Editorial

Are We Stuck With the Tar Baby?

"We are not governed from overseas... The Carter Administration has for 10 months now been trying to make policy for us. It will be nice if, for a change, they make their own policy."
- Prime Minister Vorster, October 21

"There is ample evidence that our policy of sweet reasonableness has not worked."

When the United States policy-makers decided in 1970 to rely on friendly dialogue with South Africa to stimulate change in apartheid, critics warned that the United States would get stuck with its dialogue partner the way Brer Rabbit did with the Tar Baby in the Uncle Remus stories. Unless U.S. policy takes a sharp turn-about, that prediction will now come true with a vengeance.

South Africa's crackdown against black organizations and apartheid critics in mid-October is a gamble that Carter and the West doesn't dare, or can't afford, to get tough.

The Carter Administration will now either have to implement the disengagement options it has been talking about since spring, or be seen to be bluffing in its support for majority rule in South Africa. The issue can no longer be delayed. The 49 African countries at the United Nations are pressing four resolutions they put to the Security Council in March but postponed to give Andy Young and the U.S. time to make progress through negotiations. They find South Africa a threat to the peace and call for a mandatory arms embargo and sanctions on investments.

New Demands for Disengagement

For the first time since Carter's inauguration, voices are being raised in Washington to call for disengagement. The Congressional Black Caucus, a growing group of young progressive white Congresspersons, and established black organizations are now calling on the Carter Administration to carry out its series of options. These minimal demands deserve the vigorous support of all Americans now that South Africa has shown us the naked face of the totalitarianism that lurks behind white prosperity. Now is clearly the moment to mount public pressure for withdrawal.

It will be an uphill fight. Not only has the right wing begun to capture the human rights issue in Congress, but moderate, respectable and influential voices in the foreign policy establishment have been insisting that Carter brought this mess on himself, by pushing South Africa too hard.

Prominent Democrat Cautions Carter

George Ball, Undersecretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson, in the current Atlantic calls Carter's policy of support for majority rule Asking for Trouble in South Africa. Since he is an elder Democratic statesman and a member of the Trilateral Commission, he represents the centrist, Europe-oriented perspective in the Carter Administration's own internal debate. As a partner in Lehman Brothers, he represents the business base of Carter's constituency.

Ball's argument in capsule form is this: South Africa will use its overwhelming power to crush all resistance. Disengagement will hurt blacks most, while driving whites into a siege mentality. Advocacy of majority rule will increase black discontent and lead to insurrections which the U.S. will not support but the Soviets will. The U.S. will then have to intervene on the side of whites. Majority rule would assure black domination, but not democracy. U.S. should favor improvements in a separate-but-equal society. After all, whites in America would be against majority rule here if it meant blacks
having dominant power.

Why Ball is Wrong

Ball’s wrong-headed interpretation misreads history, obscures the issues and amounts to support for racism.

Majority rule is not negotiable; it is a minimum demand. It is true that the dominant group in America has never had to surrender power to another group which was numerically larger. In fact it has been most reluctant to share political or economic rights with minorities—Afro-Americans, Hispanic-speaking people or Native Americans—or women. It has only done so in response to a struggle led by those groups, a struggle which is far from over.

But to ask ourselves, as Ball would have us do, how we (whites) would feel if we were a threatened minority (16 percent in South Africa, 4 percent in Rhodesia), plays on white racist fears we should instead be combating, and does not address the flagrant injustice involved in a denial of the rights of an entire race. For the African, Coloured and Indian majority in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, equal political rights are a minimum demand. All people must at least be able to vote or have equal access to the political process. To argue that majority rule will be racist and/or undemocratic is itself a racist judgment; it assumes that blacks are incapable of treating persons of other races with justice or equity.

It is quite useless to argue in favor of a separate but equal education or political system. A system of segregation based on race is designed to preserve white domination. It is by its very nature unequal, as our Supreme Court found in Brown vs. School Board in 1954.

In South Africa, no separate-but-equal solution will work because it can not meet the inevitable demand of blacks for political power in the country where their labor has turned resources into wealth for whites. Africans do not need Americans to tell them where South Africa’s fabulous mineral storehouses are nor where the industries are that make South Africa the most developed country in Africa as well as the one with the grossest inequities in incomes. They are in the white areas. More than half of the African population lives in these areas, where they are considered to be “urban Bantu” with no value other than their labor and where most cannot live with their families.

