On September 25, the House of Representatives defeated another attempt to restore United States compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia. The vote of 187 to 209, which came on only one week's notice, was a disheartening culmination to almost three years of effort in support of sanctions by Africa liberation support groups, church and civil rights groups, labor unions and Congressional sponsors. The defeat of H.R. 1287 almost certainly destroys any possibility that Congress will renew full U.S. compliance with sanctions against Rhodesia during this session.

The floor debate was a classic example of the use of anti-communism and racism to cloak the interests of U.S. industries seeking profits from the exploitation of developing countries. The bill's opponents argued that repeal would make the U.S. completely dependent for chromium on the Soviet Union, which would manipulate the supply and price to the U.S. Proponents responded that the Byrd Amendment has not had the effect of reducing dependence on the Soviet Union, and showed that imports of Soviet Chromium have actually increased while the U.S. has been breaking sanctions. But these rational answers had no effect.

Other opposition arguments reflected flagrant racism and distaste for the people of the third world. Pennsylvania Democrat John Dent, a long-time opponent of sanctions, declared dramatically, "Is there any person in this room that believes we can have one-man, one-vote, with equality of any kind, when they practice polygamy in Rhodesia?" Illinois Republican Edward Derwinski showed an imperial contempt for third world countries by arguing that the United Nations General Assembly "misbehaved badly" in 1974 and that the sanctions vote should be postponed to give members of Congress an opportunity to "judge" this year's Assembly actions.

In an attempt to win "hard-headed" moderates away from these ideological and emotional appeals, Congressional sanctions proponents stressed the economic pragmatism of reimposing sanctions. Congressmen Donald Fraser and Andrew Young argued that Rhodesian chrome would soon be excluded from the U.S. market, whether or not sanctions were re-imposed, because of the likely cut-off of sanctions-breaking traffic through newly independent Mozambique and the over-burdened rail and port facilities of South Africa. They concluded that the United States should reimpose sanctions now to enhance the prospects of long-term access to Rhodesian products from a future majority government. Others applied this argument to the whole of Africa, saying that U.S. access to Nigerian oil, Zambian and Zairian copper and cobalt, and Malagasy graphite could be jeopardized by continued U.S. opposition to the liberation of southern Africa.
Some proponents used the fear of the growing influence of the left in southern Africa to promote the bill. Congressman John Buchanan of Alabama argued that sanctions would increase the chance of a "moderate" rather than a "leftist, anti-American government" in Rhodesia, by encouraging a solution by negotiations rather than by armed struggle. Internal House lobbying using this argument probably did influence a few additional Republicans to support the sanctions measure.

Political pressure from the stainless steel industry clearly had a decisive impact on the bill's defeat. For three years, the steel industry used every available tactic to influence members of Congress to oppose sanctions. Well-paid industry lobbyists worked to round up votes by persuasion, political pressure and campaign contributions. In home districts, local officials of steel and steel-consuming industries convinced some workers to send form letters to Congress saying that their jobs would be threatened by the renewal of sanctions. The steel industry even paid the way of local labor officials to come to Washington to contradict the pro-sanctions position of their international unions. In some districts, industry officials tried to intimidate people working for sanctions.

Another decisive factor was the complete failure of the Administration to act on its statements of support for sanctions. Throughout the three-year sanctions battle, the White House dangled the carrot of its support before the bill's sponsors, who always knew that the margin of victory or defeat

VOTE ON H.R. 1287:

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The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:
Mr. Udall for, with Mr. Annunzio against.
Mr. Riegels for, with Mr. Hébert against.
Mr. Molloff for, with Mr. Risenhoover against.
Mr. Phillip Burton for, with Mr. Farry against.
Mr. Erlenborn for, with Mr. Rose against.
Mr. Brown of Ohio for, with Mr. Conlan against.
Mr. Hébert for, with Mr. Litt[l] against.
would be small. Only two days before the House action, Secretary of State Kissinger told representatives of the Organization of African Unity in New York that "President Ford and his entire cabinet continue to urge repeal of the Byrd Amendment and expect this will be accomplished during the current session of the Congress." Up until the morning of the vote, the White House told the bill's sponsors that they would lobby on their behalf, but they did not contact one "swing" member of Congress to urge him or her to vote for H.R. 1287. The hollow support from the Administration took its toll: only 22 Republicans voted for the bill.

