Sanctions:  
The Fight is On

Ian Smith and his black partners are banking on the US Congress. If Congress will lift sanctions and grant the regime the legitimacy it has been unable to obtain from the people of Zimbabwe, its leaders believe it can survive. “Let’s face it,” a high-ranking white government official said in January, “Britain is a spent force and what really counts for us now is Capitol Hill.”

Why Lifting Sanctions Matters

While Congressional debate on sanctions has become an almost annual ritual, this time there is a serious chance that the Right will succeed in lifting sanctions completely. The stakes are higher than ever.

For Rhodesia, the significance is military. Its own Information Office in Washington makes no secret of its shopping list: We would not be asking for the Marines. We would be asking for the normalization of relations in trade and commerce, and for access to weaponry with which to defend ourselves.

The Carter Administration’s Africa policy is also on the line. As former Senator Dick Clark wrote in the January 30th New York Times:

Few members of Congress are familiar with the complexities of the Rhodesian war... In reality, the debate will be more of a trial of the Administration’s performance, an assessment of [its] ability to defend itself against the anti-Administration, anti-terrorism and anti-Soviet impulses that are shaping public attitudes on American foreign policy today.

Act Now on Sanctions

The battle in Congress over sanctions is already in high gear. Your action is urgently needed to prevent the US from being pulled into backing the wrong—and losing—side in Rhodesia.

Write to Policy-Makers in Washington.

The President and Congress will make key decisions on Zimbabwe right after the April 20th election. Tell them why you believe elections conducted under the internal settlement cannot be free, and why sanctions should not be lifted.

Write to them at:
- The White House, Washington, DC 20500
- Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510
- House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515

Educate People in Your Community.

The US media have had a virtual blackout of news about conditions inside Zimbabwe under the internal settlement. Help get out the facts in your community.

You will find a Special Feature on page 4 of this issue documenting how conditions have worsened since the March 3rd agreement.

Mobilize Others to Act.

At minimum, write to your Senators and Representative and ask a few friends to do the same. Mobilize a letter-writing campaign at your workplace, church, union hall, or at an educational event or film show. Better yet, organize a delegation to meet with your Senators and Representative at their local offices. Let us know where they stand on sanctions.
The sanctions fight is also important for the anti-apartheid movement. This issue is looked on by the national media as a barometer of public opinion on southern Africa. A loss to the Right on sanctions would set back a whole range of issues: cutting US ties with South Africa, increasing aid to refugees, and recognizing Angola. National organizations are therefore gearing up for a major fight.

How the Battle is Shaping Up

Last July, Congress passed the Case-Javits amendment which requires the President to lift sanctions if he determines that:

1. the Rhodesian government is willing to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference, and

2. that a free election open to all political and population groups has been held with impartial internationally-recognized observers.

In contrast to the Anglo-American proposal, the amendment accepts that elections held under supervision and control of the minority-rule government can be a fair test of the will of the people.

Senate opponents of sanctions are already arguing that Smith and his partners will meet the conditions of the Case-Javits language. On February 9th Senators Schweiker (R-Pa) and DeConcini (D-Ariz.) introduced a resolution (S Con Res 7) stating that the Rhodesian regime has agreed to negotiate in good faith, that the April 20th election will be free and open to all political groups, and calling on Congress to lift sanctions within ten days of the election.

Sanctions supporters in Congress have moved cautiously so far. Senator McGovern, the new chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, introduced a resolution with ranking minority member Hayakawa on March 1st appointing a team of observers to make an official report to Congress on the April election. An official observer team would legitimize the internal settlement constitution and elections which are clearly a fraud, and would fall into the trap of examining the superficial mechanics instead of the substance of democracy in Zimbabwe.

The mood in the Senate is not good. A liberal Democratic Senator said that there is "a new macho strain" among liberals and moderates as well as conservatives which represents a sharp turn from the spirit of retrenchment following the Vietnam war. Southern Africa policy is getting caught up in the mood of anti-Soviet belligerence. After alleged US "losses" to the Soviets in Iran, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Angola, Congress is set to challenge Soviet support for southern Africa liberation movements.

