

# THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA

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## WORKING PAPER ON LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY ON ZIMBABWE

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The situation in Zimbabwe is a case of logical historical progression toward African liberation in the face of white minority intransigence. The settler refusal to accept majority rule in recent history reached its watershed with the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The following years of armed struggle are certain to end in victory for the Patriotic Front.

History shows that Ian Smith and his supporters have always met protests with repression. From the beginning, Africans attempted to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Rhodesian problem. All efforts were rebuffed and many leaders were imprisoned. The continued repression of Zimbabweans left no choice other than armed struggle. It is this armed struggle that will defeat Ian Smith and his regime.

Until 1977, the United States openly violated United Nations sanctions by importing chrome and nickel and thus gave the regime important foreign exchange. At the same time the United States had given aid to Portugal for its colonial wars in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. Only when the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed in 1974 did Secretary of State Henry Kissinger become converted to the cause of saving Rhodesia from minority rule.

In early 1977, the Carter Administration promised a new approach to Africa, and made what seemed at the time to be a bold move by appointing Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. The State Department, with such appointees as Donald McHenry and Haskell Ward, began to structure a new U.S.-Africa policy along with Young. That policy, particularly as it pertained to Zimbabwe and Namibia, stressed the diplomatic approach of a negotiated settlement based on proposals prepared by the U.S. and its partners. In the case of Zimbabwe, the proposals were called the Anglo-American plan.

The United States and Britain have argued that the Anglo-American plan offered a viable way to a negotiated peace. The U.S. and U.K. attempted to prove their good faith through the concessions they made to the Patriotic Front, particularly guaranteeing the integration of acceptable units of the Rhodesian armed forces with the liberation forces. Ian Smith's visit to the United States showed the hollowness of the Anglo-American plan. The U.S. hailed Smith's declaration that he would attend an all-parties conference with no "preconditions" as a major break-through in the negotiations. Prior to the Smith visit, the U.S. and U.K. floated a new "Option B" of the Anglo-American plan, which made critical alterations in the plan as it had been accepted for discussion by the Patriotic Front. By eliminating the provision calling for elections prior to independence and advocating that the transition period be defined as a state

of emergency pending a referendum that would not require the registration of voters, Option B offers an indefinite state of emergency whose end is contingent on a vote count that cannot be effectively verified.

By encouraging secret negotiations such as those carried on by Smith and Nkomo in the presence of Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba, the United States and Britain have heightened tensions within the Patriotic Front and the Frontline States. By seeking to advance and favor one side of the Patriotic Front alliance, western diplomacy has increased the likelihood of the very civil war which the West says it wants to avoid at all costs.

Some members of Congress have been eager to assist the Carter Administration in finding Marxists behind every Zimbabwean bush.

When Ian Smith offered his internal settlement on March 3, 1978, the extreme conservative forces in Congress began pushing for acceptance of that agreement in this country. In June, Jesse Helms led the campaign to lift sanctions against the Smith regime. The Helms attempt fell short by only six votes. It was followed by a compromise put forward by Senators Case and Javits that called for the lifting of sanctions providing that "free and fair" elections were held and that the Smith regime agreed to attend and negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference. Under these conditions the President is required to lift sanctions unilaterally.

Encouraged by this success, 27 Senators, led by S.I. Hayakawa, issued an invitation in September to Ian Smith and the members of his executive council to visit the United States. Such groups as the Coalition for Peace through Strength, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Conservative Union wined, dined and feted Ian Smith and his party, making such they were kept in the spotlight.

Many observers believe the U.S. position on the Anglo-American team was jeopardized by Ian Smith's visit to this country. If the visit did not spell out a U.S. decision to support the Smith regime directly, it did show the Administration's inability and/or unwillingness to enforce U.N. sanctions and to fight for its own proposal for a peaceful democratic transition to majority rule.

The intentions of the sponsors of the Smith visit should not be underestimated. They intend that the lifting of sanctions should lead to U.S. military assistance and ultimately to the deployment of U.S. military forces to "save" Rhodesia from the Patriotic Front.

