and fourth grade. The earliest participant in Renamo was abducted in December 1978, and the latest in August 1987. On average they had spent 37 months in the Renamo forces. They included three with more than eight years experience, and nineteen whose stay extended into 1988.

over ...
Without exception, all 27 who had been directly involved in combat inside Mozambique said they had originally been abducted at gunpoint. Moreover, they said that all or almost all of those who trained with them had also been forcibly abducted. Most said the standard penalty for trying to escape was execution.

They described the supply operation for munitions as a strict need-to-know system in which only some soldiers had direct access to the deliveries. Almost all made reference to captured arms, but none said these were their major source. Outlying bases received supplies from central bases in each province by head porterage. Bases in southern Mozambique received some supplies overland from South Africa, but elsewhere the pattern was of periodic landings of DC-3's, parachute drops, or sea landings.

A given area normally received supplies only once or twice a year in quantities sufficient to last that long. The last specific delivery cited in my interviews was a plane landing in Zambezia province in April 1988, mentioned by a combatant who escaped in June 1988. Another ex-Renamo member, speaking to journalists in Manica province in late November, said she had carried supplies from South African planes which landed in the Gorongosa area in October 1988.

South African involvement was also cited in an interview by a recent defector from Renamo's Lisbon office. He said that in October, when he left, they were still receiving Renamo military communiqués from the same South African officers who had always handled the communications.

The interviewees also described a highly centralized system of command, control and communications, with its apex the communications link between the Renamo headquarters in central Mozambique and South African special forces. The military training they described ranged from basic training and special courses in bases in Mozambique to long-term instruction for selected soldiers in South Africa.

Author:

The author is a writer on southern Africa. His most recent books are King Solomon's Mines Revisited (1986) and Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier (1988). He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Wisconsin (Madison), and is fluent in Portuguese. He is currently associated with the African Studies Program, Georgetown University, as a visiting researcher, and is a contributing editor for Africa News Service.

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