Mr. Ball’s plea for sympathetic treatment of South Africa’s racist regime parallels one he made for the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal. In the Kennedy era Ball argued that the U.S. ought to be understanding, if tough, towards that government rather than strike a self-righteous pose about the Portuguese colonial wars in Africa. He argued then that the U.S. should give Portugal aid, and time to work on reforms.

The Case for Disengagement

Disengagement is an act of moral responsibility because it weakens the strength of the oppressive society which U.S. economic institutions have helped to build.

South Africa’s growth in the last hundred years into the most industrialized, prosperous and powerful economy in Africa has been financed by outsiders. British, American, German, French and other corporations have poured foreign capital into mining and then industry. U.S. direct investments stand at $1.6 billion in book value; loans at more than $2 billion. Foreign oil provides indispensable fuel for South Africa’s vehicles, planes, plants and mines. Foreign technology has brought South Africa to the brink of the nuclear club by giving her a new process for enriching uranium. Foreign banks and government credit institutions have enabled South Africa to purchase the sophisticated aircraft, computers, heavy transportation and mining equipment that it does not produce for itself.

Far from being foreign interference, economic disengagement is only a necessary first step in ending U.S. collaboration in the growth of apartheid.

Disengagement is an act of solidarity with the oppressed. It is an act of peaceful economic pressure which more and more South Africans are crying out for, even though to do so is an act of terrorism under South African law. Here are some examples:

"RESOLUTION. 1) to reject the involvement of foreign investors in this exploitative economic system . . ."
-- Black People’s Convention, 1972

"The ANC has long called for the ending of all foreign capital investment in South Africa."
-- Oliver Tambo, Acting President General of the African National Congress

"Many black organizations have opposed foreign investment in South Africa, and this would be the opinion of the majority of South African blacks if their voices could be heard."
-- The Christian Institute, 1976

Chief Albert Luthuli, President of the African National Congress, put it this way many years ago:

"The economic boycott of South Africa will entail un­
doubted hardship for Africans. We do not doubt that. But if it is a method which shortens the day of blood, the suf-
fearing to us will be a price we are willing to pay. In any case, we suffer already, our children are often undernourished, and, on a small scale (so far) we die at the whim of a policeman.”

Disengagement would put some consistency into American advocacy of non-violence. There is an inherent contradiction between urging black South Africans to use their economic leverage to boycott South African businesses, as Andy Young has done, and the U.S. failure to use its enormous economic leverage. Withholding American and western resources is potentially a greater lever than withholding the relatively insignificant buying power of people close to starvation. The issue, therefore, is a question of political will.

Disengagement may be the price of admission to black African markets in the future. Nigerian head of state Olusegun Obasanjo warned President Carter at the White House on October 11 that the United States must end arms shipments to and investment in South Africa. In spite of the potential for strengthened economic ties between Nigeria and the United States, Nigeria has threatened to exclude corporations that do business with South Africa.

Pressure, not dialogue, brings change. Of course, disengagement is not decisive pressure for majority rule, as it has not been in Rhodesia. But it does add acceptable, peaceful pressure to the struggles carrying on within and without South Africa by the peoples themselves. There can be no easy victories in such a contest where the ruling powers of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party are determined, ruthless and uncompromising.

It is true that South Africa could hold out for a fairly long time if it cut relations with the west and withdrew into its own “laager” (a reference to the circle of wagon trains South African pioneers used for self-defense.) It has built up reserves of oil and its own arms and nuclear industry thanks to western technology and capital. But this is not a proper argument against economic pressure. On the contrary, history shows that pressure rather than friendly persuasion has yielded results:

- Because of the victory of MPLA in Angola, the West has warned South Africa that it cannot count on continued western vetoes in the Security Council on Namibia unless it moves to create an internationally acceptable path to independence there. By creating united pressure on South Africa, the West has succeeded in getting some concessions: abandonment of the Turnhalle puppet government, an agreement for elections, some agreement on U.N. supervision.

- Because of international sports boycotts, South Africa has been forced to sanction mixed teams in international competition.

- The uprisings which have taken place in Soweto have shaken the foundation of South Africa. In their wake we are seeing not only repression but far more demands for change than ever before.