This cold-war confusion needs to be replaced by a calm and realistic appraisal of conditions in Zimbabwe itself. The claims of the internal settlement to having the support of the people and to being able to end the war are even less credible today than they were in July. The evidence clearly disproves the empty assertion of Helms and Hayakawa and Schweiker that the April election will be free (see page 4).

As the April 20th election approaches, President Carter will be under heavy pressure from the Right to lift sanctions by determining that the election has been free. If Carter rejects the election, Senate conservatives will try to lift sanctions unconditionally.
Zimbabwe: The Noose Tightens, Diplomacy Fails

Does the Administration have a Rhodesia policy?
The answer is by no means clear.
A year of shifting maneuvers by the United States and Britain to attain a settlement favorable to western interests has robbed their diplomacy of credibility and shifted the initiative to Smith and his conservative allies in Congress.
The unravelling of policy that began in mid-summer had its roots in American and British double-mindedness. It had been clear all along that the Smith government had no intention of accepting Anglo-American proposals. While the Patriotic Front continued to try to improve them by negotiation, the West refused to bring Smith to the table by cutting off his oil, mercenaries or his arms. When the Rhodesian internal settlement of March 3rd was announced, the United States found it “inadequate”, but a sign of “progress” not to be condemned as the fraud as it actually was. The effect was to shift attention away from the West’s plan and toward improvements to be made in Smith’s.

Split and Add a Half

While still talking in late June about an all-parties conference to discuss the Anglo-American proposals, the Americans were lining up Nigeria and Zambia to assist in improving the internal settlement by bringing Nkomo and ZAPU into it.
In secret talks held in Lusaka on August 14th, Smith had proposed that he surrender chairmanship of the interim government to Nkomo. He wanted guarantees for the civil service and the army, which Nkomo would need to fight ZANU. When Nkomo, to his credit, insisted that his coming back must be in the context of the Patriotic Front, Smith agreed to bring Mugabe in on the condition that he would only deal with Nkomo. Mugabe must be a figurehead Number 2. Mugabe.

But Britain and the United States still had hopes. They circulated “Option B”, the effect of which would have been to meld the Patriotic Front into the internal settlement and to abandon UN-supervised elections before independence which they had earlier proposed. According to a top ZANU official, the West had exposed its hypocrisy:
When the West thought Muzorewa would win an election, they were for elections. Now that we are winning over the people and the war is going well, they want to install Nkomo as a military dictator.
The effect on Nyerere and Machel was equally disastrous. To them the maneuvers were part of a game to destroy the liberation struggle. At a hastily summoned frontline states’ meeting, they angrily denounced them as an attempt to split the Front:
The diplomatic failure cost everyone something. By trying to impose Nkomo and ZAPU at the expense of Mugabe and ZANU, the promoters of the deal had increased the risk of civil war and undermined the possibility of democratic processes to settle leadership issues. By excluding Nyerere and Machel, they had alienated two statesmen who had advocated the British-American plan as at least a basis for negotiation. Nigeria and Zambia lost standing by playing the West’s game. Although Nkomo had not succumbed to the ploy, his participation in secret talks left him open to angry criticism.

Cutting the arms of liberation

With the failure of the West’s secret diplomacy, the partners in dialogue doomed its continuation by attacking each other. ZAPU’s downing of a Viscound plane with loss of 48 civilians lives hardened Rhodesian attitudes. Nkomo the moderate was now Nkomo the murderer. When Rhodesian forces retaliated by striking ZAPU camps in Zambia, killing at least ten times as many more civilians, Nkomo called the all-parties conference “dead and buried.”
In early January British special envoy Cledwyn Hughes summed up the situation:
"Each side in the war is convinced that it can reach its goal... by continuing to follow its own policies. Thus the Patriotic Front would attend an all-parties conference believing it can achieve its aims by war... The Salisbury parties would attend believing that they would lose nothing by again offering a place to the Patriotic Front within the internal settlement... This is a prescription for breakdown, subsequent intensification of the war and increased communist involvement."
With ZANU claiming control of a third of Rhodesia’s countryside and ZAPU launching successful new strikes on key installations, the balance of political and military power has begun tilting toward a Patriotic Front victory. As the tilts developed, Britain and the United States increased counterpressures to level the balance again.
Under IMF pressure, ZAPU’s base country, Zambia, unilaterally opened its borders with Rhodesia in early October, placing itself more firmly in the grip of the Rhodesian and South African economy. The excuse, mounting economic difficulties, could equally well have been made by Mozambique, and was barely plausible. British troops and equipment rushed to assist Zambia’s air force and army allegedly to guard against another humiliating Rhodesian attack. Yet the action also served to forestall Soviet or Cuban help and to guard Kaunda against a ZAPU military grown critical of Zambia’s ineptitude in defense of Zimbabwean refugees.
In late October, Uganda launched an invasion of Tanzania. Although the invaders were repelled, the war drained Tanzania’s meager resources and lessened its capacity to sustain the liberation struggle. Neither Machel nor Nyerere thought it was a coincidence.