Even without the formal lifting of sanctions, the Rhodesian government gets assistance from the United States through lax enforcement of sanctions regulations. Recent revelations by the Bingham inquiry in Britain and by Jorge Jardim in a book published in Portugal confirm earlier allegations by the United Church of Christ that Mobil Oil and CALTEX have been involved over the years in supplying Rhodesia via South Africa with the oil that the Smith regime needs. Public pressure in Great Britain has produced an investigation with corporate revelations and further documentation. This is yet to occur in the United States. In addition, Americans continue to serve as mercenaries in Rhodesia without fear of significant reprisal.

Given this record of ineffective sanctions enforcement and muddled diplomacy, only a strong public campaign can halt this dangerous trend. Leaving it to the Administration will simply not do.

We believe that a policy of sanctions enforcement and non-intervention in Rhodesia best serves American interests, for the following reasons:

1. The military gains of the Patriotic Front in the last year have been impressive. At least 40 percent of the country is now reported to be under its full control; it is operative in 85 percent of the country as a whole. Administrative control and political education in the liberated areas mean, in the view of many observers, that any free and fair election held on a national basis would result in an overwhelming victory for the Patriotic Front.

Given these circumstances, it would be singularly inappropriate for the United States to intervene to stop the process in the name of democracy.

2. The chances of achieving the least bloody transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe are greatest if the United States respects and maintains the unity and strength of the Patriotic Front.

3. U.S. political interests in the rest of Africa require that the U.S. not intervene to save a regime which is not only doomed but identified with privileges based on skin color. The racial privileges involved in the internal settlement agreement are in fact being further entrenched, not eliminated.

4. Intervention by the United States would lead to an internationalization of the conflict without affecting the ultimate outcome. The Vietnam experience should not be repeated in Africa.

#### Possible Lobbying Strategies

For these reasons, we should begin to gear our legislative efforts toward blocking the lifting of sanctions and tightening their enforcement. Our efforts should involve lobbying Congress and the Administration along the following lines:

1. Block the lifting of sanctions. The move to lift sanctions will probably begin in the Senate. We should therefore begin by lobbying swing votes in that body as soon as possible, concentrating on:

Freshman Senators: Bill Bradley (N.J.), Nancy Landon Kassebaum (Kans.), Carl Levin (Mich.), Rudy Perpich and Bob Durenberger (Minn.), James Exon (Neb.), Alan Simpson (Wyo.), Donald Stewart and Howell Heflin (Ala.), and David Pryor (Ark.).

Veteran Senators: Jacob Javits and Patrick Moynihan (N.Y.), Charles Percy (Ill.), Bob Packwood (Ore.), Lawton Chiles (Fla.), Walter Huddleston (Ky.), J. Bennett Johnston and Russell Long (La.), Ernest Hollings (S.C.), Jim Sasser (Tenn.), Dennis DeConcini (Ariz.), Richard Stone (Fla.), Lowell

Weicker (Conn.), and John Heinz and Richard Schweiker (Pa.).

The conservative Senators' strategy is not yet clear. They might abandon their own criterion that the lifting of sanctions be conditional on the holding of elections, and introduce new legislation that would lift sanctions immediately. Or they might wait until the planned April 20th. elections, if they do take place, and then press President Carter to determine that they have been "free and fair". In the latter situation, we will need to mount a counter-campaign, since it is very unlikely that elections held under the duress of war or intimidation and which do not include all political parties will be "free and fair".

2. Tightening enforcement of sanctions. The Treasury Department began in November a second investigation into the involvement of American oil companies in supplying the Smith regime. However, it is likely that this investigation will uncover little more than the "inconclusive" report issued by the Treasury Department after its first investigation in 1977. A campaign of letter-writing and/or visits to the Departments of Treasury and State is the only way we can hope for a meaningful investigation that might cut off the flow of oil to Smith.