Carter’s Other Problem: Talk about Disengagement is not Enough

The Carter Administration is now face to face with a credibility problem.

In early March it told the press it was thinking about certain “options” if South Africa did not begin to move toward majority rule: removal of military attaches, ending of intelligence exchanges, denial of tax credits for taxes paid by American investors to South Africa, denial of visas to certain South Africans, and curtailing of Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees.

Since the Vorster-Mondale meeting in May, none of these disengagement options have been implemented.

One of the alleged reasons for the delay has been the need to get South African co-operation for negotiated settlements in Namibia and Zimbabwe. But it is hard to disagree with Black Caucus’ Chairman Parren Mitchell that such excuses amount to game-playing. In spite of African criticism of the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia because it failed to provide a lever to get rid of Smith, the American government has not agreed to support oil sanctions against South Africa so long as it supplies oil to Rhodesia, or even to clamp down on U.S. multinationals which deal with Rhodesia through South African subsidiaries. Progress on Namibia to date has been the result of a mounting struggle, and not because the West has been “sweetly reasonable.” If South Africa does not agree to withdraw its troops from Namibia, the West will simply have to accept that some form of sanctions against South Africa is necessary, at least to resolve the Namibia issue.

On nuclear questions, the United States has been leaning toward continued collaboration with South Africa. South Africa’s continued refusal to place all its nuclear facilities under international inspection or to make unequivocal guarantees or promises not to produce nuclear weapons have so far not moved the Administration to end nuclear co-operation.

Because of the economic slump in South Africa and the internal political challenges to the apartheid system, American direct investments and loans to South Africa have slowed, and Export-Import Bank exposure in South Africa is down to around $200 million. This situation has led to a slowdown after Sharpeville also, and was then followed by a massive inflow of capital in the 1964-74 boom. It could happen again. But American pronouncements since May have talked about the constructive role that American businesses can play in South Africa and not about the role that investment plays in strengthening apartheid.

While the United States has a unilateral arms embargo against South Africa, it has refused so far to support a mandatory U.N. embargo that would have teeth. “Dual purpose” aircraft and “non-military” weapons continue to go to South Africa. Military equipment made in Europe under American license seems to end up there. A prohibition on sales of

Private capital flows into and out of South Africa, 1946-74, illustrate the size and importance of foreign investment.
police and riot equipment is the only step to tighten the embargo that the Carter Administration is known to have taken.

In view of this record, it is clear that the United States is still doing the two-step with the Tar Baby. Vorster can be pardoned for thinking that U.S. “meddling” is just talk. It’s high time therefore that we show that the American public is outraged by Vorster’s fascist challenge. There needs to be massive public support of the demands of the Black Caucus and progressive Congresspersons that the Administration take immediate steps to:

- End all tax credits for U.S. corporations that invest in South Africa. Develop strong tax disincentives to reduce investment;
- Eliminate Export-Import guarantees of loans for U.S. exports to South Africa;
- End nuclear co-operation in technology, research and supplies of nuclear materials.

These are really a bare minimum. Without these moves, the United States is going to lose whatever semblance of credibility it has created for itself by voicing support for democratic rights in South Africa.

---

The Road to Zimbabwe:
The Anglo-American Line


What is the real story behind these headlines? What are the main provisions of the Anglo-American proposals, and how do they differ from the Kissinger “solution” of 1976? Why are the parties reacting differently today? What, in short, should we expect to come of the new proposal?

New Elements in the Transition

The new Anglo-American proposal gives complete authority to a British Resident Commissioner, where the Kissinger plan left control during the transition period squarely in the hands of the minority Rhodesian Front. The Patriotic Front and the Front-Line states (Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola) had clearly rejected white Rhodesian control of the army and the police, and veto power over the drafting of the independence constitution. The growing military success of the nationalist forces, and the threats of increased isolation of the Smith regime by South Africa, meant that some other political forces would have to replace Ian Smith’s minority party during the transition. So instead, the entire transition plan is couched in terms of a “return to legality” of British colonial rule, and the granting of powers to a Resident Commissioner which, Mozambican President Machel told the United Nations, are more concentrated than “during the whole colonial period.” The U.S. and Great Britain intend that a British Commissioner be a neutral force between contending parties, but the Patriotic Front maintains that a colonial administrator cannot be neutral (see excerpts of Patriotic Front statement on page 5). His “absolute” powers—over police, the judicial system, the entire civil service and the new election process—and the continuity of Rhodesian Front appointees in all these positions, may be a bone of contention in the new plan instead of an acceptable compromise.