The defeat should not be seen wholly as a failure, however. The uncertainty of whether the United States would back the Rhodesian Front with continued imports made Rhodesia's economic plans more complicated. Furthermore, Rhodesian leaders could not pretend that it had the whole-hearted support of the United States and its people so long as sanctions remained a bone of contention, and the people of Zimbabwe who knew of our effort have been heartened by it. While the vote to retain the Byrd Amendment is a psychological boost to the Rhodesian Front regime at this time, the long Congressional fight for sanctions yielded an affirmative vote in the Senate at the end of 1973, and forced the Administration into hypocritical support for the measure for which it may have to answer in the future.

The defeat by 22 votes actually represents an increase in the support for sanctions since the last vote in 1972, which failed by a margin of 113. This improvement resulted mainly from political pressure on incumbents and the election of more liberal Representatives. In the three-year period, 21 Representatives changed to support the measure, while eight switched to oppose it. Among new supporters significantly influenced by constituent pressure were Thomas Morgan and Joseph McDade (Penn.), Robert Giaimo (Conn.), and Peter Peyser (N.Y.). Perhaps there could have been other gains from constituent pressure had there been more lead-time before the September vote, and if the many delays in 1973 and 1974 not discouraged and diluted the constituency effort.

In addition to these 13 votes gained by changes from old positions, 33 freshmen and 7 members elected in 1972 voted for sanctions whereas their predecessors had voted against them. Fifty-nine freshmen in all vote for, 34 against. This office and the sponsors of the bill focussed their lobbying efforts this year on winning over new members. The gratifying gains show that electing the right person and educating him or her on southern African issues may be more effective and easier than converting incumbents who have an established position.

The importance of electoral changes was especially borne out in the South, where a significant increase from five to fifteen supporters from the former Confederate states came mostly from members elected in 1972 and 1974, including three blacks. Many of these new members look to the black community for political support. Most of their more senior colleagues, however, still respond in large part to a conservative white community, as shown by a loss of four of five southern supporters from 1972.

The failure to win a victory on the sanctions bill can lead to several important, although tentative, conclusions. Constituency pressure from the relatively small number of persons who campaigned for sanctions did not prove as enduring or effective as that from industry. This should not surprise us. Nor
should we lapse into cynicism.

Three years of work on this issue shows once more that Congress reflects the economic interests of U.S. industries, who seek to maximize profits and minimize costs. Concern for majority rule and the indignity of racism are subordinated to economic self-interest. To fight this ever-present argument, we may conclude that we need to find ways to better link our support for southern African liberation with the economic and political struggles of Americans at home, in both lobbying on specific legislation and in long-term electoral politics.

U.S. INTERVENES IN ANGOLAN STRIFE

Since the Portuguese coup of April, 1974, the process of decolonization in Angola has proven far more tortuous and complex than in the former sister territories of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In the latter two colonies, power was transferred to single, relatively unified liberation movements which acceded to independence and sovereignty in orderly fashion. In Angola, the presence of three movements divided on political, ideological and geographic and ethnic lines has prevented a simple transition from colony to independence. These divisions, together with strategic considerations and Angola's wealth in natural resources, have invited intervention in the decolonization process by external powers. The United States has been prominent among these outside forces, and recent evidence has provided a clearer, though still very incomplete, picture of the nature of U.S. intervention.

In a front page New York Times article of September 25, Leslie Gelb revealed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been buying arms for two liberation movements, FNLA and UNITA, in an effort to offset the military success of the third movement, MPLA, which has received significant arms support from the Soviet Union. The Times story states that the CIA operations have been approved by President Ford and are being carried out, as prescribed by law, with the knowledge of several Congressional committees. These include the Senate and House Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees, and the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees. In each case CIA oversight has been delegated to subcommittees dominated by conservatives, or to individual ranking members.