How About the Other Half?

In spite of these pressures, the West is aware that it cannot entirely stop Soviet aid to ZAPU. But with ZAPU’s moderate image fading, Great Britain and America seem to have discovered ZANU as a viable candidate for improving the internal settlement.
Senator Helms’ staff reports that while Brzezinski was in China, he asked the Chinese for help in forcing Mugabe into

continued on page 6
The Hidden Zimbabwe

Predictions that Rhodesia's internal settlement would lead to an extension of the war and an escalation of violence have come disastrously true since the signing of the Salisbury Accord on March 3rd last year.

The steadily deteriorating situation makes a mockery of claims that "free and fair" elections will be held in April. The judgment of the President and the Congress as to the true character of the elections and the internal settlement under which they are being held will determine whether the United States unilaterally lifts sanctions. From a wide range of reports we have compiled a picture of what is going on in Rhodesia which demonstrates that the elections cannot be anything more than a twisted caricature of democracy.

Martial Law

One of the clearest signs of the regime's loss of control of the country has been the imposition of martial law, which now extends to more than 85 percent of the country. The meaning of martial law is made starkly clear in a paper issued by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, dated December 1978. Written on one side in English and in Shona and Ndebele on the other, it warns:

"In martial law areas, the security forces can make their own laws to help them find and kill terrorists. They will not have to follow the ordinary laws, because that can take too much time... Those people who help the terrorists will find lots of trouble... Here are some of the things the army can do in martial law areas:
1. They can arrest and detain people.
2. They can confiscate or destroy property such as huts and cattle.
3. They can make people work for them.
The security forces can now hold their own courts. These courts will have power to sentence people to gaol and death."  

— New Statesman, Jan. 19, 1979

Even Ian Smith does not deny that his security forces are guilty of widespread intimidation of civilians. According to the law of the country, they [villagers who allegedly aid guerrillas] could be convicted and hanged. So if they are still alive and able to talk about these things, they have gotten off lightly.

— New York Times, Feb. 9, 1979

Destruction of Civilian Life and Property

The war is taking an increasingly tragic toll of African civilian lives and property. According to the Smith regime's own figures, Rhodesian security forces had killed 1,533 unarmed African civilians in the six years up to July 1978. By contrast, only 207 white civilians had been killed by what the Rhodesians call the "terrorists." Since July, the total killed in the war has grown to 12,000 by year's end. Rhodesian raids into Zambia and Mozambique have cost another 3000 lives. One hundred people are dying daily and another 300 are being maimed, injured or displaced. More than 50,000 now live in makeshift squatter areas outside Salisbury and Bulawayo, and more than 150,000 are refugees in neighboring countries.

Shortly after martial law was first proclaimed on September 23, the security forces began systematically burning villages in reprisal for alleged support of the nationalist guerrillas. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia and Christian Care, a voluntary aid organization, documented that 718 families had their homes burnt down by security forces between September and December in the areas of Salisbury, Gwelo and Umtali.