But two other aspects of the transition plan are even more troublesome. Like the old Kissinger plan, the new Carter/Callaghan proposal doesn’t explain how Smith will be convinced to surrender power and step down as Prime Minister if he doesn’t do so voluntarily. The proposal simply states: “The two governments will take such steps as seem to them appropriate to secure the transfer of power by Mr. Smith . . . on a day to be agreed.” As President Machel pointed out in his October 3rd statement to the U.N., “The sincerity and effectiveness of the present proposals depend to a large extent on the determination and ability of the United Kingdom and the United States to remove Ian Smith from the political scene forthwith.”

Another basic stumbling block has received wider attention: the composition of a new army in Zimbabwe. On this point, too, the proposal is notably vague. It states that the Resident Commissioner will become the Commander-in-Chief of “all armed forces which may be lawfully operating” during the transition. He will also oversee the formation of a new Zimbabwe National Army which will in due course replace all existing armed forces and which will become the army of an independent state.

British Foreign Secretary David Owen said September 1st that the “liberation army” would form the basis of the new national army, along with acceptable elements of Smith’s 60,000-man force. But this provision doesn’t appear anywhere in writing. Smith, of course, wants the situation reversed, so that his army would continue after independence along with “suitably screened” guerrillas.

New Plan for Universal Suffrage

There is one significant difference in the Anglo-American plan for independence, without which no new proposal could have gotten off the ground: election of a President and Parliament by one-person, one-vote. Henry Kissinger was credited with a major breakthrough last year when Ian Smith said he would “support majority rule” in two years’ time. But people who had watched Rhodesian politics over the years knew even then that Smith’s acceptance of majority rule “provided that it is responsible rule” was just a well-worn euphemism for continued white control. More recently, when asked in a British television interview September 25th of this year whether he would now consider one-man, one-vote, Smith answered, “Yes, with the provision that I would like to know what the alternative ideas are for preserving the kind of standards that I have referred to.”
Excerpts from Patriotic Front Statement on Anglo-American Plan

"Despite the acceptance of [certain] principles by Britain, the genuine independence we are fighting to achieve is still as distant as ever, for the power structure of the transitional period negates the whole process . . . The premise that the Rhodesian problem is being solved in the context of a return from 'illegality to legality' is a completely wrong and irrelevant approach . . . The people of Zimbabwe have reached this point on the basis of their own strength and must rely on the power of their own liberation forces to cross them to free and fair democratic elections and independence."

**On Resident Commissioner**: "Whilst we believe that a Resident Commissioner is inevitable for the process of decolonization, we cannot, however, agree to his assumption of absolute colonial Powers . . . The installation of a Resident Commissioner does not introduce neutrality."

**On Retaining Civil Servants**: "By what faith can an election booth be regarded as 'democratic, free and impartial' if it is surrounded at its four corners by Smith's henchmen; his policeman, his soldier, his district Commissioner, and his judge, supervised by a British colonial officer, all of whom combined yesterday in hanging hundreds of freedom fighters."

**On U.N. Peacekeeping Force**: "How can a United Nations committed to the policy of decolonization in support of the liberation struggle be called upon to stand between advancing liberation forces and colonial forces with a view of assisting the colonial Power? . . . Under the proposals the United Nations representative has neither power nor discretion nor independent terms save to act in support of the colonial civil power at the instance of the British Resident Commissioner."

**On New Army**: "The Resident Commissioner cannot build an army more loyal to Zimbabwe than the patriotic army born out of struggle. The people of Zimbabwe know that their independence shall come about and be defended by their sons and daughters who have sacrificed lives and sweated blood fighting in the ranks of the patriotic liberation forces. Therefore there can be no new army for an independent Zimbabwe . . . It is only fair for us to be categorical on the question of the armed forces of the Rhodesian regime. They must be dismantled in toto. This includes the police."

**On Role of Patriotic Front**: "The only guarantee of the definite advent of genuine independence for Zimbabwe is the direct involvement of the patriotic liberation forces in all organs and functions of the transitional structures."