CIA support for FNLA has a long history: according to Gelb, in 1962 the Agency and President Kennedy selected FNLA leader Holden Roberto as a man to back for the future, since Portugal could not be expected to retain Angola indefinitely. Support waned in 1969 but the CIA reactivated its Roberto connections last spring, in light of the upsurge in liberation activities following the Portuguese coup. The CIA interest in UNITA is much more recent. Gelb's report on this connection followed a few days after an announcement by UNITA President Savimbi that he is receiving armaments from "anti-Communist Western nations and their allies" (according to Africa News). Jonas Savimbi, who heads UNITA, is avowedly anti-communist and anti-MPLA - two reasons for the CIA's interest in him. He may also be emerging as a more realistic possibility than Roberto as a future contender for leadership of Angola. Savimbi is a magnetic figure with considerable popular support from the rural peasantry of central and southern Angola,
and is personally attractive to some progressive African leaders in other countries.

U.S. aid to the two movements is being disbursed largely through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Indeed, it is impossible to approach the subject of Angola and U.S. intervention there without examining Zaire's relationship with both Angola and the United States. Zaire shares a long border with Angola; the BaKongo people, who comprise the bulk of FNLA's supporters, straddle this border. Holden Roberto of FNLA is Mobutu's brother-in-law. It is not surprising, then, that Mobutu's Zaire government has long been an open supporter of FNLA. Mobutu's support for UNITA is much less solid, and seems primarily based on UNITA's shared opposition to FNLA's main enemy, MPLA. An instance of U.S.-Zaire connection with UNITA was reported by an expert eye-witness recently. He saw a Hercules transport plane offloading arms at Silva Porto, UNITA's headquarters. The French-speaking crew was smoking Zairean cigarettes; the U.S. sold the Hercules aircraft to Zaire last year.

Establishing and maintaining the stability of Mobutu's staunchly pro-western rule in Zaire has, of course, been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in Africa since the General seized power in 1965. The CIA has long had a principal Africa station in Zaire. U.S.-Zaire relations received a jolt in June of this year when Mobutu expelled U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton, accusing him and the CIA of complicity in a coup plot. Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who was travelling in Africa at the time, tried to go to Zaire to repair relations, but was refused entry. (Mobutu had earlier in the year opposed Davis' nomination to his post, precisely because of Davis' implication in CIA activities in Chile.)

The task of patching up things with Mobutu fell to Sheldon Vance, a former ambassador to Zaire, now a senior aide to Kissinger. Vance made two trips to Zaire, and then began to put together a new package of U.S. aid for Mobutu. The package totals $60 million - 4 times the 1975 level, 7 times the 1974 level, and $20 million higher than the annual average of U.S. aid during the peak years of U.S. assistance in the crisis period of the 1960's. It is divided into $20 million in Export-Import Bank loans; $20 million in Food for Peace credit, and $20 million for "Security Supporting Assistance" - which exists to "support or promote economic or political stability." The State Department rationale for the package has been Zaire's balance of payments problems stemming from a drop in price of its copper exports and a rise in import costs, especially for oil. Vance and other State Department officials have also approached U.S. private creditors to assist in the rescheduling of Zaire's considerable foreign debt.

In July Vance and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa Edward Mulcahy discussed the package with several Senators and Congressmen, hoping that a low-key approach would gain their acquiescence while avoiding publicity. Reaction on the Hill to State's approach was decidedly negative. Although the Ex-Im Bank and Food for Peace portions require no specific Congressional approval, Senators Clark and Humphrey insisted that the Security Supporting Assistance be fully scrutinized. Closed hearings on this part of the package are to be held in the near future.

In short, the Administration is seeking to underwrite the finances of the Mobutu government with a quantum leap in its level of aid. Since Mobutu is actively involved in the Angolan civil war and is the conduit for U.S. involvement, this move seems to have considerable implications for the Angolan scenario.
More evidence of increasing Administration interference in Angola has emerged in the revelation that Nathaniel Davis — according to news reports of September 1 — plans to resign shortly from his post as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. The ostensible reason is his inability to establish good relations with African states and their leaders, as his problem with Mobutu demonstrates. A high-ranking source in the State Department, however, contends that the immediate reason for Davis' departure is his disagreement with Henry Kissinger over Angola — i.e., Davis balked at Kissinger's proposals for stepped-up intervention there. Davis may have resisted because he feared yet another CIA blot on his record, which would confirm what was predicted by his opponents at the time of his nomination. Many observers expect Davis' successor to be Sheldon Vance. Whether or not Davis objected to Angolan intervention, he surely could not implement it effectively if he could not work with the other major actors in the Angolan arena.