They report that in the Mangwende tribal trust area 45 miles east of Salisbury another 225 people were made homeless when four villages were burned: Chitsa (150), Rhembere (49), Nyamatombu (22), and Manjoni (4). In all cases, the soldiers ordered people from their homes without even giving them time to collect their belongings before their homes were set alight. (The Observer, Jan. 28, 1979)

Starvation Tactics

An estimated one to three million people face starvation in the northeast and southeast of the country. Two hundred thousand of these people were released from protected villages in September. They had no homes to go back to, no grass for their rooves, no seed for planting and no cattle for ploughing. Voluntary relief agencies have been prevented from operating in at least six districts. The International Commission for the Red Cross, which recently received $1 million in funds out of a possible $5 million appropriated by the US Congress to spend inside Rhodesia, confirmed that military authorities in the Moko and Mrewa districts have ordered a halt to the distribution of Red Cross food and medical supplies. The Rev. David Gibbs, a Rhodesian Roman Catholic priest based in the northeast, said that the clampdown has virtually stopped the activities of the Rural Ecumenical Action Committee on Hunger. (International Herald Tribune, Jan. 16, 1979) The government is denying food to the people so as to deny food to the guerrillas, and deaths by starvation are already being reported.

Private Armies and Conscriptiion

The formation of "private armies" by Rev. Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa has intensified the violence and paved the way for civil war. Several thousand poorly-trained, untrained and heavily-armed youth now roam the countryside terrorizing the people. A recent article in Illustrated Life Rhodesia quoted UANC (Mozorewa) militia recruits as saying that they were to be used "to teach people how to vote." The stage is set for political intimidation on an unprecedented scale before the April elections.

A special report published by the Commission for Justice and Peace describes the kind of "teaching" taking place:

Nembudzia—The Sithole guerrillas demand food from the people on a roster basis and failure to produce it means certain death. They demand meat and meat only and the people have now run out of chicken and goats and very soon will be forced to slaughter their cattle.
Many people are being tortured and killed especially men. Most of the girls in the area are pregnant as a result of being raped... Anyone suspected of supporting any other party is killed or tortured.

Gokwe—The first priority is to build up Sithole's party. Spend all night with singing and slogans "Down with Muzorewa" "Down with Smith" as well, of course, as with Patriotic Front leaders.

People are forced to have membership cards (50c), of the Sithole party. Have to pay (each house) a weekly contribution of 25c for upkeep of party. If people refuse, they are tortured and shot.

Gandachibuwa-Njanja—These Sithole people beat up many people for small things like coming late to meetings, preparing food badly, etc. and killed many.

Because of its critical shortage of manpower to fight the escalating war, the Rhodesian regime decreed that educated Africans between 18 and 25 must register under the National Service Act before December 1st. The conscripts were called up for duty in early January, but the results make a grim commentary on the unpopularity of the internal settlement.

On November 23, the Rhodesian Herald reported that 17 black employees of a Salisbury firm had been fired for refusing to fill out national service forms. A representative of the group said that 102 out of 107 people refused to fill them out and that only the five who signed had been paid their week's wages.

Censorship

Wholesale censorship and total suppression of freedom of speech, assembly and publication continues to be the rule in Rhodesia. Both ZANU and ZAPU have been banned for years. The press has been forbidden to mention their names or the names of their officials. In October 1978, the Zimbabwe Times, the only African newspaper left in the country, was closed down. Only persons approved by the government have access to radio and television.

A group of white businessmen, meeting in Bulawayo on December 1, 1978, analyzed the effect of these actions as follows:

The power, the control and the authority, are exercised by those determined to perpetuate them, and who use them to suppress any opposition. The realists have been driven almost to utter despair, prevented as they are from publicly expressing their views by using the media to disseminate and propagate their case. Detention notices, government control of broadcasting, emergency powers to suppress meetings; all these combine to silence them.

Detentions and Forced Labor

Between 2000 and 3000 convicted political prisoners were neither amnestied nor had their sentences reviewed, as promised in Section C of the March internal settlement agreement. During the third week in September more than 300 leaders of the Patriotic Front were rounded up and detained and Smith declared he would "liquidate the workings" of the two parties. Police sources say at least two black men have been hanged as a result of convictions by military courts set up under martial law. (The Guardian, Feb. 9, 1979)

Since the beginning of the year large numbers of young people from 13 years of age have been detained or forced to labor on white-owned farms. These children were removed from their schools or detained after meetings held to explain the implications of martial law. According to reports received by the Justice and Peace Commission, their numbers are in the thousands.