**Conclusion**: "The problem in Zimbabwe is not the election of a 'President' but: (i) the destruction of colonialism and its institutions; (ii) the attainment of genuine independence; (iii) the democratization not only of the vote but of all institutions and the way of life in Zimbabwe . . . It is up to the British Government to make the necessary improvements to its 'Proposals' to expedite a guaranteed transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe."

September 12, 1977

(signed) Joshua M. Nkomo
(signed) Robert Mugabe

Co-Leaders, Patriotic Front
While Smith negotiates, his propaganda war continues.

poorest farmers was being used to pay back wealthy white landowners.

4. Guarantees that people may take their wealth out of the country could actually encourage whites to stay, by providing them with a sense of financial safety. The draft Constitution provides for the free remittance abroad of pensions and payments for land and other property. In addition, the multilateral Zimbabwe Development Fund (described more fully below) is meant to "provide support for, and take into account the balance of payments implications of," unspecified programs that encourage white skilled workers and managers to stay. Such programs could include retaining large salary differentials for skilled whites, plus providing that salaries be paid in foreign currency or into foreign bank accounts.

5. Probably the most important single factor in encouraging whites to stay is broad assurances of a continued capitalist economy with as little interruption or change as possible, since it is that economic system which has given them their privileges. The $1.5 billion Zimbabwe Development Fund is intended to be an economic "carrot" that will encourage nationalists to accept the Constitutional guarantees of white privilege mentioned above. It will also provide programs specifically designed to strengthen capitalism in Zimbabwe and open it up to outside investors. An Annex on the Fund that accompanies the Anglo-American Proposal assumes that Zimbabwe will need substantial amounts of foreign private investment and trade. "Efforts [of the Fund] should encourage commercial capital flows, especially in extractive, processing and manufacturing industries, supported as appropriate by national export credit and investment insurance agencies."

In Third World countries, private corporations often increase their investment as public aid expands or stabilizes the economy to suit the foreign investors' needs. This is exactly the kind of framework the Zimbabwe Development Fund provides. The Fund will be available only to a government which accepts the Anglo-American plan and comes into power under its conditions. Then, disbursements from the Fund will probably be controlled directly by the Americans and the British, since their 55 percent combined contribution will presumably give them commensurate voting power on the Fund's board (if, as has been suggested, the World Bank is used as a model).

Why is the Plan Still on Track?

The main thing the Anglo-American plan has going for it is that neither side wishes to be the party which dashed hopes of a prompt settlement, delayed independence or promised a longer guerrilla war. The Patriotic Front is under intense pressure from the Front-Line states to take these proposals seriously, if they might provide a basis for the end of the war that has spilled into Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, and that has dislocated the economy of the region. The Carter Administration has already been very effective in convincing Tanzania and Nigeria to give the new Administration and its new plan the benefit of the doubt.

To take advantage of the desire of all the parties to be seen as co-operative, the Anglo-American proposals were carefully designed to be implemented, at the beginning at least, in small steps. As Andy Young explained to the Diggs Africa Subcommittee in early September, "Everyone agreed with just enough of the plan to keep it going . . . We didn't ask anybody to buy into the whole package at this point." So far this has worked; the Security Council approved U.N. Secretary General's appointment of Lieut. Gen. Prem Chand of India (who served with U.N. peace-keeping forces in the Congo and Cyprus) to try with British Resident Commissioner-designate Lord Carver to negotiate a ceasefire. But this first step is by far the easiest one.

Both the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Front regime have now said that they won't go the next step until the whole package is decided on. They are not prepared to agree to a ceasefire by itself, without agreement on all aspects of the transition and independence.

Now that the plan has reached this difficult point, a lot of politicking is going on in secret. "Anything is possible now," Washington Post correspondent David Ottaway reported a western diplomat as saying, after the Rhodesians announced that Smith held a secret all-day meeting with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda September 25. Speculation throughout the Front-Line area has it that the meeting involved an effort to promote Nkomo as the first leader of Zimbabwe. Ottaway reported that "the secretive comings and goings of a . . . jet belonging to [Lonrho President] Tiny Rowlands" which ferried Smith to Zambia for the meeting seem to be "just the tip of the hidden diplomacy around the British-American settlement plan."

Trying from the outside to predict what will come of the Anglo-American proposal would be somewhat foolhardy. No matter what initiatives emanate from the West or what diplomacy goes on in the Front-Line states, what happens in Zim-
babwe will be ultimately determined by its own people, who have been struggling for decades for independence and self-determination.