On another front, when Senators Clark and Brooke proposed an amendment to this year's foreign economic aid bill which would specify $30 million for assisting the former Portuguese territories, the Agency for International Development suggested that $25 million of this be earmarked for resettlement of black Angolan refugees. Most such refugees are Bakongo returning to Angola from Zaire. But the Senators caught the political implications of the language and specified in the report accompanying the bill that no aid should go toward "refugee or economic assistance that would constitute political support for any one of the liberation movements in Angola."

A further complication in the Angolan turmoil revolves around Cabinda, the tiny exclave of Angola separated from the rest of the country by a strip of Zairean territory. Cabinda is where Gulf Oil produces 100,000 barrels of oil a day. MPLA currently controls the area, and all the Angolan liberation movements favor keeping Cabinda part of Angola. But a Cabindan separatist organization, FLEC, has recently emerged into the limelight. FLEC is presently located in and is heavily backed by Zaire, which is known to have an interest in the oil; some experts predict Zairean attempts to dominate or even annex Cabinda in the future. Clearly Cabinda is also a focus of external interests, both private and governmental.

The United States is not, of course, the only external power involved in Angola. The Soviet Union has given considerable support, especially in arms, to MPLA. China has provided some assistance to FNLA, including military advice. Numerous indications and allegations of intervention have been aired concerning other countries such as France, Tunisia, Zambia and South Africa.

The Soviet Union's arms deliveries to MPLA make opposition to U.S. intervention more difficult. It can be cogently argued that a "Soviet-engineered takeover" of the Angolan government is no more desirable than a similar CIA effort. The problem, however, is that any Soviet presence in a particular country is so often exaggerated, and used as justification for significant American subversion of the internal political process. Furthermore, warnings of dangerous Soviet intervention from American officials should hardly be taken at face value, when accompanied by pious denials of U.S. interference. In a major Africa policy statement on September 23, Secretary Kissinger stated that one of the three major U.S. concerns was "that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict." He added a "cautionary word" specifically about Angola: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise
of true independence."

One task, then, is to judge the degree of Soviet support for, and control over, the movement they are backing - MPLA. Soviet arms have been used to some extent by MPLA for several years; but according to the respected British journalist David Martin, the principal arms shipments came last spring, in response to a massive movement of FNLA troops from Zaire to Angola. It is notable that MPLA has sought good relations with China (despite the latter's moderate support for FNLA) by sending two top-level MPLA delegations for visits; hardly the behavior expected from a Soviet puppet. MPLA also is maintaining good relations with Gulf Oil, and has recently softened its position on post-independence nationalization.

The evidence, then, that MPLA is completely under the Soviet thumb is unconvincing. Such a figure as Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Angola and met with the presidents of all three movements in August, came away firmly convinced that nothing in the situation justifies U.S. intervention. The problem may be best expressed by one of Leslie Gelb's government sources: "It's just that we can't keep our hands out of anything."

In general, we feel any effort to stop U.S. intervention in Angola should be supported. Several amendments are being considered to the military aid bill, which the Administration has yet to submit and which Congress will probably pass on by mid-November. Specifically, the Security Supporting Assistance to Zaire should be opposed, since there is too much possibility that Angola movements will be the beneficiaries of it. We should support an amendment which Clark may propose stipulating that no aid should go "directly or indirectly" to the liberation movements in Angola. Another possibility is to back a possible Clark "sense of Congress" resolution urging negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual restraint in Angola. An aide to Congressman Diggs has suggested that such negotiations include not only the major powers of East and West but those on the African continent as well.

There is a persisting doubt, however, that steps such as these will affect only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg" of U.S. policy in central and southern Africa. Significant policy operations have proceeded and are proceeding covertly under the rubric: "CIA". The American people have not been informed of these actions and have, in fact, been deliberately been misled concerning them. The whole range of policy, covert and overt, appears to amount to an unwarranted and immoral intrusion to guarantee a government friendly to the U.S. interests. But it will be impossible to debate U.S. policy, and to propose effective alternatives to it, when so much remains hidden from public view.

In a situation so murky we need your ideas and analyses concerning these issues. We welcome your response.