The Election Process

The election process in April is designed to deliver an African endorsement of the internal settlement parties, not democracy. There will be no registration of African voters. Those who want to vote will simply show their situapa (identity card), birth certificate, or—in the case of women—their marriage certificate. The possibilities for fraud in such a system are endless. African voters will vote only for a party, not for the person they want to represent them. The 72 African seats are to be allocated in proportion to the potential voters in each of eight provinces, drawn to match and emphasize tribal divisions. Within each province, the seats will be allocated in proportion to the votes each party gets. A group of Bulawayo businessmen recently assessed the effect of this system as follows:

[The black internal leaders] are determined... not to face an election wherein the people can make their own choice of leaders. That is why they now wish to adopt the "party list system" whereby their own names can top the party lists and they can retain the offices to which they have never been elected, nor would ever be elected by the votes of the people. This is a total negation of... one man, one vote and the choice of leaders by the people themselves.

The Smith regime's security forces will be directly involved in carrying out the polling process.

Plans are afoot for staggered balloting that will make it possible for large military contingents to be moved around to different voting areas on successive days. To counter the influence of some 12,000 guerrillas now operating inside the country, most of them in the tribal areas, it will have to make a major show of military force in polling areas, opening itself to accusations that it intimidated reluctant tribesmen into voting.

the internal settlement. Although the report was angrily denied, knowledgeable Washington hands believe it all the same.

In fact, China’s supplies to ZANU have already decreased. Although ZANU has launched a new diplomatic effort to gain Soviet and Cuban help, it has had encouraging but limited result so far.

At the same time, ZANU’s public image is being reworked. Anthony Lewis of the New York Times has recently redrawn the face of Mugabe:

Americans would find him personally attractive... He is a trim 50, the best-educated of Rhodesia’s leaders, articulate, rational, a practicing Catholic.

... He does not like the ideological rigidity of Mozambique... Mugabe’s forces are not beholden to any outside great power for their military gains... A Western diplomat said: ‘He is the toughest but also the straightest. He doesn’t say things to please people. Frankly I think we can work with him’.

Such journalist explorations often encourage and foreshadow new diplomatic openings.

Choices for the End Game

The Administration is now faced with difficult alternatives. First, the United States could back the internal settlement. By lifting sanctions or by simply not fighting hard to defeat Congressional right wing moves to lift them, the United States would give Rhodesia access to foreign exchange, weapons, aid and recognition. Such a move would encourage South Africa to commit more troops, airplanes and equipment to the battle. While these moves might increase Soviet and Cuban involvement, the United States has to draw the line against further “communist advances.”

Second, the Administration could explore diplomacy quietly if its Namibia plan succeeds. If South Africa cooperates in the latter, it could persuade Smith to try an international route. The advocates of this view argue that the first choice will not stop the war. On the contrary, it would intensify and prolong it but not affect its ultimate outcome. It would internationalize the conflict, increasing the danger of a major war, and the influence of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Third, the United States could cut its losses. Since Rhodesia is further gone than Namibia, there is little chance of executing the second choice. Further secret diplomacy could increase risks of civil war. Diplomacy having failed, the war will go on to its conclusion. A Patriotic Front victory would not be a disaster. The U.S. and Britain should turn the situation back to the United Nations to handle, offering good offices if they seemed useful later. Aid to the innocent victims of the war should be extended without partisanship. Rigorous enforcement of sanctions, including a cutoff of oil, weapons and mercenaries could shorten the war.

So far, the Administration seems to be undecided between One and Two.

While President Carter rightly contends that things are seldom as simple as they seem to the Right Wing, he has not so far demonstrated the political will to fight them and to educate the people and the Congress on Rhodesia. It seems clear that we are going to have to do the educating and the fighting.

Namibia: On Again?

United Nations Secretary Kurt Waldheim has submitted a report to the Security Council calling for a ceasefire and the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force to Namibia on March 15th. If this deadline is met, a long and arduous negotiating process will be near completion. But nothing is guaranteed.

The Secretary General’s February 26th report admitted that “the parties had differing interpretations and perceptions regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the settlement proposal” which he had tried to resolve. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha told the South African Parliament that “a serious situation had arisen in connection with the implementation of the settlement plan.” Foreign Minister Pik Botha seconded the Prime Minister’s remarks saying that there were “evidently serious deviations” between the Waldheim resolution of the problem and the original proposal accepted by South Africa.