Newsbriefs

Congress Appropriates Southern African Aid

Congress has been embroiled in a four-month controversy over aid to Mozambique and Angola, aid neither the Carter Administration nor the Congress ever actually intended to offer.

In June, the House passed an amendment proposed by Phil Crane (R-Ill.) prohibiting all “direct and indirect” aid to Mozambique and Angola. The amendment, styled after an earlier one against aid to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as well as Cuba and Uganda, meant that U.S. contributions to international banks and United Nations agencies could not be used for programs in these countries. World Bank President Robert McNamara said the Bank could not accept such restricted contributions.

So President Carter came up with a “compromise”: he will direct U.S. representatives to international financial institutions (although apparently not to U.N. agencies) to “oppose and vote against” all loans in the next year to all seven countries mentioned by the House, and the House will recede from its prohibition on “indirect” aid.

For us this amounts to a defeat, not a compromise. The same conservatives who have consistently supported South Africa and Rhodesia have now succeeded in labelling Mozambique and Angola as human rights violators ineligible for aid, without any hearing procedure or any documented evidence whatsoever. By a vote of 189 to 219 on October 18, the House insisted on striking Senate language allowing aid to the two countries if the President and Congress agree that such aid would be in the U.S. interest. The right wing will surely be ready for another fight over the FY 1979 foreign aid bill in the spring, since Carter’s directive to oppose loans lasts only through FY ’78.

Here is where FY ’78 Security Supporting Assistance is going in southern Africa. The figures listed are maximum amounts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>$18.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The very preliminary AID break-down of how the “Regional” money will be spent includes $4 million for training southern African students, $2.5 million for training nationals from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, $800,000 for a refugee examination post in Botswana, and $7 million for refugee relief and rehabilitation and AID studies.

AID has already begun a $1 million study of development needs of southern Africa mandated by Congress. AID Assistant Administrator for Africa Goler Butcher is keeping close watch over the study, which Congress wants completed by January. AID is trying to avoid the political difficulties of the study done last fall by the African American Scholars Council, and is therefore assiduously consulting with American “Africanists” and southern Africans here and in Africa before proceeding further.

West Claims Progress Toward Namibian Settlement

While the Vorster government was cracking down on internal dissent in South Africa, the five western members of the U.N. Security Council claimed to be seeing light at the end of the tunnel in Namibia. The focus of discussion has now been narrowed down to two major questions:

1. Withdrawal of South African forces. South Africa has offered a new version of phased withdrawal. If, during November and December, a visibly peaceful situation has been achieved, South Africa would reduce its troops to 12,000 by December 31, to 8,000 by January 21 and to 4,000 by February 15. These last remaining forces would be gathered at a camp in Ovamboland, deployed at several bases along the frontier, and engaged in maintenance, logistics and communications tasks elsewhere. They would stay until a new Namibian government is formed. South Africa is reported to want U.N. forces of not more than 4,000 armed with side arms only, a force considerably short of what U.N. contingency plans require.

SWAPO continues to insist on total withdrawal of South African forces as a precondition to the electoral process, since troops stationed along the border could materially affect the ability of SWAPO to enter Namibia freely in order to participate in the political process.

Besides the South African army itself, there are a number of military elements which could create considerable pressure, manipulation and intimidation. UNITA is reported to

NEW RESOURCES ON AFRICA


“Stop Banking on Racism in South Africa,” leaflet on national campaign to stop bank loans. From American Committee on Africa (see address above). Also, slide show, “Banking on South Africa,” available for $53 (slides) or $17 (filmstrip). From Packard Manse Media Project, P.O. Box 450, Stoughton, MA 02072.
have a considerable number of its forces in Namibia. South Africa also has created at least three native battalions now operating in border areas and is actively recruiting among the Damaras, Namas, Coloureds and others in order to put in place a new Namibian army. White “Southwesters” have their own Defense Force. Without an adequate U.N. military presence these groups could exercise considerable, if not decisive, power.

2. Timetable for elections. South Africa insists on elections by March 31, 1978 in order to assist the existing political organizations which took part in the Turnhalle constitutional talks. SWAPO takes the position that adequate time must be given to insure that the United Nations can adequately prepare for, control and supervise the election process.

Meanwhile, South Africa has taken steps to lock an independent Namibia into the South African economy. On September 1, the State President proclaimed Walvis Bay to be an integral part of South Africa, including a fishing zone 12 to 200 miles out from shore, which probably contains important oil and gas fields which have been drilled but not developed. By holding Walvis Bay, the only deep water port in Namibia, the South Africans will have a hand on the trade of Namibia, which now depends on South Africa for 90 percent of its imports. Without control of the port, Namibia would be a hostage state like Botswana.

While prospects for a settlement are bright in the long run, further negotiations are probably off at least until after the November 30 elections in South Africa, and until the question of sanctions against South Africa itself is resolved at the United Nations.

U.S. Watches South African Nuclear Developments

The Administration is closely monitoring South Africa’s ability and intent to explode a nuclear device. After Soviet and American satellites spotted a testing site in the Kalahari desert in August, President Carter said he had received assurances that South Africa does not “intend to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose ... now or in the future.” But a month later, an Administration official “who is in a position to read all U.S. intelligence reports filed on the subject” told a Los Angeles Times reporter that South Africa has not dismantled its testing facility, and that it “could explode a bomb any time it wished.” Now, according to Africa News, the Administration wants to send an inspection team to examine South Africa’s nuclear facilities, and especially the Kalahari site.

Although South Africa has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Administration seems to be moving cautiously in deciding how to press South Africa to refrain from exploding a bomb. Carter’s carefully-worded August press statement encouraged South Africa to place its “nuclear power production capabilities” under international safeguards, a demand less stringent than signing the NPT. His statement didn’t deal with South Africa’s pilot enrichment plant, where South Africa can probably produce weapons-grade uranium for a bomb. In addition, the State Department still hasn’t formulated its position on whether to sell South Africa 26 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium for the pilot plant, although an application has been pending for more than two years.

Congress Reacts to Crackdown

The harsh crackdown in South Africa has galvanized liberals in Congress to begin to call for American disengagement from South Africa. On October 19th, the day of the massive bannings and arrests, five House members told State Department officials that the U.S. must “disentangle” itself from the Vorster regime. They represent a new coalition consisting of members of the Congressional Black Caucus and a small group of relatively junior white Democrats who first became activated on South Africa in response to the death in prison of black consciousness leader Steve Biko.

Reps. Andrew Maquire (D-N.J.), Thomas Downey (D-N.J.), and Edward Markey (D-Mass.) collected signatures of 128 of their House colleagues on a letter to South African Ambassador Sole expressing concern about Biko’s death. Twenty-nine members have also formed an “ad hoc monitoring group” to follow cases of individual South African political prisoners.

For the most part, Congressional reaction to Biko’s death was limited to outcries about South Africa’s treatment of Biko and other political prisoners, with hardly a mention of U.S. policy. But the October crackdown changed the political climate. The Black Caucus published a 12-point plan urging concrete policy changes including the following: an end to nuclear co-operation, tax credits for investment and Export-Import Bank guarantees of commercial loans for exports, and a tightening of the arms embargo. According to Caucus Chairman Parren Mitchell: “As far as the Caucus is concerned, the battle lines have been drawn.” The group of white House Democrats has also supported most of these specific actions. Senator Clark, chairman of the Senate Africa Subcommittee, has been more cautious, partly because he anticipates a filibuster of virtually any bill on South Africa. Almost a week after the crackdown, he called for an end to Ex-Im programs, a mandatory arms embargo and discouragement of future loans and investments.

To send a quick signal to South Africa at the end of this session of Congress, the House coalition proposed a broad resolution which calls on the President to take “effective measures ... to register deep concern ... about the continued violations of human rights” in South Africa. The resolution will be considered under a suspension of the rules, and therefore requires a two-thirds majority to pass.

The sponsors of the resolution see it as a first step toward specific legislation next year on concrete policy issues. How such bills will fare depends on continued public visibility of South Africa’s repression and public support in the United States for disengagement.

Washington Office on Africa
110 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-7961

Subscription rates: We request a $5 contribution for an annual subscription to Washington Notes on Africa and Africa Action bulletins on Congressional action. Additional copies of this issue are available for: 25¢ each for 1-10; 20¢ each for 11-50; 15¢ each for over 50 copies (plus postage).

Produced by: Ted Lockwood and Christine Root