January and February reports on Namibia showed the strains of attempting to bring about a settlement. Statements from diverse sources such as the Rand Daily Mail and Radio Maputo spoke guardedly about a settlement. As Martin Dickson of the Financial Times stated, there were “negotiation pitfalls” that were based on time-hardened “residual doubts.” SWAPO’s February 13th attack on a South African military installation certainly intensified the issues and brought the expected warning from South Africa that such action could negatively affect the settlement. According to the International Herald Tribune, SWAPO expressed fears that South Africa would attempt to sabotage the UN elections that SWAPO had committed itself to.

Then on March 6th South Africa launched an air and ground attack into Angola against SWAPO bases. While saying it was a “limited” attack, South Africa once again seemed intent on derailing diplomacy. The Cassinga attack last May had also been said to be “limited”, although 800 people were killed in it.
Furthermore, South Africa was now hard-lining on three points: there could be no SWAPO camps in Namibia; UN troops must guard SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia; and no elections could be held later than September 30th. Botha accused the West of “scheming” behind the scenes by supporting “clear and deliberate departures” from what had been agreed to.

**South Africa’s Advantage**

South Africa has begun this round with a real advantage. It has on the scene the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), a coalition of the all-white Republican Party and the ethnic-based African organizations which emerged out of “independence” negotiations in a Windhoek gymnasium two years ago. Justin Ellis, the now-deported former head of the Namibia Christian Center, has stressed that the DTA victory in the December election administered by South Africa must be taken seriously. South Africa, he says, has “hastily interposed an ‘internal election’” designed to wreck any later UN-supervised election. In South African eyes, DTA is now the legitimate government. As an incumbent it will have the governmental, bureaucratic and electoral machinery grinding in its favor.

As Namibia’s “bona fide” government, DTA issued to the UN a set of ultimata under which UN-supervised elections could take place: the UN must withdraw all support from SWAPO; elections must be held by September 30th; and South African troops should not be withdrawn from Namibia until there was a cessation of hostilities.

**Isolation of SWAPO**

The South Africa/DTA strategy is to isolate SWAPO. Their recent reservations concerning the Western Five’s proposal are part of an attempt to make international negotiations so unpalatable that SWAPO will reject them completely. South Africa could then say to the west “I told you so,” as SWAPO comes off as the terrorists who prefer violence.

If SWAPO withdraws from negotiations and from the UN-supervised elections, DTA would emerge as the Constituent assembly, elected by the people. An internal settlement would be in place a la Rhodesia.

Even if SWAPO doesn’t refuse, South Africa’s Administrator General Justice Steyn has said the present DTA-led constituent assembly could continue to function even after the UN-supervised election. While the present assembly could not draft a new Namibian constitution, he said there was nothing to prevent it from aiding him in the execution of his duties and in the maintenance of law and order. Steyn sees no inconsistency in Namibia having two constituent assemblies, especially if one meets South Africa’s needs.

**R.S.V.P.: Carter Invites Botha**

A side effect of the West’s Namibia strategy is to inflate South Africa’s standing despite its refusal to deal in good faith with either party—the west or SWAPO.

South Africa’s standing has improved with every phase of the settlement negotiations. In 1971, the United States had accepted the World Court’s opinion that South Africa is illegally administering the territory and that it should turn administration over to the United Nations as the sole legal guardian pending independence. But now the US press sees the situation differently. A Washington Post editorial, for example, identified South Africa as the only authority in Namibia, implying that South Africa had a legal right to administer Namibia until it saw fit to grant independence. Recently a source in the National Security Council took a “wait and see” posture concerning the new Botha government, insisting that South Africa is the only leverage the US has in southern Africa to bring about peaceful change. Underscoring all this is President Carter’s hand-delivered invitation to Botha to visit the US if South Africa will co-operate with the West’s diplomacy in Namibia and Zimbabwe. As Jim Hoagland reported in the Washington Post, the Carter Administration’s philosophy seems to be “more carrot and less stick.”

South Africa is understandably delighted, as the following Financial Mail statement pointed out last October:

[The West would be] brought face to face with the contradiction in its own policy: its sentimental, racial and highly profitable links with a country whose policies it finds politic to condemn in world forums. ... With this knowledge South Africa would have successfully gamble on the fact that the West’s bark is worse than its bite, that Vance and Co. are really little more than paper tigers, that when the chips are down they will wield their votes against sanctions resolutions put forward at the UN.

For more than a decade South Africa has defied international demands that it give up control of Namibia. Its latest raid into Angola and rejection of important elements of the UN plan are the last straw. If the West does not agree to sanctions against South Africa now, its Namibia plan will join the Anglo-American proposals on the scrap pile of history.
D.C. Newsbriefs

... Who's Who in Congress. George McGovern chairs the Senate Africa Subcommittee this session. S.I. Hayakawa, who invited Ian Smith to the US, is ranking Republican. Other members are Edmund Muskie (D-Maine), Richard Stone (D-Mia.), and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.). Liberal New Yorker Stephen Solarz chairs the House Subcommittee. Diggs gave up the chair because of a felony conviction, but is still a member. Other members are Cardiss Collins (D-Mich.), chairwoman of the congressional Black Caucus, Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.), a scholar on Nigeria, William Gray (D-Pa.), a new black representative, Floyd Fithian (D-Ind.), William Goodling (R-Pa.), John Buchanan (R-Ala.), and Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.).

... Administration Doublespeak on Rhodesia. This State Department is giving out some confusing signals:

Our constant negotiation and use of shuttle diplomacy has brought the problem very close to successful settlement. Rhodesia's recent establishment of a mixed government and their announced commitment to full majority rule prompt us to plan for the re-opening of our Embassy in Salisbury in FY 1980

-Congressional Presentation Document for FY'80 State Department Authorization Bill, Jan., 1979

... the Salisbury agreement [does] not provide for an irreversible transfer of power to majority rule... We must maintain our neutrality among all the parties...

-Secretary of State Vance, May 12, 1978

State official says its all a mistake, but so far the January statement hasn't been retracted or amended. Two sources tell us the Africa Bureau cleared the statement; others blame it on a "little man with a green eyeshade" in the basement.

... State still undecided on Exim Regs. The State Department has yet to write regulations implementing the restriction on Export-Import Bank financing to South Africa enacted by Congress last October. Some officials argued that financing should be denied to private South African importers because the US can't certify that companies outside US jurisdiction are "moving toward implementing" fair employment practices. At least one company—Caterpillar Tractor—has lobbied for a looser interpretation of the law so that its South African distributor can get Exim backing. Our latest reports are that State will write looser guidelines and may use the reports compiled for Rev. Leon Sullivan on voluntary compliance with fair employment guidelines to decide who will get export financing. They don't want "truly progressive" companies to be penalized.

... Kennedy to introduce Bank Disclosure Bill. Senator Kennedy plans within a few weeks to introduce legislation requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to report biannually on certain commercial bank loans in countries whose governments violate human rights. Drafted originally to apply primarily to Chile, the bill may be broadened to include bank loans to South Africa. New York Senator Moynihan has already announced that, in the interests of the banks from his state, he will oppose the measure.

... AID Requests $100 Million for Southern Africa. Congress is being asked to authorize $100 million in Security Supporting Assistance for southern Africa in FY '80, about the same amount as last year. The program includes Botswana ($16 million), Lesotho ($17.5 million), Malawi ($5.5 million), Swaziland ($9 million), Zambia ($31 million), Mozambique ($3 million) and regional programs ($18 million) including $9.5 million for humanitarian aid and $3.6 million for scholarships for refugees.

Congressional conservatives will probably try to renew Congress' two-year ban on bilateral aid to Mozambique and Angola. which also affects foreign aid funds to United Nations-run Zambian refugee camps in Mozambique. A core of liberals are preparing to oppose them. That battle will probably come on the House and Senate floor in mid-summer.

AID will soon release the findings of a $1 million study of "development needs" in southern Africa requested by Congress last year. At a colloquium on the study in January, the moderate states in the region pushed for more aid. Mozambique did not participate, and the State Department ruled against consulting with the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia.